

ENTRETIENS SUR L'ANTIQUITÉ CLASSIQUE

Publiés par Olivier Reverdin

TOME XXII

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# ALEXANDRE LE GRAND

*IMAGE ET RÉALITÉ*

SEPT EXPOSÉS SUIVIS DE DISCUSSIONS

PAR

A. B. BOSWORTH, FRITZ SCHACHERMEYR,

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ERKINGER SCHWARZENBERG, E. BADIAN

Avec la participation de  
Denis van Berchem, Herbert A. Cahn,  
José Dörig, Niklaus Dürr, Adalberto Giovannini,  
André Hurst et Walter Spoerri

Entretiens préparés par E. Badian,  
présidés par Denis van Berchem

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FONDATION HARDT

POUR L'ÉTUDE DE L'ANTIQUITÉ CLASSIQUE

VANDOEUVRES - GENÈVE

L'expédition d'Alexandre a fondamentalement transformé les relations entre Grecs et Barbares. Elle a provoqué une véritable mutation du monde antique. La chose est évidente. En revanche, les mobiles d'Alexandre sont difficiles à pénétrer. Son personnage apparaît ; sa personnalité véritable demeure mystérieuse. La deviner, la connaître même, dans la mesure du possible, aide à mieux interpréter son action et les conséquences de celle-ci.

C'est à une confrontation systématique entre l'image d'Alexandre, telle que nous l'ont transmise les textes littéraires et les arts plastiques, et la réalité d'Alexandre, telle que l'analyse des faits et des témoignages permet de la reconstruire, que la Fondation Hardt a consacré ses XXII<sup>es</sup> Entretiens, préparés par le professeur E. Badian (Harvard) et présidés par le professeur Denis van Berchem (Genève).

Dans cette perspective, le professeur A. B. Bosworth (Nedlands, Australie) a soumis les textes littéraires à une analyse renouvelée. Le comportement d'Alexandre à l'égard des Macédoniens, des Grecs, des Perses et des peuples barbares éclaire quelque peu les mobiles profonds de son action, comme l'a démontré le professeur Fritz Schachermeyr (Vienne). Une meilleure connaissance de l'instrument de la conquête, la phalange macédonienne, dont le professeur R. D. Milns (Brisbane) a analysé les structures, peut y contribuer aussi.

Quelle image ses contemporains et les premières générations de l'époque hellénistique se sont-ils faite du conquérant ? Comment cette image a-t-elle été adaptée, sous Auguste, aux nécessités politiques de l'Empire romain naissant ? Les professeurs R. M. Errington (Marburg) et Gerhard Wirth (Erlangen) proposent leurs réponses à ces questions. Quant au Dr Erkinger Schwarzenberg (Vienne), il s'est efforcé de retrouver les traits véritables d'Alexandre derrière les portraits que les sculpteurs, les peintres et les graveurs nous ont laissés.

Chaque période a vu Alexandre à travers le prisme déformant de ses conceptions ou de ses passions politiques, de sa sensibilité et de ses préoccupations propres. Le professeur E. Badian l'a montré de manière saisissante pour les XIX<sup>e</sup> et XX<sup>e</sup> siècles.

Ces sept exposés ont été suivis de discussions animées, auxquelles ont également pris part les professeurs van Berchem, Hurst, Giovannini, Dörig et M. N. Dürr (Genève), les professeurs Spoerri (Neuchâtel) et Cahn (Bâle). Exposés et discussions forment la matière du présent volume.





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*ENTRETIENS*  
*Tome XXII*

ALEXANDRE LE GRAND  
*IMAGE ET RÉALITÉ*







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## P R É F A C E

*Les professeurs E. Badian (Harvard) et W. den Boer (Leyde) ont proposé à la Fondation Hardt de consacrer ses XXIIes Entretiens à Alexandre le Grand. Ils ont fait valoir que d'importants travaux, publiés récemment, avaient suffisamment renouvelé le sujet pour qu'il se justifât de faire le point. Le Comité scientifique accueillit avec enthousiasme leur proposition; il chargea le professeur E. Badian de préparer les Entretiens et le professeur Denis van Berchem (Genève) de les présider.*

*Alexandre a provoqué dans le monde antique une mutation. Son expédition a fondamentalement transformé les relations entre Grecs et Barbares. La chose est évidente. En revanche, les mobiles d'Alexandre restent difficiles à pénétrer. Son personnage apparaît; sa personnalité profonde demeure mystérieuse. La deviner, mieux, la connaître (pour autant qu'on le puisse) permet de mieux interpréter son action.*

*Pour découvrir, sous l'image que l'Antiquité nous en a transmise, la réalité d'Alexandre, il faut commencer par examiner à nouveau, dans cette perspective, les grandes sources littéraires sur lesquelles se fonde l'essentiel de notre information: Arrien d'une part; de l'autre la « vulgate », représentée notamment par Diodore, Quinte-Curce et Trogue Pompée/Justin. Le professeur A. B. Bosworth (University of Western Australia, Nedlands) s'est chargé de cette tâche.*

*La personnalité d'Alexandre transparaît dans son comportement à l'égard des Macédoniens, paysans entraînés par lui dans la plus extraordinaire des aventures; à l'égard des Grecs, dont il affectait d'être le vengeur, le bienfaiteur et, en Asie, le libérateur; à l'égard des Barbares, que force lui était bien de se concilier après les avoir soit vaincus, soit affranchis du joug perse. Le professeur Fritz Schachermeyr, doyen des historiens contemporains d'Alexandre, a traité ce sujet complexe.*

*L'instrument de la conquête, c'est l'armée macédonienne. Robert D. Milns (University of Queensland, Brisbane) a développé des vues inédites sur le recrutement et l'organisation de la phalange macédonienne.*

*L'époque hellénistique, en ses débuts, a vécu dans le souvenir immédiat du héros; mais, bien vite, un portrait intellectuel et moral s'est imposé, qui n'empruntait à la réalité qu'une partie de ses traits. Cela s'est*

déjà produit en un temps où de nombreux compagnons, témoins directs des campagnes d'Asie, vivaient encore, comme le montre le professeur R. M. Errington (Marburg). A Rome, dès Auguste, Alexandre a été considéré par d'aucuns comme le prototype du souverain dont l'Empire se confond avec le monde civilisé. D'où un regain d'intérêt pour sa personnalité, qu'analyse et interprète le professeur Gerhard Wirth (Erlangen).

Ce n'est pas seulement dans les textes littéraires qu'il convient de chercher les traits véritables et l'image idéalisée d'Alexandre, mais aussi dans les arts plastiques. C'est ce qu'a fait, avec beaucoup de sensibilité, le Dr Erkinger Schwarzenberg (Vienne).

Le programme initial prévoyait également un exposé de M. Georges Le Rider (Paris) sur le monnayage d'Alexandre, dont il a renouvelé l'étude ces dernières années. Les circonstances l'ayant obligé de se dédire au dernier moment, les professeurs Herbert Cahn (Bâle et Heidelberg), Adalberto Giovannini (Genève) et M. Niklaus Dürr (Genève) ont supplié à sa défaillance en traitant le sujet au cours des discussions. Ils ont notamment posé la question de savoir dans quelle mesure et à partir de quand la tête d'Héraclès, sur les tétradrachmes, a reçu les traits d'Alexandre, et ils se sont interrogés sur les raisons de la fidélité d'une partie du monde hellénistique au monnayage à l'effigie du souverain.

Il restait au professeur Badian la mission de conclure les Entretiens. Il le fit en analysant, avec une subtile perspicacité, l'œuvre des historiens modernes d'Alexandre, à partir de Droysen. Chaque génération a vu le Macédonien à travers le prisme de ses sentiments (à l'époque romantique) ou de ses options politiques!

Les sept exposés et les discussions qui les ont suivis, discussions auxquelles ont également participé les professeurs José Dörig (Genève), André Hurst (Genève) et Walter Spoerri (Neuchâtel), forment la matière du présent volume, dont M. Bernard Grange a établi les index et surveillé avec un soin minutieux l'impression.

Le Fonds national suisse de la recherche scientifique a pris à sa charge les frais de voyage et de séjour des participants, ainsi que ceux qu'a entraînés la mise au point des manuscrits en vue de leur impression, aux frais de laquelle deux entreprises genevoises, Montres Rolex S.A. et Sodeco Saia S.A., ont contribué. La Fondation Hardt leur en exprime ici sa vive reconnaissance.

Olivier REVERDIN.

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## I

A. B. BOSWORTH

ARRIAN AND THE  
ALEXANDER VULGATE

The image of Alexander the Great which is most familiar to modern readers is that presented in the *Anabasis Alexandri* of L. Flavius Arrianus. This account of the Macedonian king has for centuries been regarded as the most authoritative, and it is used as the narrative spine of most modern histories. There is, however, another major source for Alexander's reign, the source used in the seventeenth book of Diodorus Siculus and in long passages of Curtius Rufus. It is detectable elsewhere, notably in Justin's *Epitome* of Pompeius Trogus. This source, often termed the "vulgata"<sup>1</sup>, gives an account of Alexander's reign which differs radically from the tradition in Arrian, both in outline and in factual detail. The vulgate accordingly tends to be accepted in so far as it supplements the central core of Arrian's narrative and discarded where there is a contradiction. There has been little attempt to assess the two traditions in detail and isolate their respective merits and

<sup>1</sup> For bibliography see J. SEIBERT, *Alexander der Grosse* (Darmstadt 1972), 26-8. The authorship of the vulgate is still controversial, but apart from Sir W. W. Tarn, no one has seriously doubted the existence of a common source for Diodorus and Curtius. Ed. SCHWARTZ, in *RE* IV 2, 1873-4, gives an impressive, but far from exhaustive, list of parallel passages.

defects. Yet such an assessment of the sources is a necessity, if we are to progress from the image of Alexander to any historical reality. Above all we must consider seriously whether Arrian deserves the preeminence he is usually assigned.

The *Anabasis Alexandri* was established as the palmary history of Alexander at a very early date. In 1775 the Baron de Sainte-Croix stated with admirable conciseness that the work should be considered not merely the supreme history of Alexander but the sole reliable source for his reign<sup>1</sup>. Indeed Arrian's preeminence, he thought, could not be challenged "without equal harm to the laws of sound criticism and of equity". As yet the discussion was confined to the extant authors and their literary qualities. Sainte-Croix recognised that Diodorus and Curtius Rufus drew upon a common source for the reign of Alexander, and he went so far as to identify that source as Cleitarchus of Alexandria. He did not, however, try to reconstruct the outlines of the lost work or assess the veracity of the common tradition of Curtius and Diodorus. Instead he concentrated on the extant authors. Arrian attracted him by his clarity of style, his citation of sources, and his apparent general accuracy. On the other hand he was clearly appalled by the haphazard nature of Curtius' narrative. The famous dictum, *plura transcribo quam credo* (IX 1, 34), is held to typify Curtius' entire approach to history, and his work is dismissed as an artificial collage of anecdotes, selected for their sensational value and strung together to produce the maximum rhetorical effect. Whether or not this sharp contrast is justified must be considered later. For the moment it is perhaps sufficient to emphasise that the veracity of a historical statement has nothing to do with its literary presentation. A blatant lie can be presented, and is perhaps best presented, as a sober factual statement, whereas unimpeachable historical facts can form the

<sup>1</sup> G. de SAINTE-CROIX, *Examen critique des anciens historiens d'Alexandre le Grand* (Paris 1775; 2nd ed. 1810), 22 ff., 35 ff.

framework of the most elaborate epideictic rhetoric. The only cogent point, if true, in this early literary approach is the assumption that Arrian both chose better sources and was more critical in his approach to them.

Nineteenth century criticism by contrast concentrated on the lost primary histories of Alexander<sup>1</sup>, and discussion focussed remorselessly on one of the favourite chimeras of scholarship, the search for an infallible criterion of historical fact. Arrian's style was once more the foundation of the criticism. His narrative contains a series of reports of promotions, receptions of embassies, arrival of reinforcements, despatch of garrison troops and the like, which read as though they were extracted from some archival source. The narrative, it has been said, has the characteristics of a diary ("einen tagebuchartigen Charakter"). J. G. Droysen had inferred that much of Arrian went back through his primary source, Ptolemy, to two court journals kept by Alexander's chief secretary, Eumenes of Cardia, for the purpose of keeping satraps and generals in touch with events at court<sup>2</sup>. The theory was refined in a famous article by Ulrich Wilcken, in which he pointed out the similarity between the ὑπομνηματισμοί of Roman Egypt, which described in detail the daily movements of the στρατηγός, and the ἐφημερίδες which Arrian and Plutarch use for their descriptions of the last days of Alexander. The ἐφημερίδες, U. Wilcken thought, were an official court journal dating back at least to the reign of Philip and providing a detailed day by day account of the king's words and actions. The journal was passed down first to Ptolemy and indirectly to Arrian, thus giving an un-

<sup>1</sup> B. G. NIEBUHR's damning indictment of G. de Sainte-Croix is typical of its period : « eine Arbeit, die für deutsche Philologie sehr ungenügend ist, und dafür so gut als nicht existierend betrachtet werden muss » (*Vorträge über alte Geschichte* II (1848), 423). Niebuhr, however, came dogmatically to the very same conclusion about Arrian : « in den Factis können wir uns sehr ruhig an Arrian halten ».

<sup>2</sup> J. G. DROYSEN, *Geschichte des Hellenismus* I<sup>2</sup> 2 (Gotha 1877), 383-6.

impeachable factual basis for the narrative of the *Anabasis*<sup>1</sup>. Once expounded, Wilcken's thesis achieved the status of holy writ, and it is at the basis of the analyses of Arrian conducted by H. Strasburger and E. Kornemann<sup>2</sup>. Both saw Arrian's work as an accretion round the central core of archival material, and Kornemann went so far as to reconstruct the original formulae of the ἐφημερίδες from the text of Arrian<sup>3</sup>. The result of this cumulative research was that the "reliable" Arrian was firmly enshrined at the head of the murky Pantheon of Alexander historians. He was not only the most lucid and the most critical. His sources were the best and had the ultimate sanction of the archives of Alexander himself. The general rule for modern scholarship was therefore glaringly obvious, and it is stated in its simplest and crudest form by Sir W. W. Tarn: "one's restoration must be based on Arrian and Arrian alone; it is as a rule useless trying to insert material of unknown value from Diodorus and Curtius" (*Alexander the Great* II (Cambridge 1948), 135).

The whole purpose of this paper is to show that the traditional argument for the supremacy of Arrian is a delusion, based upon a series of fallacies. The so-called journal need not detain us long. Recent work on the ἐφημερίδες actually published under the names of Eumenes of Cardia and Diodotus of Erythrae (*FGrH* 117) has, I think, shown that the document covered at most the last year of Alexander's life, and its con-

<sup>1</sup> U. WILCKEN, « ὑπομνηματισμοί », in *Philologus* 53 (1894), 84-126. The definitive statement is at p. 117 : « es sei mir erlaubt, in kurzen Zügen die Hypothese hinzustellen, dass die Ephemeriden Alexanders die Hauptquelle für die Memoiren des Königs Ptolemaios I gewesen sind, die wiederum den Grundstock der Anabasis Arrians bilden ».

<sup>2</sup> H. STRASBURGER, *Ptolemaios und Alexander* (Leipzig 1934), esp. p. 17; E. KORNEMANN, *Die Alexandergeschichte des Königs Ptolemaios I von Aegypten* (Leipzig 1935).

<sup>3</sup> See H. STRASBURGER's classic review (in *Gnomon* 13 (1937), 483-92); despite all his criticisms of Kornemann's method Strasburger still took as axiomatic the existence of « der aktenmässige Grundstock » for Arrian's work (p. 486).

tents were suspiciously slanted to emphasise Alexander's epic potations<sup>1</sup>. The material for the document may in fact have been extracted from court archives, but it was certainly not a coverage of Alexander's reign in all its aspects. In the second place, the supposed archival material is not unique to Arrian. There are similar reports of receptions of embassies, routine appointments, and arrivals of reinforcements in the common tradition of Curtius and Diodorus. These reports sometimes corroborate Arrian, but very often they add supplementary material. One need look no further than the accounts of Alexander's appointments in Babylon, where the tradition of Curtius and Diodorus has every detail mentioned by Arrian and adds that Agathon of Pydna was appointed citadel commander in place of the Persian Bagophanes (Diod. XVII 64, 5; Curt. V 1, 43-44; cf. Arr. III 16, 4)<sup>2</sup>. There are numerous other cases, particularly the appointments in Syria, where the vulgate tradition transmits details which supplement Arrian's account and are omitted by him. It has been thought that the vulgate tradition in these matters derives from Alexander's first historian, Callisthenes of Olynthus, who must have had first hand information about Alexander's official actions and pronouncements<sup>3</sup>. That may well be the case, but, if true, the theory demolishes the principle of Arrian's supreme authority in matters of fact. If Callisthenes' work was based on autopsy

<sup>1</sup> Cf. L. PEARSON, in *Historia* 3 (1954/5), 432-9; E. BADIAN, *Studies in Greek and Roman History* (1964), 256-8; A. E. SAMUEL, in *Historia* 14 (1965), 1-12; A. B. BOSWORTH, in *CQ* 21 (1971), 117-23. F. SCHACHERMEYR, however, regards these attacks as hypercritical (*Alexander der Grosse*<sup>2</sup> (Wien 1973), 149 n. 141).

<sup>2</sup> Compare the accounts of the arrangements at Susa, where Curtius has far fuller details about the garrison and adds that Callicrates was placed in charge of the treasury (Curt. V 2, 16-17; Arr. III 16, 9). In the same context note the far fuller information in the vulgate tradition about the reinforcements from Macedon led by Amyntas (Diod. XVII 65, 1; Curt. V 1, 40-42; Arr. III 16, 10).

<sup>3</sup> For the theory that Callisthenes' work formed the core of the vulgate tradition, a theory which goes back to J. G. DROYSSEN (I<sup>2</sup> 2, 389-90), see F. JACOBY, in *RE* X 2, 1705 (with earlier bibliography); in *RE* XI 1, 651; and, most recently, F. SCHACHERMEYR, *Alexander der Grosse*<sup>2</sup>, 152-3.

and he had first-hand access to official documents, then the official material was public knowledge, certainly not restricted to Ptolemy and Arrian. There is a further obvious objection. An official journal need not necessarily be an impeccable source. U. Wilcken supposed that Alexander's court journal, like that of Ptolemy Philadelphus, was emended and edited by the king himself. The temptation was always present to alter sensitive facts to give the best possible interpretation to posterity. Indeed Wilcken's explanation of Alexander's motives for keeping a journal is astoundingly reminiscent of Mr. Nixon and his famous tapes : "Alexander may have placed some value in having his actions fixed in a form determined by himself, and one could recall the commission of Callisthenes, to exalt his deeds in Greek eyes" <sup>1</sup>. The journal, then, may never have existed in a form uniquely accessible to Ptolemy, and, even if some of the tradition is archivally based, it is common to all sources and has no aura of infallibility.

We are forced back to Arrian himself, to his style and his use of sources. The first thing to notice is Arrian's deceptive simplicity of narrative. It has been a common and fatal assumption that Arrian's style is derivative from his sources. Wilcken, for instance, noticed that the diary-like style of Arrian began as early as the Danube campaign of 335 and assumed that the reason was that Ptolemy's narrative (and therefore Arrian's) was wholly derived from a court journal <sup>2</sup>, a theory which E. Kornemann later took to extreme lengths, denying Arrian any originality of style or composition. But Arrian's simplicity of style was not unique to the *Anabasis*. Photius' evidence about his diction comes at the end of his digest of the *History*

<sup>1</sup> U. WILCKEN, *art. cit.*, 116.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 119. The theory dies hard. N. G. L. HAMMOND has recently argued that Arrian's report of Alexander's Illyrian campaign is taken (at only one remove) from a day-to-day diary compiled "by Alexander either himself or through an amanuensis" (in *JHS* 94 (1974), 77-8).

of the *Successors*<sup>1</sup>, and the verdict is equally applicable to the *Anabasis*. The apparent lucidity and clarity, he claims, is a carefully managed effect, produced by the skilful arrangement of common words for maximum emphasis. The narrative is simple enough, with no striking innovations of vocabulary, but enlivened by adept use of variation and ellipse. If the result is an apparent diary-like character, it is a contrived result not the product of slavish copying. Arrian's stylistic pretensions should never be underestimated. It is perfectly clear from the first to the last sentence of the *Anabasis* that Arrian considered his main qualities to be stylistic. He is quite open that his opinion is that Alexander's achievements have never been properly commemorated in literature and it is his self-appointed task as the leading man of Greek letters to rectify the situation (I 12, 2-5)<sup>2</sup>. Arrian's work, then, is a literary memorial to Alexander, and his style is as skilfully varied as his claims would suggest, ranging from his normal lucidity of narrative to parenthetical passages of comment of Thucydidean complexity. The observations on Alexander's refusal to risk a night attack before Gaugamela and the presentation of the king's pre-battle speech (III 9, 6-10, 4) amount to an excellent pastiche of Thucydides, not imitation of any particular passage but genuine composition in Thucydidean style<sup>3</sup>. When dealing with Arrian we are faced with a writer stylistically competent, able to adapt the raw material of his sources in any way he chooses.

It is in the understanding and the basic selection of sources that Arrian is most vulnerable. If we can believe Photius, the

<sup>1</sup> Cod. 92, 72 b 40 ff. = T 26, in Fl. Arrianus, II, *Scripta minora et fragmenta*, ed. A. G. Roos (Leipzig 1967), p. LXVI sq.

<sup>2</sup> For discussion of this passage see G. SCHEPENS, in *Ancient Society* 2 (1971), 254-68; A. B. BOSWORTH, in *CQ* 22 (1972), 167-8; 174-5.

<sup>3</sup> Note also the verbal echo of Thucydides I 97, 2 at *Anab.* I 12, 2. The excursus on the sack of Thebes is Thucydidean not only in theme (proof that the disaster was the greatest in Hellenic history) but in phraseology (I 9, 1; cf. Thuc. I 1, 2 with III 113, 5-6; VII 30, 4; VII 87, 5-6).

*Anabasis* was in a sense a prelude to what Arrian regarded as his major task, the *Bithyniaca*, the eight book history of his native province down to its incorporation in the Roman empire. Arrian felt himself not immediately competent to tackle the history and deferred it until he had written preliminary monographs on Dion and Timoleon and his history of Alexander<sup>1</sup>. The reason for this delay cannot have been any stylistic deficiency, for in the *Anabasis* Arrian is supremely confident in matters of style. It is far more likely to be that Arrian needed practice in the composition of non-contemporary history, the welding of material from different primary historians into a unified narrative. The *Bithyniaca* covered a huge range, from mythological times to the death of the last Nicomedes (74 B.C.) and required the incorporation of a mass of material from different primary sources. It is hardly surprising that he felt the need for preliminary work on a more limited period. One reason, then, for writing the *Anabasis* was practice in the use of sources, not so much source criticism in the modern sense as the creation of a well-rounded and internally varied historical narrative from disparate primary sources. This lack of assurance in source manipulation coupled with complete mastery of style is, I think, a dangerous combination. On the one hand Arrian is demonstrably prone to all the errors one would expect in a secondary author : omissions of essential material, misunderstandings of technical exposition, inaccurate reading of sources, and uneasy conflations of variant traditions. Such errors are commonplace in Curtius, and there we expect them as a matter of course, but in Arrian they are less obtrusive because of the seamless flow of the narrative<sup>2</sup>. But the crucial problem is the overall quality of Arrian's two major sources, Ptolemy and Aristobulus, and one can only gain results in this area by a critical comparison of Arrian and the vulgate tradition, keeping

<sup>1</sup> *Bithyniaca* F 1, 3 Roos. For discussion see *CQ* 22 (1972), 178-82.

<sup>2</sup> For examples and full discussion see "Errors in Arrian", in *CQ* 26 (1976), 117 ff.

a consideration of the historical statements rigidly separated from their stylistic presentation.

I shall begin with the consideration of two interlocking passages which shed light both on the quality of the use of sources by Arrian and on the relative strengths and defects of the two traditions. At III 11, 9 Arrian is in the middle of a very detailed report of the Macedonian dispositions before Gaugamela, a report generally assumed to be taken from Ptolemy. He lists the phalanx battalions in order. After the battalion of Polyperchon comes that of Amyntas, son of Philippus, led in Amyntas' absence by his younger brother, Simmias. These details read convincingly enough. All sources attest Amyntas' absence at this time. He had been sent to Macedon on a recruiting trip after the siege of Gaza in late 332 (Diod. XVII 49, 1; Curt. IV 6, 30), and he only returned when Alexander was on his way to Sittacene, towards the end of December 331 (Diod. XVII 65, 1; Curt. V 1, 40; Arr. III 16, 10). The problem is that in the context of Gaugamela Arrian calls Amyntas son of Philippus, whereas he and every other source elsewhere terms him son of Andromenes (cf. Berne II Nr. 57)<sup>1</sup>. There is no doubt that Arrian is in error about the patronymic in his narrative of Gaugamela<sup>2</sup>.

The problem is compounded by the vulgate tradition. Diodorus and Curtius have an account of the Macedonian line of battle which corroborates Arrian in almost every way. There is one exception. The list of battalion commanders is the same

<sup>1</sup> H. BERNE, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage*, 2 vols. (München 1926), hereafter Berne II.

<sup>2</sup> The mistake has of course long been known. In 1668 Nicolaus Blanckardus emended Φιλίππου to Ἀνδρομένους (a correction also made that same year by J. PALMERIUS, *Exercitationes in optimos auctores Graecos* (Lugduni Batavorum 1668), 238). All subsequent editions down to A. G. Roos followed his lead, and Ἀνδρομένους is printed without comment or hint of any textual variant in the Teubner edition of K. SINTENIS (and K. ABICHT) and the Loeb edition of E. I. ROBSON. Although A. G. Roos left Φιλίππου in his text and observed correctly "Arriano error imputandus", the mistake is far less familiar than it deserves to be.

as Arrian's and listed in the same sequence, but in place of Simmias deputising for his brother they report Philippus, son of Balacrus as commander (Diod. XVII 57, 3; Curt. IV 13, 28). This gives us the solution to the error in Arrian; we have an unwitting conflation of two traditions. Arrian presumably was faced by two army lists, one of which named Simmias temporary commander of Amyntas' battalion and the other Philippus, son of Balacrus. Arrian opted for the Simmias version, most probably because he found it in Ptolemy, the source he regarded as of paramount authority (cf. VI 2, 4: ὁ μάλιστα ἐγώ ἔπομαι); but the variant tradition of Philippus, son of Balacrus, remained at the back of his mind, so that he let the name slip in as the patronymic of Amyntas.

The error in Arrian is plain enough, but the problem of choice between the two traditions is more complex. It looks as though the majority of sources favoured Philippus. The name occurred both in the source of the vulgate and in a subsidiary source of Arrian, probably Aristobulus. Simmias, however, seems unique to Ptolemy. Most modern scholars, if they have noticed the problem at all, have automatically opted for the Ptolemaic version ("zweifelos richtig": Berve II Nr. 778). In that case the origins of the variant tradition are difficult to explain. Philippus, son of Balacrus, despite his impeccable Macedonian name is otherwise unknown, unless he is to be identified with the veteran of Alexander's campaigns who acted as adviser to Demetrius before the battle of Gaza (Diod. XIX 69, 1; Berve II Nr. 786). There seems no reason to insert a figure so obscure into the army list at Gaugamela, which is otherwise attested in all sources without significant variants.

It is more profitable, I think, to reverse the question and ask whether Ptolemy had any motive to insert the name of Simmias. The answer, I think, is given by a later passage, describing the course of the battle itself. During the Macedonian advance, according to Arrian III 14, 4, Simmias' battalion was unable to keep pace with the rest of the phalanx and a gap occurred

through which a group of Indian and Persian cavalry burst to attack the baggage train. This is a problematic passage in its own right<sup>1</sup>, and I can here only deal with it in outline. Alexander's line of battle consisted of a double phalanx of infantry (cf. III 12, 1), and a break-through of this nature, which on any interpretation occurred towards the middle of the battle line, ought to have been covered by the reserve line of infantry. Yet Arrian's narrative reads as though the commanders of the reserve infantry only learned of the irruption when the Persian cavalry was attacking the camp. The other, more substantial point is that in the vulgate tradition the Persian attack on the camp was a highlight of the battle. It came as a formidable well-planned circling movement ordered by Mazaeus, the commander of the Persian right, and it was the motive for an appeal for help by Alexander's lieutenant Parmenion, which was stingingly rebuffed by Alexander himself (Diod. XVII 59, 5-8; Curt. IV 15, 5-11; Plut. *Alex.* 32, 5-7). The incident was clearly a standard part of the tradition of Gaugamela, and in all probability it goes back to Callisthenes<sup>2</sup>. There is, however, no trace of a planned attack by the Persians in the account of Arrian. The only reference to an attack on the Macedonian camp is the story of the limited break-through in the centre, small in scale and easily dealt with by the reserve infantry.

<sup>1</sup> W. W. TARN, *op. cit.*, II 180-1 built the episode into the major incident of the battle, "the charge of the Persian guard" (followed with modifications by G. T. GRIFFITH, in *JHS* 67 (1947), 84-5). Arrian's description, however, suggests a limited break-through, small in scale and easily crushed (so E. W. MARSDEN, *The Campaign of Gaugamela* (Liverpool 1964), 59-60). The problem is that Arrian differs fundamentally from the rest of the tradition in his account of the scale, purpose, and success of the attack on the camp, and one cannot accept his version without some attempt to explain the alternative tradition. See A. R. BURN, in *JHS* 72 (1952), 88-90, who accepts the vulgate tradition of a deliberate flanking move by Mazaeus.

<sup>2</sup> For Callisthenes' portrait of Parmenion see *FGrH* 124 F 37; cf. F. JACOBY, in *RE* X 2, 1700-1; *FGrH* II D pp. 429-30; L. PEARSON, *The Lost Histories of Alexander* (London 1960), 47-8; J. R. HAMILTON, *Plutarch Alexander* (Oxford 1969), 89.

What is more, Arrian's statement that there was an attack on baggage and prisoners is inconsistent with his earlier statement (III 9, 1-2) that the Macedonian baggage was left with the prisoners in a base camp over thirty stades from the battlefield proper<sup>1</sup>. It was hardly possible for the reserve infantry to be thrown back more than four miles and still catch the Persian cavalry, apparently without warning, in the act of plundering the camp. The vulgate account of a premeditated and largely successful attack on the base camp is certainly the more plausible, and it was apparently embarrassing to Ptolemy. If we can judge from Arrian's account, he transformed it into a limited and haphazard irruption, caused by the failure of Simmias to keep the Macedonian line intact.

Why was Simmias cast in this role? For elucidation we should turn to a later passage in Arrian (III 27, 2). In the aftermath of the trial and execution of Philotas the four sons of Andromenes were accused of complicity in the alleged plot. Their case was made far more serious by the flight of the youngest brother, Polemon, after the arrest of Philotas. According to Arrian, Amyntas made a powerful speech in his own defence and secured his acquittal. He then led the search for his fugitive brother and brought him back on the same day. Curtius, however, has a different story (Curt. VII 2, 1-10), and in it Polemon is the hero of the piece. After Amyntas' speech for the defence, a powerful composition which won the admiration even of W. W. Tarn, Curtius introduces Polemon, who had been brought back to justice by an official search party, overtaken while agonising whether or not to return. The youth made an appeal to the army assembly which resulted in the

<sup>1</sup> Arrian says explicitly that the Macedonian army began their march οὐδὲν ἀλλα στι μὴ ὅπλα φέρουσιν (III 9, 1), and, though baggage may have been moved up during the day of reconnaissance (III 9, 3-4), there is no hint or likelihood that prisoners were also moved up to the front line. In that case the prisoners who joined the attack on the camp (III 14, 5) can only have been the prisoners left in the base camp four miles to the rear.

acquittal of all the brothers. Once more this is a variant not usually noted or casually dismissed. H. Berve, for instance, dismisses Curtius' story as "dramatisch ausgeschmückt" (II 322, Nr. 644), a phrase which recurs like a clarion call—or a parrot cry—in his criticisms of the vulgate tradition. Of course Curtius' narrative is shaped for its pathetic effect; after Polemon's appeal there is literally not a dry eye in the assembly (VII 2, 7). But it is quite another thing to suggest that Curtius or his source has deliberately warped the facts to produce a display piece of rhetoric. Arrian's version had equal possibilities. Amyntas pleading with his brother to return and face justice was a theme which would have fired every rhetorical school in the ancient world. There were certainly two traditions about the return of Polemon, that of Curtius which places the fugitive himself in the limelight, and that of Arrian which makes Amyntas the undisputed hero.

Arrian's account of the trial of the sons of Andromenes probably comes from Ptolemy. At least the λέγουσι at the head of the chapter explicitly takes up the original reference to Ptolemy and Aristobulus with which Arrian began his account of the Philotas affair (III 26, 1). Now Ptolemy was a declared enemy of the sons of Andromenes, at least of Attalus and Polemon; Amyntas was decently dead shortly after his acquittal in late 330 (Arr. III 27, 3)<sup>1</sup>. Both Attalus and Polemon were prominent members of Perdiccas' faction after Alexander's death. In 321 they had commanded the force sent to intercept the body of Alexander, and they almost succeeded in preventing Ptolemy spiriting it into Egypt as the virtual talisman of his régime (Arrian, *De hist. succ.* F 24 Roos)<sup>2</sup>. In the subsequent civil war Attalus, Perdiccas' brother-in-law, commanded the

<sup>1</sup> It may be significant that Amyntas' battalion is associated with that of Perdiccas in Ptolemy's famous story of the unauthorised attack on Thebes (Arr. I 8, 2 = *FGrH* 138 F 3).

<sup>2</sup> On this episode see E. BADIAN, in *HSPh* 72 (1967), 189; J. SEIBERT, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios' I.* (München 1969), 110–11.

fleet for the invasion of Egypt, and Polemon was closely associated with him. The two brothers were captured with Perdiccas' brother, Alcetas, in their final refuge in Pisidia and imprisoned together in a fortress in Asia Minor (Diod. XVIII 45, 3; XIX 16, 1). These facts shed some light on the variant tradition of the trial in 330. Both sources agree that Polemon's flight put his brothers in jeopardy, but Curtius represents him as the instrument of their acquittal. In Arrian's story Amyntas wins his own salvation and procures the liberty of Polemon himself. It is more than possible that Ptolemy gave the story a malicious twist in order to place the actions of an enemy in a worse light. The case of Simmias is more complex. Here Ptolemy seems to have been unique in assigning him the command of his brother's battalion. It is at least possible that Simmias had held a subordinate position under his brother and later under Philippus, son of Balacrus. His younger brother, Polemon, was only a stripling in 330 (Curt. VII 2, 4: *primo aetatis flore pubescens*), and Simmias himself may not have been fully mature. In that case Ptolemy elevated him to the rank of battalion commander, so that he could lay at his door, by implication at least, the break of the Macedonian line and the attack upon the base camp. The whole procedure resembles closely Ptolemy's allegation that the Macedonian attack on Thebes was prematurely set in action by Perdiccas; the unauthorised advance resulted in a limited defeat, which the other sources attribute to Alexander himself (Arr. I 8, 1 = *FGrH* 138 F 3; cf. Diod. XVII 12, 3; Polyaenus, IV 3, 12). In both cases Ptolemy implied that his future enemies were responsible for military reverses during Alexander's reign.

Ptolemy's treatment of the sons of Andromenes takes us directly into the politics of the early years of the Successors. It seems that Ptolemy deliberately slanted his narrative in order to discredit his own later enemies and adherents of Perdiccas. Ptolemy's work, as far as such things can be proved, consistently minimised and deprecated the role of Perdiccas during

Alexander's lifetime and suppressed the achievements of men prominent in his faction<sup>1</sup>. Why Ptolemy should have gone out of his way to falsify the record in these matters needs explanation, and the reason, I think, is directly connected with the posthumous *charisma* of Alexander. It is perfectly clear that proven service during his reign was the most important claim that dynasts could make in the generation after his death. In 316 B.C., when Antigonus learned of the intended revolt by Peithon, satrap of Media, he had to behave with great circumspection, for, says Diodorus, "it was no easy matter to arrest by force a man who had gained preferment from Alexander on grounds of merit" (Diod. XIX 46, 2). The same was true of Cassander's actions against Aristonous. Aristonous had great prestige because of his promotion under Alexander and so had to be put away in secret (Diod. XIX 51, 1). Service under Alexander was more than an insurance policy against political enemies. It had great weight diplomatically. In 317 Peucestas was the automatic choice for the command of the coalition against Antigonus because of his position as *σωματοφύλαξ* at Alexander's court and his promotion for valour (Diod. XIX 14, 4; 15, 1); and Seleucus was to claim a year later that he had received his satrapy of Babylonia for his services during the lifetime of Alexander (Diod. XIX 55, 3). All this evidence comes indirectly from a contemporary source, Hieronymus of Cardia, and there is no doubt that it was a prominent factor in the propaganda of the Successors. Now it is a well-known fact that the works both of Ptolemy and Nearchus of Crete were to a great extent monuments of their own achievements in Alexander's reign<sup>2</sup>. The achievements of others were played

<sup>1</sup> See particularly R. M. ERRINGTON, in *CQ* 19 (1969), 235-42.

<sup>2</sup> For the characteristics of Ptolemy see C. B. WELLES, *The Reliability of Ptolemy as a Historian*, in *Miscellanea Rostagni* (Torino 1963), 101-16; J. SEIBERT, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios' I.*, 1-26. On Nearchus see particularly L. PEARSON, *The Lost Histories of Alexander*, 131-9, arguing that he modelled his account of his adventures upon the *Odyssey*. Odysseus, it will be recalled, was not only a wanderer but a liar! See now E. BADIAN, in *YCIS* 24 (1975), 147-70.

down or suppressed. In Arrian's narrative at least the principal heroes apart from Alexander himself are men who were dead shortly after Alexander's own death—Hephaestion, Craterus and Leonnatus. The principal dynasts in Ptolemy's own reign, Antigonus, Seleucus and Lysimachus, are notable for their obscurity under Alexander<sup>1</sup>. If it was natural to exaggerate one's own services, it was equally natural to discredit one's enemies and imply that during Alexander's reign they had been failures, so that no services in the past could be placed against their current account.

The influence of contemporary propaganda is a trait which is fairly evident in Ptolemy/Arrian. There are, however, other tendencies less easily observed and more intractable to explain. As an example I should like to examine the historical tradition of the siege of Tyre, which is both extensive and relatively unpolluted by modern scholarship<sup>2</sup>. If we look closely at Arrian's narrative, there appears an unmistakable apologetic tendency. His account of the seven month siege of Tyre makes the whole operation run very smoothly. What setbacks there are tend to occur in the earlier part of the siege, the Tyrian attacks on the end of the mole and the damage inflicted by the fireship (II 18, 5 - 19, 5). After the arrival of the fleet from Sidon towards the end of April 332, the reverses virtually disappear. The Tyrians pointedly refuse battle (II 20, 6-10),

<sup>1</sup> For Antigonus see Berve II Nr. 87. Seleucus' role under Alexander is summed up by Berve as "durch nichts hervorragend" (Berve II Nr. 700); he himself claimed to have enjoyed considerable success (Diod. XIX 55, 3). The career of Lysimachus is equally blank (Berve II Nr. 480). We know incidentally from Arrian that he was σωματοφύλαξ by 326 (V 13, 1; 24, 5; VI 28, 4), but there is no hint how or why he achieved that lofty rank.

<sup>2</sup> There has been only one important recent article on the subject, an investigation by W. RURZ of the narrative technique of Curtius Rufus ("Zur Erzählungskunst des Q. Curtius Rufus", in *Hermes* 93 (1965), 370-82). It deals only peripherally with the value of the sources and is not central to my theme. There are passing remarks about the siege in E. W. MARSDEN, *Greek and Roman Artillery* (Oxford 1969).

and a surprise attack on the Cypriot squadron is repelled with relative ease and complete success (II 21, 8-22, 5). The narrative underlines the successes and moves inexorably to the final assault, an impressively executed shipborne assault, which surmounted the walls and mastered the city with the loss of a mere 20 hypaspists to 8,000 Tyrian casualties (II 24, 4). There were reverses, of course. Arrian cannot conceal the fact that the attacks on the city wall from the siege mole itself were ineffective (II 21, 3), and the first shipborne assault was unsuccessful (II 22, 6-7). But even here Arrian represents the failure as limited. A large portion of the walls was shaken and Alexander made a small-scale trial attack ( $\delta\pi\epsilon\pi\epsilon\varrho\alpha\theta\eta\ \dot{\epsilon}\varsigma\ \delta\lambda\acute{\imath}\gamma\varsigma\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \pi\varrho\sigma\beta\omega\lambda\eta\varsigma$ ) which the Tyrians were able to beat back without excessive difficulty. Neither in this passage nor in any part of his account of the siege does Arrian even hint at substantial Macedonian casualties, which is hardly surprising if one reflects that his figure for the entire casualties during the siege is a mere 400 dead (II 24, 4).

The vulgate tradition is far more explicit about failures during the siege. Diodorus' narrative mainly covers the period after the arrival of the fleet, and he speaks of continued attacks upon the siege mole. A surprise attack upon the construction workers was completely successful, whereas an attempt by Alexander to occupy the main harbour by cutting their rear failed completely (Diod. XVII 42, 1-4; cf. Polyaen. IV 3, 4). In future Alexander used a protective screen of ships during his construction work, but even so the north-east gale caused severe damage (XVII 42, 5-6). But it is the final naval assaults which provide the most dramatic contrast with Arrian. Diodorus mentions *two* unsuccessful preliminary thrusts, the first making a breach in the wall which the Tyrians succeeded in repairing (43, 4-5); the second was apparently a joint land and sea assault which was repelled with immense losses by the sophisticated defensive tactics of the Tyrians (Diod. XVII 43, 5 - 45, 6). Curtius substantially agrees with this account. He mentions

the first attack by the fleet, which he claims was partially frustrated by the wind rising and breaking the lashings of the Macedonian troop transports (IV 3, 11-18). That was a hazard familiar to Arrian's source, for he stresses that Alexander chose a windless day for the final assault (*νηνεμίαν φυλάξας*: II 23, 1). After an interlude about the Carthaginian embassy, including details about Punic human sacrifice taken, it seems, directly from Cleitarchus (Curt. IV 3, 23; cf. *FGrH* 137 F 9), Curtius gives an account of Tyrian siege tactics which digests the longer version of Diodorus (IV 3, 24-26). Both accounts lead up to Alexander debating seriously whether or not to break off the siege (Diod. XVII 45, 7; Curt. IV 4, 1-2).

Which of these traditions deserves more credence? Tarn opted unreservedly for Arrian, but for very eccentric reasons<sup>1</sup>. He argued that from XVII 43, 6 onwards Diodorus' account is excerpted from a Hellenistic siege manual, which had nothing to do with the siege of Tyre. Diodorus, he claimed, conflated the actual seaborne attack on Tyre with an unhistorical land assault. If Curtius has the same material, it is not through use of a common source but because he has decided to use Diodorus directly. This is clearly an absurd position, but it is worth refuting because of the misconceptions about the siege it involves. In the first place Tarn seems to think that the siege mole never reached the island of Tyre, as Diodorus states (43, 5). It is, however, perfectly clear from Arrian (W. W. Tarn's "good" tradition) that siege engines were brought to bear against the walls on the mole itself (*κατὰ μὲν δὴ τὸ χῶμα προσαγόμεναι διὰ ἴσχὺν τοῦ τείχους οὐδὲν ἤγουν*: II 22, 6). More importantly, Tarn believes that Diodorus' account of assault bridges (*ἐπιβάθραι*) thrown onto walls from towers is only appropriate to a land attack (Diod. XVII 43, 7; 46, 2). That is a consequence of his view that the assault against Tyre was conducted *at sea level* through breaches opened in the walls

<sup>1</sup> *Alexander the Great*, II 120-1.

from top to bottom<sup>1</sup>. But once again he is refuted by his own "good" tradition. Arrian makes it as clear as crystal that the attackers first mounted the walls and secured the turrets and intervening parapets before descending into the city by way of the palace (II 23, 5-6). What is more, the capture of Massaga in 327 was effected by land, on scaling bridges thrown from siege works; Arrian says explicitly that Tyre had been stormed in this way (IV 26, 6; 27, 1). Arrian and Diodorus are in full agreement, and Diodorus gives the more helpful details. Alexander's siege engines were mounted on triremes lashed together and these engines included siege towers (Diod. XVII 46, 1-2; Curt. IV 4, 11). Towers mounted on ships were nothing new. They are attested on a small scale during the siege of Syracuse in 413 B.C. (Thuc. VII 25, 6), and shortly after Alexander's death we find Demetrius using them on a tremendous scale in the siege of Rhodes; like Alexander's towers they were mounted on ships lashed together in tandem (Diod. XX 85, 1). Later still Marcellus mounted *turres contabulatae* on pairs of *quinquiremes* for his naval assault on Syracuse (Livy XXIV 34, 7). The technique used by Alexander was clearly not to breach the walls from top to bottom, which would have required an unconscionable amount of pounding, but rather to shake the battlements sufficiently to dislodge the defenders and allow bridges to be thrown across (cf. Arr. II 23, 5; Diod. XVII 45, 5 etc.). Shipborne towers and crossbridges are integral to the final assault, and Diades, the engineer commemorated as the architect of the victory at Tyre, is said to have claimed the invention of both mobile towers and siege bridges (Athen. Mech. 10, 10). Unfortunately he refrained from describing in detail the use of the bridges and the shipborne *εργα* used in the assault (Athen. Mech. 15, 5 f.). It seems clear none the less that

<sup>1</sup> This appears to be a general assumption among modern historians of Alexander, cf. J. R. HAMILTON, *Alexander the Great* (London 1973), 72-3; F. SCHACHERMEYR, *Alexander der Grosse*<sup>2</sup>, 218; R. LANE FOX, *Alexander the Great* (New York 1973), 190.

Diodorus' towers and bridges were shipborne and that the assault was directed against the battlements of Tyre. It was in fact a somewhat ponderous anticipation of the famous use of *sambycæ* during the Roman siege of Syracuse<sup>1</sup>.

The vulgate tradition cannot be impugned on matters of detail, and its general picture of repeated Macedonian setbacks and heavy losses seems cogent enough. There has been a recent suggestion that the Diodoran tradition may have inserted pictorial effects to make the fighting appear more evenly poised<sup>2</sup>. Given the circumstances of the attack upon Tyre, however, there seems to have been no reason to invent an equally balanced contest. The defenders were in an island fortress, and their movements, concealed as they were from the enemy, had all the advantages of surprise. Nor are the horrendous details of Tyrian defensive measures unconvincing<sup>3</sup>. The defenders had seven months to develop anti-personnel weapons, and it is not surprising that they were effective. Where the bias lies is not in the vulgate but in Arrian, and the bias is not rhetorical but apologetic. Arrian's source clearly minimised the setbacks and the enormous casualties, representing the siege as a virtual catalogue of success against superhuman obstacles.

There is a very significant omission in Arrian which underlines the point. After the siege of Gaza at the very end of 332 Amyntas, son of Andromenes, was sent back to Macedon to levy recruits. The incident is reported by Diodorus and Curtius (Diod. XVII 49, 1; Curt. IV 6, 30-31; VII 1, 37-40). Although it was approaching mid-winter Amyntas was committed to the perils of the Mediterranean with ten triremes. Alexander must have been in urgent need of reinforcements,

<sup>1</sup> For the *sambycæ* see Polybius, VIII 4, 2 ff.; Andreas of Panormus, *FGrH* 571 F 1; Appian, *Mitbr.* 26, 103; 27, 105; with the discussion of J. G. LANDELS, in *JHS* 86 (1966), 69-77.

<sup>2</sup> P. A. BRUNT, in *CQ* 12 (1962), 148.

<sup>3</sup> E. W. MARSDEN, *Greek and Roman Artillery*, 102, accepts the anti-catapult measures as historical beyond question.

and Curtius makes the point explicitly : *namque etiam secundis atterebantur tamen copiae* (IV 6, 31). Now there is not a word about Amyntas' mission in Arrian's account of 332 ; it is only mentioned in later retrospective references (III 11, 9 ; 16, 10). What is more, Arrian says nothing about the numbers of troops raised by Amyntas. They are supplied by the vulgate, and they are impressive ; over 15,000 troops in all, including 6,000 infantry from Macedonia alone, half the number of the phalanx troops at the start of the campaign (Diod. XVII 65, 1 ; Curt. V 1, 40-42 ; cf. Diod. XVII 17, 3). Arrian's sources appear to have omitted the original mission of Amyntas and concealed the extent of his activity. The omission is probably deliberate. Too much information about his recruiting would have shed unwelcome light on the appalling casualties of the sieges of 332, which are consistently minimised in his historical narrative.

This glossing over of Macedonian reverses and losses is not unique to the narrative of the siege of Tyre. It is a consistent motif in Arrian. There is a parallel in his description of the final sortie of the defenders of Halicarnassus two years earlier. The Persian defenders made a combined sortie, concentrating their attack on the apex of the Macedonian siege works. According to Arrian the assault was easily beaten back (*οὐ χαλεπῶς ἀπεστράφησαν*) by a hail of missiles and the hand-to-hand attack of Alexander's men (I 22, 1-3). Diodorus has a much more detailed and quite different story. Two thousand picked defenders under the Athenian Ephialtes issued forth at daybreak in a deep phalanx and attempted to destroy the principal siege tower (XVII 26, 6). It was a brilliant attack. The Macedonians fell back in confusion, and Diodorus adds that Alexander was completely at a loss (*εἰς πολλὴν ἀμηχανίαν ἐνέπιπτεν*). The tide of battle was only reversed by the intervention of the Macedonian veterans held in reserve, who caught Ephialtes' men in the flush of victory and drove them back into the walls (27, 1-4). The story, it is true, is highly dramatic and provides a classic example of *περιπέτεια*, but that does not make it any

the less historical. The incident is mentioned by Curtius in the context of the Cleitus affair, where the behaviour of the veterans at Halicarnassus is brought up in vindication of the men of Philip's army (VIII 1, 36). The principal agent in the recovery is named and is a familiar figure in the vulgate tradition : Atarrhias, son of Deinomenes (Berve II Nr. 178). It looks as though the apologetic motif is again at work in Arrian ; a serious reverse, rectified with the utmost difficulty, is transformed into an effortless victory. The same thing happened at an earlier stage of the narrative. The night attack launched by two drunken members of Perdiccas' battalion is presented by the vulgate as an unmitigated disaster. Many Macedonians were killed, and Alexander was forced to parley for the return of the bodies (Diod. XVII 25, 5-6). In Arrian this impromptu attack is almost a success : παρ' ὀλίγον δὲ ἥλθε καὶ ἀλῶναι ἡ πόλις (I 21, 3). There is no hint of serious Macedonian losses and not a word about Alexander suing for the return of his dead. Once more a humiliating Macedonian setback has been transformed into near victory, and the moral defeat of leaving the dead in enemy hands, an event almost unique in the reign<sup>1</sup>, is totally omitted.

It is also possible to detect a more positive bias, to exaggerate the obstacles faced by Alexander in such a way as to enhance his achievement in surmounting them. Once more the siege of Tyre provides useful examples. According to Arrian the height of the city walls in the vicinity of the siege mole was no less than 150 feet and their breadth was comparable (II 21, 4). This is incredible. In the same breath Arrian states that the Tyrians increased the height of their walls still further by means of wooden towers, implying that the Macedonian siege works overtopped the walls. In that case they were far bigger than

<sup>1</sup> After the first abortive attack on the Persian Gates Alexander was forced to leave his dead on the battlefield (Diod. XVII 68, 4; Curt. V 4, 3 ; not in Arrian) ; but he did not on this occasion sue for their return.

Demetrius' gigantic *helepolis* at Rhodes. That monster was apparently the greatest siege engine hitherto constructed, nine stories high and with sloping sides of 100 cubits (Diod. XX 91, 3-4), and it towered up to twice the height of the walls of Rhodes. If we accept Arrian's figure, the walls of Tyre were higher than the most colossal siege engine of the Hellenistic period. It must be a deliberate exaggeration to turn the capture of the city into a superhuman feat. The same seems true of his account of the dredging operations in front of the walls. Great stones were piled up in the form of a breakwater, and they had to be winched out by triremes specially secured by iron chains. They were then loaded onto catapults and shot into deep water (II 21, 7). All this reads very circumstantially, but, one asks, how large were these stones? In fact the greatest weight of a catapult shot recorded during the Hellenistic period is three talents (c. 180 lbs.) on board Hieron's monstrous *Syracosia* (Moschion, *ap.* Athen. V 208 c). Those catapults had been specially designed by Archimedes, and they must have had far greater tensile power than Alexander's machines. In other words, either the rocks before Tyre were surprisingly small for a defensive breakwater, or Arrian's source has unscrupulously exaggerated the power of Alexander's catapults.

These exaggerations pale into insignificance when we move to the siege of Gaza. Arrian's account begins with a debate on the possibility of attack. Alexander's siege engineers claimed that the wall was impregnable because of the height of the mound on which the city was built. The king's opinion was that the more impregnable the city the greater the necessity to capture it—words prophetically reminiscent of his motive for the attack on the rock of Chorienes (II 26, 2; cf. IV 21, 3). It comes as a surprise therefore to find that the modern city of Gaza is clustered on a low hill only 60-100 feet in height and two miles in circumference—hardly the lofty fortress Arrian claims. No other source so much as hints that Gaza was at all elevated. Arrian moves to Alexander's siege technique, the

creation of a siege mound all round the city to provide a foundation for his engines (II 26, 3). At a later stage he gives the dimensions of the mound, no less than two stades broad and 250 feet high (II 27, 3). There was surely no time during the two month siege for the construction of such a gargantuan work, and certainly no marks have been left on the landscape, as was the case with the siege works at Smyrna and Masada, or Alexander's own siege mole at Tyre. The siege mound at Gaza does not feature so prominently in the other tradition. Curtius claims that the early siege work consisted of undermining the walls, an operation which was easy enough in the sandy soil of Gaza and which Arrian himself mentions in passing (Curt. IV 6, 8; cf. Arr. II 27, 4). The siege mound appears only at a later stage of Curtius' narrative, as a support for the siege towers which overtopped the defensive superstructure of the walls of Gaza (Curt. IV 6, 21-22). There is, however, no hint that the mound encircled the city or that it played a vital part in the siege. The principal damage in Curtius' view was done by mining (IV 6, 23). Arrian's sources represented Gaza as a far more formidable fortress than it was, in order to increase the glory of its capture and maximise the effectiveness of Macedonian siege techniques. There is a similar exaggeration (for apologetic reasons) of the defensive position of the citadel of Celaenae. Arrian describes it as πάντη ἀπότομος (I 29, 1), whereas in fact the acropolis is connected by a neck of land to the hills on the east and is unlikely to have deterred anyone from assault<sup>1</sup>. Alexander, however, renounced a direct attack and left a force to blockade the acropolis (Arr. I 29, 2 f.; cf. Curt. III 1, 7-8). His apologists may have

<sup>1</sup> For the geography of Celaenae see D. G. HOGARTH, in *JHS* 9 (1888), 349; P. BRIANT, *Antigone le Borgne* (Paris 1973), 111-2. Briant correctly emphasises the encomiastic element in Ptolemy/Arrian; his suggestion (pp. 112-6) that Curtius' narrative of the episode is an isolated excerpt from Hieronymus of Cardia is less happy.

distorted the topography and represented the fortress as precipitous all round.

Arrian's narrative, especially the military narrative, displays two distinct and complementary tendencies. Macedonian setbacks are either omitted altogether or turned into partial victories. On the other hand there seems a conscious exaggeration of the physical difficulties overcome in the course of the Macedonian victories. The overall picture is one of continuous and effortless success in the face of overwhelming obstacles. There is nothing surprising in this, even if we supposed that Arrian's material were derived ultimately from the royal archives. Encomiastic exaggeration of personal success and suppression of the unpalatable is characteristic of the official records of the ancient world from the Annals of the Hittite kings to the *Res Gestae* of Augustus, and should be startling only to those who regard the official seal as the seal of authenticity. There is, however, a halfway house between the royal archives and the histories of Ptolemy and Aristobulus; that is the work of Callisthenes of Olynthus, who wrote the first account of the campaign at the king's side and took his account down to 330 at least. It was a contemporary work, obviously written before Callisthenes' unfortunate demise in spring 327, and its tendency was overtly encomiastic<sup>1</sup>. He apparently claimed that the fame of Alexander and his *res gestae* depended on his literary presentation. Admittedly Arrian is slightly sceptical about the authenticity of the remark (*εἰπερ ἀληθῆ ξυγγέγραπται*: IV 10, 1), but it is the unanimous verdict of antiquity from Timaeus onwards that Callisthenes was the archetypal court flatterer<sup>2</sup>.

Some idea of his approach can be gained from Polybius' criticisms of his narrative of the battle of Issus, and it is, I think, symptomatic that his account contains the same exaggeration of

<sup>1</sup> On Callisthenes see particularly F. JACOBY, in *RE* X 2, 1674-1707; L. PEARSON, *The Lost Histories of Alexander*, 22-49, with E. BADIAN, *Studies...*, 251-2.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *FGrH* 124 T 20-21; F 14 a.

difficulties of terrain that we detected in Arrian's descriptions of Gaza and Tyre. In particular he described the Pinarus, the river across which the battle was fought, as precipitous and inaccessible throughout its intersection of the plain of Issus (Plb. XII 17, 5; 22, 4). Despite the precipitous nature of the banks, the battle was apparently decided by a Macedonian cavalry charge across the river, and the difficulty of reconciling Callisthenes' description with the actual battle has bedevilled all modern reconstructions<sup>1</sup>. It is very likely that Callisthenes exaggerated the steepness of the banks in order to place the Macedonian victory in the most favourable context. This distortion, however, recurs in Arrian's narrative. The banks of the Pinarus are twice described as precipitous, and Arrian adds that the more accessible areas were fortified by a palisade (II 10,

<sup>1</sup> See particularly the observations of the Austrian colonel A. JANKE, *Auf Alexanders des Grossen Pfaden* (Berlin 1904), 55-74; *Klio* 10 (1910), 155-62. Janke noted the impossibility of a cavalry charge across banks as steep as those described by Callisthenes, Arrian and Plutarch, and he supposed that the ancient Pinarus was the modern Deli Çay, a river whose banks are extremely level and no encumbrance to a cavalry charge. The Deli Çay, however, is too far north to be reconciled with the detailed distances of the approach march given by Callisthenes. W. DITTBERNER, *Issos. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen* (Berlin 1908), 105 ff., reverted to the old identification of the Pinarus with the Pajas, a water-course whose banks are uniformly steep and whose position, roughly 12 miles from Iskenderun, corresponds to the 100 stades of Callisthenes (Plb. XII 19, 4). The difficulty of the cavalry charge subsisted, and Dittberner conjured from maps a relatively level stretch of terrain to the east of the Pajas, which he thought wide enough to allow Alexander passage. A. JANKE promptly drew on his first-hand knowledge to prove this level stretch apocryphal (*Klio* 10 (1910), 155 ff.), and the Deli Çay held the day as the site for the battle despite its incompatibility with the distances given by Callisthenes. The entire impassioned debate has an air of unreality when two additional factors are adduced. The whole of the coastline around Issus may have changed, and probably has changed, since antiquity. In that case Janke's painstaking measurements are irrelevant. Secondly, ancient descriptions of the Pinarus are encomiastically distorted, and the data about the steepness of the banks are especially suspect. Whatever the identification of the river, no charge at speed was possible in conditions such as those described by Callisthenes and Arrian. For a graphic description of what might happen see Arrian, IV 5, 7-9, a passage certainly derived from Ptolemy.

1 and 5). This detail about the palisade may have entered the tradition after Callisthenes, for it does not figure in Polybius' criticisms of the Macedonian manœuvres (XII 18, 11; 22, 4), although it would have strengthened his argument. More significantly, the palisade does not recur in Arrian's battle narrative. It is obvious, however, that if any part of the banks was level enough to permit a cavalry charge at speed ( $\delta\varphi\mu\omega$ ) that was the place most naturally fortified by a palisade. Arrian's narrative suggests no obstacle to the Macedonian onslaught. The palisade looks suspiciously like a supplementary fiction to exaggerate the strength of the Persian defences and so enhance the glory of victory. A more famous fiction is Ptolemy's account of the Persian casualties. Callisthenes had mentioned reports that the majority of Persians perished in the ravines created by the rain-swelled torrents from the mountains north of the battlefield (Plb. XII 20, 4). Ptolemy recorded that in the pursuit he was able to cross such a ravine upon a bridge of corpses (Arr. II 11, 8 = *FGrH* 138 F 6). Modern scepticism about this claim is surely justified, for Ptolemy was with Alexander in the van of the pursuit and the Persian dead he encountered were casualties of their own side, trampled down by their cavalry in flight (Arr. II 11, 3; Diod. XVII 34, 7). Whatever the panic in the  $\sigma\tau\epsilon\nu\chi\omega\rho\alpha$ , the self-inflicted slaughter cannot have been as immense as Ptolemy implied.

It is perhaps a more awkward problem why Ptolemy, a veteran of the entire campaign in Asia, transmitted encomiastic distortions which he must have known were distortions. The answer can only be that he approved of Callisthenes' treatment of Alexander. One must always remember that Ptolemy had possession of the mummified body of Alexander and referred his whole legitimacy as ruler of Egypt to the king's conquests<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> It was only after 321 that Ptolemy could refer to the land as acquired ( $\delta\varphi\iota\kappa\tau\eta\tau\varsigma$ ) by his own efforts. His defeat of Perdiccas and later of Antigonus made Egypt peculiarly his (Diod. XVIII 39, 5; 43, 1; XX 76, 7), but he held it originally through right of conquest by Alexander. Not surprisingly, in the famous pro-

Indeed the Lagids had an official genealogy which associated Ptolemy with the Argead house through his mother, Arsinoe ; and it was contemporary dogma that Alexander and the rulers of Egypt were of one blood<sup>1</sup>. Under those circumstances it is hardly surprising that Ptolemy embraced the encomiastic history of Callisthenes. But much of the encomium concerned not only the king but the army. The Macedonians were also ἀνίκητοι and performed prodigious feats to acquire their victories. From Callisthenes' point of view this was perfectly understandable. He was writing against the background of rising disaffection in mainland Greece, which was to erupt into Agis' War of 331, and he had an immediate practical object in portraying the Macedonian army as unconquerable. Similar motives, however, existed in the time of the Successors. Having served with Alexander was one of the most formidable claims a fighting man could make. When Attalus, Polemon and six other associates broke out of their prison in Asia Minor in 316, they were able to hold several hundred guards at bay and were only subdued after reinforcements had been summoned from adjacent regions ; so great was their skill and daring, commented Hieronymus, because of their experience with Alexander (Diod. XIX 16, 1). But it was not only the officer class who were prized as veterans. The famous ἀργυράσπιδες of Antigenes played a decisive role in the long struggle against Antigonus, and it was only the fact of their changing sides, after their families had fallen into Antigonus' hands, that led to the capture and death of Eumenes (Diod. XIX 43, 9). The ἀργυράσπιδες

cession of Ptolemy Philadelphus images of Alexander and Ptolemy Soter appeared in the closest proximity (Callixenus, *FGrH* 627 F 2, *ap.* Athen. V 201 c; 202 a; cf. V. EHRENBURG, *Alexander and the Greeks* (Oxford 1938), 2-7; P. GOUKOWSKY, in *RE* A 71 (1969), 328).

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Satyrus, *FGrH* 631 F 1; *POxy.* 2465 ; with C. F. EDSON, in *HSPh* 45 (1934), 224-5 n. 2. As early as Ptolemy's lifetime a story had arisen that he was the bastard son of Philip II and therefore brother of Alexander (Curt. IX 8, 22; Paus. I 6, 2; cf. W. W. TARN, in *JHS* 53 (1933), 58).

numbered only 3,000, and they were only a fraction of the veterans of Alexander, albeit the most formidable. The rest of the phalangites seem to have been dispersed, and significantly a large number found refuge with Ptolemy. When Perdiccas invaded Egypt in 321, he was plagued by massive desertions, affecting his Macedonian troops (Diod. XVIII 33, 2; 36, 1-6). These will have comprised mainly the phalanx infantry inherited from Alexander after his death at Babylon. Subsequently the deserters formed a formidable nucleus for Ptolemy's own army. A substantial proportion of his 8,000 Hellenic infantry at the battle of Gaza (312) were of Macedonian extraction (Diod. XIX 80, 4); whereas his enemy, Demetrius, had no more than 2,000 Macedonians, who had to be supplemented by native troops and mercenaries to a total of 11,000 (Diod. XIX 82, 4). Ptolemy might well have been proud of the Macedonian core of his armies, and any propaganda extolling the invincibility of Alexander's army could only redound to the credit of his own men. The encomiastic elements of Callisthenes' history would have been more than welcome<sup>1</sup>.

Not all the themes propagated by Callisthenes would have been useful or relevant to Ptolemy in the generation after Alexander's death. The treatment of Parmenion is a case in point. It is well known that Callisthenes represented his behaviour at Gaugamela as ineffectual and insinuated motives of disaffection. He also suggested that it was Parmenion's second appeal for help which enabled Darius to escape capture (Plut. *Alex.* 33, 9-10 = *FGrH* 124 F 37). In Arrian's account of Gaugamela, however, Parmenion plays a perfectly honourable role. He sends one message for help when his wing was in severe difficulties (III 15, 1). Far from resenting the message, Alexander returns promptly, to find that the heroism of the Thessalians has already turned the tide (III 15, 3). That is the

<sup>1</sup> Note Arr. II 10, 6: καὶ τὴν δόξαν τῆς φάλαγγος, ὡς ἀμάχου δὴ ἐς τὸ τότε διαβεβοημένης, μὴ ἀφανίσαι.

only message; there is no earlier appeal during the Persian attack on the Macedonian camp (so Plut. *Alex.* 32, 6; Curt. IV 15, 6), and indeed the Macedonian camp virtually disappears from Arrian's narrative. In the prelude to the battle, moreover, Arrian has the unique detail that Parmenion proposed reconnoitring the battlefield and carried his view (III 9, 3). It is true that Arrian records a snub administered to Parmenion for his advice to attack the Persians by night. The story, however, is presented as a λεγόμενον, that is, taken from Arrian's subsidiary sources, not from Ptolemy<sup>1</sup>. That is interesting, for the story is common to Plutarch and Curtius, and it may well derive from Callisthenes' portrait of the incompetent Parmenion. Ptolemy appears to have ignored the derogatory anecdote and included instead an illustration of Parmenion's effective generalship. The whole picture is different from that of Callisthenes, who was inevitably preparing the ground for the murder of Parmenion late in 330. The old man, he implied, was incompetent, perhaps treasonably so.

Something should perhaps be said about the series of dialogues between Alexander and Parmenion, which is such a feature of Arrian's narrative. On five occasions the old general makes suggestions which the king rejects<sup>2</sup>. These debates were a feature of the general tradition of Alexander's reign; it is symptomatic that an exchange between the two men is included in Josephus' apocryphal story of Alexander's visit to Jerusalem (*AJ* XI 333-336). It is usually, and plausibly, argued that the originator of the tradition was Callisthenes<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Arr. *prooem.* 3; II 12, 8; H. STRASBURGER, *Ptolemaios und Alexander*, 35.

<sup>2</sup> Arr. I 13, 3-7 (Granicus); I 18, 6-9 (Miletus); II 25, 2-3 (Euphrates frontier); III 10, 1-2 (Gaugamela); III 18, 12 (Persepolis). Note also the rejection of Parmenion's letter of warning against Philip the Acarnanian (II 4, 9). For the counter-tradition of Parmenion's advice being accepted see Arr. III 9, 3; Curt. III 7, 8-10.

<sup>3</sup> F. CAUER, *Jahrbücher für class. Philologie*, Suppl. 20 (1894), 33-4; H. STRASBURGER, *Ptolemaios und Alexander*, 23; 25; J. R. HAMILTON, *Plutarch Alexander*, 89.

To add substance to his later insinuations of incompetence and disloyalty the court historian may have constructed a series of debates, representing the old general as pedestrian and unimaginative, the perfect foil to his epic portraiture of Alexander. In that case what probably gave rise to the whole tradition was the debate over Darius' proposal of a frontier at the Euphrates, the only debate which is recorded by all extant sources<sup>1</sup>. A genuine disagreement and a genuine snub by Alexander at this point could have given the inspiration for a series of fictional debates. It is, however, uncertain how far Ptolemy followed this tradition. As we have seen, he omits the purported advice at Gaugamela to attack by night, and none of the other debates can be surely attributed to him. The advice to accept the Euphrates frontier is presented by Arrian in *oratio obliqua* as a λεγόμενον, and the debate before the crossing of the Granicus occurs immediately before a list of the Macedonian army which seems derived from Aristobulus<sup>2</sup>. It is possible and probable that the entire series of debates in Arrian comes from Aristobulus and not Ptolemy. There is perhaps one exception. The debate over a sea battle at Miletus has a number of eccentricities which cannot be attributed to Callisthenes. It is Alexander who is the cautious party, rejecting on pragmatic grounds the proposal to join battle with the more numerous Persian fleet, and his language echoes that allegedly used at the Granicus by Parmenion<sup>3</sup>. Even more strikingly, Alexander hints openly that revolt in Greece would be the immediate result of a Macedonian

<sup>1</sup> Arr. II 25, 2-3 ; Plut. *Alex.* 29, 7-8 ; Diod. XVII 54, 4-5 ; Curt. IV 11, 11-15 ; Iust. XI 12, 10 ; *Itin. Alex.* 44 ; Val. Max. VI 4, ext. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Arr. I 14, 1-3. The phalanx battalions are here described as *phalanges* instead of τάξεις, a very rare usage (cf. III 9, 6 ; V 20, 3 ; 21, 5 ; Polyaen. IV 3, 27). The hypaspists are uniquely termed οἱ ὑπασπισταὶ τῶν ἑταίρων. These variants from Arrian's usual military terminology are likely to derive from Aristobulus.

<sup>3</sup> Arr. I 18, 8 : οὐ μικρὸν τὴν βλάβην ἔσεσθαι ἐς τοῦ πολέμου τὴν πρώτην δόξαν.  
Arr. I 13, 5 : καὶ τὸ πρῶτον σφάλμα ἔς τε τὰ παρόντα χαλεπόν...

defeat<sup>1</sup>, an admission hardly likely to have occurred in the writings of the contemporary Callisthenes, directed as they were at the contemporary Greek world. The Miletus debate, then, is atypical. There is no hostile animus against Parmenion; Alexander merely disagrees and considers Parmenion's interpretation of the eagle omen implausible ( $\tauῇ γνώμῃ ἀμαρτάνειν...$  καὶ τοῦ σημείου τῇ οὐ κατὰ τὸ εἰκός ξυμβλήσει).

This debate may rest on fact and *may* be a corrective by Ptolemy himself of the Callisthenean picture of an over-cautious Parmenion.

It seems the case that, when Arrian's narrative is derived from Ptolemy, Parmenion is always handled respectfully and his abilities are unquestioned. Most importantly there is no attempt to represent his death as anything other than political murder. If there is any hint of his involvement in the "conspiracy" of Philotas, it is presented as a personal suspicion by Alexander alone (III 26, 4 = *FGrH* 138 F 13). After Alexander's death there was no reason to pursue the vendetta against Parmenion. He was dead, as were his sons, and his political influence had disappeared. On the other hand his memory had been respected by the Macedonian troops and his murder was bitterly resented. It is hard to see any advantage Ptolemy might have gained from blackening the memory of Parmenion, but there may have been disadvantages in attacking a man who had been so popular with the army during his lifetime.

Ptolemy's work, then, must always be viewed from the perspective of the generation after Alexander. It reflects the political bias of his day, not necessarily that of Alexander, and the encomiastic portrait of the king and his army had its uses long after the death of Callisthenes and of Alexander himself. But Ptolemy is a relatively accessible figure. The vulgate tradition presents far more difficult problems of interpretation. How can it be that its material is so much less encomiastic than

<sup>1</sup> Arr. I 18, 8:  $\tauά τε ἄλλα καὶ τοὺς "Ελληνας νεωτερεῖν.$  Compare the hints of Greek unrest at I 29, 6, a passage probably deriving from Ptolemy.

the Ptolemaic tradition and so rich in information, particularly from the Persian point of view? Until it can be proved that the source of the vulgate is in fact Cleitarchus, all speculation is necessarily inconclusive. It is, however, worth emphasising that Cleitarchus probably wrote before 300 B.C., perhaps before Ptolemy and in the immediate aftermath of Alexander's campaign. He was presumably able to question survivors, and there are traces in the vulgate of discussion of contemporary sources<sup>1</sup>. What is more, Cleitarchus' father, Deinon, had written a *Persica*, a fact which may explain the emphasis the vulgate tradition gives to happenings at Darius' court<sup>2</sup>. But whatever the background of the vulgate tradition, it seems undeniable that it represents a stream of historiography quite different from the sources of Arrian; and it certainly appears less permeated by the distortions of the official tradition. The prime task of the historian is to strip the factual statements in the vulgate away from the rhetoric which surrounds them in Diodorus and Curtius and to place them critically alongside the tradition of Arrian<sup>3</sup>. Until that is done, histories of Alexander will continue to repeat the distorted literary *proskynesis* of the king, which is the hallmark of the uncritical acceptance of Arrian as the only Alexander historian worth consideration.

<sup>1</sup> To wit, discussion of the disbanding of the Macedonian fleet (Diod. XVII 23, 1); the burning of Persepolis (Plut. *Alex.* 38, 8); and the death of Darius (Diod. XVII 73, 4). Cf. F. JACOBY, in *RE* XI 1, 651.

<sup>2</sup> *Testimonia* and fragments: *FGrH* 690. Note particularly Nepos, *Con.* IX 5, 4: *Dinon historicus cui nos plurimum de Persicis rebus credimus*.

<sup>3</sup> This is a procedure which has been occasionally advocated (most eloquently by E. BADIAN, in *CQ* 8 (1958), 148-50). It is, however, very rarely put into practice.

## DISCUSSION

*M. Schachermeyr*: Ich freue mich darüber, dass Herr Prof. Bosworth in der Quellenfrage zur *Vulgarata* einen ganz ähnlichen Standpunkt einnimmt wie ich ihn in meinen *Alexander*-Büchern von 1949, 1968 und 1973 vertreten habe.

Die sogenannte *Vulgarata* wird vor allem von drei Autoren vertreten, von Diodor, Curtius Rufus und Justinus. Sie findet sich bei Diodor am reinsten, bei Curtius und Justinus aber vermischt mit anderen Versionen. Ich möchte diese *Vulgarata* auf Kleitarch zurückführen, der wieder auf folgenden Informationen beruht:


- a) schriftlich: Kallisthenes (offiziös, stark panegyrisch, aber Zeitgenosse und z.T. Augenzeuge), bestens orientiert, von Alexander z.T. inspiriert und für den griechischen Leser berechnet;
- b) mündlich:
  - 1) Mitteilungen von Offizieren und Soldaten *Alexanders*; von Hofbeamten, usw.;
  - 2) Mitteilungen von Offizieren und Soldaten in persischen Diensten.

Kleitarch lebte nachher in Alexandrien und schrieb daselbst unter Ptolemaios I. (vermutliche Abfassung des Werkes vor 310 v.Chr., da bei der Aufzählung der Schandtaten Kassanders durch Diodor (Kleitarch) die Ermordung des jungen Alexander (nach 311) noch nicht erwähnt wird, weil man in Ägypten immer noch nach diesem Alexander datierte).

Wert der kleitarchischen Nachrichten verschiedenartig: Offizielle und Beamtennachrichten sehr gut; kallisthenische Nachrichten wegen der panegyrischen Färbung mit Vorsicht zu genießen, sonst aber sehr wertvoll. Soldaten-Erinnerungen geben Augenblicksbilder, sind aber oft ungenau, neigen zu Übertreibungen, ja u.U. zu willkürlicher Erfindung.

Die Abhängigkeiten kann man so darstellen :

### Überblick über das Verhältnis der einzelnen Alexander-Quellen zu einander



*M. Badian* : As regards Cleitarchus, I hope I established in *Proc. of the Afr. Class. Assoc.* 8 (1965) that he claimed to have been in Babylon in 323. He may therefore have written of the events following Alexander's death as an eyewitness, and it has occurred to me to wonder whether he could be the source of Curtius' account of these events, filtered, of course, through Curtius' own experiences (at whatever time—on which I need not commit myself) under the early Empire. This would obviate the assumption (which I have myself made in the past) of a change of source on the part of Curtius after Alexander's death, which nothing in Curtius' own narrative seems to impose. The actual date of Cleitarchus' work, though (as has just been shown) probably not after 310, could be at any time before, and indeed need not be much later than 323.

As regards Ptolemy, the view that he wrote his account of the campaign in his dotation, because while king he would have no time to write, seems to have been passed down unscrutinised for genera-

tions. In my review of L. Pearson's *The Lost Histories of Alexander the Great* (in *Gnomon* 33 (1961)), I suggested that rulers and politicians have often found time to write, especially for a political purpose, and that Ptolemy might well have written his history much earlier, while actively engaged in the struggles of the Successors and as a weapon in those struggles. (I expanded this in the Introduction to my *Forschungsbericht* in *CW* 65 (1971-2).) After R. M. Errington's article in *CQ* 19 (1969), now reinforced by Mr. Bosworth's paper we have just heard, we may perhaps hope that the uncritical consensus has at last been broken and that—at least within this room—the easier and more obvious interpretation of Ptolemy's work will gain acceptance. The precise date and precise political purpose of his composition (and they would be interdependent) cannot yet be fixed with any confidence.

*M. Wirth*: Wie Herr Schachermeyr mit Recht betont, hat das Referat ausgezeichnet wiedergegeben, worauf es uns, worauf es künftiger Forschung ankommen muss.

Die Frage indes, die wie ich glaube noch einmal aufgeworfen zu werden verdiente, ist die nach Arrian schlechthin und von hier aus auch die nach Ptolemaios.

Im Gegensatz zu Herrn Bosworth nun möchte ich an der Spät-datierung für Arrian festhalten. Selbstzeugnisse betonter darstellerischer und sachlicher Kompetenz — man mag über diese denken wie man will — lassen sich m.E. doch wohl nur aus Erfahrungen eines Lebens und daraus resultierender Autorität verstehen. Dazu kommt persönliches, allzu persönliches Bekenntnis, wie ich es von einem Jüngeren in solchem Zusammenhang einfach für unmöglich halte. So wäre dieser Arrian mit seiner Alexandermonographie demnach im Raume zwischen Trajan und Mark Aurel, nahe dem letzten, anzusiedeln. Nach einer Reihe historischer Schriften (*Bithyniaca*, *Parthica*) von irgendwie persönlichem Bezug gab es für ihn, Taktiker und Handbuchverfasser mit eigenen Erfahrungen genug Gründe, sich das Alexandersujet zu wählen. Das Herrscherbild, gezeichnet von dem Philosophen Arrian, damit exemplifiziert, passt in solchen

Zusammenhang, ja gab vielleicht den Ausschlag. Scheint Arrians Anliegen aber das des Militärs und des literarisch versierten Staats-theoretikers — seine Darstellungsweise (vgl. *RE* XXIII 2, 2467 ff.) entspricht diesem Bemühen um Eindringlichkeit und Verständlichkeit im Detail. Für die grossen Szenen und Affären ist nicht vielleicht zuletzt deshalb sein Interesse gering ; ein gleiches könnte selbst für die grossen militärischen Ereignisse gelten, Schlachten, Belagerungen, die in ihrer Einmaligkeit doch wenig an Effekt versprachen. Möglich wäre sehr wohl auch, er habe im einzelnen seine Hauptquelle korrigiert. Und nur deshalb, zur Rechtfertigung, dokumentiere er seine Belesenheit so auffallend.

Was nun diese Hauptquelle, Ptolemaios betrifft, so bleibt zu fragen, was denn Arrian mit diesem so eigenartig verband. Geringe Benutzung von dessen Opus fällt auf, besonders auffallendes, zum Nachdenken anregendes Material kann er demnach kaum gebracht haben. Obendrein, Arrians berühmte Einleitung und das  $\mu\acute{\alpha}\lambda\sigma\tau\alpha$   $\epsilon\pi\omega\mu\alpha\iota$  ... lassen an etwa grundsätzlicher Abhängigkeit in allen Dingen zweifeln. Dann aber bliebe wohl nur eine gewisse Verwandtschaft der Interessen in den Intentionen, die Arrian in seiner Quelle finden zu können glaubte. Das hiesse aber denn doch wohl, in seiner Darstellung müsse Ptolemaios den militärischen, taktischen Sektor herausgearbeitet haben. Dass dieser freilich allein sein Anliegen war, ist nicht gesagt.

Ich glaube nicht, dass die neuerdings wieder diskutierte Frage nach dem Zeitpunkt des ptolemäischen Alexander bei all dem von grossem Belang ist.

An politischen Gründen für eine solche Publikation gab es zu allen Zeiten genug ; den Grad etwa von Altersdebilität des Diadochen nach Amtsübergabe kennen wir nicht, und mit einem Demetrios von Phaleron im Hintergrunde halte ich alles für möglich.

Herr Bosworth hat nun am Beispiel der Andromenessöhne und der Perdikkasrolle bei Ptolemaios recht deutlich die Paradebeispiele herausgearbeitet dafür, in welche Richtung diese Gegenwartsabsichten gegangen sein könnten, dazu etwa passt sein berühmtes Perdikkasbild und anderseits, was er für sich selbst als Assoziationen

anklingen lässt. Viel mehr, fürchte ich, wird sich mit unseren Möglichkeiten auf direktem Wege kaum erarbeiten lassen. So wären es denn zwei Dinge, die auffallen. Das Militärische, m.E. bewusst für den Bereich des Trivialen herausgearbeitet, und das Politische, d.h. die Abqualifizierung von Personen, die Ptolemaios je im Wege gestanden hatten. Indes, erfüllte Ptolemaios möglicherweise mit solcher Darstellung ein literarisches Desiderat, gerade dieser militärische Aspekt liess sich dann sehr wohl als Insinuationsmedium für den zweiten, eben jenen aktuell-politischen, verstehen. Politische Propaganda bestand zu allen Zeiten nicht zuletzt in Verwendung einer Vielfalt von scheinbar frappierenden Möglichkeiten : Was hier sich böte, passte gut zu den anderen Raffinessen, an denen anderen Quellen nach ptolemäische Politik der ersten zwanzig Regierungs-jahre keineswegs arm zu sein scheint.

*M. Errington* : One point about the military aspect of the narratives of Ptolemy and Arrian, for the quality and competence of which both have been so widely praised, seems to emerge from Bosworth's paper, which has much wider implications. If, as now seems probable, Callisthenes was responsible for much of the exaggeration which Bosworth has exposed, then Ptolemy and Arrian, both men with military interests and experience must in turn have taken over quite thoughtlessly (or deliberately) the military nonsense of Callisthenes, some of which was publicly criticised at least as early as Polybius. Thus the value of the narratives, even judged merely as military narratives, seems now to have been made questionable ; and this contributes still further to my doubts as to the mainly military nature of Ptolemy's narrative.

On a different point, Mr. Badian has suggested the possibility that Cleitarchus may have been the eyewitness source whose account Curtius followed for events at Babylon after Alexander's death. I have earlier suggested that this may have been Hieronymus of Cardia, writing on information supplied by Eumenes. Merely to give a name to an eyewitness (in view of the progressive rehabilitation of Cleitarchus) need no longer be a major pre-occupation of

source critics, as long as the central importance of the need to use Curtius here is recognised. Nevertheless I still incline towards Eumenes as being the ultimate source of these chapters, since the hypothesis seems to me to explain best Curtius' apparent knowledge of what the high officers were doing.

*M. Schachermeyr*: Der Ausdruck *Vulgata* stammt aus der Zeit der « Geheimratshistorie », in der man nur den offiziellen Äusserungen bedingungslos glaubte, und alles übrige verdächtigte. Heute wissen wir, dass gerade offizielle und offiziöse Nachrichten als besonders verdächtig zu gelten haben. Ebenso aber auch alles Inoffizielle. Es muss eben alles als *verdächtig* gelten und kritisch untersucht werden. So kann man z.B. auch Aristobul im letzten Buch Arrians mit seinen Nachrichten über Alexander und Babylon nicht ohne Kritik hinnehmen, denn sie wirken wie mündliches Gerede. Ich würde den Gegensatz *Vulgata* — *Nichtvulgata* am liebsten fallen lassen. Ebenso missfällt mir der in neuerer Zeit konstruierte Gegensatz Militärisch (so Ptolemaios und Arrian) zu Nichtmilitärisch (Kallisthenes), denn auch Kallisthenes könnte sich als Historiker (vgl. seine phokische Schrift) für Militärisches interessiert haben und Kleitarch hatte vieles von Offizieren und Technikern. Ich rate daher zu gleichmässiger Kritik bei allen Quellen und rate von einer blinden Ptolemaios-Verherrlichung ab.

*M. Bosworth*: I should like to make a few, somewhat unconnected points. In the first place I agree with Prof. Wirth that Arrian took a very serious view of his literary task. He claims that the subject attracted him because of the inadequacy of the subject required his own special talents. Indeed the success of his work would guarantee his primacy in Greek letters (*Anab.* I 12, 5). But the pretensions are a very different thing from the actual performance, and Arrian can be almost incredibly negligent in his use of sources and in particular his combination of variant authorities. It is difficult to take too seriously an author who can in consecutive sentences place a battalion at different places in the battle line, as Arrian does in the

case of Craterus at the Granicus (I 14, 2-3), or give a double report of an important event such as Craterus' march to Carmania, which is placed at two different places without any attempt to reconcile the variants (VI 15, 5; 17, 3). It is the literary presentation, above all the encomiastic picture of Alexander, which concerns him; scrupulous accuracy in his reproduction of the sources is clearly a secondary matter.

This carelessness on Arrian's part helps in one of the most difficult problems in the dating of the vulgate. Prof. Schachermeyr, Prof. Badian and myself have argued for dating Cleitarchus in the first generation after Alexander's death, in the last decade of the fourth century. The primary obstacle to that dating is the famous vulgate story of Ptolemy's wound at Harmatelia and his cure at the hands of Alexander, enlightened in a dream by a friendly snake (Diod. XVII 103, 7-8; Curt. IX 8, 22 ff.). It is hard to believe that Ptolemy, if he wrote after Cleitarchus, would have passed over such a golden opportunity to commemorate his closeness to Alexander. But the only evidence that he omitted the episode is the fact that it does not occur in Arrian. That is clearly an unsafe deduction given Arrian's general carelessness, and indeed the description of the Indus journey between the Malli town and Patala is one of the most confused episodes in Arrian, with constant oscillation from source to source. He might easily have passed over Ptolemy's account of the stirring events at Harmatelia. At all events silence in Arrian does not guarantee an omission by Ptolemy.

The principal problem facing Alexander historians is to determine the limits of the vulgate and of Ptolemy/Arrian. Criteria for deciding between them can only be established by continuous and rigorous examination of the two traditions, and the yardstick will often be the vague concept of "innere Wahrscheinlichkeit". What is needed is a continuous assessment of the *facts* transmitted by the two traditions, viewed in isolation from their literary and rhetorical presentation and without preconceived notions of their relative value. That, I think, is a principle that everybody here would agree upon.

*M. Wirth*: Eine Frage an Herrn Bosworth wäre es m.E. noch, wie er den Mangel an Hinweisen auf Griechenland bei Arr. *Anab.* III (Jahr 331) sich erklärt, springt das Abbrechen mitten in der Agis-affäre doch geradezu ins Auge. Dass Ptolemaios sich an Callisthenes hielt und über ihn hinaus von Hellas nichts mehr brachte, wäre möglich, gesetzt den Fall, Callisthenes hat alles auf Griechenland Bezugene überhaupt noch in extenso bringen können. Für möglich halte ich, Ptolemaios vermied einfach, was heisses Eisen wohl zu Lebzeiten Alexanders und wohl auch noch bei Abfassung seines Werkes war. Und auch dies liesse sich dann als Politicum verstehen.

Was Arrian betrifft, ich würde dabei sogar so weit gehen, zu behaupten, Unstimmigkeiten, *lapsus calami* und offenkundige Fehler legten nahe, zur eingentlichen Vollendung sei es gar nicht mehr gekommen. Verweise auf die *Indike* widersprächen dem nicht.

*M. Bosworth*: Personally I hardly think the *Anabasis* shows any sign of incompleteness. That is a position only tenable on the hypothesis that the work was produced in Arrian's old age, so that he died before its final revision. If, as the evidence strongly suggests, it was a relatively early work, preceding the *Bithyniaca*, *Parthica*, and the *History of the Successors*, one can only conclude that Arrian himself considered the work a finished product (as its last sentence implies). In that case the inaccuracies and omissions are the result of historical incompetence; they cannot be viewed as symptoms of incompleteness.

It is certainly true that the reports of events in Greece, which are a prominent feature of the narrative of Books II and III, end after Hegelochus' report in Egypt (III 2, 3-7). Arrian never gives us the story of the end of Agis' War and the Macedonian victory at Megalopolis. I tend to think that the incompleteness results from the abrupt termination of Callisthenes' work. As H. Strasburger argued, the reports of events in Greece tend to be presented as reports to Alexander by the officers in charge. Now the report of Megalopolis can hardly have reached Alexander before spring 330, probably too late for incorporation in Callisthenes' work. That

may be over-speculative, but it seems to me certain that the omission of Megalopolis is either the sign of an omission in Arrian's sources or of sheer negligence. It is hardly a sign that the *Anabasis* is incomplete.

*M. Milns* : Mr. Bosworth is correct in emphasising the political aims of Ptolemy's history in the context of the struggles of the successors. But it is necessary to exercise caution lest we give the political aspect an emphasis beyond its due. It is possible that the political justification of himself—and the denigration of his enemies, such as Perdiccas—was only an *incidental* aspect of the work, not the main object, and that Ptolemy was indeed intending to write a more accurate "official" history of the military and administrative aspects of the campaign than had hitherto been done. We may accept the priority of Cleitarchus over Ptolemy and Aristobulus ; but Schachermeyr rightly demonstrates that Cleitarchus' work contains much first-hand information from such eyewitnesses as soldiers and court-officials. This kind of evidence is likely to give a lively, but incomplete picture. Ptolemy, it could be argued, was attempting to correct this tendency by giving the overall and more factually accurate picture of the *course* of events. The incident of the Malli town can only be explained as proof of the priority of Cleitarchus to Ptolemy.

Whilst I am reluctant to accept Bosworth's argument that the *Anabasis* was intended by Arrian to be, as it were, a "trial piece" for his *Bithynian history*, I believe that he rightly emphasizes Arrian's concern with his *style*.

The impression we get, indeed, is frequently that of a transcriber rather than an analytical historian ; and Arrian's reputation as a military man is hardly enhanced by his narrative in the *Anabasis*, especially in such matters as his accuracy in giving troop-details and in describing and holding together the threads of several contemporary events. In general, one receives the impression that Arrian knew and understood as little as, if not less than, we do about the technicalities of Macedonian military and political institutions.

*M. Bosworth*: Other works of Arrian hardly inspire confidence in Arrian's abilities. I am thinking of the *Parthica* in particular, certainly a work of his maturity. If we can trust Photius' summary, it gave a highly romanticised account of the origins of the Arsacid house and it is basically inaccurate. The accounts of Strabo and even Justin are far preferable (as J. Wolski has shown), and attempts to use Arrian result in hopeless confusion.

*M. Schachermeyr*: Ptolemaios wurde m.E. durch folgende Motive zur Afbassung seines Werkes veranlasst:

- 1) Er wollte vielerlei Falsches, was er in der Alexander-Literatur fand, korrigieren und ein militärisch-sachliches Alexander-Bild entwerfen.
- 2) Da die Metaphysik des hellenistischen Königtums (und damit auch seines eigenen Königtums) auf der Metaphysik der Würde Alexanders beruhte, sollte sein Alexander-Bild die hohe und unantastbare Würde des Weltoberers herausstellen. Der Welt sollte ein offizieller Alexander (ganz ohne Intimes und ohne private oder sonstige Schwächen) gezeigt werden.
- 3) Das Werk sollte auch den Aufstieg des Generalstäblers Ptolemaios in v o r n e h m e r Weise und ohne Übertreibungen anschaulich machen.
- 4) Bei dieser Gelegenheit konnte auch einiges Missgünstiges gegenüber Perdikkas und anderen eingeflochten werden.

*M. Schwarzenberg*: Mr. Bosworth suggests Arrian's use of Callisthenes for passages in which the dangers and difficulties overcome by Alexander are exaggerated. Indeed he is likely to have heightened Tyre's walls and increased the enemy's losses to an improbable, an impossible extent.

Mr. Bosworth sees in these gross exaggerations so much propaganda demanded by Alexander to counter disaffection in Greece.

Now the heroic nature of Callisthenes' epic prose was apparent not only in the assimilation of his characters and situations to those

of Homer, but also in the size of his landscape and the number of the slain. Callisthenes took the liberties demanded by his encomiastic genre.

To see reasons of state behind such simple fun seems to me far-fetched.

*M. Bosworth*: I would not disagree that the Callisthenean picture of Alexander results from the man's literary ambitions. If Arrian's statement of his intentions (as is likely) is derived ultimately from the preface of the Πράξεις Ἀλεξάνδρου (cf. Arr. IV 10, 1), there is no doubt that his work was blatantly and overtly encomiastic. But I cannot believe that Alexander was indifferent to events in Greece. Arrian repeatedly stresses his suspicions of both Athens and Sparta (cf. I 18, 8; 29, 6; II 15, 5; III 6, 3), and suggests that he felt it necessary to intimidate the cities of Greece. What is more, Alexander of all men should have known how acutely his constant demands for reinforcements had affected Macedonian reserves of manpower. At least in 331 Antipater had serious difficulty in raising an army to meet the crisis in the Peloponnese. Under those circumstances there was an immediate practical purpose in emphasizing that 8000 Tyrians could be killed for the loss of 20 hypaspists, and Alexander doubtless encouraged his historian to underline the point.

*M. Errington*: One must consider the potential audiences for whom the authors were writing. It must surely be the case that Callisthenes, whatever his ultimate objectives in writing and whatever form the final work would have taken, intended his purple passages—I am thinking particularly of the Homeric colouring of events in Asia Minor—to be read in the first instance for the entertainment of Alexander himself.

In the case of Ptolemy the question is more difficult and touches on the problem of the character of the whole work. However, what is perhaps more important for the history of Alexander than the question when the work was actually written are the clear indications in Arrian, which Bosworth's paper has again emphasized, that at

least part of Ptolemy's purpose was personal and justificatory, in at least this limited sense therefore political. But since the work was clearly not a political pamphlet with an obvious flagrant message which could be quickly reacted to, we should perhaps seek this political context in Alexandria, where the legitimacy of Ptolemy's rule through his connection with—or at least importance under—Alexander most needed to be asserted (and where his book was most likely to be read and his version of events to find acceptance). This means therefore that the book was written at a time when this need was still deeply felt ; and an earlier rather than a later date during his period of rule still seems to me most likely.

*M. Hurst* : Une question plus nettement littéraire, mais qui a son importance pour l'histoire et se situe dans l'axe d'un certain nombre de remarques faites à propos du style d'Arrien : certes, on aimerait disposer d'une œuvre théorique d'Arrien lui-même sur l'art d'écrire (dans ce sens, on a plus de chance avec Plutarque : on pourrait se risquer, non sans résultats, à lire sa *Vie d'Alexandre* à la lumière du *De audiendis poetis*, par exemple) ; pourtant, il existe peut-être une direction indiquée involontairement par Arrien lui-même. Le défi sur lequel se termine sa préface fait irrésistiblement songer à la remarque fondamentale d'Aristote sur le style : διαφέρει γάρ τι πρὸς τὸ δηλῶσαι ὡδὶ η̄ ὡδὶ εἰπεῖν (*Rh.* 1404 a 9-10). D'autres indices pointeraient encore, semble-t-il, vers une influence de l'art poétique des péripatéticiens ; mais peu importe : nous sommes ramenés à l'importance du μῦθος dans la *Poétique*, et c'est là que j'aimerais en venir. Entre le fait « pur » que voudrait atteindre l'historien et l'analyse de la λέξις d'Arrien, sur laquelle on a beaucoup écrit, il y a peut-être place pour un examen des μῦθοι, des schèmes littéraires à grande échelle (par opposition à l'examen des figures rhétoriques), dans la mesure où l'on peut en déceler de constants (le professeur Bosworth indique pratiquement cette voie lorsqu'il décèle une περιπέτεια par exemple). Ce qui est incohérence aux yeux de l'historien ne pourrait-il pas en définitive se révéler, chez un écrivain aussi conscient de son

art, comme le résultat d'une prééminence de l'écrit et de ses contraintes propres, sur l'observation et l'expérience ?

*M. Bosworth* : One would dearly like to know how far Arrian has transformed the raw material of his source in the compilation of his work. But, unlike Lucian, he has given us no historiographical principles, and in the absence of his primary sources there is no possibility of carrying out the sort of detailed analysis which is possible with Polybius and Livy. M. Hurst has certainly raised an important question, but given the deficiencies of the source tradition, no answer is possible, even in principle.

## II

FRITZ SCHACHERMEYR

### ALEXANDER UND DIE UNTERWORFENEN NATIONEN

Als ich gebeten wurde, über das Thema « Alexander und die unterworfenen Nationen » zu sprechen, war es mir von vornherein klar, dass hier verschiedene Betrachtungsweisen möglich wären. So könnten wir die Frage stellen, wie Alexander die unterworfenen Völker organisierte und verwaltete, was auf eine Besprechung der verschiedenen Satrapien und Verwaltungsbezirke hinausliefe. Dabei würde es sich aber um einen so vielbearbeiteten und abgedroschenen Stoff handeln<sup>1</sup>, dass ich dafür kaum Ihre Aufmerksamkeit erbitten dürfte.

Ich könnte aber auch die Frage aufwerfen, wie sich die verschiedenen Nationen ihrerseits zu Alexander verhielten und ich glaube, dass das eine neue und interessante Fragestellung wäre. Leider mangelt es mir zu ihrer Beantwortung aber an hinreichendem Material<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Über die Verwaltung des Alexanderreiches hat schon C. F. LEHMANN-HAUPT, in *RE* II A 1, s.v. Satrap, 138 ff., vortrefflich gehandelt; nachher auch H. BERVE *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage* (abgekürzt BERVE) (München 1926), 253 ff., und unter den Neueren E. BADIAN, in *Greece and Rome* 12 (1965), 166 ff.; ferner P. A. BRUNT, *ibid.*, 205 ff., und C. BRADFORD WELLES, *ibid.*, 216 ff.; s. ausserdem G. T. GRIFFITH, in *PCPhS* 10 (1964), 23 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Hierfür bedürfte es entsprechender Spezialkenntnisse der einschlägigen Texte in Hieroglyphen und Keilschrift.

So möchte ich hier lieber nur eine dritte Frage stellen und auch beantworten: Wie hat sich Alexander selbst in seiner Eigenschaft als Eroberer zu den einzelnen unterworfenen Völkerschaften, ja zu der Idee der Untertanenschaft verhalten? Mit dieser Frage beschäftige ich mich um so lieber, als es mir bei ihrer Behandlung möglich erscheint, über das, was ich in meinem letzten Alexander-Buche geboten habe<sup>1</sup>, noch hinaus zu kommen und damit einiges Neues zu bieten. Ich habe mich in den letzten fünf Jahren zwar kaum mehr mit Alexander beschäftigen können<sup>2</sup>, bekam aber gerade hierdurch einen fruchtbaren Abstand und konnte aus diesem Abstand die hier vorliegende Problematik viel schärfer fassen als bisher.

Ausscheiden muss ich dabei im Augenblick das Verhältnis des Herrschers zu den Makedonen, mit denen er als argeadischer Volkskönig durch heilige Gewohnheitsrechte<sup>3</sup> verbunden war.

Ausscheiden muss ich vorerst aber auch die Hellenen, soweit sie dem Korinthischen Bunde angehörten, und daher den Anspruch erheben konnten, « hegemonisch » behandelt zu werden. Auch von den untertänigen Balkanvölkern soll hier nicht gesprochen werden, da die Zeit nicht hinreicht und wir auch zu wenig darüber wissen. Zudem fand hier Alexander deren Verwaltung ohnehin schon von Philipp vorgeformt<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Ich habe drei Bücher über Alexander veröffentlicht, zuerst *Alexander der Grosse, Ingenium und Macht* (Salzburg 1949), dann *Alexander in Babylon und die Reichsordnung nach seinem Tode* (Wien 1970) (abgekürzt *Al. in Babylon*) und schliesslich *Alexander der Grosse. Das Problem seiner Persönlichkeit und seines Wirkens* (Wien 1973) (abgekürzt *Al. Persönlichkeit u. Wirken*).

<sup>2</sup> Meine Arbeitskraft wurde inzwischen durch das dreibändige Werk *Ägäische Frühzeit* in Anspruch genommen, dessen erster Band anfangs 1976 veröffentlicht wurde, während sich der zweite Band gegenwärtig im Satz befindet.

<sup>3</sup> Dass die Makedonen über kein richtiges Staatsrecht verfügten, hatte ich einst-mals, in *Klio* 19 (1925), 435 ff., noch nicht begriffen. Vgl. meine Richtigstellung in *Al. in Babylon*, 140 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Zur Verwaltung von Thrakien vgl. BERVE, 227 f. Doch haben wir zu beachten, dass einzelne Balkanvölker mit ihren Dynastien eine bevorzugte Stellung einnahmen. Letzteres gilt vor allem von den Agrianen und ihrem Fürsten Langaros.

Was uns hier vorerst also allein beschäftigen soll, ist die Frage, wie sich der Herrscher zu den von ihm selbst in Asien und in Afrika neu unterworfenen Nationen und Völkerschaften stellte.

Zuerst wollen wir überlegen, ob und in welcher Weise der Jüngling Alexander auf diese Aufgabe vorbereitet war. Dass er sich in dieser Hinsicht etwa von den Meinungen seines Vaters oder des makedonischen Hofes beeinflussen liess, möchte ich nicht glauben<sup>1</sup>. Dafür war er zu eigenwillig. Die Anregungen, denen er sich aufschloss, kamen vielmehr von griechischer Seite, vor allem von Aristoteles.

Freilich treffen wir dabei auf mancherlei vorgeformte Tatbestände. Müssen wir doch bedenken, wie sehr sich damals Philosophen und Rhetoren bemühten, die Fürsten und deren Söhne «im guten Regieren» zu unterweisen. Immer war es dabei die Idee des «Wohltuns», die man als Ziel voranstellte. Der Fürst möge sich als «Euergetes» bewähren und so sich legitimieren. Dafür ist damals ein eigenes literarisches Genos entstanden, das seine Stellung zwischen Parainese und Enkomion fand<sup>2</sup>.

Was freilich die Lehren des Aristoteles anbetrifft, so können wir mit Sicherheit annehmen, dass es sich dabei nicht um das billige Moralin der Rhetoren handelte und dass der Philosoph dem Knaben vor allem die *'Αρετή* als höchste Herrschertugend

<sup>1</sup> Der engere Freundeskreis des jungen Alexanders umfasste vor allem griechische Jünglinge wie Nearchos, Laomedon und Erigyios, deren Väter wohl von Philipp in den makedonischen Adelsstand aufgenommen worden waren. Dazu nur noch der Elimote Harpalos, als richtige Makedonen aber allein der Eordäer Ptolemaios und Hephaistion. Mit dem makedonischen Hochadel stand sich der Prinz nicht zum besten und von seinem Vater wird er wohl überhaupt keine Ratschläge angenommen haben, seitdem dieser sich von Olympias getrennt hatte.

<sup>2</sup> Zum Enkomion vgl. O. CRUSIUS, in *RE* V 2, 2581 ff.; zum Euergetes vgl. J. OEHLER, in *RE* VI 1, 978 ff.

vor Augen stellte. Hatte er diese doch auch in seinem *Gedicht auf Hermias* so sehr verherrlicht<sup>1</sup>.

Aristoteles empfand zur Zeit der Ermordung des Hermias den Gegensatz zur persischen Welt ganz stark. Wir würden uns daher nicht wundern, wenn in seinen Lehren schon damals die Scheidung von Hellenen und Barbaren bereits in dem Sinne angeklungen wäre, dass man die einen ἡγεμονικῶς, die andern aber δεσποτικῶς zu behandeln habe. Später hat er dann in dem bekannten Sendschreiben diesen Gegensatz noch in aller Schärfe herausgearbeitet<sup>2</sup>.

Es will mir aber als sicher erscheinen, dass sich auch ein Aristoteles dem allgemeinen Trend nicht entziehen konnte, dem Prinzen neben der Ἀρετή noch das « Wohltun » ans Herz zu legen<sup>3</sup>, zumal diesem ja auch von anderen Ratgebern solches

<sup>1</sup> Zu Hermias und seinem Gedicht vgl. Arist. Fr. 675 Rose ; Athen. XV 696 a-e ; Diog. Laert. V 6 ff., wozu meine Ausführungen in *Al. Persönlichkeit u. Wirken*, 85 f. ; weiter U. von WILAMOWITZ-MOELLENDORFF, *Aristoteles und Athen* II (Berlin 1893), 405 ff. ; W. JAEGER, *Aristoteles* (Berlin 1923), 117 ff. ; S. M. STERN, *Aristotle on the World-State* (Oxford 1968) ; G. GLOTZ - P. ROUSSEL - R. COHEN, *Histoire Grecque* IV 1, 2. Aufl. (Paris 1945), 19 ff. ; E. BADIAN, “Alexander the Great 1948-1967”, in *CW* 65 (1971-2), 42 ; M. BROCKER, *Aristoteles als Alexanders Lehrer in der Legende*, Diss. Bonn (1966). Zum Tod des Hermias vgl. u.a. P. Von der MÜHLL, in *RE* Suppl.-Bd III 1126 ff. ; F. WÜST, *Philip II. von Makedonien und Griechenland* (München 1938), 63 ; D. E. W. WORMELL, in *YCL* 5 (1935), 55 ff. Gegen die « Barbaren » wandte sich in diesem Zusammenhang auch Kallisthenes, *FGrH* 124 F 2.

<sup>2</sup> Zu diesem Sendschreiben vgl. Arist. Fr. 658 Rose ; vgl. auch *Pol.* 1252 b 9 ; 1285 a 20 ; ferner E. BUCHNER, in *Hermes* 82 (1954), 378 ff. Hegemonisch wurden im allgemeinen Bundesgenossen, despatisch aber Untertanen behandelt. Dass die Warnung des Aristoteles gerade im Hinblick auf die Zwangsansiedlungen griechischer Söldner in der Schrift ὑπὲρ ἀποίκων erfolgte, hat V. EHRENBERG, *Alexander and the Greeks* (Oxford 1938), 85 ff. wahrscheinlich gemacht. Neuerdings suchen E. BADIAN, in *Historia* 7 (1958), 442 und Anm. 76, und J. R. HAMILTON, *Plutarch Alexander. A Commentary* (Oxford 1969), 17 ff., die erwähnte Schrift viel früher zu datieren.

<sup>3</sup> Vgl. dazu meine Ausführungen in *Al. Persönlichkeit u. Wirken*, 82 ff. Zur Erziehung Alexanders durch Aristoteles äusserte sich in höchst bedeutsamer Weise Isokrates, *Ep.* 5. Dabei handelt es sich letzten Endes um den damals so erbittert geführten Streit zwischen philosophischen und rhetorischen Erziehern. Vgl. dazu u.a. U. von WILAMOWITZ, *Aristoteles und Athen* II, 398 f., und Ph. MERLAN, in

immer wieder empfohlen worden sein dürfte. Denn an Alexander hatte schon Isokrates geschrieben, nachher gilt solches von Theopomp, Xenokrates und sicher auch von vielen anderen<sup>1</sup>.

Ich möchte nun meinen — und das kommt in meinem Alexander-Buche noch nicht hinreichend zum Ausdruck —, dass diese Griechenlehre des Wohltuns für Alexanders weitere Entwicklung von höchster, ja entscheidender Bedeutung wurde. Dabei handelte es sich um gar keine makedonische Vorstellung, denn makedonische Ritter waren viel zu stolz, um auf fürstliche Wohltaten anzustehen. Es handelte sich vielmehr um ein hellenisches Herrscherideal, das mit den hellenischen Soter-Vorstellungen zusammenhing. Nur hat Alexander dieses Ideal in den turbulenten Jahren nach seinem Regierungsantritt noch kaum zu betätigen vermocht.

Als er aber den Hellespont überschritt, da sollte diese Idee, er käme als «Wohltäter» für seinen ganzen Reichsgedanken und dessen Romantik durchaus zu einem tragenden Pfeiler werden. Weit mehr als früher ein griechischer Fürst, weit mehr auch als etwa ein Grosskönig, wollte Alexander zum grossen «Wohltäter» werden<sup>2</sup>.

*Historia* 3 (1954-5), 60 ff. Verfehlt scheint mir die Abhandlung von A. H. CHROUST, in *Classical Folia* 18 (1964), 26 ff. zu sein. Für Philipp stand bei der Berufung die Erziehung des Thronfolgers im Vordergrund. Ich kann somit der einseitigen Betonung des aussenpolitischen Momentes durch W. JAEGER, *Aristoteles*, 121, und auch durch BERVE II 70 nicht beistimmen. Gewiss spielte es mit einer Rolle, doch war es nicht die Hauptsache. Richtig schon V. EHRENBERG, *Alexander and the Greeks*, 62, und jetzt J. R. HAMILTON, *Plutarch Alexander*, 17.

<sup>1</sup> Isokrates schrieb an den Kronprinzen Alexander nur ganz kurz: *Ep.* 5. Zum Sendschreiben, das Theopomp bereits an Alexander als König gerichtet hat, vgl. *FGrH* 115 T 8 und F 250 ff.; zu Xenokrates vgl. BERVE II 281, Nr. 576.

<sup>2</sup> Alexander tritt uns als Euergetes vor allem durch seine verschiedenen Wohltaten entgegen, ohne dass in den Quellen m.W. der Ausdruck Euergetes fällt. Doch betonte er seine Bereitschaft zum Wohltun bereits in seinem Schreiben an den Grosskönig (Arr. II 14, 8). Vgl. weiter das Moment des Wohltuns in seiner Rede in Indien (Arr. V 26, 8) und zu Opis (Arr. VII 9, 2 ff., wo er sogar noch auf die von seinem Vater geleisteten Wohltaten verweist). Davon könnte manches authentisch (über Ptolemaios!) in den Arriantext gekommen sein.

Aber schon am Hellespont stellte es sich heraus, dass der junge Fürst für seine Pläne noch einen zweiten Pfeiler aufrichten würde. Solches hat er mit grosser symbolischer Geste schon dort statuiert: Als sich sein Schiff der Küste Asiens näherte, da schleuderte er den Speer in den Strand und betrat ihn als Erster, also zum Zeichen, dass dieses Land nun, soweit er käme, ein von ihm erobertes Land sein werde, eine  $\chi\omega\rho\alpha \delta\sigma\rho\kappa\tau\eta\tau\varsigma$ <sup>1</sup>. Alles, was er mit seinem Eroberer-Speer an Ländern unterwürfe, das wäre nun seine Kriegsbeute und werde nach göttlichem Ratschluss zu seinem Besitz. Er könne damit tun, was er wolle, und niemand dürfe sich dem widersetzen. Es gäbe nur eines, sich mit ihm zu vertragen, nämlich absoluten Gehorsam zu leisten.

Zwar hatte Isokrates einst (V (*Philipp.*) 154) dem Vater Philipp geraten: « Mögest du die Einheimischen von ihrer barbarischen Despotie befreien und der hellenischen Fürsorge teilhaftig machen ». Alexander glaubte aber mit dem Wohltun doch eine Forderung nach absolutem Gehorsam verbinden zu müssen, denn sein Reich sollte auf beiden Säulen stehen. Was sich aus diesem Konnex ergab, war Alexanders Idee des Wohltuns ohne Widerspruch, eines Wohltuns, das er zugleich als eine höhere Weisheit, ja als Liebe empfunden haben mag. Hierdurch verband

<sup>1</sup> Diod. XVII 17, 1 ff.; Arr. I 11, 6 f.; Plut. *Alex.* 15, 7; Iust. XI 5, 10 f. Bei Arrian steht nichts vom Speerwurf, doch legte der Herrscher darauf Gewicht, als erster und bewaffnet vom Schiff aus den asiatischen Boden zu betreten. Wenn Alexander den Speerwurf als symbolische Geste ausgeführt hat, wollte er natürlich, dass die Welt davon Kenntnis erhielt. Ich möchte daher meinen, dass alles, was uns in diesem Zusammenhang von Alexanders *pietas* berichtet wird, auf Kallisthenes zurückgeht. Auf die Tatsache, dass ihm alles eroberte Land durch die Gnade der Götter zuteil geworden sei, weist Alexander bereits in seinem Brief an Dareios hin (Arr. II 14, 7), also noch vor dem Bescheid durch Zeus Ammon. Wir erkennen daraus, dass der Speerwurf, wenn er erfolgt ist, ganz generell auf alle Eroberungen Bezug haben sollte. Zu seiner Symbolik vgl. vor allem H. U. INSTINSKY, *Alexander der Große am Hellespont* (Godesberg 1949); weiter A. AYMARD, in *REG* 64 (1951), 499 ff.; F. W. WALBANK, in *JHS* 70 (1950), 79 ff., und L. PEARSON, *The Lost Histories of Alexander* (London 1960), 9 ff.

sich das Wohltun des Euergetes mit der Despotie des Eroberers und mit der Sendung des Weltbeglückers. Worin die künftigen Wohltaten und ihre Beglückungen bestehen würden, das habe allein Alexander zu bestimmen. Das ist so ziemlich die einfachste Formel, auf die ich Alexanders Wirken zu bringen vermag, doch scheint sie mir sein Wesen und Werk einigermassen erschöpfend zu umfassen.

Im folgenden möchte ich nun zeigen, dass dieser Gedanke des zwar irgendwie liebenden, aber despotischen Wohltuns in Alexander selbst einer gewissen Entwicklung vom bloss-aktuellen zu einer umfassenden Reichs- und Civilisationsidee unterlag, und gerade das möchte ich Ihnen in diesem Vortrag darlegen.

Eins muss ich vorher aber noch feststellen : Diese Idee des gewaltsamen Wohltuns lag gar nicht im Rahmen des griechischen Herrscherwohltuns, sondern war ihm entgegengesetzt. Es widersprach sowohl der griechischen Freiheitsidee wie dem Hegemoniegedanken und mochte allein für Barbaren angemessen erscheinen. Alexander hat damit also erst jenseits des Hellespont begonnen. Wie hat er hier aber diese seine Idee im Laufe seines Feldzugs zu verwirklichen versucht?

In Kleinasien übernahm er, als wäre das selbstverständlich, die persische Satrapenorganisation, nur setzte er als Satrapen nun Makedonen ein. Dem Wohltun wollte er aber auf zweierlei Art gerecht werden, einmal ganz allgemein durch aktuelle Wohltaten als Euergetes, dann aber auch, indem er sich als « Befreier » aufspielte.

Zuerst galt diese Befreiung den Kleinasiatischen Griechen. Ärgerlicherweise wollten sich aber weite griechische Kreise gar nicht befreien lassen. Nicht nur die hellenischen Söldner in persischen Diensten hielten am Grosskönig und an ihren ohnehin meistens griechischen Kommandanten fest, auch die oligarchischen Kreise in den Städten wollten die ihnen durchaus sympathische Herrschaft der feudalen Perser keineswegs mit einer ihnen weitaus unsympathischeren makedonischen Fremd-

herrschaft vertauschen<sup>1</sup>. Nur die Masse der kleinen Leute hoffte durch Alexander zur Macht zu gelangen<sup>2</sup>. Darum liessen sie sich auch befreien.

Wie schon angedeutet, sollten sich zu diesen Befreiungen aber auch aktuelle Wohltaten des Euergetes gesellen. In Ilion hatte sich das wohl in recht erfreulicher Weise verwirklichen lassen<sup>3</sup>. Was aber Alexander in Ionien als Pläne ins Auge fasste, kostete allzuviel Geld und Alexanders Kassen waren dermassen leer, dass er es war, der die Griechenstädte nun auspressen musste<sup>4</sup>. Natürlich hätte er gerne geweiht, geschenkt und gestiftet, aber das musste alles auf später verschoben werden, so auch die Neugründung von Smyrna und die Durchstechung der Halbinsel von Erythrai<sup>5</sup>. Gerne hätte sich Alexander die Stiftung des neuerbauten Artemis-Tempels von Ephesos zugeschrieben, aber das schlügen ihm die Bürger ab und machten ihn lieber selber zum Gott<sup>6</sup>. Nur die Umsiedlung von Priene und die Anlage des Damms nach Klazomenai wurden dann tatsächlich ausgeführt<sup>7</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Oligarchische Regimenter unter persischem Schutz bei Arr. I 17, 10; 18, 2; vgl. BERVE I 249.

<sup>2</sup> Zur Bevorzugung der Demokratie durch Alexander vgl. u.a. Arr. I 17, 10; 18, 2; vgl. BERVE I 249 f.

<sup>3</sup> Dass Ilion bereits durch Alexander seine ersten Benefizien erhielt, ergibt sich aus Strab. XIII 1, 25-26, p. 593; vgl. auch Diod. XVIII 4, 5; weiter J. KAERST, *Geschichte des Hellenismus* I, 3. Aufl. (Berlin/Leipzig 1927), 347 f.; Ernst MEYER, *Die Grenzen der hellenistischen Staaten in Kleinasien* (Göttingen/Zürich 1925), 11; Th. LENSCHAU, in *Klio* 33 (1940), 222; W. LEAF, *Troy* (London 1912); J. M. COOK, *The Troad. An archaeological and topographical study* (Oxford 1973), 364.

<sup>4</sup> Über den Geldmangel Alexanders vgl. Arr. VII 9, 6; I 20, 1; 26, 3; 26, 5; 27, 4; Onesikrit, *FGrH* 134 F 2; Aristobul, *FGrH* 139 F 4. Vgl. auch R. ANDREOTTI, in *Saeculum* 8 (1957), 124 Anm. 14.

<sup>5</sup> Zum Plan der Neugründung von Smyrna: Paus. VII 5, 2. Zur Durchstechung der Mimas-Halbinsel: Plin. *Nat.* V 116; Paus. II 1, 5.

<sup>6</sup> Zu Alexander und dem Artemis-Tempel: Arr. I 17, 10; 18, 2; Strab. XIV 1, 22, p. 641.

<sup>7</sup> Zum Damm von Klazomenai: Plin. *Nat.* V 117. Zur Umsiedlung von Priene: A. ASBOECK, *Das Staatswesen von Priene in hellenistischer Zeit*, Diss. München (1913), 1 ff.

Was aber für die Zukunft das Entscheidende war, die ionischen Städte wurden, so weit ich sehe, gar nicht dem Korinthischen Bunde angeschlossen, sondern sie blieben, da auf  $\chi\omega\rho\alpha\delta\sigma\rho\kappa\tau\eta\tau\omega\zeta$ , im Kreis der Untertanen und unter Alexanders Verwaltung<sup>1</sup>. Nur wurden sie nicht mit den Satrapien zusammen verwaltet, sondern erhielten als Hellenen eine eigene Organisation. Auch mussten sie weiterhin Abgaben zahlen, die man anscheinend aber nicht mehr als «Tribute», sondern als «Beiträge» bezeichnete<sup>2</sup>. So wurden die Ionier nur vom «Perserjoch» befreit, nicht aber von Alexander. Doch liess er sich gerne von ihnen in die Reihe der Götter erheben, das mochte ihnen ihr Los erleichtern<sup>3</sup>.

Um eine Art von Befreiung bemühte er sich aber auch in Lydien und in Karien. In Lydien schränkte er die Kompetenzen der neuen makedonischen Satrapen gegenüber denen der persischen Statthalter beträchtlich ein<sup>4</sup>, auch wurde Sardeis als Kultzentrum begünstigt und zur Reichsfestung erhoben<sup>5</sup>. Den

<sup>1</sup> Diese meine Auffassung ist allerdings umstritten. Vgl. dazu u.a. F. MILTNER, in *Klio* 26 (1932), 43 ff.; E. KORNEMANN, *Weltgeschichte des Mittelmeer-Raumes* I (München 1948), 105 f.; E. BICKERMANN, in *REG* 47 (1934), 346 ff.; V. EHRENBURG, *Alexander and the Greeks*, 1 ff.; G. TIBILETTI, in *Athenaeum* 32 (1954), 3 ff.; C. A. ROBINSON Jr., in *Hesperia Suppl.* 8 (1949), 299 f.; H. GALLET DE SANTERRE, in *BCH* 71-72 (1947-48), 302-6; W. W. TARN, *Alexander the Great* II 228 ff.; H. BENGTSON, in *Philologus* 92 (1937), 137 ff.; G. WIRTH, in *Chiron* 2 (1972), 91 ff. Die gegenteilige Meinung vertritt vor allem E. BADIAN, in *Ancient Society and Institutions = Studies presented to V. Ehrenberg* (Oxford 1966), 37 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Arr. I 17, 10; 18, 2 gebraucht allerdings den Ausdruck  $\phi\delta\rho\omega\zeta$  weiter. Vgl. aber Fr. HILLER VON GAERTRINGEN, *Inscriptions von Priene* (Berlin 1906), Nr. 1, 14 (S. 4), und M. N. TOD, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions* II (Oxford 1948), Nr. 184 f. Dass diese Beiträge, wie W. W. TARN, *Alexander ...* I 35 annimmt, nur dem panhellenischen Racheckrieg galten, scheint mir unwahrscheinlich, denn dann hätte Alexander die Abgaben von Ephesos nicht dem Artemis-Tempel überweisen können.

<sup>3</sup> Zur Heroisierung Alexanders in Ionien vgl. BERVE I 252 und unsere Anm. 1 S. 78. Für Ephesos ergibt sie sich aus Strab. XIV 1, 22, p. 641.

<sup>4</sup> Arr. I 17, 4 ff. Vgl. dazu schon BERVE I 255. Es wurde die Finanzverwaltung abgetrennt und sowohl Sardeis wie Ionien von der Satrapie abgelöst.

<sup>5</sup> Sardeis als Kultzentrum und Reichsfestung: Arr. I 17, 5 ff.; Diod. XVII 21, 7.

persischen Grundbesitz dürfte man abgeschafft haben, auch wurde die lydische Sprache in der Verwaltung neu belebt. Alexander scheint im einzelnen lokale Verwaltungen begünstigt zu haben<sup>1</sup>.

In Karien ernannte er die einheimische Fürstin Ada zum Statthalter und liess sich von ihr adoptieren. Das sicherte ihm nach mutterrechtlichen Vorstellungen die persönliche Nachfolge<sup>2</sup>. Hier trat er also zum ersten Mal die Nachfolge in einer einheimischen Dynastie an, ein Modus des « Wohltuns », der uns noch öfter begegnen wird.

Wie schon in Lydien suchte sich Alexander also auch in Karien um eine Neubelebung nationaler und lokaler Traditionen verdient zu machen. Auch zeigte er sich überall den Heiligtümern und ihren Priestern besonders freundlich und gnädig gesinnt. Vor allem Branchidai zog daraus seinen Nutzen und zeigte sich nachher dankbar<sup>3</sup>. In der Folgezeit begünstigte er gleichfalls allenthalben die heimischen Kulte und so erfuhr auch die Tempelherrschaft von Jerusalem durch Alexander keinerlei Beeinträchtigung.

Auf seinem weiteren Marsch durch Kleinasien begnügte sich Alexander mit der freiwilligen Unterwerfung der Landschaften<sup>4</sup>, wobei er nur in Grossphrygien eine richtige Satrapien-Verwaltung einrichtete. Was uns besonders auffällt, ist die Tatsache, dass Alexander nirgends im barbarischen Kleinasien oder nachher in Syrien daran gedacht hat, Städte zu gründen und mit

<sup>1</sup> Vgl. Arr. I 17, 4. Inschriften in lydischer Sprache finden sich gerade auch in der Zeit seit Alexander. Die iranischen Barone mögen ihre Rittergüter schon nach der Schlacht am Granikos verlassen haben.

<sup>2</sup> Alexander in Karien : vgl. Arr. I 23, 7 f. ; BERVE I 255.

<sup>3</sup> Zum Aufleben von Branchidai im Zusammenhang mit dem Alexanderzug vgl. Kallisthenes, *FGrH* 124 F 14. Darum schaltete sich das Orakel sogleich auch ein, als Alexander von Gott Ammon zu dessen Sohn erklärt wurde; vgl. Kallisthenes, *ibid.*, und meine Bemerkungen in *Al. Persönlichkeit u. Wirken*, 248 Anm. 276.

<sup>4</sup> Zur Satrapie von Grossphrygien vgl. Arr. I 29, 3 ; zu Paphlagonien Arr. II 4, 1 ; zu Kappadokien Arr. II 4, 2 ; zu Sabikta vgl. BERVE II 348, Nr. 690.

Griechen zu besiedeln<sup>1</sup>. In früheren Zeiten hatte man von griechischer Seite die Gewinnung Kleinasiens gerade unter solchen Aspekten propagiert. Den griechischen Emigranten und überhaupt allen Auswanderungswilligen sollte auf diese Weise eine neue Heimat geboten werden. Alexander scheint diesen Gedanken aber nicht weiter verfolgt zu haben, sodass wir jetzt schon den Eindruck gewinnen, er habe das Hellenenvolk wohl als Kulturträger besonders geschätzt, habe aber die aristotelische Scheidung von Hellenen und Barbaren damals bereits aufgegeben. Daher war er bereit, auch den Phoinikern alsbald ähnliche Freiheiten und eine ähnliche Sonderstellung zu gewähren wie den Ioniern<sup>2</sup>, ja er tolerierte dort auch einheimische Dynastien. Nur Tyros musste seinen Zorn um so schwerer verspüren, wollte es sich doch Alexanders Gewaltrecht als  $\chiώρα δορίκτητος$  entziehen und den absoluten Gehorsam verweigern<sup>3</sup>.

In Ägypten kam es Alexander ganz besonders darauf an, als Befreier aufgefasst zu werden<sup>4</sup>. Hier hatte man immer wieder

<sup>1</sup> Nach der Schlacht von Issos könnte Alexander vorübergehend den Gedanken gefasst haben, im Bereich des späteren Alexandrette eine Stadt zu gründen, doch hat er einen solchen Plan nicht weiterverfolgt. Allerdings wäre nicht ganz ausgeschlossen, dass die ptolemäisch eingestellte Literatur (Kleitarch, Ptolemaios) die Anweisungen zur Gründung einer Stadt zugunsten von Alexandria unterdrückte. Aber Kallisthenes müsste eine solche Nachricht immerhin geboten haben. Vgl. übrigens auch BERVE I 291.

<sup>2</sup> Zur Organisation von Phoinikien vgl. Arr. III 6, 4; BERVE I 284 ff., und meine Ausführungen in *Al. Persönlichkeit u. Wirken*, 220; 258 ff. Der Unterschied zu Ionen könnte vielleicht darin bestanden haben, dass die Phoiniker weiterhin Tribute und keine Abgaben zahlten, doch haben wir damit zu rechnen, dass die Formulierung bei Arrian III 6, 4 in ähnlicher Weise ungenau war wie I 17, 10.

<sup>3</sup> Wenn Tyros sich weigerte, einem Verlangen des Eroberers nachzukommen und somit als ein dem Herrscher gleichgestellter Partner angesehen werden wollte, so erkannte es die Auffassung Alexanders, dass sie zur  $\chiώρα δορίκτητος$  gehörte, nicht an. Daher die Erbitterung Alexanders.

<sup>4</sup> Über Alexander und Ägypten grundlegend V. EHRENBURG, *Polis und Imperium* (Zürich/Stuttgart 1965), 402 ff.; *Ost und West* (Brünn 1935), 155 ff. Zu meiner Auffassung vgl. *Al. Persönlichkeit u. Wirken*, 233 ff.; 256 ff. In seiner Eigenschaft als nationaler Befreier empfingen ihn dann die Priester, wozu Arr. III 1, 4 und

gegen die persische Herrschaft revoltiert und hatten sich des öfteren libysche Pharaonen gegen die Heere des Grosskönigs behauptet. Darum war für Alexander vor allem die Gewinnung der Priesterschaften wichtig, um so der pharaonischen Weihen teilhaftig zu werden. Hierdurch wurde er in der Tat dann zum Pharao und nationalen Herrscher. Für die Verwaltung des Landes zog er Makedonen überhaupt nicht heran, sondern vor allem in Ägypten geborene Griechen und Ägypter<sup>1</sup>. Durch die Gründung von Alexandria hoffte er das Land enger an sein Reich heranzuziehen und gedachte hier eine grosse Reichszentrale erstehen zu lassen<sup>2</sup>.

In Ägypten kündigte sich mit der Gründung von Alexandria aber eine ganz neue Form des Wohltuns erstmalig mit Deutlichkeit an. Bisher hatte sich der Herrscher um aktuelle Akte dieses Wohltuns bemüht, von denen er aber nur wenige verwirklichen konnte, da es ihm an Zeit und Geld mangelte. So verblieben seine Absichten im dauernden Zustand der Planung. In der hierfür zuständigen Abteilung seiner Kanzlei häuften sich solche Hypomnemata in Gestalt von Entwürfen, Projekten, Kostenvoranschlägen und Gutachten<sup>3</sup>.

U. WILCKEN, *Alexanders Zug in die Oase Siwa*, Sitzungsber. Preuss. Akad. d. Wiss. 1928, 30, 577 f.; Ps.-Kallisthenes I 34 zu vergleichen ist. Beachte auch die Weiheungen, welche nachher zur frühen Ptolemäerzeit im Namen des nachgeborenen Alexanders ausgeführt wurden. Sollte es sich dabei u.a. etwa auch um Stiftungen handeln, die schon der Vater angeordnet hatte?

<sup>1</sup> Zur Verwaltung Ägyptens vgl. Arr. III 5, 2 f. Alexander wollte sowohl Oberwie Unter-Ägypten unter die Verwaltung je eines Ägypters stellen. Die übrigen Funktionäre waren Griechen, nur unter den Militärkommandanten waren einige Makedonen. Vgl. dazu meine Ausführungen in *Al. Persönlichkeit u. Wirken*, 237 f., und *BERVE* I 259.

<sup>2</sup> Eine ähnliche Reichszentrale wollte Alexander nachher auch in Babylon einrichten. Nur glaubt man nicht, dass es sich an einem dieser Plätze um eine richtige Reichshauptstadt handeln sollte. Eine solche hat der Herrscher zu seinen Lebzeiten überhaupt nirgends in Aussicht genommen.

<sup>3</sup> Zu den Hypomnemata vgl. meine Ausführungen in *Forschungen und Betrachtungen zur griechischen und römischen Geschichte* (Wien 1974), 299 ff. und *Al. Persönlichkeit u. Wirken*, 547 ff. Alexander hat wohl so ziemlich überall, wo er hinkam, etwas errichten wollen, aber meistens hatte er keine Zeit und kein Geld, seine Pläne

Für die Erbauung der Stadt Alexandreia fand der König aber in einem ägyptischen Griechen, in Kleomenes von Naukratis<sup>1</sup>, diejenige zielstrebig brutale Persönlichkeit, welche dafür sorgte, dass sich dieses Projekt binnen kurzem in grossartige Wirklichkeit verwandelte. Dabei sorgte Kleomenes, der sich bald zum Machthaber von ganz Ägypten aufschwang, nicht nur für die Organisation und für das eiserne Muss der Bauausführung, sondern auch für die Finanzierung. Dass er im Interesse der Finanzierung dieses Vorhabens die Getreidepreise ungebührlich in die Höhe trieb und dass in Griechenland darüber Hungersnöte ausbrachen<sup>2</sup>, kümmerte weder ihn noch Alexander<sup>3</sup>. Der Herrscher tolerierte alle die übeln Geschäftspraktiken seines Beauftragten. So erkennen wir zum ersten Mal mit aller Deutlichkeit, dass es dem Herrscher gar nicht mehr auf ein aktuelles Wohltun ankam, sondern vielmehr auf eine in die Zukunft weisende Reichsräson und eine damit zusammengehende universale Civilisationsidee, denen auch das neue Alexandreia dienen sollte. Damit kündigte sich eine wichtige Umstellung von höchster Bedeutung an, denn offenbar nahm nun das Sendungsbewusstsein zu einer grösseren Reichsplanung in Alexanders Phantasie bereits Gestalt an. Wir werden sehen, dass von nun ab sich das Schwerpunktgewicht seiner "Wohltaten" immer mehr nach dieser Reichsplanung verlagerte.

Als Alexander von Ägypten nach Vorderasien zurückkehrte und schliesslich Babylon gewann, da hoffte er wieder, nun aber zum letzten Mal, wohltätig im Sinne einer Befreiung vom Per-

auch durchzuführen. Er liess aber seine Projekte verschiedentlich von Fachleuten wenigstens mit Entwürfen und Kostenvoranschlägen ausstatten. Als es nach dem Tod des Herrschers Perdikkas darum ging, die Gesamtheit dieser Vorhaben von der Heeresversammlung stornieren zu lassen, suchte er aus der Masse der Hypomnemata wohl diejenigen heraus, die mit Kostenvoranschlägen versehen waren und auch sonst die aufwendigsten gewesen sind, natürlich auch solche, denen besondere Aktualität zukam oder für die bereits Aufträge erteilt worden waren.

<sup>1</sup> Zu Kleomenes vgl. BERVE II 210 ff. und zuletzt J. VOGT, in *Chiron* 1 (1971), 153ff.

<sup>2</sup> Kleomenes als Preistreiber : Ps.-Arist. *Oec.* II 33, 1352 a 16 sqq.

<sup>3</sup> Kleomenes und Alexander vgl. Arr. VII 23, 6 ff.

serjoch auftreten zu können. Zugleich wollte er zum Rechtsnachfolger der von den Persern einst beseitigten babylonischen Könige werden und damit zum "König der Gesamtheit" wie "der vier Weltgegenden". Darum ergriff er in einem ausserordentlichen Kultakt feierlich die Hände des babylonischen Hauptgottes, des Marduk<sup>1</sup>. Im übrigen sollte aber auch Babylonien, gerade so wie Ägypten und Karien, weiter zur  $\chi\omega\rho\alpha \delta\sigma\rho\kappa\tau\eta\tau\omega\varsigma$  gehören<sup>2</sup>. Immerhin kam es ihm hier überall auf die geistlichen Würden nationaler Regentschaftstraditionen an und auf die Gewinnung auch einer metaphysischen *auctoritas*. Die sollte überall noch die absolutistischen und damit despotischen Rechtsgewohnheiten der orientalischen Monarchie geistig untermauern.

In diesem Sinne wollte er zu Babylon in ganz besonderer Weise « wohltätig » sein. Man berichtete ihm, wie übel die Perser dem religiösen Wahrzeichen der Stadt, dem riesigen Stufenturm Etemenanki, mitgespielt hatten. Man bat ihn, seine Wiederherstellung zu altem Glanze zu veranlassen. Der Herrscher entschloss sich aber zu etwas ganz anderem und wiederum zu einem Wohltun ganz ohne Pardon. Er nahm den Priestern die Planung aus den Händen und befahl, den ehrwürdigen Tempel bis in die Grundfesten abzureißen. Er werde von den Fundamenten aus einen ganz neuen Etemenanki, einen von Alexander erbauten Etemenanki, errichten. Das war nun gewiss nicht in den Absichten der Priester gelegen und sie suchten dieses Projekt zu hintertreiben, ja Alexander später sogar vom Betreten Babylons abzuhalten. Wiederum waren es somit keine

<sup>1</sup> Vgl. Arr. III 16, 5, wo mit Belos sicherlich der Gott Marduk gemeint ist. Wir haben allerdings zu beachten, dass die « Erfassung der Hände des Marduk », was einer Inthronisation gleichkam, eigentlich am 1. Nisan, also im Frühjahr hätte stattfinden müssen. Offenbar wurden für den Befreier Alexander irgend welche Ersatzriten improvisiert.

<sup>2</sup> Darum hat Alexander auch die Palastfestung von Babylon von der Satrapie abgetrennt und als Reichsfestung erklärt. Das Kommando übertrug er einem seiner Offiziere (Arr. III 16, 4). Auch den Euphrat hat er nicht in sein altes Bett zurückleiten lassen. Vgl. zu alledem eingehend *Al. in Babylon*, 55 ff. und 63 f., und *Al. Persönlichkeit u. Wirken*, 280 ff.

erbetenen und aktuellen « Wohltaten », sondern solche, welche Alexander — auch hier im Sinne einer Reichsräson — einfach diktierte. Sollte der neue Stufenturm doch gar nicht Babylons, sondern Alexanders Frömmigkeit in dieser Reichszentrale würdig, ja gleichsam symbolhaft repräsentieren<sup>1</sup>.

Mit dem Eindringen in den Iran und schon mit der Gewinnung der Persis begann für Alexander ein neuer Abschnitt in seiner Auseinandersetzung mit den unterworfenen Nationen, denn nun vermochte er die Rolle eines Befreiers vom Perserjoch nicht mehr zu spielen. Als er aber seinen Gegner, von dessen eigenen Paladinen ermordet, auffand, da ergaben sich für ihn sogleich grossartige Aspekte der Rechtsnachfolge<sup>2</sup>.

Die alte Rechtfertigung der Heerfahrt war der Racheckrieg gegen Persien gewesen<sup>3</sup>. Der hatte mit dem symbolischen Akt der Niederbrennung der Paläste von Persepolis sein Ziel erreicht<sup>4</sup>. Die griechischen Kontingente wurden nun nach

<sup>1</sup> Das alles habe ich in meinen Büchern *Al. in Babylon*, 64, und *Al. Persönlichkeit u. Wirken*, 282, noch nicht begriffen gehabt. Erst nachträglich wurde mir klar, warum die Priester Alexander nach seiner Rückkehr aus Indien von der Kapitale fernhalten wollten (vgl. Arr. VII 17) und warum sie die Abtragung des alten Stufenturms so lax oder gar nicht betrieben hatten. Sie waren mit Alexanders Plan, den Tempelkoloss ganz abzureissen und einen völlig neuen aufzubauen, gar nicht einverstanden. Vielleicht fürchteten sie auch, dass dieser Neubau wohl von irgend einem griechischen Architekten gestaltet werden möchte, etwa in der Art, wie später das Grabmal Hephaistions geplant wurde. Alexander hat dann die alte Anlage nach seiner Rückkehr nach Babylon durch sein Heer bis in die Grundfesten niederreissen lassen (vgl. Strab. XVI 1, 5, p. 738) und auch jetzt finden wir dort nur eine flache Höhlung und darin einen Tümpel trüben Wassers als makabres Zeugnis vergangener Würde und auch vergangener Hybris.

<sup>2</sup> Eingehend hierüber *Al. Persönlichkeit u. Wirken*, 298 ff.; 301 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Zum Rachgedanken äusserte sich Alexander selbst in seinem Schreiben an Dareios : Arr. II 14, 4.

<sup>4</sup> Die Brandstiftung war sicher beabsichtigt, denn die amerikanischen Ausgräber haben festgestellt, dass die Hallen vor dem Brand ausgeräumt worden waren. Zu den Palästen vgl. u.a. E. F. SCHMIDT, *Persepolis I und II*, Univ. Chicago, Oriental Inst. Publ. 68-69 (Chicago 1953-7); A. T. OLIMSTEAD, *History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago 1948), 272 ff. Zu den meistens elamisch abgefassten Texten von Persepolis vgl. G. G. CAMERON, *Persepolis Treasury Tablets*, Univ. Chicago, Orient. Inst. Publ. 65 (Chicago 1948), und R. T. HALLOCK (ed.), *Perse-*

Hause geschickt<sup>1</sup>. Da kam es dem König trefflich zu bass, dass er die Heerfahrt nunmehr im Zeichen einer Rache für die Ermordung seines Vorgängers als iranischer Grosskönig fortsetzen konnte<sup>2</sup>. Schon aus der Art, wie er den Königsmantel über den Leichnam des Ermordeten gebreitet hatte, sollte sich ein Symbol für diese Rechtsnachfolge und das damit verbundene «Wohltun» ergeben<sup>3</sup>.

Alexander wollte aber nicht nur persisch-iranischer Grosskönig sein, sondern darüber hinaus richtiger Rechtsnachfolger der Achämeniden. Daher heiratete er als iranischer Grosskönig zwar die iranische Adelstochter Roxane, nachher aber doch auch eine Tochter des ermordeten Grosskönigs und eine von dessen Vorgänger<sup>4</sup>.

Mit der Zeit gelang dem Herrscher durch gnadenvolle Behandlung seiner früheren Gegner, ein Gefolge von persischen und iranischen Grossen um sich zu sammeln<sup>5</sup>. Dabei kam es ihm wiederum vor allem auf die metaphysische Fundierung dieser neuen Beziehungen an. Darum liess er sich in gleicher Weise, wie das früher den Achämeniden geschehen, das heilige

*polis Fortification Tablets*, Univ. Chicago, Orient. Inst. Publ. 92 (Chicago 1966). Vgl. ferner W. HINZ, in *Orientalia* 39 (1970), 421 ff.; in *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie* 61 (1972), 260 ff. Bei Kleitarch mögen sich Berichte von Teilnehmern der Heerfahrt niedergeschlagen haben, was dann auf Diodor und wohl auch auf Plutarch (*Alex.* 38; vgl. hierzu J. R. HAMILTON, *Plutarch Alexander*, 99 f.) wirkte. Ptolemaios hat sich als offiziöse Quelle und auch aus persönlichen Gründen sehr zurückgehalten (*Arr. III* 18, 11). Das schliesst nicht aus, dass dieser Rache-Akt vielleicht in einer etwas turbulenten und nicht ganz würdigen Weise vollzogen wurde.

<sup>1</sup> Zur Verabschiedung der Bundeskontingente: *Arr. III* 19, 5.

<sup>2</sup> Zum neuen Rachegegenden vgl. *Arr. III* 28, 1; 29, 6; 30, 1 ff.; *IV* 7, 3 f.

<sup>3</sup> Zu Alexander vor dem Leichnam des Dareios vgl. meine Ausführungen in *Al. Persönlichkeit u. Wirken*, 300 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Roxane: *Arr. IV* 19, 5; 20, 4. — Zu den Ehen Alexanders in Susa: *Arr. VII* 4, 4.

<sup>5</sup> Alexander schätzte besonders Mithrines, Artabazos, Oxyartes, Oxyathres und Atropates.

Königsfeuer einrichten, das ihn nun immerzu begleitete<sup>1</sup>. Von den Achämeniden übernahm er zweifellos auch die Fürsorge für die Heiligen Feuer im gesamten Reich<sup>2</sup>.

Mit der Rechtsnachfolge auf Achämenidenthron hätte Alexander allerdings auch eine Schwierigkeit erben müssen, mit der die Achämeniden selbst niemals ganz fertig geworden waren. Der persische Grosskönig hätte in seinen Grossen, die er in der Reichsverwaltung einsetzte, am liebsten Reichsbeamte und zwar absetzbare Reichsbeamte gesehen. Die Grossen selber aber wollten sich als Lehensträger betrachten und letzteres brachte für den Grosskönig die ernste Verpflichtung mit sich, seine Lehensleute zu schützen und ihnen hegemonisch zur Seite zu stehen<sup>3</sup>.

Wie verhielt sich nun Alexander zu diesem Problem? Nach sorgfältiger Prüfung dieser Frage kann ich nur sagen, dass der Herrscher den iranischen Lehensstandpunkt durchaus ablehnte, dass er also gar nicht oberster iranischer Lehensherr sein und auch keine damit verbundenen Verpflichtungen auf sich nehmen wollte. Wieder wäre ihm damit ja das ihm so verhasste Prinzip des *primus inter pares* in den Weg getreten.

Alexander interpretierte seine grosskönigliche Würde daher im Sinne des Gewohnheitsrechtes der vorderasiatischen Des-

<sup>1</sup> Dieser für Alexander als Nachfolger der Achämeniden so entscheidend wichtige Tatbestand ist durch lange Zeit nicht verstanden worden, da die meisten Alexander-Forscher von dem achämenidischen Grosskönigtum nur eine recht silhouettenhafte Vorstellung hatten. Ich hoffe in meinem *Al. in Babylon*, 38 ff. und weiter in *Al. Persönlichkeit u. Wirken*, 68 ff., die Sache hinreichend geklärt zu haben.

<sup>2</sup> Jetzt haben wir durch die Tontafel-Archive von Persepolis (dazu schon unsere Anm. 4 S. 61 sq.) hinreichende Belege dafür, dass es die königliche Verwaltung war, der auch die Betreuung der heiligen Feuer im Reiche oblag.

<sup>3</sup> Zutreffend F. W. KÖNIG, « Die altpersischen Adelsgeschlechter » I-III, in *Wiener Zeitschr. f. Kunde d. Morgenlandes* 31, 33 und 34 (1924, 1926 und 1927); « Der falsche Bardija », in *Klotbo* 4 (1938); ebenso W. EILERS, in *Zeitschr. d. Morgenländ. Ges.* 94 (1940), 192 ff.; H. BENGTSON, in *Gnomon* 13 (1937), 115 ff.; 18 (1942), 212 ff.; H. SCHÄFER, *Athen und das Griechentum im 5. Jahrhundert*, in *Das neue Bild der Antike* I (Leipzig 1942), 207 f.; und zuletzt G. WIDENGREN, in *Festschrift für L. Brandt* (1968), 523 ff., und *Feudalismus im alten Iran* (1969).

potie wie es in Babylon geherrscht hatte und zugleich im Sinne des von ihm errungenen speergewonnenen Eroberrechtes. Er interpretierte sie als eine absolute, ja despotische Würde, welche ihm alle autoritären Möglichkeiten eines höheren Wohltuns offen liesse.

Die Achämeniden hatten ursprünglich ja eine doppelte Stellung eingenommen, für die stammverwandten Iranier sollten sie Hegemone und *primi inter pares* sein, für den übrigen Orient aber Despoten nach babylonischem Schema. Nur hatten sie im Lauf der Zeit den hegemonischen Gedanken ohnehin schon zugunsten des despotischen unterdrückt. Alexander machte nun mit diesem hegemonischen Gedanken den Iranern gegenüber Schluss. Sie waren besiegt und hatten das Schicksal aller Besiegten zu teilen. Darum betrachtete er auch die iranischen Grossen, welche er im Reiche verwendete, als ihm untertänige Beamte, die ihm zu absolutem und blindem Gehorsam verpflichtet wären. Als solche wurden sie bestellt, ihrer Tüchtigkeit nach beurteilt, sie wurden mit Vertrauen, ja mit echter Freundschaft belohnt<sup>1</sup>, sie wurden aber auch bestraft und u.U. ohne viel Federlesens auf sein Geheiss hingerichtet<sup>2</sup>.

Mit seinen Bemühungen, die iranische Oberschicht zu gewinnen, hatte Alexander nach langem Ringen solchen Erfolg, dass man schliesslich sogar seine Städtegründungen im Osten hinnahm. Auch diese Gründungen<sup>3</sup> standen durchaus im Zeichen des Wohltuns ohne Pardon, denn niemand wollte sie. Am

<sup>1</sup> Alexander stützte sich in der Satrapienverwaltung u.a. auf Atropates, Phrataphernes und Oxyartes. Auch die Väter der iranischen Adelstöchter der Hochzeit von Susa (Arr. VII 4, 4) gehörten in diesen Kreis.

<sup>2</sup> Solche Aburteilungen ohne Prozess scheint es bei Abulites, Baryaxes, Oxathres, Astaspes, und wohl auch Zariaspes gegeben zu haben; vgl. dazu Arr. VI 29, 3; VII 4, 1; Curt. IX 10, 19; 21; 29. Von einem Verfahren hören wir nur bei Orxines: Arr. VI 30, 1 f.; Curt. X 1, 37.

<sup>3</sup> Zwangseignungen und Zwangsansiedlungen, durch welche nicht nur die Einheimischen, sondern auch die griechischen Elemente betroffen wurden, lernen wir besonders in der Sogdiana kennen; vgl. Arr. IV 1, 3 f. Vgl. im allgemeinen BERVE I 291 ff.

wenigstens natürlich die Einheimischen, die ihrer besten Ländereien beraubt wurden, die man nach Bedarf sogar zwangsübersiedelte und die nun als Untertanen zweiter Klasse in diesen Städten leben sollten. Kaum minder erbittert und enttäuscht waren aber auch die griechischen Söldner, die Alexander als Patrizier in diesen Gründungen festnagelte<sup>1</sup>. Ja sogar den makedonischen Kommandanten und Satrapen galt ein solcher Ehrenposten gleich einer Verbannung. Überall stand hier also ein aktuelles Wohltun bereits ganz zurück und handelte es sich nur mehr um ein Wohltun im Sinne der künftigen Reichsräson.

Alexander hat als Rechtsnachfolger der Achämeniden das Perserreich in seiner gesamten Ausdehnung erobert, doch war er damit noch nicht zufrieden. Er betrachtete es mit den gleichen Augen wie einst Kyros, Kambyses und Dareios und empfand diese Ausdehnung für ein Weltreich als unzulänglich. Alexanders « Asien » sollte daher den gesamten Kontinent nach Osten hin bis zum Ozean umfassen<sup>2</sup>.

Da gab es allerdings keine Rechtfertigung im Sinne einer Rechtsnachfolge auf dem Achämenidenthron, das war eher schon pure Gewalttat. Als Rechtfertigung tritt daher auch hier immer deutlicher — allerdings neben dem Gedanken einer Weltentdeckung — der Gedanke einer ganz universalen Weltreichsräson<sup>3</sup>. In deren Zeichen stand die Weltentdeckung und

<sup>1</sup> Vgl. die Aufstände und Versuche, sogleich in die Heimat zurückzukehren, sobald sich eine Nachricht vom Hinscheiden des Königs verbreitete.

<sup>2</sup> Alexander liess sich nach Gaugamela nicht zum Grosskönig des Perserreiches, sondern zum « König von Asien » ausrufen ; vgl. Plut. *Alex.* 34, 1, wozu *Al. Persönlichkeit u. Wirken*, 276 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Die letzten Ziele Alexanders sind bekanntlich umstritten. Es gibt Forscher, die zeichnen einen ängstlichen Alexander, andere einen gedankenlosen, für manche folgte Alexander nur den bereits von seinem Vater gesteckten Zielen, für andere wollte ein gleichfalls « braver » Alexander die Grenzen des Perserreiches ja nicht überschreiten. Eine Übersicht über die vielen Auffassungen habe ich in *Al. Persönlichkeit u. Wirken*, 633 ff. zu geben versucht. Für einen nach den Grenzen der Welt ausgreifenden Alexander spricht seine Zielsetzung in Indien, in Arabien und seine dem Westen geltende Planung (zu letzterem s. auch Anm. 4 S. 66).

Welterschliessung, vor allem auch der Welthandel. Wiederum Wohltaten, deren man im Augenblick noch gar nicht bedurfte, die aber für die Zukunft fruchtbar werden sollten.

Die Einstellung Alexanders gegenüber den indischen Staaten und Stämmen war also eine ähnliche wie die der europäischen Kolonisatoren der Kolonialzeit<sup>1</sup>. Man sprach sich im Dienste einer höheren Civilisationsidee eben das Recht zu, die Farbigen zu unterwerfen. Auch Alexander hatte mit seiner Reichsräson ja eine solche Civilisationsidee, nur lag auch hier schon die Schwierigkeit darin, diese den Unterworfenen begreiflich zu machen. Alexander scheint mir aus Indien daher etwas enttäuscht zurückgekehrt zu sein<sup>2</sup>. Er dachte auch gar nicht daran, etwa ein zweites Mal dahin zu ziehen.

Kurz vor seinem Tod plante Alexander noch seine arabische Expedition<sup>3</sup>. Wieder galt als Rechtfertigung der Weltentdeckergedanke und derjenige der Reichsräson wie des Reichshandels. Die Pläne<sup>4</sup>, welche nachher dem Westen des Mittelmeeres gelten sollten, dienten dem gleichen Universalgedanken. Grossartige Flottenbauten, die Hafenanlagen zu Babylon, das neue Reichsheer, alles muss von dieser Reichsräson aus gesehen

<sup>1</sup> Dass Alexander auch im Osten eine Civilisationsidee, so wie er sie verstand, zu vertreten suchte, scheint mir nun für ihn besonders bedeutsam zu sein.

<sup>2</sup> Er hat nur einen Teil des Indos-Bereichs unter makedonische Verwaltung gestellt. Das übrige überliess er der einheimischen Verwaltung, besonders jener des Poros und Taxiles.

<sup>3</sup> Alexander wollte an der Arabien-Expedition auch persönlich teilnehmen ; vgl. Arr. VII 20 f. ; 25 ; Plut. *Alex.* 76.

<sup>4</sup> Wer die Ansicht vertritt, Alexander hätte nach dem Westen gar nicht zu ziehen gebraucht, da sich ihm dort ohnehin alles unerworfen hatte, hat übersehen, dass Alexander auch nach Phoinikien und Ägypten gezogen ist, obgleich man sich ihm unterwarf, und dass er auch Indien am liebsten kampflos und friedlich gewonnen hätte. Nur hat es sich nicht unterworfen. So hätte er auch im Westen mancherlei Unterwerfung gefunden, aber nur, wenn er mit höchster Macht angerückt kam, gewiss aber nicht von Seiten Roms. In Süditalien hatte der König übrigens noch einen Rache-Akt zu vollziehen für den Tod seines Schwagers ; vgl. dazu Iust. XII 1, 4 ff. ; 3, 1, und meine Ausführungen in *Al. in Babylon*, 190.

werden. Das neue Reichsheer sollte vor allem die militärische Gleichstellung der Iranier verwirklichen<sup>1</sup>.

Überschauen wir die Wandlungen in Alexanders Wohltun, so stellte er, wie mir scheint, zuerst den Euergetes in den Vordergrund, der nach griechischen Vorstellungen aktuelle, erwünschte und unmittelbar wirksame Wohltaten darbot. Aber schon seit der Gründung von Alexandria liess er derartiges in den Hintergrund treten.

Die zweite Art des Wohltuns fand er in seiner Rolle als Befreier vom persischen Joch, die er bis zum Einzug in Babylon zu spielen vermochte.

Ein drittes Wohltun glaubte er durch die Anerkennung nationaler Traditionen und die Übernahme von Rechtsnachfolgen in den von den Persern unterbrochenen nationalen Herrscherreihen zu wirken, wobei es ihm besonders auf die damit verbundenen religiösen Weihen ankam. Damit ging stets ein besonderes Entgegenkommen gegenüber Tempelstaaten und Priesterschaften einher<sup>2</sup>.

Diese Arten von Wohltun hat Alexander in all ihren Möglichkeiten ausgeschöpft, dann aber wandte er sich immer mehr, ja fast ausschliesslich dem Wohltun im Sinne eines auf die Zukunft gerichteten Wirkens im Zeichen seiner Weltreichsräson zu. Dieses universale Wohltun hat er dann ohne Pardon bis zum letzten durchgeführt.

In jeder Hinsicht unterstellte der König nun seine ihm untertänigen Nationen ganz grundsätzlich dieser Reichsräson und erkannte davon abweichende oder diese Räson gar schädigende Sondereinstellungen einfach nicht mehr an. Aber nicht nur die Orientalen, sondern auch die Griechen und Makedonen, wenn sie auf dem Boden der *χώρα δορίκτητος* auftraten, beurteilte er im Laufe der Zeit immer rücksichtloser nach ihrer jeweiligen

<sup>1</sup> Flottenbauten : Diod. XVIII 4, 4 ; Hafenanlage zu Babylon : Arr. VII 19, 4 (aus Aristobul I) ; das neue Reichsheer : Arr. VII 23, 1 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Zu Alexanders Einstellung gegenüber lokalen Kulten, vgl. BERVE I 98 ff.

Eignung und setzte sie ungescheut nach dieser für Reichszwecke ein<sup>1</sup>. Alexander war in « Asien » nun einmal der absolute Herrscher. Da konnte es auch für die Eroberer selbst, konnte es weder für Makedonen noch für Hellenen eine Ausnahmestellung geben. Daher auch das Ansinnen der Proskynese. Der König von Asien hatte nun einmal seine ihm spezifischen Formen, verehrt zu werden. Da hätten sich eben auch die makedonischen und griechischen Paladine zu diesem Untertanenstatus zu bequemen. Als man ihm das aber weigerte, mag sich der Herrscher (mehr noch als sonst) einfach als « unverstanden » gefühlt haben. Denn das Ansinnen war, vom regionalen Standpunkt aus gesehen, durchaus berechtigt.

Übrigens zeichneten sich in Alexanders Augen nicht nur Makedonen, Griechen und Iranier für Reichsaufgaben besonders aus<sup>2</sup>, sondern auch Levantiner und Küstensemiten. Mit irgendwelchen Widerständen brauchte er bei den Einheimischen seit seiner Rückkehr aus Indien kaum mehr zu rechnen. Der Orient war zum Gehorsam bereit.

Wir können die Weltreichsplanung Alexanders aber nur völlig begreifen, wenn wir sie zugleich mit einer Civilisationsidee verstehen, die dem Eroberer vorschwebte. Leider mangeln uns unmittelbare Äusserungen des Herrschers, denn im Gebet zu Opis (Arr. VII 11, 9) handelte es sich allein um die ὄμοιοια

<sup>1</sup> In diesem Sinne setzte er auch gegen ihren Willen die griechischen Söldner in Sogdiana und in Indien als Siedler an und befahl zu Susa seinen makedonischen wie griechischen Paladinen die Heirat mit iranischen Adelstöchtern. Seinen Paladinen bediente er sich allerdings nach Möglichkeit — um den Schein zu wahren — noch des « freiwilligen Zwanges », das heißt, er trachtete ihre Zustimmung und ihre « Freiwilligkeit » zu erlangen, auch wenn sie eigentlich nicht wollten. So wohl schon im Prozess des Philotas und nachher bei der Proskynese. Bei letzterer ist diese Praktik allerdings missglückt, im Zusammenhang mit der Hochzeit von Susa hat sie sich aber bewährt. Bezeichnend ist es, dass Alexander anscheinend auch an makedonischen Funktionären Hinrichtungen vollzog, ohne für Schuldspruch und Vollstreckung die Heeresversammlung heranzuziehen, so bei Parmenion (Arr. III 26, 3), Kleandros und Sitalkes (Arr. VI 27, 4 : ἀπέκτεινεν).

<sup>2</sup> Darauf habe ich erstmalig in meinen Alexander-Büchern hingewiesen; vgl. zuletzt *Al. Persönlichkeit u. Wirken*, 542; 549 f. nach Arr. VII 19, 5.

und κοινωνία der (nunmehr !) makedonisch-iranischen Reichsherrschaft. Immerhin geben uns seine Pläne, welche dem Persischen Meerbusen gelten (Arr. VII 19, 3), und andere hinterlassene Projekte (Diod. XVIII 4) mancherlei Einblick in seine Civilisationsidee : Es kam ihm auf die Erschliessung (nur wo nötig auch Entdeckung) wie auf die Zusammenorganisierung des gesamten Erd-Kreises an, um ihn einer friedlichen wie gemeinsamen Nutzung zuzuführen und so alle etwa vorhandenen Wohlstandsmöglichkeiten zu entwickeln.

Diese Planung unterschied sich in bemerkenswerter Weise von der Entstehung des Römischen Weltreiches. In Alexanders Gedankenwelt stellte sich ein Wohltun universalen Formates und ein damit zusammengehendes Sendungsbewusstsein schon sehr früh ein. Den Römern kamen solche höhere Ideen erst in einer Zeit, da sie über eine Art von Weltherrschaft *de facto* bereits verfügten. Wohl hatten sie sich dank ihrem hochentwickelten Rechtsbewusstsein immer schon als von den Göttern begnadet angesehen, in den Dienst eines Wohlergehens der ganzen Welt traten sie aber erst, als sie von der griechischen Philosophie hiezu gleichsam eingeladen wurden.

So wollte Alexander in der Tat mit seinem Wohltun ohne Pardon eine völlig neue Welt erschaffen. Er hätte dieses Reich auch ohne allzu grosse Schwierigkeiten bis an den Atlantik auszudehnen vermocht<sup>1</sup>. Dennoch stand ausser Zweifel, dass dieses Riesenreich mitsamt seiner Reichsräson ein Torso bleiben müsse, solange es nicht gelang, auch die ägäischen Ausgangsbereiche, Makedonien und Griechenland, seinem absoluten Willen und seiner Reichsräson in der von ihm verlangten Unbedingtheit anzupassen. Irgendwie mussten also auch diese Bereiche in den Kreis der Untertanen eingefügt werden, nur

<sup>1</sup> Dazu schon unsere Anm. 4 S. 66. So hoch man auch das Potential Alexanders einschätzen mag, so muss man doch bedenken, wie schwer selbst Rom in den drei punischen Kriegen zu ringen hatte, um Karthago zu bezwingen. Schon hier hätte Alexander alle seine Kräfte aufbieten müssen, vom Rom und den italischen Bergstämmen gar nicht zu reden.

konnte das nicht mit Hilfe des Speeres, sondern allein mit Hilfe der Überredung und Überzeugung geschehen. So handelte es sich also um geistige Waffen, die aus dem Hegemonischen ganz sanft in das Absolute hinüber zu führen hätten. In diesem friedlichen Sinne mussten Makedonien und Hellas erst neu erobert werden.

Gegenüber dem Festhalten der Makedonen am traditionellen Volkskönigtum hatte Alexander auf seinem Feldzuge zwar bedeutsame Erfolge erzielt. Wie sehr sich seine Paladine auf dem Boden der *χώρα δορίκτητος* schliesslich als gehorsame Werkzeuge gebrauchen liessen, hatte ja die Hochzeit von Susa gezeigt<sup>1</sup>. Zu Opis hatte er dann auch den Willen der makedonischen Heeresversammlung gebrochen, und die stellte damals als *βασιλικὴ δύναμις* in der Tat ja das offizielle Makedonien dar<sup>2</sup>. Alles das würde im Mutterland aber keinerlei Gesinnungswechsel herbeiführen, dort würde man in Alexander auch weiterhin den *primus inter pares* sehen<sup>3</sup>. Immerhin musste nun Antipater abberufen und durch den an Gehorsam gewöhnten Krateros ersetzt werden<sup>4</sup>. Der sollte das Seine versuchen, dem heimischen Makedonien den neuen Gehorsam beizubringen. Im übrigen musste der Herrscher eben auf die Zukunft hoffen. Im Laufe der Jahre würde durch das Beispiel der übrigen Welt auch Makedonien zur Räson, d.h. zur Weltreichsräson, kommen.

Vorerst kam es also gar nicht so sehr auf Makedonien, sondern auf die Brechung des Hellenenstolzes an, der eine Sonderstellung und « hegemonische Führung » verlangte. Würden die Griechen auf solche Vorrrechte verzichten, so konnte man auch von den Makedonen ähnliches erhoffen.

<sup>1</sup> Hochzeit von Susa : Arr. VII 4, 4 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Zu Opis : Arr. VII 8 ff. ; zur *βασιλικὴ δύναμις* vgl. meine Ausführungen in *Al. in Babylon*, 152 f.

<sup>3</sup> Ich habe in *Al. Persönlichkeit u. Wirken*, 32 f., die Stellung des makedonischen Volkskönig zu charakterisieren versucht.

<sup>4</sup> Arr. VII 12, 4.

Alexander sah sich dabei nicht nur dem griechischen Anspruch auf hegemonische Waltung gegenüber, sondern auch der Forderung des Einzelindividuums wie ganzer Städte auf griechische Freiheit. Den hegemonischen Standpunkt hatte immer schon Aristoteles vertreten und jüngst in aller Öffentlichkeit mit Nachdruck formuliert<sup>1</sup>. Für die Freiheit des Einzelnen hatte aber bereits Kallisthenes sein Leben aufs Spiel gesetzt<sup>2</sup>.

Dabei handelte es sich bereits um einen Prinzipienstreit, ging es doch darum, ob das personale oder das regionale Prinzip den Vorrang zuerkannt bekäme. Für den Philosophen blieben Hellenen auch in der *χώρα δορίκτητος* Hellenen und hatten Anrecht auf hellenische Freiheit. Nach Alexanders Grundsätzen, so wie er sie sich im Laufe des Feldzuges zu eigen mache, sollte es in der *χώρα δορίκτητος* aber überhaupt nur Untertanen geben<sup>3</sup>. So war es im Orient immer gewesen und hatte der Grosskönig die Proskynese sogar von griechischen Gesandten verlangt. Aber auch in Makedonien hatte das Prinzip der Regionalität dermassen den Vorzug, dass z.B. die dortigen Könige auch Griechen in den makedonischen Adel erheben konnten, soferne sie nur in Makedonien für Makedonien wirkten<sup>4</sup>.

Entscheidend spitzte sich dieser Gegensatz aber zu, als schliesslich die Frage nach der künftigen Einstufung des mutterländischen Griechentumes für Alexander immer dringlicher

<sup>1</sup> Zum Sendschreiben des Aristoteles, s. bereits Anm. 2 S. 50.

<sup>2</sup> Als Kallisthenes die Proskynese verweigerte; vgl. Arr. IV 10 ff.; 14, 1 ff.; 22, 2.

<sup>3</sup> Vgl. schon oben S. 67 f. Alexander nützte dazu gegenüber den Griechen im Heer zeitweise auch seine Befugnisse als ἡγεμὼν αὐτοκράτωρ und gegenüber den Makedonen seine erweiterten Rechte, die ihm im Kriege als königlichem Heerführer zukamen. Zuerst gab es noch Kapitalprozesse, so gegen Philotas, doch schon gegen Parmenion war davon keine Rede mehr. Vielleicht gilt gleiches auch von Kleandros, Sitalkes und wohl auch von Herakon; vgl. Anm. 1 S. 68.

<sup>4</sup> Darum gehörten die griechischen Freunde Alexanders alle zum makedonischen Adel. Schon deren Väter waren zu Baronen gemacht worden. S. Anm. 1 S. 49.

wurde. Natürlich handelte es sich dabei nun auch um das künftige Schicksal des Korinthischen Bundes. Wie hatte sich der Herrscher bisher zu dieser Institution verhalten, die gar nicht er, sondern die noch sein Vater geschaffen?

Zuerst ein paar Worte über Philipps Einstellung zum Griechenproblem. In Makedonien selbst war alle Staatlichkeit und Gesellschaft auf dem Grundsatz aufgebaut, dass der Volkskönig als *primus inter pares* des makedonischen Adels aufzufassen wäre. Auf gegenseitigen Verpflichtungen beruhten dort auch das Lehnswesen und das Verhältnis des Herrschers zur Heeresversammlung<sup>1</sup>. Dabei handelte es sich um eine ähnliche Gegenseitigkeit, wie sie auch im hellenischen Hegemonie-Gedanken anklingt. Auch der griechische Hegemon sollte — gleich dem makedonischen König — von Freien freiwillig als Führer gewählt beziehungsweise anerkannt werden und hätte dann die Interessen seiner Wähler entsprechend zu wahren.

Als Philipp die Verfassung des Korinthischen Bundes den Hellenen nahelegte, verstand es sich von selbst, dass er diesen Hegemonie-Typus der Gegenseitigkeit in Vorschlag brachte. Es gab für ihn gar keine andere Herrschaftsform. Damit entsprach er auch den Vorschlägen der griechischen Staatstheoretiker<sup>2</sup> und ich zweifle keinen Augenblick daran, dass er sein diesbezügliches Konzept vorher besonders mit Aristoteles eingehend durchbesprochen hat<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Innerhalb der makedonischen Adelswelt war der König als Argeade zwar etwas Höheres, persönlich aber ein *primus inter pares*, zu dem jeder Makedone Zutritt finden konnte, dem man Vorwürfe machen konnte und an dem man u.U. sogar Rache nahm. Natürlich geschah es, dass man sich gemeinsam betrank und da war dann der König kein Vorgesetzter, sondern der Gastgeber. Was aber die Heeresversammlung betraf, so dankte ihr jeder Makedonenkönig für die ihm zuteil gewordene «Kür». Ohne Volksversammlung und Kür gab es keine Herrschaft und keinen Thron.

<sup>2</sup> Vgl. u.a. G. DOBESCH, *Der panhellenische Gedanke im 4. Jh. v.Chr. und der Philippos des Isokrates* (Wien 1965), 160 ff.; 213 ff.; weiter G. WIRTH, in *Chiron* 1 (1971), 143.

<sup>3</sup> Das steht natürlich nicht in den Quellen, jedoch müssen wir uns vor Augen halten, dass einer der Ratgeber Philipps doch sicher Antipater war und dass dieser wieder mit Aristoteles befreundet gewesen ist. Aristoteles selbst hatte das

Was aber für Philipp noch etwas Natürliches und Selbstverständliches war, bildete für Alexanders Gewalt natur eine ganz unmögliche Zumutung. Das galt sowohl vom makedonischen Volkskönigtum wie von der griechischen Hegemonie. Ersteres musste er für das Territorium von Makedonien vorerst natürlich hinnehmen. Die so betont auf Gewaltenteilung abgestellte Hegemonie im Korinthischen Bund mag ihn aber von Anfang an angewidert haben.

Alexander legte wohl grösstes Gewicht darauf, den Griechen als strahlender, ja göttlicher Heros, als wohltuender Wunder-täter und schliesslich als richtiger Gott vor Augen zu treten, aber gerade mit alledem wollte er ja zu erkennen geben, dass er weit mehr wäre als nur ein *primus inter pares*, dass ein Alexander überhaupt keine *pares* unter den Sterblichen haben könne.

Ich habe in meinem Alexander-Buch bereits eingehend über Alexanders Verhältnis zum Korinthischen Bund gehandelt, doch scheint mir jetzt die neue Abhandlung meines Kollegen an der Wiener Universität Gerhard Dobesch in den *Grazer Beiträgen* 3 (1975), 73 ff. diese Tatbestände in vieler Hinsicht noch tiefer ausgelotet zu haben. Zeigt er uns doch, dass der König das Synedrion des Bundes nur soweit zur Wirksamkeit brachte, als es seinen eigenen Interessen — und nicht denen des Bundes — entsprach, dass er auf ihn im übrigen aber keine Rücksicht nahm. Doch auch das Synedrion selbst hat nach G. Dobesch, in *Grazer Beiträge* 3 (1975), 101 ff., als Willensträger der Nation versagt.

Der griechische Freiheitsbegriff galt, wie schon erwähnt, nicht nur einer Freiheit der Nation gegenüber nichtgriechischen Eingriffen, sondern galt auch einer Freiheit für jede einzelne Polis zu beliebiger Aussen- wie Innenpolitik. Diese Freiheiten

Vertrauen des Königs, denn sonst hätte er ihm die Erziehung seines Sohnes nicht übertragen. Aristoteles spielte ausserdem in dem politischen Spiele mit, das Philipp mit Hermias verband. Was lag also näher, als dass der König sich mit Aristoteles auch in der Angelegenheit der griechischen Hegemonie besprach? Isokrates lebte ja in der Ferne und war schliesslich schon in ein greisenhaftes Alter gekommen.

wurden von der korinthischen Bundesverfassung aber ersticket<sup>1</sup>. Sie hatte die Freiheit nicht gebracht, sondern genommen. Mit ihrer Hilfe wurde sogar Theben zerstört. So lag den Griechen nichts am Synedrion und nichts an dem Bund.

Noch etwas anderes mussten sich die Griechen damals vor Augen halten. Was es mit Hegemonien auf sich hatte, konnte man in den letzten Jahrhunderten aus der Praxis erlernen. Immer musste man ja erfahren wie sehr solche Hegemonien letzten Endes in Gewaltherrschaften ausarteten<sup>2</sup>. War also Hegemonie, so wie man sie gerne haben wollte, nicht überhaupt eine Utopie, ein Traum von Leichtgläubigen und Idealisten, ein Phantasiebild von Intellektuellen und Ahnungslosen? War somit auch Philipps und Alexanders Hegemonie nicht eine Selbsttäuschung gewesen? So die Bedenken der Hellenen.

Als Alexander nach Asien gezogen war, blieb als sein Stellvertreter und somit als tatsächlicher Hegemon der Hellenen der treffliche Antipater zurück. Es will mir aber scheinen, dass sich der Herrscher gerade in den Jahren, da er im fernen Osten mit ganz anderen aktuellen Aufgaben befasst war, gedanklich doch viel mit dem griechischen Problem beschäftigt hat. Gerade der weite räumliche Abstand ermöglichte es ihm, ohne Rücksicht auf alle Detailschwierigkeiten, die sich im Polis-Gewirre ergaben, einen Plan grossen Stils über alle griechischen Freiheitsansprüche hinweg zu konzipieren.

Um diese Konzeption Alexanders verständlich zu machen, möchte ich einiges vorausschicken. Die griechische Freiheitsidee hatte in den beiden letzten Jahrhunderten wahrhaft Gross-

<sup>1</sup> Das galt sowohl von der innerpolitischen Freiheit, da ja die bestehenden Verfassungen nicht mehr geändert werden durften, wie auch von der Aussenpolitik, da diese Angelegenheit des Bundes und des Hegemons geworden war. So sah sich die Polis einer «institutionellen Erstarrung» ausgeliefert.

<sup>2</sup> Das galt ganz exemplarisch zuerst von der attischen Hegemonie im Delischen Seebund wie schliesslich auch von der spartanischen im Peloponnesischen Bund. Aber auch Theben nützte allein schon für Boiotien seine Vormachtstellung in ähnlicher Weise, und zuletzt noch Megalopolis gegenüber den arkadischen Städten.

artiges und Einmaliges geleistet. Nun war sie aber gleichsam am Plafond ihrer Leistungsmöglichkeiten angelangt. Ich habe darüber bereits in meiner *Griechischen Geschichte* (Stuttgart 1960), 229 ff. gehandelt. Schon gab diese Freiheit in der Polis und in der Demokratie nichts weiteres an positiven Leistungen mehr her. Polis und Demokratie hatten ja auch aufgehört, Zentralwerte darzustellen, kein Wunder, wenn man nun auch das Synedrion als Gremium der Polis-Gesandten nicht mehr ernst nahm. Selbst die bisherigen Sotere hatten sich nur zu häufig zu machtgierigen Tyrannen gewandelt<sup>1</sup>. Weder die bisherige Freiheit, noch die Polis, noch die Sotere hatten echtes und allgemein gültiges Wohltun gebracht. Sie hatten sich stets zugunsten des einen und zu ungünsten des andern eingestellt. So war die griechische Freiheit immer wieder in Widersprüche verwickelt worden, und hatten sich ihre Erfolge nur zu oft als Schein-Erfolge herausgestellt. Wohltun und Freiheit hatten sich bisher kaum zu einem echten Wohlklang zusammengefunden.

Daher scheint sich Alexander im Osten für die Griechen ein neues Konzept zurecht gelegt zu haben, in dem er nicht nur das Synedrion und den Bund, sondern auch die Polis mit ihrer Freiheit und Autonomie weitgehend ausschalten wollte. Für Alexander war die Polis ja immer noch der Hort einer gewissen Unabhängigkeit und Selbständigkeit. Wohl hatten Olynth, Theben und Tyros ihren hochgemuteten Widerstand mit der Vernichtung bezahlen müssen, Athen aber glaubte immer noch, gestützt auf seine Flotte, den von Tyros einst gewagten Widerstand wiederholen zu können<sup>2</sup>.

Da führte der Herrscher einen gewaltigen Titanenschlag, um diesem Hochmut ein Ende zu bereiten. Unter Umgehung des Synedrions, aber mit um so feierlicherer Verkündigung in Olympia, sandte er der griechischen Nation das Edikt der Ver-

<sup>1</sup> Zum Soter vgl. F. DORNSEIFF, in *RE* III A 1, 1211 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Zu der Kriegsstimmung im makedonischen Hauptquartier vgl. u.a. Ephippos, *FGrH* 126 F 5, und die Bemerkungen F. JACOBYS im *Kommentar* hierzu.

banntenrückführung<sup>1</sup>. Er sandte es als « König Alexandros » und nahm damit in Anspruch, nun auch den Hellenen ihr König zu sein<sup>2</sup>. Als König erliess er auch die Weisungen an die einzelnen Städte zur Restituierung aller Flüchtlinge. Das bedeutete nicht nur einen Schlussstrich unter die nationale Zuständigkeit des Synedrions, sondern auch einen Schlussstrich unter die Autonomie der griechischen Polis. Griff er doch ohne Rücksicht auf die Satzungen des Korinthischen Bundes und ohne Rücksicht auch auf die in den einzelnen Städten fungierenden Volksversammlungen in die Innenpolitik derselben entscheidend ein. Dass damit ganz besonders Athen getroffen werden sollte, versteht sich von selbst. Mit Hilfe der erzwungenen Rückgabe von Samos<sup>3</sup> sollte die Stadt in ihrem Stolz geknickt und, wenn sie sich nicht beugte, mit Gewalt erniedrigt werden.

Was hier vernichtet werden sollte, war eine bereits unfruchtbare gewordene Freiheit der Polis, deren « Freiheit » auch zu Neid und Zwietracht und aller ihrer inneren Gewalttätigkeit benutzt werden konnte. Daher hatte Alexander schon früher die von Antipater eingerichteten Tyrannenherrschaften wieder abgeschafft<sup>4</sup> und hatte sich immer für Demokratie ausgesprochen. Damit wollte er auf der Basis eines friedlichen Nebeneinanders für die Hellenen eine neue Ordnung und eine neue Art von demokratischer Freiheit einrichten, eine Freiheit der gegenseitigen Toleranz und des gemeinsamen Gehorsams.

<sup>1</sup> Zum Edikt der Rückführung der Verbannten vgl. Diod. XVIII 8, 3 ff. Vgl. dazu u.a. U. WILCKEN, *Alexander der Grosse* (Leipzig 1931), 116 ff.; J. BELOCH, *Griechische Geschichte* IV 1, 56 ff.; E. BADIAN, in *JHS* 81 (1961), 28 ff. Befasst wird mit der Durchführung Antipater, betroffen sind die Städte, der Bund wird nicht erwähnt.

<sup>2</sup> Die Stelle lautet: Βασιλεὺς Ἀλέξανδρος τοῖς ἐκ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων φυγάσι.

<sup>3</sup> Zu Samos vgl. BERVE I 247; II 114. Die Insel war 365 von Timotheos erobert worden. Ein Teil der Samier wurde damals vertrieben und ihr Land an attische Kleruchen verteilt.

<sup>4</sup> Zur Abschaffung der Tyrannenherrschaften: Plut. *Alex.* 34, 2.

Auf diese Weise sollte die Polis auch in ihrer bisherigen Rolle als Zwischeninstanz zwischen dem König und den hellenischen Menschen ausgeschaltet werden. So wie in Asien die Satrapen, sollten in Hellas nun auch die Volksversammlungen über keinerlei Widerstandrechte verfügen, sobald Alexander befahl. Wenn der Herrscher etwas verfügte, hätten sie sich lediglich als Vollzugsorgane zu betrachten. So wie er Asien von der Willkür der Perser befreit hatte, wollte er Hellas nun von der Willkür der Polis befreien.

Wem aber verblieb dann überhaupt noch Autonomie, wem wahrhalte Freiheit? Die sollte allein Alexander zukommen. Und erst in dieser von Bund und Polis nicht behinderten Freiheit konnte dann Alexander in Hellas genau so schalten wie im Orient, als Wohltäter nicht für kleinliche Augenblicksgaben, sondern als ganz grosser Wohltäter für eine dauernde Zukunft.

Auch für die Hellenen musste es vorerst ein Wohltun ohne Pardon sein, denn auch sie musste man erst auf die Bahnen einer höheren Vernunft zwingen. Nur auf diesem Wege vermochte man sie von ihrer Zwietracht zu befreien und zugleich von ihrem allzu grossen Nationalstolz, der sich in das Zukunftsreich einer allgemeinen Völkertoleranz einfach nicht mehr einfügen liess. Und darum musste den Hellenen auch der Anspruch auf hegemonische Waltung, wie ihn Aristoteles stellte, allein schon aus Weltreichsräson, verweigert werden.

Damit wurden aber — und hierhin liegt die Bedeutung des Ediktes der Verbanntenrückführung — auch die Hellenen des Korinthischen Bundes zu Untertanen. Sie wurden in die vom König regierten besiegten Nationen eingereiht. Nur der Modus sollte ein anderer sein, da Alexander hier nicht mit der Waffe, sondern mit Hilfe seiner höheren Vernunft und Einsicht allmählich zu überreden und schliesslich über Freiwillige zu siegen hoffte.

Dabei suchte er seine neue Stellung als König wenigstens mit Hilfe seines Gottkönigtums einigermassen zu legitimie-

ren<sup>1</sup>. Dass Götter im griechischen Raum weit weniger galten als im Orient, muss ihm wohl klar gewesen sein. Wie mir scheint, schätzte der König an seiner Göttlichkeit vor allem Eines: Sie befreite ihn von dem ihm so verhassten Anspruch seiner Gefolgschaft, dass er nur *primus inter pares* wäre. Ein Gott stelle eben doch etwas grundsätzlich anderes dar als die Menschen und niemals nur deren *primus*. Hierin lag, wie ich glaube, für Alexander der grosse Schritt in Richtung auf die Anerkennung seiner absoluten Autorität. Das Gottkönigtum schloss damit auch den Hegemonie-Gedanken ganz grundsätzlich aus und machte den Herrscher ähnlich wie in Ägypten rangmäßig zu einer übergeordneten, absoluten Grösse.

Der Vorschlag, den Alexander nun an die griechischen Städte richtete, man möge ihn in den einzelnen Poleis unter die Stadtgötter aufnehmen, war somit gar kein Ersatz für die verlorene Freiheit alten Stils. Aber es verlangte Alexander daranach, dass man ihm durch Anerkennung seines Gottkönigtums eine Art von Vertrauensvorschuss zur Verfügung stellte, den er dann im Laufe der Jahre durch ein höheres Wohltun und eine höhere Liebe einlösen würde. Und in der Tat hat Alexander mit alledem ja nur geplant, was nachher das Römische Reich ausgeführt und den in ihrer Entwicklung ohnehin schon altersschwach gewordenen Griechen als Endgültiges geboten hat: nämlich einen wahren und echten Frieden.

So hoffte schon Alexander, dass schliesslich die Griechen ihm doch noch zugestehen würden, er wäre nicht nur ein Gott, sondern in der Tat ein wohltuender Gott gewesen.

Damit sind wir am Ende. Alexanders Zukunftsvision galt einem Weltreich mit allgemeinem Frieden. Da die Welt dafür nicht reif war, musste er sein Werk auf den beiden Säulen von Wohltun und von Gewalt errichten. Eine besondere Zukunfts-

<sup>1</sup> Vgl. zuletzt dazu u.a. E. BADIAN, *Studies in Greek and Roman History* (Oxford 1964), 202; F. TAEGER, *Charisma I* (Stuttgart 1957), 217 ff.; Chr. HABICHT, *Gottmenschen und griechische Städte*, 2. Aufl. (München 1970), 17 ff.

vision galt aber dem griechischen Frieden. Auch Griechenland war noch nicht reif dafür. So musste er auch hier sein Wohltun mit Gewalt verbinden. Dreihundert Jahre nachher vollstreckte Rom sein Vermächtnis.

Wenn ich nun meine Behandlung des Themas « Alexander und die unterworfenen Nationen » zum Abschluss bringe, so geschieht das mit dem Gefühl einer gewissen Unzufriedenheit, glaube ich doch das Wirken des Herrschers hier allzu negativ gezeichnet zu haben. Ein Ausgleich würde sich aber sogleich ergeben, wenn nun ein weiterer Vortrag über « Alexander und der Weltreichsgedanke » gehalten werden könnte, und ich bin sicher, dass wir darauf im Verlauf unserer Tagung noch zurückkommen werden. Denn, was Alexander den Einzelnationen auch an partikularer Entelechie genommen, das vereinigte er — auch wenn er dergleichen in seinem Gebet zu Opis noch nicht zur Sprache brachte — doch auf den Gedanken einer universalen Weltgestaltung, so wie er ihm als höchstes Ziel vorschwebte.

## DISCUSSION

*M. van Berchem* : On me permettra d'ouvrir la discussion en exprimant à M. Schachermeyr ma gratitude pour un exposé qui a embrassé bien davantage que le seul traitement réservé par Alexandre aux populations subjuguées par lui. Ce qu'il a évoqué, c'est l'idée même qu'Alexandre s'est faite de sa mission et qui a inspiré son comportement. Très importante, la constatation que l'*εὐεργεσία* est inconcevable sans *δεσποτεία*. Cette dernière étant intolérable pour les Grecs comme pour les Macédoniens, on pourrait prétendre qu'Alexandre s'est jeté sur l'Asie pour s'approprier des formes de gouvernement compatibles avec ses aspirations. Aussi bien a-t-il, sur son passage, assumé successivement toutes les formes de despotisme créées au cours du temps, avec l'investiture religieuse qu'elles comportaient le plus souvent. Dynaste en Carie, du fait de son adoption par Ada, fils d'Ammon en Egypte, roi-prêtre à Babylone, héritier et continuateur, en Iran, des Achéménides. Deux épisodes de la conquête éclairent à la fois son ambition et les réticences qu'elle inspirait : la « libération » laborieuse des cités grecques d'Asie mineure, d'une part, et l'ambiguïté du statut qui en est résulté pour elles ; sa prétention, d'autre part, à sacrifier à Tyr sur l'autel d'Hercule-Melqart, et le refus qu'il essuya. Le rôle ainsi assumé par Alexandre devait nécessairement, avec les années, se refléter dans ses relations avec les Macédoniens et les Grecs, et c'est pourquoi je suis heureux qu'au terme de son exposé, M. Schachermeyr soit revenu sur cet aspect de sa politique.

*M. Badian* : Prof. Schachermeyr's principle of the inexorable *εὐεργεσία* ("Wohltun ohne Pardon") is an important principle well beyond Alexander history, fitting the latter into a well-known historical and theoretical background. I feel convinced that it explains a good deal in the multi-faceted personality of Alexander, in addition (of course) to the aspect of *Realpolitik*, which must not be neglected.

As has been shown, we start with recognisable acts of individual εὐεργεσία (in Asia Minor I would add the intervention in the internal affairs of the “liberated” cities for arbitration and the act of νομοθεσία implied in his insistence on approving the constitutions of those cities, both exemplified for us in the famous Chios decree). These actions, though εὐεργεσία, of what one might call an obvious and traditional kind, already lead us on to the *facilis descensus* into “Wohltun auf lange Sicht”. Similarly, in more recent history and theory, the actual will of a majority, democratically expressed, can be superseded by a *volonté générale*, no longer based on any concrete manifestation of popular desires, but imposed by a ruling power in the name of a superior wisdom and a superior freedom, which makes the exercise of ordinary freedom, in daily life and in political self-government, irrelevant and indeed unacceptable. This is precisely what Prof. Schachermeyr has shown us in Alexander's dealings with the Greeks. Through this principle, power is morally justified, and disobedience is no longer merely illegal: it becomes immoral and sinful. In other words, the ruler (or, in our day, the state—and this largely includes the modern “democratic” state) assumes the standing of a god; for “Wohltun ohne Pardon”, in nearly all religions, is the peculiar characteristic of gods. When Alexander expects to be recognised as a god, we can now see that this is because he has for a long time already been *functioning* as a god, performing acts of notional εὐεργεσία beyond the understanding of mortals.

*M. Wirth*: Man wird Herrn Schachermeyrs Gedankengängen im Grossen wie im Detail nur zustimmen können und für die gegebenen Perspektiven dankbar sein. Die Frage nach den pragmatischen Komponenten aller einschlägigen Massnahmen, Gesten und Handlungen könnten freilich den gegebenen Aspekt erweitern: Es waren die Umstände nicht zuletzt auch mit, die im einzelnen Alexanders Entwicklung mit bedingten und, wie ich glaube, eine Alternative gar nicht erlaubten. Zu Kompromissen mit Hellas in den ersten Jahren kommt dann bewusst hervorgehobener Gegensatz zu allen Achäemeniden (vgl. etwa die literarisch allein durch Pseudo-Kallisthenes be-

richtete Pharaonen-Krönung, und den Aufbau des Marduktempels in Babylon in eigener Regie); bezeichnend nicht zuletzt ist der Bruch in solcher Verhaltensweise nach dem Tod des Dareios, als Alexander die Achämenidentradition bewusst usurpiert.

Für die Einordnung Griechenlands in das so sich gestaltende Reich auffallend scheint mir eine gewisse Subtilität der Verfahrensweise. So gab Alexander die übernommene Rolle des *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ* von vornherein eine ausserordentliche Machtgrundlage zur Durchführung eigener Absichten; Zeugnisse für Niederlegung etwa und Ende des Racheckrieges 330 sind nicht erhalten; für 324 und sicher auch später könnte diese Rolle zumindest als wenigstens fiktive Rechtsbasis gedacht gewesen sein, für die von Herrn Schachermeyr aufgezeigte Umwertung aller politischen Werte etwas wie formales Verständnis zu finden: liesse sich nicht das auf jeden Fall *suo loco* recht eigenartige [...] ἀναγγεῖλαντος ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ... für das Verbanntendekret (*Syll.*³ 312)] am ehesten als Hinweis auf personelle Erweiterung der makedonischen Heeresversammlung durch Griechen verstehen, denen im Rahmen des Möglichen und wohl Herkömmlichen damit eine gewisse Rolle in den Zentren der Entscheidung eingeräumt worden wäre?

*M. Badian:* As regards G. Wirth's question on the continuing position of Alexander as *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ* of the Hellenic League, I don't really think such constitutional points of much importance, in situations where power is all on one side and can easily enforce acceptance not only of its will, but of any justification it chooses. But such as it is, the answer should be affirmative in this instance. The fact that the *synhedrion* of the League chose to let Alexander deal with the "rebels" after the battle of Megalopolis shows that they expected Alexander to assert a legal claim to such authority.

One small point, perhaps worth a comment: Prof. Schachermeyr's reference to the abolition of tyrannies in Greece—a point often made, of course. It seems to me that Plutarch, *Alex.* 34 does not say anything of the sort. Alexander, after Gaugamela, writes to the

Greeks that tyrannies in Greece *have been abolished* (*καταλυθῆναι*)—at some unspecified time in the past, so that the Greeks are now free, owing to his benefaction (and he proceeds to list other benefactions). These tyrannies abolished by Alexander are presumably anti-Macedonian *régimes*—and by no means those of which Ps.-Dem. XVII complains. The statement seems to me a purely propagandist one, with little concrete historical content. (Cf. J. R. Hamilton's commentary on this passage.)

*M. Bosworth* : In Plutarch, the proclamation occurs in the immediate aftermath of Gaugamela. Earlier in the year Alexander had learned of the end of the island war and had dealt specifically with the oligarchs of Chios and Lesbos (Arr. III 2, 7; Curt. IV 8, 11). The downfall of these last Persian-backed juntas may have inspired the proclamation. There were now no “tyrannies”; all *régimes* were now sanctioned by Alexander.

*M. Errington* : I should like to comment on the so-called “Macedonian Heeresversammlung”, though this is obviously not the place for a detailed exposition of the whole problem. I do not find any basis in the sources for the traditional view of the existence of a Macedonian army assembly as a constitutional organ. Reconstructions of this in the past have relied largely on extrapolation from the events in Babylon after Alexander’s death. It is however clear enough that the original intention of the Macedonian nobles at Babylon was that they should organise the succession amongst themselves; only when the mass of the army allowed itself to be used to object to the proposed solution did it achieve any influence at all; and even then the views it chose to favour were ignored as long as possible by the nobles. The whole performance therefore reflects not a normal but an abnormal royal succession.

It has also been argued in the past that the role of the army in connection with Antigonus’ taking the royal title demonstrates the traditional constitutional character of the procedure. This, I would argue, is also not a correct interpretation; and in any case Antigonus’

behaviour in 306 cannot legitimately be used as a basis for the extrapolation of an original pre-Alexander Macedonian constitutional army assembly. Antigonus certainly relied on his army—and not merely on the Macedonian elements in it: cf. explicitly for another occasion, Diod. XIX 61, 1—as the basis of his power; but in the political circumstances of the time this is enough in itself to explain his need to find confirmation of his decision to assume the royal title there. Prof. Schachermeyr has emphasized that the traditional Macedonian king was *primus inter pares*, which is clearly strictly speaking correct: an extrapolation from the events at Babylon seems to suggest that the normal succession procedure before the death of Alexander was that it was the *pares* and they alone who appointed or acknowledged their *primus*. I shall discuss the whole question in detail elsewhere.

I do not see that G. Wirth's point that the Heeresversammlung played a part in the events connected with the carrying out of the Exiles' Decree 324/3 can be right. The form in the usual formula chosen by the Samian proposer of the decree (*Syll.<sup>3</sup> 312*) seems to me to show quite plainly merely that the announcement was made in the camp (ἐν τῷ[!] στρατοπέδῳ); no mention is made of the στρατόπεδον doing anything: indeed, it is explicitly “the Greeks” present who crown Alexander (see my article, in *Chiron* 5 (1975)).

My last point concerns the βασιλικὴ δύναμις: as I have pointed out elsewhere (in *JHS* 90 (1970)), this formula in the usage of Hieronymus of Cardia seems to mean no more than the army which at any particular time was (officially) commanded by the king.

*M. Milns*: We should always remember, when dealing with Alexander's attitudes towards and dealings with the subject peoples of his empire (i) the problems caused by the diversity of political institutions within the empire (uniformity being the desire and goal of any large-scale administrative organisations) and (ii) the fact that Alexander did not have at his disposal, in the persons of the Macedonian nobility, a trained administrative class, with long tradition and experience behind them. The same was largely true of the

Persian nobility ; for Persian administration seems to have taken one or two extreme forms, either *laissez-faire* or severe repression. Hence, though Alexander may have been imbued with ideas of εὐεργεσία, the class from which he took his officials was not and was without experience in the problems of imperial administration on a grand scale ; hence the many examples attested among both Macedonians and Persians of inefficiency and lack of concern for the subject peoples. The inevitable tendency in such a situation is for the ruler increasingly to intervene and take personal responsibility for all aspects of government and administration ; and this results in increasingly overwhelming pressure on the ruler, who finds himself more and more unable to tolerate any divergence from the norm. The Exile's Decree may be regarded as a measure of desperation, issued by a man who no longer had the time or the freedom to concern himself with diplomatic niceties and concern for individual differences. In short, Alexander acquired too large and too diverse an empire too quickly for him to be able to handle it with the means at his disposal. The situation was different with the Romans, who acquired their empire slowly and thus had time to develop methods and traditions of administration in the governing class.

*M. Schachermeyr* : Ich danke den Herren van Berchem, Badian, Wirth, Errington und Milns für ihre wertvollen Bemerkungen, die ich als wichtige Ergänzungen zu meinen eigenen Ausführungen bestens begrüsse. Wenn meine Darstellung etwas düster ausgefallen ist, so liegt das an der mir gestellten Aufgabe, über Alexander und die unterworfenen Völkerschaften zu berichten. Da musste viel Schatten auf sein Wirken fallen. Hätte ich zu berichten gehabt über Alexander und seine Sendung gegenüber der Welt als Gesamtheit, so würde auf sein Wirken natürlich um so helleres Licht gefallen sein.



### III

ROBERT D. MILNS

## THE ARMY OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT

The topic is one which, surprisingly in view of the fact that the reign of Alexander is largely the story of a military campaign of eleven years' duration, has received comparatively slight treatment from modern scholars. Proof of this can be gained by comparing the slender amount of space devoted by J. Seibert in his *Alexander-Forschungsbericht* to "Das Heerwesen" with the vastly swollen body of literature cited in the same work on such a peripheral matter as Alexander's visit to Jerusalem. There is still no major book devoted entirely to the subject and the most significant general discussions are still those of J. G. and H. Droysen, A. von Domaszewski, H. Berve and W. W. Tarn, supplemented by discussions in the general histories of Alexander—the views of Professor F. Schachermeyr may be singled out here for special mention—and a not too bulky list of journal articles on specific subjects, such as those of G. T. Griffith, P. A. Brunt and E. Badian on the Macedonian cavalry, G. T. Griffith and J. R. Hamilton on the various battles and myself on various aspects of the infantry. The most recent and up-to-date discussion of the Macedonian elements in Alexander's army is the still unpublished doctoral thesis of Dr. R. Lock, a pupil of Professor E. Badian. This is a fine, scholarly piece of work, of which I had the privilege to be an

examiner and of which I have made extensive use in this paper. It is to be hoped that Dr. R. Lock will not be long in publishing his more important conclusions.

Not only is the topic an important one, but it is one of great extent, covering the fields of administrative organisation, tactics and strategy and politics ; and each one of these three major divisions would be capable of book-length treatment.

Nor are we given much help by our ancient sources when examining all these problems. Contemporary accounts are virtually non-existent ; and of our surviving Alexander-historians, Plutarch, Diodorus and Curtius have little knowledge of or interest in the technicalities of Macedonian military institutions. Arrian is still, *faute de mieux*, our best—that is, our most informative—guide. Arrian, because he was a soldier himself and because he used Ptolemy, contains much detailed information on such matters as the technical terminology current in Alexander's army, the size of troop-detachments and their commanders. But, on the other hand, Arrian, either because he was a soldier himself and assumed that all his readers would be in the same position, or because he himself did not understand the information he found in Ptolemy, never gives us any indication of the composition and structure of the individual units and hardly ever goes beyond hinting at or alluding vaguely to important changes in organisation and functions within the army.

The problems, then, are numerous and the scope is vast ; and it is for this reason that I have decided that in a paper of this length more profit would be gained by a narrowing down of the topic, with a more detailed examination of the issues involved. I have, accordingly, limited myself to looking at some of the questions concerning that most enduring and solid section of the Macedonian army, the so-called "phalanx" of the *pezhetaeri*. My justification for this limitation of extent is not only the near impossibility of dealing adequately with the whole army in so short a space of time, but also the fact that

I believe that several new conclusions about the general nature of Alexander's aims and policies can be gained from a detailed study of these phalangites. Moreover, a particular impulse in this direction has recently been given by the publication of Professor A. B. Bosworth's important paper on *asthetaeri*, to which I shall make frequent reference.

### THE ORIGINS OF THE PEZHETAERI

There seems to be general agreement among scholars that the phalanx had its origins in the levies of the peasantry of the individual districts of Macedonia and was organised and recruited on a territorial basis<sup>1</sup>. On the basis of the famous fragment 4 (Jacoby) of Anaximenes (*FGrH* 72), the soldiers of the phalanx were, at some time, given the collective name *pezhetaeri*, Foot Companions, being thereby placed in a position of equality, *vis-à-vis* the King, with the Companions of the cavalry. Theopompus (*FGrH* 115 F 348) gives a definition of who the *pezhetaeri* were and how they were recruited. The two fragments are crucial to any discussion of the term *pezhetaeri* and may be set out here in full:

*Theopompus*, F 348 Jacoby : Θεόπομπός φησιν ὅτι ἐκ πάντων τῶν Μακεδόνων ἐπίλεκτοι οἱ μέγιστοι καὶ ἵσχυρότατοι ἐδορυφόρουν τὸν βασιλέα καὶ ἐκαλοῦντο πεζέταιροι.

*Anaximenes*, F 4 Jacoby, ap. Harpocr. s.v. Πεζέταιροι : Δημοσθένης Φιλιππικοῖς. 'Αναξιμένης ἐν α' Φιλιππικῶν περὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου λέγων φησίν. ἔπειτα τοὺς μὲν ἐνδοξοτάτους ἵππεύειν συνεθίσας ἐταίρους προσηγόρευσε, τοὺς δὲ πλείστους καὶ τοὺς πεζοὺς εἰς λόχους καὶ δέκαδας καὶ τὰς ἀλλας ἀρχὰς διελών πεζεταίρους ὡνόμασεν, ὅπως ἐκάτεροι μετέχοντες τῆς βασιλικῆς ἐταίριας προθυμότατοι διατελῶσιν ὄντες.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. BERVE I 113; KROMAYER/VEITH, 99; TARN II 144; R. D. MILNS, *Alexander the Great* (London 1968), 46 ff.

It will be noticed immediately that there are important discrepancies between the two fragments. Anaximenes extends the name *pezhetaeri* to all the Macedonian infantry; Theopompus regards them as picked troops (*ἐπίλεκτοι*) and as Royal Bodyguards (*ἐδορυφόρουν τὸν βασιλέα*), not as line-infantry<sup>1</sup>. Anaximenes attributes the institution to a King Alexander; Theopompus—as cited in the fragment—makes no attribution. Demosthenes, speaking about 350 B.C. and the earliest contemporary evidence for the *pezhetaeri*, gives no indication of the nature of the troops except that they were extremely well trained. The problem is one of reconciling the accounts of the two fragmentary historians. Were the *pezhetaeri* a picked force (as Theopompus states) or were they the native Macedonian levy (as Anaximenes implies with his use of *τοὺς πλείστους*)?<sup>2</sup> Are Theopompus and Anaximenes talking about

<sup>1</sup> This “bodyguard” idea is found consistently in the other lexicographers who discuss the term (and often with specific reference to bodyguards of Philip II). Cf. *Etymol. Magn.* s.v. Πεζετάρους: *τοὺς περὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ Φιλίππου φρουρούς*. “Ησαν δὲ οὗτοι καὶ πρῶτοι καὶ ισχυροί; Hesych. s.v. Πεζετάροι: *τοῖς περὶ τὸν βασιλέα δορυφόροις*; Phot. *Lex.* s.v. Πεζέταιροι: ... Δημοσθένης δὲ τοὺς περὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ Φιλίππου φρουρούς οὐτως ὀνομάζει, οὐ ησαν καὶ πιστοί καὶ ισχυροί... (Demosthenes, in fact, says nothing about their being Philip’s guards). It would seem highly probable, from the words used, that Theopompus is the ultimate source of each of these lexicographers. We might note, at this point, that the word *pezhetaeri* is of quite rare occurrence in ancient literature and, with one exception (Plut. *Flam.* 17, 8), confined to the period of Philip and Alexander the Great. As far as I can see, outside of the references and citations in the *lexica* and the Plutarch passage, Arrian is the only other ancient writer to use the term. In A. G. Roos’ 1967 Teubner edition of the *Anabasis* the word appears eight times in the text. A. B. Bosworth has recently pointed out to us (in *CQ* 23 (1973), 245 ff.) that in the majority of the occasions on which the word appears in the editions of Arrian’s *Anabasis* the correct reading of the text should be *ἀσθέταιροι* or *ἀσθέτεροι*, this being the original and best attested reading of the mss. of Arrian and *πεζέταιροι* being the emendation of Nicolaus Blancardus. This is true; but there are still three passages in the *Anabasis* (I 28, 3; VII 2, 1; VII 11, 3) where *πεζέταιροι* is undoubtedly the correct reading and must be retained. Arrian almost certainly took the word over from Ptolemy. The term *asthetaeri* will be discussed later.

<sup>2</sup> I cannot see the need to excise as a gloss the words *τοὺς πεζούς* from Anaximenes’ text, as does A. MOMIGLIANO, *Filippo il Macedone* (Firenze 1934), 9.

the same thing? Who was the King Alexander who, according to Anaximenes, so organised 'the majority and the infantry' and called them *pezbetaeri*? The general tendency among scholars has been to accept the account of Anaximenes, whilst either ignoring or explaining away the conflicting testimony of Theopompos, and to try to determine which of the three Macedonian kings named Alexander is meant by Anaximenes. Several scholars, indeed, have gone further than this : arguing that the Alexander *must* be Alexander II, they say that the brevity of his reign (369-8 B.C.) meant that such extensive reforms as Anaximenes describes could only have been carried out by a King who had both the energy and the opportunity to put them into operation. This was obviously Philip II, under whose reign (c. 350) the *pezbetaeri* first appear, and who is credited by Diodorus<sup>1</sup> with the introduction of the phalanx and the sarissa. The reforms described by Anaximenes and Diodorus are obviously one and the same thing ; and Anaximenes' accuracy in his attribution is saved by the assumption that Alexander II was the *originator* of the idea, but Philip the man who translated it into reality. Among the proponents of Philip have been such distinguished scholars as W. W. Tarn<sup>2</sup>, G. Plaumann<sup>3</sup>, J. Kaerst<sup>4</sup>. I also, in my article on 'Philip II and the Hypaspists'<sup>5</sup>, worked on this assumption when arguing about the institution of the corps of the hypaspists and argued that when Theopompos called the King's bodyguard *pezbetaeri*, he really meant the hypaspists. His confusion, I argued, was due to the very recent formation of the hypaspist-corps and to the fact

<sup>1</sup> Diod. XVI 3 and XVI 13.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. II 141 : "some earlier King, probably his [sc. Alexander's] father ... made the national Macedonian levy of infantry his Companions."

<sup>3</sup> In RE VIII 2, 1378.

<sup>4</sup> Geschichte des hellenistischen Zeitalters I (Leipzig 1901), 194.

<sup>5</sup> In Historia 16 (1967), 509-12.

that their equipment was identical with that of the levies of the phalanx, from whom the hypaspists were recruited—a confusion easily made by “Greeks not intimately connected with the Macedonian military circle”. I must confess now that this was a somewhat cavalier way of dismissing the testimony of Theopompus, who, if any Greek, could be called intimate with Macedonia, its court, army and institutions<sup>1</sup>; and must acknowledge the sense of V. Costanzi’s remark about Anaximenes, that (p. 167) “Uno storico che ha intitolato l’opera sua proprio Φιλιππικά, e per giunta contemporaneo, non può aver commessa tale inesattezza” (viz. as to attribute the army reform to ‘Alexander’, if Philip were the innovator)<sup>2</sup>. V. Costanzi argues that Diodorus only attributes to Philip the introduction of the phalanx-formation and the sarissa, not any of the other innovations spoken of by Anaximenes, and concludes (p. 165), “specialmente perché Anassimene ne ha parlato nel libro I, che probabilmente conteneva un riassunto introduttivo del periodo anteriore a Filippo”, that the Alexander must be Alexander I, Philhellene. A. Momigliano, both in his *Filippo il Macedone*<sup>3</sup> and his article ‘Re e popolo in Macedonia’<sup>4</sup>, also argues for Alexander I and dismisses the arguments advanced for Alexander II on the ground that, if it were indeed Alexander II, the reforms made by Archelaus, mentioned by Thucydides (II 100, 2), would be reduced to nothing. This particular argument is a dubious one, since it depends on one’s willingness to interprete the διπλα of Thucydides’ text as meaning διπλῆται and ignores the evidence of writers such as Polyaenus<sup>5</sup> and Xenophon<sup>6</sup>, who indicate quite clearly that in the early part of the

<sup>1</sup> On Theopompus’ sojourn in Macedonia, see now *RE* V A 2, 2176 ff.

<sup>2</sup> V. COSTANZI, in *Athenaeum* N. S. 8 (1930), 157 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Pp. 8-11.

<sup>4</sup> In *Athenaeum* N. S. 13 (1935), 3 ff.

<sup>5</sup> II 1, 17, on 394 B.C.

<sup>6</sup> *HG* V 2, 40, on 379 B.C.

fourth century B.C. Macedonia was still lacking in properly trained and equipped infantry forces. Among the very rare group of scholars who have argued for Alexander the Great is O. Abel<sup>1</sup>, who argues that the Anaximenes fragment refers to the introduction of Persians by Alexander into the *betaeri*. This view, however, is quite untenable, since, firstly, it would have been quite absurd for Harpocration, in commenting upon a passage in Demosthenes which refers to a military institution early in Philip's reign, to cite a passage referring to a very controversial innovation at the end of Alexander's reign; and, secondly, the one thing that Alexander the Great did not do when he organised his Persian 'Macedonian' units after the mutiny of Opis<sup>2</sup>—units which, moreover, seem to have been organised purely as a psychological means of breaking the resistance of the Macedonians and to have been disbanded as soon as the mutiny was ended—was to use the mass of the Persians in the infantry, but the specially picked and trained Persians, either the so called *Epigoni* or the 20,000 Persians under Peucestas<sup>3</sup>.

Recently there have been two further attempts made at interpreting the Anaximenes and Theopompus fragments, both, unfortunately, still unpublished. One is the discussion of R. Lock, in his doctoral thesis on Alexander's army<sup>4</sup>, the other a long note by G. T. Griffith in two parts, entitled 'Theopompus F 348 and Anaximenes F 4' and 'Pezhetaeri and Asthetaeri'. This note is intended, I understand, to be included

<sup>1</sup> O. ABEL, *Makedonien vor König Philipp* (Leipzig 1847), 131 n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Arr. VII 11, 3.

<sup>3</sup> For the *Epigoni*, see Arr. VII 6, 1; for the Persians under Peucestas, Arr. VII 23, 1.

<sup>4</sup> R. LOCK, *The Army of Alexander the Great*, doctoral thesis in the School of History in the University of Leeds, supervised by Professor E. Badian.

as an appendix in G. T. Griffith's volume of the *History of Macedonia*; and I had the pleasure and benefit of discussing the note with the author during 1974, when I was resident in England. R. Lock (p. 18 ff.) points out that Demosthenes, in the passage in the *Second Olynthiac*, is making a clear distinction between the privileged *pezhetaeri* and the mass of Macedonians in general, who derive no benefits from Philip's policies; therefore, he argues, the implication is that the *pezhetaeri* did not consist of the whole infantry levy of Macedonia—at least, at the time when Demosthenes was speaking—as has commonly been believed, but “was a select body formed to be a household guard, alongside the *hetairoi* cavalry, and it is to the creation of this unit that Anaximenes is referring” (p. 19). R. Lock argues for Alexander II as being the King responsible for the innovations described by Anaximenes and believes that this élite corps of *pezhetaeri* was trained in phalanx-tactics and that it was from these troops that there eventually developed the Macedonian phalanx as we see it in the reigns of Philip and Alexander the Great. R. Lock's explanation of the institution of the *pezhetaeri* as a select, élite guard of the King (in his view, Alexander II) has the merit of doing justice to the implications of the Demosthenes passage and the specific statement of Theopompus, to whom, despite his censorious nature, much credence should be given. It does not, however, satisfy the definite statement of Anaximenes that the Alexander in question organised τοὺς πλείστους in the manner described and called them *pezhetaeri*. Here we may turn to G. T. Griffith's note on the subject. Griffith makes the very sensible point that it is reasonable to assume that Theopompus is describing the *pezhetaeri* as he saw and knew them in Macedonia in the late 340's and that Theopompus means neither more nor less than what he says: the *pezhetaeri* of Philip were a picked force of king's guards, not the general levy of the Macedonians. For the detailed accuracy of the Anaximenes fragment Griffith has little but contempt, and Anaximenes, it may be noted, did not enjoy

a high reputation as an historian in antiquity<sup>1</sup>. On the other hand, Theopompus may be regarded as a good witness, having been resident in Macedonia. The only possible way of reconciling the two passages, if we accept the veracity of Theopompus, is to assume that Anaximenes, in a confused and garbled manner, is saying that Alexander the Great widened the application of the existing name of Companions to include or embrace all the Macedonian heavy cavalry, as compared with the Royal Squadron, which had hitherto been exclusively the cavalry Companions of the King<sup>2</sup>, and the application of the existing name of Foot Companions to include all the Macedonian infantry of the phalanx. In this way the two passages under discussion, Theopompus F 348 and Anaximenes F 4, can be brought into harmony and there is now, to use Griffith's words, "at least a sequence of development here that makes sense". The reason for this extension by Alexander to all the heavy Macedonian cavalry and all the phalanx-infantry of the honorific title of Companions was precisely as Anaximenes says: "in order that each of the two classes, by sharing in the royal Companionship, should be always exceedingly loyal [sc. to the King]." Alexander the Great, as has been pointed out by some scholars<sup>3</sup>, was in a comparatively insecure position at the start of his reign and virtually in the tutelage of the family of Parmenion, which held nearly all the senior positions in the expeditionary force. Alexander's two most pressing problems in the early years of his reign were to prevent any recrudescence of local separation among the Macedonian dynastic houses and to break the power of Parmenion's faction and win the loyalty

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Dion. Hal. *De Isaeo* 19 (= *FGrH* 72 T 13) for a general assessment of Anaximenes' qualities and G. T. GRIFFITH's comment on this passage: "A writer capable of stuff like this perhaps was capable of the ultimate in silliness."

<sup>2</sup> For the Royal Squadron, ὑπηρέται βασιλική, as the original cavalry Companions, see TARN II 139.

<sup>3</sup> On Alexander's position at the start of his reign, see especially E. BADIAN, in *TAPhA* 91 (1960), 324-38, and R. D. MILNS, *Alexander the Great*, 33 ff.

of the troops to himself alone. Hence this extension of the honorific title from the originally small and élite forces of the Household infantry and cavalry to all the heavy cavalry and the infantry of the phalanx. As W. W. Tarn says<sup>1</sup>, "It made no real difference ; but people will often welcome a name in place of a thing."

Now if we accept Griffith's argument—and I find them very persuasive—there is a further deduction that can be made. It is highly unlikely that the original footguard, the *pezbetaeri*, were disbanded or disappeared and quite possible that some attempt would have been made to enable the corps to retain some outward sign of its specially close relationship with the King, as compared with all the other phalangites, who were now all his Companions. I would suggest tentatively that it was at this time that the élite infantry-corps received the name which we know so well from the pages of Arrian : the hypaspists. I argued in my article on "Philip II and the Hypaspists"<sup>2</sup> that the name hypaspists was given to the corps to distinguish it from the *pezbetaeri*—though, of course, here I was thinking in terms of Philip II—and that the name was perhaps deliberately chosen as not having the connotations of the mercenary guard of tyrants that is contained in the more common word δορυφόροι. The known figure of 3,000 hypaspists early in Alexander's reign<sup>3</sup> would also seem reasonable, if we regard them, not simply as the King's personal bodyguards, but also and originally as the King's personal standing infantry-force<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> II 141.

<sup>2</sup> *Art. cit.*, 509.

<sup>3</sup> The figure 3,000 is deduced from the fact that the corps at Issus occupied the same space as two *taxeis* of the phalanx ; Arr. II 8, 3-4 and cf. BELOCH, 330.

<sup>4</sup> It should be stated here that I do not accept the arguments of those scholars who believe that the hypaspists were armed differently from the rest of the phalangites. TARN II 153 shows clearly that the only differences between the phalangites and the hypaspists were in their historical development and method of recruitment. For proponents of the view that the hypaspists were more lightly armed, see H. DROYSEN, 16; KROMAYER/WEITH, 99; SCHACHERMEYR,

At this point in the discussion, we may conveniently turn to the problem of *asthetaeri*. There are six passages in Arrian where the correct manuscript reading is *asthetaeri* (or a very similar form) not *pezhetaeri*<sup>1</sup>. It is a word that is found nowhere else in ancient literature and the question naturally arises : who and what were these *asthetaeri*? The existence of the word *pezhetaeri* in Arrian's text, on one occasion (VII 11, 3) in the same sentence as *asthetaeri*, proves that this is not simply another term for *pezhetaeri*; and the same argument can be advanced for the hypaspists. Yet the context on each occasion that *asthetaeri* are mentioned indicates clearly that they are *Macedonian* infantry of the phalanx, that they have a particularly close relationship with the King, and that there is no reason to assume that they had a different military function from the *pezhetaeri* (i.e. they were not 'light' armed or missile troops). A further point may be noted immediately, which may have some significance : unlike the word *pezhetaeri*, the term *asthetaeri* is, with one exception, always accompanied in Arrian's text by the participle καλούμενοι or οἱ καλούμενοι<sup>2</sup>. Noteworthy too is the fact that,

155 ; von DOMASZEWSKI, 25 n. 1. Their use on rapid, forced marches proves only that they were better trained than the territorial levies, not that they were more lightly armed. On the question of the precise date of the introduction of the term hypaspists, in place of *pezhetaeri*, there may be a clue in the narrative of the campaign across the Danube in 335 B.C. At Arrian I 3, 6 it is said that 1,500 cavalry and 4,000 infantry crossed the river with Alexander ; at I 4, 2, Alexander τὴν φάλαγγα δὲ ἐν πλαισίῳ Νικάνορα ἔγειν ἐκέλευσε. The figure 4,000 is significant, since it is the combined total of Alexander's favourite troops, the hypaspists and the Agrianians ; equally significant is the fact that Nicanor is the commander of "the phalanx", since Nicanor, in Asia, is the commander of the hypaspists. Is it not possible that we see here a situation in which the troops whom we know as the hypaspists were still the phalanx, i.e. the élite troops referred to by Demosthenes and Theopomitus as the *pezhetaeri*? If this is so, then the extension of the honorific title of *pezhetaeri* to the rest of the Macedonian infantry did not occur until the very beginning of the Asian expedition.

<sup>1</sup> The passages are II 23, 2 ; IV 23, 1 ; V 22, 6 ; VI 6, 1 ; VII 21, 3 ; VII 11, 3.

<sup>2</sup> The one exception is VII 11, 3, which speaks of ἀσθέτεροι ἄλλοι, excised by Fr. Schmieder without any justification. It is interesting to note that D. G. HOGARTH, in his article "The Army of Alexander", in *Journal of Philology* 17 (1888),

whilst at the first appearance of the word (II 23, 2), there seems to be but one *taxis* of *asthetaeri*, in all subsequent references they are referred to by the plural *taxeis*. Indeed, at VI 21, 3, the number of *asthetaeri-taxeis* appears to be equivalent to half the number of known phalanx-*taxeis*. A. B. Bosworth<sup>1</sup>, noting that the *asthetaeri-taxeis* included at least those of Coenus and of Polyperchon and that these *taxeis* came from "the old Kingdoms of Upper Macedonia" (viz. Elimiotis and Tymphaea), concludes (p. 250) that "*ἀσθέταιροι* was a technical term, used to denote the infantry from Upper Macedonia" and that "These troops were absorbed into the national army long after the infantry had been organised into regular cadres and given their title of *πεζέταιροι*.... They were latecomers, and it would have been logical and understandable if they were given a separate title of their own to distinguish them from the main body of the phalanx." But what is the significance of the word? Bosworth rejects the possibility that it is derived from some obscure dialect word, unique to Macedonia and unintelligible to the rest of the Greek world, on the ground that the second component part of the name is recognisably Greek and one would therefore expect that the word as a whole would be of Greek derivation, "rather than a strange bastard hybrid" (p. 250). His suggestion for the meaning and origin of the

<sup>1</sup> ff., observes that, with the possible exception of I 28, 3, the references to *pezhetaeri* in Arrian never refer to the *whole* phalanx, but always to single *taxeis* or to the forces used when an expeditionary-force is made up of a part only of the whole army (p. 11); that in several of the Arrian passages the epithet *οἱ καλούμενοι* is attached to the word—a sure indication of something unusual; and that there seems to be a close connection between the *pezhetaeri* and Coenus. D. G. Hogarth, of course, was working on the basis of the reading *πεζέταιροι* on every occasion; had he read his apparatus criticus with the care that, since A. B. BOSWORTH's article, we all now realise should have been employed, he might well have anticipated several of the conclusions or conjectures put forward in this paper. O. HOFFMANN, it is to be remarked, makes no mention of the word *asthetaeri* in his book on *Die Makedonen, ihre Sprache und ihr Volkstum* (Göttingen 1906).

<sup>1</sup> *Art. cit.* (cf. *supra*, p. 90 n. 1), 247 ff.

first part of the word is that it is a contraction of ἀσιστα, a very rare by-form of ἄγχιστα, in the sense of “closest of kin”<sup>1</sup>. The original word would have been \*ἀσισθέταιροι, “presumably contracted by haplology into the form we meet in Arrian”, and would mean ‘closest-in-kin Companions’, a phrase which, suggests Bosworth, would have encapsulated nicely their Macedonian nationality and their previous independence from the central monarchy (p. 251). Bosworth’s arguments on this point, however, do not seem particularly compelling.

A different approach to the problem of the origin of the *asthetaeri* is taken by G. T. Griffith, in the note previously referred to. On the question of the derivation of the word, Griffith is inclined to accept the suggestion that had already been rejected by Bosworth (p. 251 n. 3), that the word is a “Thessalian” contraction of ἀριστο-έταιροι, “Best Companions”, and answers Bosworth’s objection that “there is no reason why Philip should have used this peculiarly Thessalian contraction” by pointing out that there are common factors in the Thessalian and Macedonian dialects<sup>2</sup>. I would myself, however, be inclined to agree with Bosworth’s objection, since all other technical Macedonian military terms, which are formed as compounds, are recognisably “Attic” in both parts (e.g. σωματοφύλακες, ὑπασπισταί, πρόδρομοι, πεζέταιροι; we may except σαρισσοφόροι, as the sarissa was purely a Macedonian weapon) and it is difficult to see why there should be such a dialect variation in this particular instance. More convincing, I feel, is Griffith’s suggestion concerning the origin of the unit or units. Arguing from the facts that the first reference to *asthetaeri* in Arrian’s text occurs during the assault on Tyre (II 23, 3) and that at that time there was apparently only one *taxis* of *asthetaeri*, that of Coenus, and that at Issus the *taxis* of

<sup>1</sup> See LIDDELL/SCOTT/JONES, s.v. ἄγχιστος.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the example of ταγοναγά, and the discussion of V. COSTANZI, in *Athenaeum* N. S. 8 (1930), 157 ff., and O. HOFFMANN, *op. cit.*, 77.

Coenus has won 'promotion' from its position at the Granicus and keeps it at Gaugamela, in both battles holding the position of honour on the right of the phalanx, next to the hypaspists, Griffith argues that this *taxis*, and this alone, has by 332 been honoured with the name *asthetaeri* (in his view 'Best Companions') as a recognition of their performance in battle and without any reference to their Elimiot origin (as Bosworth argues). It is, says Griffith, a battle honour, making them (by a modern usage) "King's Own". By the time of India, the same honour has been extended to two more *taxeis*—possibly three—one of which is that of Polyperchon. Support for this view is gained from the fact that on the three occasions in India where the army is divided and Alexander has about half of it under his personal command, his part of the phalanx is, on each occasion, the *asthetaeri*, along with the inseparable hypaspists<sup>1</sup>; and that on another occasion, when only one *taxis* of the phalanx is included in Alexander's personal command, it is a *taxis* of the *asthetaeri*<sup>2</sup>. The fact, says Griffith, that certainly two and perhaps three of the three or four *asthetaeri* *taxeis* were levies from the *ethne* of Upper Macedonia is to be seen as an 'Aristotelian accident', in the sense that they had been awarded this status, not because they came from Elimea or Orestis, but because they had distinguished themselves in action. An analogy, in fact, might be made with the distinguished service and hence distinguished reputation of Scottish Highland brigades in the British army.

To sum up the discussion so far : we can say, with a reasonable degree of probability, that after the early years in Asia there were at least three distinct elements in the phalanx : the *pezhetaeri*, the *asthetaeri* (who were, of course, also *pezhetaeri*), and the hypaspists. I myself do not believe that there was any difference between the *pezhetaeri* and the hypaspists in respect

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Arr. IV 23, 1; V 22, 6; VI 21, 3; and A. B. BOSWORTH, *art. cit.*, 247-9.

<sup>2</sup> Arr. VI 6, 1.

to their arms and armour—I shall return to this point again when discussing the significance of the adjective *κοῦφος* in Arrian's narrative—and it seems reasonable to assume the same with respect to the *asthetaeri*. We can further say that the naming of these units was largely the responsibility of Alexander the Great. For, though he did not invent the term *pezhetaeri*, it was he who early in his reign extended it to the whole of the infantry-levy of Macedonia<sup>1</sup>; who changed the name of the original *pezhetaeri* to hypaspists; and who devised the honorific title *asthetaeri*, which he conferred on certain particularly distinguished *taxeis* of the phalanx. This concern which Alexander showed in devising and conferring honorific titles on his Macedonian soldiers, both infantry and cavalry, if we accept Griffith's interpretation of the Anaximenes fragment, is also indicative of the great need that Alexander felt, in the early years of his reign, of binding to himself the Macedonians by emphasising their close personal relationship to himself; and hence the measures must be seen in the context of the political struggles current in the Macedonian court-circle.

#### THE ORGANISATION OF THE PEZHETAERI

The general consensus among scholars is that, at the time of the crossing into Asia, the *pezhetaeri* were organised in six *taxeis* (which, in Arrian's imprecise terminology, can also be called *phalanges*)<sup>2</sup> of c. 1500 men each, recruited or levied on a territorial basis and each commanded by a *strategus* or a *taxisarch*, who was usually a member of the district of Macedonia in which the *taxis* was raised<sup>3</sup>. The figure of 1500 is reached as follows:

<sup>1</sup> It is, of course, impossible to say whether the term *pezhetaeri* was limited only to those *taxeis* who were serving with the King at any particular moment.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. TARN II 136.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. BERVE I 113; TARN II 142; H. DROYSEN, 11; KROMAYER/VEITH, 99. J. G. DROYSEN, 242, makes a subtle distinction between the term *strategus* and *taxisarch*, to the effect that *strategus* denotes the overall commander of the *taxis*,

the whole phalanx, *pezhetaeri* and hypaspists, numbered 12,000 at the time of the crossing into Asia<sup>1</sup>; it is almost certain that there were six *taxeis* of the *pezhetaeri* in each of the three major battles down to 331<sup>2</sup>; and the hypaspists, as can be seen from their position at Issus, occupied the same frontage as two *taxeis* of *pezhetaeri*<sup>3</sup>. Thus 12,000 men equals eight *taxeis*, i.e. 1500 men per *taxis*.

A brief word may be in order here on the question of the arms and equipment of the phalangites. The best and most convincing discussion, it seems to me, is still that of G. T. Griffith in his article “*Μακεδονικά*: Notes on the Macedonians of Philip and Alexander”<sup>4</sup>. Griffith demonstrates that the phalangites of Philip II and Alexander were not hoplites or heavy infantry in the same way as their counterparts in the Greek *poleis*; and this was the result of social and economic factors. The Macedonian phalangite lacked the *thorax* and had a much smaller shield than the Greek hoplite, the absence of protective armour being compensated by the *sarissa*, which gave him the advantage in battle of the first strike. To speak of the soldiers

*taxyarch* the field commander: “... jede Phalanx wird neben ihrem Strategen einen Taxarchen gehabt haben.” I do not find his explanation convincing; surely we have here yet another example of Arrian’s looseness in the use of technical terms.

<sup>1</sup> Diod. XVII 17, 1 ff.; the hypaspists are not mentioned in Diodorus’ list; they must be included in the 12,000 Macedonian infantry.

<sup>2</sup> For the *taxis* commander at the Granicus, Issus and Gaugamela, see Arrian I 14, 2-3; II 8, 3-4; III 11, 9-10. A convenient list of *taxis*-leaders is given in BERVE I 114 and 116. A dissentient voice to the view that there were six *taxeis* down to 331 is that of BELOCH, 326 ff. J. Beloch argues, on the basis of the information given at Arr. I 29, 4 of the arrival of 3,000 Macedonian infantry at Gordium, that a new *taxis* was formed there. The arguments whereby he justifies the presence of only six *taxeis* at both Issus and Gaugamela are ingenious, but, because of the manipulations that are involved with the texts of Curtius (IV 13, 28), Arrian (III 11, 9) and Diodorus (XVII 57, 2) cannot be sustained; J. Beloch has found few supporters for his view.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. TARN II 150.

<sup>4</sup> In *PCPhS* N. S. 4 (1956-7), 3 ff.

of the phalanx as “heavy infantry”, “Schwerbewaffnete” or “hoplites” in the Greek sense is misleading<sup>1</sup>; they seem to have occupied a place midway between the Greek hoplite and the peltast<sup>2</sup>.

On the question of the method of recruitment of the phalanx-*taxeis*, there seems to be almost complete unanimity that each *taxis* represented the levy of a particular ‘district’ or ‘Gau’ of Macedonia<sup>3</sup>. The main pieces of evidence for this view come from the descriptions of Diodorus and Curtius of the battle of Gaugamela, in which are mentioned the *taxeis* of Elimea, Orestis and Lyncestis and Stymphaea (=Tymphaea)<sup>4</sup>; their commanders were, respectively, Coenus, Perdiccas and Polyperchon. In addition, we learn from Arrian<sup>5</sup> that the reinforcements who reached the army late in 331 B.C. were distributed κατὰ ἔθνη,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. SCHACHERMEYR, 114; J. G. DROYSSEN, 245; TARN II 142.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, we may note, is guilty here, as everywhere else, of lack of precision in his terminology. On at least eight occasions he refers to the phalangites as ὄπλιται—I 1, 8; I 3, 3; I 6, 1; I 13, 1; I 21, 1; I 27, 8; II 8, 2; II 8, 3—, on all of which occasions there can be no doubt that phalangites are meant. There are five further occurrences of the word in the *Anabasis*: I 5, 12 (Cleitus' Illyrian troops); II 8, 6 and II 8, 8 (Darius' Greek infantry and the Evaces at Issus); V 15, 6 (Porus' infantry); and VI 18, 3, which could refer to phalangites, though Greek mercenaries are just as possible and where, moreover, the word is used simply as a contrast to ψιλοί. It may be of significance that the only occasions on which the word certainly refers to the phalangites occur in Book I and in the description of the battle of Issus in Book II. Does this give a clue to Arrian's—or Ptolemy's—sources for the early part of Alexander's reign and campaigns? Callisthenes' description of Issus, as is well known, was the famous one (cf. Polybius' criticisms at XII 17-22) and his was the first full account of the early years of the expedition. Anaximenes may well have described the Illyrian campaigns. Greeks writing for Greeks, they would tend to use the common Greek term “hoplite”, rather than the Macedonian term *pezhetaeri* or a word such as φαλαγγίτης (whose first attested appearance in Greek literature dates to the time of Polybius; cf. LIDDELL/SCOTT/JONES, s.v.). Ptolemy, writing forty or more years later and himself a very minor figure in the early years in Asia, may simply have taken over this term, where he found it in his source, without questioning its precise applicability.

<sup>3</sup> Cf., among others, BERVE I 114 ff.; von DOMASZEWSKI, 42 ff.; TARN II 142.

<sup>4</sup> Diod. XVII 57, 2; Curt. IV 13, 28.

<sup>5</sup> III 16, 11.

which seems to imply strongly some form of territorial organisation. The evidence, then, is slight, but nevertheless has produced a great mass of theories, of which the most widely accepted is perhaps that of Berve<sup>1</sup>. Working on the statement of Diodorus in the army-list, that Antipater retained 12,000 infantry and on the belief that Alexander's 12,000 included the 3,000 hypaspists<sup>2</sup>, he arrives at a total of 18-20,000 *pezhetaeri*, recruited from twelve or thirteen recruiting areas. The three *taxeis* whose territorial area is named all stem, observes Berve, from "die westlichen Fürstentümer" or "das altmakedonische Land"<sup>3</sup>. These principalities, he argues, still claimed "eine gewisse Sonderstellung"; hence their commanders had to be appointed from the local dynastic families; thus Coenus, from the dynastic family of Elimiotis, commanded the *taxis* of Elimiotis and so on. Ten unnamed *taxeis*, however, were recruited from districts in Central Macedonia—"Kernmakedonen"—where there was greater unity and loyalty to the crown; hence there was no need for their leaders to be chosen from the local aristocracy, "sondern vom Könige aus dem Adel ganz Makedoniens ausgewählt werden konnten" (p. 115). Thus Craterus, from Orestis, and Meleager, from Tymphaea, do not command *taxeis* from these districts, but from 'Kernmakedonen'. Berve categorically excludes the possibility that the *pezhetaeri* *taxeis* in Alexander's army in the early years could have been recruited from the coastal districts of Macedonia, i.e. the areas of mainly Greek settlement; this is, he believes, "nach der hochbedeutenden, durchaus das makedonische Volk repräsentierenden Stellung, welche die Pezhetairen in Alexanders Heerlager einnahmen... unzweifelhaft" (p. 115). He is, however, prepared to accept that the new, seventh *taxis* that joined

<sup>1</sup> I 113 ff.

<sup>2</sup> BERVE also believes (I 113 n. 4) that Antipater had some hypaspists in his 12,000.

<sup>3</sup> But the obvious implication is that neither Orestis nor Lyncestis individually could supply sufficient infantry to form a full *taxis*.

the army after Gaugamela<sup>1</sup> may well have been from the "Küstengebieten"<sup>2</sup>. It seems however best and safest to treat arguments such as Berve's with extreme caution ; to assume that it is purely an accident that in Diodorus' narrative three *taxeis* are given geographical origins ; and to draw no conclusions about the origin and method of recruitment of the other three (later four) *taxeis*, other than to say that the Arrian passage (III 16, 11) seems to indicate 'ethnic' organisation.

R. Lock<sup>3</sup> accepts—and I would agree with this—the arguments of J. Beloch<sup>4</sup> that there were no hypaspists left in Macedonia with Antipater and that the 12,000 infantry left with the Regent was the rest of the national levy. He assumes (p. 48) that both the troops with Alexander and those with Antipater were organised territorially ; hence, at 1,500 men to each *taxis* and a total levy of c. 21,000 men, there would have been fourteen territorial *taxeis*, though, as the example of Orestis-Lyncestis shows, there may well have been more than fourteen territorial levy-areas. The date by which the definitive administrative reforms, which established these recruiting areas, had been completed is placed by Lock (p. 41) at c. 340 B.C., by which time, he argues, the boundaries and population of the Macedonian kingdom had reached some degree of stability at Philip's hands. However, I do feel reluctant to accept Lock's contention that the infantry and cavalry forces of the Greek *poleis* incorporated in Macedonia by Philip were used in the Companion Cavalry and the *pezhetaeri* *taxeis*. For, to speak only of the infantry, it is difficult, in view of the strong ethnic antipathy that existed between Greeks and Macedonians<sup>5</sup>, to see

<sup>1</sup> That of Philotas ; see below.

<sup>2</sup> I 116 n. 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, 36 ff.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, 326 ff.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. the probably apocryphal, but certainly illuminating anecdote in Diod. XVII 100-101. The attitude of Demosthenes was probably not unrepresentative of common Greek opinion of the Macedonians.

how conquered—and hostile—Greeks could be placed side by side with their despised Macedonian conquerors, in a position of equality, in units of the Macedonian army, which have rightly been described as *the* representatives of the Macedonian people<sup>1</sup>.

#### DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PHALANX, 334–323 B.C.

Having discussed the origins and composition of the infantry of the phalanx up to the time of Alexander's accession and during the first years of his reign, we may now look at the developments, in terms of organisation, composition and function, which took place with the corps during the course of the Asian expedition. The first question that requires attention, since many other questions depend on the way in which this one is answered, is that of reinforcements from Macedonia and of losses during the campaign<sup>2</sup>.

Reinforcements from Macedonia are recorded in 333 B.C.<sup>3</sup>, when 3,000 Macedonian infantry reached the army at Gordium. Callisthenes<sup>4</sup> records that 5,000 infantry reached the army between 334 B.C. and the battle of Issus. The discrepancy between the figures of Arrian (=Ptolemy) and Callisthenes is probably to be explained by the argument that Callisthenes' figure includes infantry other than Macedonians<sup>5</sup>. No other reinforcements of *Macedonians* are reported until after the battle of Gaugamela, though at least 7,000 Greek mercenaries joined

<sup>1</sup> Cf. BERVE I 115; J. G. DROYSSEN, 245: "Wie hätten τῶν πεζεταίρων καλουμένων αἱ τάξεις (Arr. IV 23, 1) auch Nicht-Makedonen enthalten können?" It makes no difference whether we read πεζεταίρων or ἀσθεταίρων.

<sup>2</sup> The most comprehensive, though not necessarily most accurate, discussion of this question is that of BELOCH, 330-49. J. Beloch's computations are truly a *tour de force*, but based all too often on assumptions and conjectures. A more recent treatment of the subject is that of R. LOCK, *op. cit.*, 130 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Arr. I 29, 4.

<sup>4</sup> FGrH 124 F 35, *ap.* Plb. XII 17-22, especially 19, 2.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. BELOCH, 332.

the army in 332 B.C.<sup>1</sup>. In my article on “Alexander’s Seventh Phalanx Battalion”<sup>2</sup>, I argued that reinforcements and losses of Macedonians between the crossing into Asia and Gaugamela, including the battle, were more or less equal<sup>3</sup>; hence the *taxis* in the battle still contained c. 9,000 men altogether<sup>4</sup>. The next batch of Macedonian infantry reinforcements recorded in the sources reached the army at or near Susa, in November/December 331 B.C.<sup>5</sup>. They numbered 6,000. It is impossible to say how many, if any, of these 6,000 were hypaspists; but Arrian’s statement that τοὺς πεζούς δὲ προσέθηκεν ταῖς τάξεσι ταῖς ἄλλαις, κατὰ ἔθνη ἐκάστους ξυντάξας strongly implies that the large majority of these troops were *pezhetaeri/asthetaeri*, since the hypaspists were, in all probability, not organised or recruited κατὰ ἔθνη<sup>6</sup>. This addition of c. 6,000 men was offset by losses in battle and garrison-duty amounting, up to the time of Persepolis, to c. 4,800 men<sup>7</sup>. Lock argues (p. 31) that I am mistaken in accepting the figure of Curtius, V 6, 11, of 3,000 for the garrison of Persepolis; since “Alexander had left Persepolis in

<sup>1</sup> Arr. II 20, 5 and Curt. IV 5, 18.

<sup>2</sup> In *GRBS* 7 (1966), 162 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Under the heading “losses” I include troops detached from the main army for such purposes as garrison-duty or siege-operations.

<sup>4</sup> I find J. BELOCH’s arguments on the army strength at Gaugamela (p. 333 ff.) quite arbitrary and unconvincing. R. LOCK, *op. cit.*, 130, criticises my figures for Macedonian losses during these years as being “disproportionately high” and assumes a figure of c. 1,500 for these losses, thus making a total of c. 10,500 phalangites who lined up at Gaugamela. But it is likely that it would be in Asia Minor, the Levant and Egypt, which were populous, vital to communications and—most significantly—with large Greek cities, that one would expect to find Alexander preferring to use reliable Macedonians. The further east he penetrated, the more he could afford to use Greek mercenaries as garrison-troops.

<sup>5</sup> Arr. III 16, 10; Diod. XVII 65, 1; Curt. V 1, 40.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. R. D. MILNS, in *Historia* 20 (1971), 186 ff. I must concede the possibility that there is at least a modicum of truth in R. LOCK’s statement (*op. cit.*, 150) that “the omission of details of additions to the hypaspist body when a general infantry reinforcement was taking place would rate as one of Arrian’s more forgiveable inaccuracies.”

<sup>7</sup> R. D. MILNS, *art. cit.* (cf. *supra* n. 2), 164.

ruins, he would hardly have spared 3,000 crack troops on these ; these 3,000 men were only a temporary garrison, until the treasure could be moved to Susa." This may be so ; yet Persis itself, of which Persepolis was the centre, was the heart of the Persian empire and here, if anywhere, strong local resistance was to be expected ; hence the need for a strong garrison of the best troops available<sup>1</sup>. The 6,000 reinforcements in late 331 B.C. are, it is to be noted, the last Macedonian infantry reinforcements recorded by our sources. Beloch<sup>2</sup> argues that the *taxis* of Cleitus, which first appears in India in 327 B.C.<sup>3</sup>, is a new *taxis*, formed from reinforcements of Macedonians who reached the army probably in the winter of 329/8 B.C. They were, he argues, among the 8,000 'Graeci' sent, according to Curtius (VII 10, 12), by Antipater. Tarn<sup>4</sup>, who also believes that the *taxis* of Cleitus was a new one (in his view, the seventh), argues that it came, together with reinforcements for the other six *taxeis*, in 327 B.C., when Alexander was at Nautaca ; and in this he has been followed by P. A. Brunt<sup>5</sup>. I find myself, however, unable to accept the arguments of these scholars. Moreover, general considerations militate against the notion of Macedonian troops being sent for or dispatched to join the main army in the Far East and India. The distances from Macedonia were vast and the army's movements, once it penetrated the Punjab, were uncertain. Much better and more sensible to make use of the many Greek mercenaries who were already in Asia and hence more accessible—a policy which would have the further advantage of preventing any additional strain on Macedonia's military resources for a few years. My

<sup>1</sup> Cf. BERVE I 181, who finds no difficulty in accepting the permanent nature of this garrison.

<sup>2</sup> P. 342.

<sup>3</sup> Arr. IV 22, 7.

<sup>4</sup> II 147 n. 3.

<sup>5</sup> In *JHS* 83 (1963), 39.

own feeling is that the reason for the silence of the sources with respect to Macedonian reinforcements from 331 B.C. onwards is that there were no more such reinforcements, because Alexander at this time made a deliberate policy-decision to summon no further troops from Macedonia in the foreseeable future (a decision that would have been all the easier to make as at that time no further large-scale opposition was to be expected)<sup>1</sup>. I would suggest—and it can be no more than this—that the three officers sent in 328/7 B.C. from Bactria were given instructions to recruit troops in Macedonia and to set out for Asia only when they heard of the return of the main army to the central provinces of the empire. Hence I would suggest that there *may* have reached Babylon in 323 B.C., not only Menidas with his cavalry, but other officers—perhaps amongst them Sopolis and Epocillus—with infantry reinforcements; but before this there were no other Macedonian reinforcements for the army. The argument is advanced by Lock<sup>2</sup> that Macedonian infantry reached Alexander in Carmania at the end of 325 B.C., brought by the generals from Media<sup>3</sup>. However, Arrian, at III 19, 5-8, despite his usual lack of precision in describing military dispositions, can only be interpreted as saying that the army of Media, left behind in 330 B.C. at Ecbatana with Parmenion, consisted of Greek mercenaries, Thracians and non-Macedonian cavalry. There were certainly no Macedonian infantry left with Parmenion other than the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. BERVE I 182: "Der makedonische Zuzug von 331 scheint bis auf weiteres der letzte gewesen zu sein; das Fehlen der Makedonen in dem 329/8 eintreffenden gewaltigen Ersatz (19,000 Mann) und ebenso am Hydaspes weist darauf hin, dass das Schweigen der Überlieferung bezüglich der Makedonen eine sachliche Berechtigung hat...».

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, 137.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Arr. VI 27, 3: ἡκον δὲ καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ οἱ ὑπολειφθέντες ἀμαὶ Παρμενίωνι ἐπὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς τῆς ἐν Μηδίᾳ, Κλεανδρός τε καὶ Σιτάλχης καὶ Ἡράκων, τὴν πολλὴν τῆς στρατιᾶς καὶ οὗτοι ἀγοντες.

temporary guard for the transferring of the treasure<sup>1</sup>. It is, of course, possible that Ecbatana had been used as a transit-camp for Macedonian troops during the years in which Alexander was in India and the Far East and that it is these whom Arrian means by τὴν πολλὴν τῆς στρατιᾶς (τῆς ἐν Μηδίᾳ); but I am not convinced of this, since Babylon had been marked out clearly as the centre of the new 'Reich' and it was to Babylon that Alexander would return, if he ever did return. Hence it would be much more sensible to send any reinforcements directly to Babylon.

With respect to losses from the Macedonian phalanx during the years from 331 B.C. to the return from India, one can do no more than make what one hopes are intelligent guesses. Arrian (III 29, 5; cf. Curt. VII 5, 27) records the sending home from the Oxus in 329 B.C. of τῶν τε Μακεδόνων... τοὺς πρεσβυτάτους; Berve<sup>2</sup> guesses their number at c. 750. Lock<sup>3</sup> conjectures losses of 3-4,000 phalangites for the years of campaigning on the Iranian plateau and in India, but offers no arguments or evidence for these figures. Obviously, the losses in the hard fighting and harsh climate of the Iranian plateau would have been considerable; even more so in India, where the climate was worse and the fighting even more bitter<sup>4</sup>. Again, it is impossible to guess how many Macedonians were among the ἀπόλεμοι and ἀπόμαχοι, who were frequently left behind to form parts of garrisons and new settlements<sup>5</sup>, but their num-

<sup>1</sup> See my note, forthcoming in *Historia*, on "Troop Details in Arrian".

<sup>2</sup> I 180.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, 136.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. the significant silence of Arrian on Macedonian losses in the battle of the Hydaspes. Only two phalanx-*taxeis*—those of Cleitus and Coenus (Arr. V 12, 2)—were actually involved in the battle, but their losses in the fighting, especially against the elephants, would have been considerable.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Arr. V 27, 5, where Coenus, at the Beas mutiny, says that οἱ δὲ ἐκ τραυμάτων ἀπόμαχοι γεγενημένοι ὅλοι ὅλῃ τῆς Ἀσίας ὑπολειμμένοι εἰσὶν... ὅλιγοι δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν ὑπολείπονται. Rhetorical exaggeration, no doubt, but not without a grain of truth.

bers too could not have been negligible. With respect to losses on the march back through Gedrosia, we may accept that, whatever may have been the real magnitude of the disaster<sup>1</sup>, the Macedonians probably suffered less than the other troops, partly because of their better training and discipline, partly because, as Berue points out<sup>2</sup>, it is highly likely that Alexander looked after his most important troops better than the others, and partly because a considerable part of the Macedonian infantry was sent with Craterus to march by an easier route (perhaps over the Bolan Pass) and to rejoin the army in Carmania<sup>3</sup>. J. Beloch<sup>4</sup> assumes total Macedonian losses in the Indian campaign and the Gedrosian march as 3,000 and the losses up to the start of the Indian expedition as c. 5-7,000, thus arriving at total losses for the whole Asian campaign (inclusive of the cavalry and hypaspists) of 8-10,000 Macedonians. This represents 27-33% of the 30,000 Macedonians who, on his calculations, took part in the Asian campaign. There would thus have been c. 20,000 Macedonians in the forces brought out of the desert by Alexander<sup>5</sup>. These are, in my opinion, unreasonably high figures. My own calculations are based on the belief that no Macedonian reinforcements at all reached the army after late 331 B.C. until, probably, 324-3 B.C. Thus to the original 9,000 phalangites there will have been added no

<sup>1</sup> On the Gedrosian march, see H. STRASBURGER, in *Hermes* 80 (1952), 456-93, and R. Lock, *op. cit.*, 421-31; cf. also W. W. TARN's view in *CAH* VI, p. 415: "He had extricated the army [12-15,000 men, on his view] without great loss, but the mortality among the non-combatants was severe."

<sup>2</sup> I 183.

<sup>3</sup> Arr. VI 17, 3.

<sup>4</sup> P. 349.

<sup>5</sup> The figure of 30,000 includes the erroneous assumption of a reinforcement of 5,000 men in 329-8 B.C.; see above p. 108. BERUE, I 184, protests against J. Beloch's figure of 20,000, though since his protest is based upon the rather dubious evidence of Plutarch's statement (*Alex.* 60) that of an army of 135,000 who entered India only a quarter came back out of the desert, his protest loses some of its force.

more than 9,000 (the 3,000 at Gordium and the 6,000 after Susa, some of whom may have been hypaspists). Losses to the time of Persepolis, including garrison-troops, were c. 7,600<sup>1</sup>. If we assume losses of c. 2-3,000 in East Iran and India (a not unreasonable assumption, since the phalanx as a whole was not involved in any major pitched battle in this area) and, based on Lock's convincing arguments for total losses in Gedrosia of between 5,000 and 10,000, a further loss of c. 2,000 phalangites in the desert, there would have returned to the west with Alexander about 7,000 phalangites. It is probable, as Berve points out<sup>2</sup>, that the Macedonians who had been left as garrison-troops in the Near East were recalled to the main army in 324, in order to be given their discharge with the veterans of the field-army at Opis. These were, as I have shown elsewhere<sup>3</sup>, c. 6,200; we may round this down to c. 6,000. There were thus c. 13,000 phalangites assembled at Opis, of whom 10,000 were discharged, to return home with Craterus, thus leaving a residue of c. 3,000 of the phalangites who had participated in the Asian expedition. The overall percentage of losses is thus about 38% (13,000 survivors out of 21,000), which is not, I would argue, a particularly high proportion in view of the length of the campaign, the continuous and hard nature of the fighting and the rigours of the climatic extremes which had to be endured<sup>4</sup>. An indirect confirmation of these calculations may be gained from the statement of Curtius (X 2, 8) that before the discharge of veterans from Opis, Alexander ordered 13,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry to be retained in Asia, "thinking that

<sup>1</sup> See R. D. MILNS, in *GRBS* 7 (1966), 163.

<sup>2</sup> I 184, cf. BELOCH, 346-7.

<sup>3</sup> In *GRBS* 7 (1966), 163-4.

<sup>4</sup> BERVE, I 185, working on a different conjectural basis, reaches a figure of 4-5,000 phalangites remaining after the Opis mutiny; on p. 121 he assumes 3-4,000 (see below notes 1 and 2, p. 127 and *ibid.* for F. Schachermeyr's figure of 4-5,000 Macedonians (phalangites)).

Asia could be held in check with a small force, because he had placed garrisons in many places and had recently founded towns and filled them with settlers who would be anxious to keep their property.”

Having established that no Macedonian reinforcements reached the main army from 331 B.C. till at least the return from India ; and having shown that c. 10,500 phalangites set out eastwards from Ecbatana in early 330 B.C. (i.e. 9,000, who originally crossed into Asia, together with 9,000 reinforcements, less c. 7,600 losses) and that c. 9,000 entered the Gedrosian desert in 325 B.C., we must next examine the question of whether the *taxeis* were reinforced and kept up to strength from any other source than Macedonians, or whether their ethnic character was completely retained and hence the strength of each *taxis* allowed to fall considerably below ‘paper’ strength. It is obvious that if the ethnic character and the territorial principle of organisation were both maintained, there would have developed considerable differences in the strength of individual *taxeis*, since some—especially those engaged at the Hydaspes—suffered heavier losses than others. Berve, who believes that from the time of Bactria-Sogdiana (329-7 B.C.) the number of *taxeis* was at least ten<sup>1</sup>, argues that at this period the principle of territorial organisation of the *taxeis* was abolished and that Greek mercenaries and Asian infantry were recruited. Lock argues that the numbers were kept up and even increased by the use of Greek mercenaries ; and that an internal reorganisation of the *taxeis* took place, as a result of which each *taxis* was increased in strength to c. 2,000 and split up into two chilarchies, one of Macedonians, the other of Greek mercenaries<sup>2</sup>. Against Berve’s argument for the inclusion of Iranian infantry in the *taxeis* of the phalanx may be urged two points : (1) the *pezhetaeri* are generally agreed to have been far more

<sup>1</sup> I 116 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, 122 ff.

'nationalistic' and conservative in their attitudes towards the conquered Iranians than the cavalry<sup>1</sup>; (2) the 'heavy' infantry of the Persian empire was generally of a poor quality (hence the Persian reliance on Greek mercenaries) and none is known to have served under Alexander until the very end of his reign<sup>2</sup>. It is therefore highly unlikely that any were made part of the *pezbetaeri taxeis*. Tarn<sup>3</sup> argues against the incorporation of Greek mercenaries on the grounds that (i) there is no evidence for this anywhere and (ii) Alexander can, in India at least, have had very few mercenaries and those that he did have are mentioned separately from the phalanx. The second argument is not a strong one, since the references could simply have been to mercenaries *not* incorporated in the phalanx; but the first—the *argumentum e silentio*—carries more weight. Tarn, however, does believe that reinforcements reached the army from Macedonia in 328-7 B.C.; and this I believe to be an erroneous argument<sup>4</sup>. I myself argued in my article on "Alexander's Seventh Phalanx Battalion"<sup>5</sup> against the addition of Greek mercenaries on the ground that, as far as could be seen, the phalanx retained its purely natural character until the end of Alexander's reign. Lock<sup>6</sup>, whilst agreeing with my general premise, argues that there is no evidence that the Macedonians of the phalanx felt towards the Greek mercenaries the sort of hostility which they displayed towards the conquered Asiatics; indeed, he argues, citing G. T. Griffith's *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World* (London 1935), 26, in support of his claim, the Macedonians and Greek mercenaries were usually on good terms during Alexander's campaigns. Furthermore, he argues,

<sup>1</sup> G. T. GRIFFITH, in *JHS* 83 (1963), 74; BERVE I 337.

<sup>2</sup> R. LOCK, *op. cit.*, 179 ff.

<sup>3</sup> II 143 n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> See above, p. 108; W. W. Tarn is followed by P. A. BRUNT, in *JHS* 83 (1963), 39.

<sup>5</sup> In *GRBS* 7 (1966), 161 n. 15.

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, 134 ff.

if Alexander did recruit *pezhetaeri* from the Greek mercenaries, he merely continued the policy of his father, who brought many Greeks into the service of his army when he established the new recruiting areas. "Any argument based upon the national character of the Macedonians can carry little weight, for the character of the Pezhetairoi was already a mixed one, of Greeks and Macedonians." This last argument is, of course, begging the question ; for, as has already been argued, there is no evidence to show that Philip recruited Greeks from the newly annexed or conquered areas as part of his phalanx-*taxeis*. Nor is the passage in Griffith's book a good support for his argument, since the point that Griffith is making is that it is an indication of the good organisation and discipline in Alexander's army that there is little or no evidence of friction between the Macedonians and the Greeks, not that they 'were usually on good terms'—a very different matter. Moreover, any theory that would have Greek mercenaries recruited into the phalanx-*taxeis* runs into several problems ; on what basis were the mercenaries allotted to these territorially raised units? Did the mercenaries so assigned become themselves *pezhetaeri* (or even *asthetaeri*)? Did they have the same legal status and the same privileges and rates of pay as their Macedonian counterparts? My own view is that the silence of the sources is decisive : Greek mercenaries were not recruited into the phalanx-*taxeis* at any stage in the campaign ; the *taxeis* retained their national character throughout, Alexander preferring to allow numbers to drop below 'paper'-strength rather than face the problems that would arise from introducing foreign elements into their ranks. We might note that, on my calculations, the *taxeis*, which I believe never exceeded seven in number, were not much more than 200 each below 'paper'-strength when the army set out from India (i.e. 9,000 divided by seven = c. 1,300 per *taxis*). Even Lock, whose estimates of figures are generally higher than mine, states, on p. 134, that "Only a few, hardly more than 3,000 to 4,000 (*sc.* Greek mercenaries) need have been in-

volved." On his estimate of seven *taxeis* of 2,000 men each, this represents only 250-300 Greeks per chiliarchy. Would a 25% reduction in 'paper'-strength have been sufficient to compensate for all the problems of integration that would have been created by introducing mercenaries, many of whom may well have fought at some time or other on the side of Macedonia's enemies?

On the question of the number of phalanx-*taxeis* that crossed into Asia with Alexander, there seems to be little dissent from the view that there were six and that at some time during the expedition the number reached seven. Disagreement sets in on the questions of when the seventh *taxis* was added and whether other *taxeis*, over and above seven, were formed. At the Granicus there are six *taxeis* recorded in Arrian's narrative of the battle-formation<sup>1</sup>. Six *taxeis* are again recorded in Arrian's description of Issus<sup>2</sup>, though now Ptolemy, son of Seleucus has replaced Philippus. Arrian and Diodorus agree that there were still only six *taxeis* at Gaugamela<sup>3</sup>, though they differ on the names of the *taxeis*-commanders. Curtius too (IV 13, 7) seems to be in agreement with this number, if indeed it is possible to sort any sense out of Curtius' account. We can say with reasonable certainty that up to the time of Gaugamela there were no more than six *taxeis*. From this point onwards views on the number of *taxeis*—and their respective commanders—became sharply divided. J. Beloch<sup>4</sup> believed that the number rose to at least ten and possibly eleven, two being added to his original seven at the end of 331 B.C. and yet another in 329/8 B.C., when, as he argued, reinforcements reached the army from Macedonia. Two, at least, of these can be removed,

<sup>1</sup> I 14, 2 ff.; Arrian's carelessness had made him record the *taxeis* of Craterus and of Philip, son of Amyntas, twice.

<sup>2</sup> II 8, 3 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Arr. III 11, 9; Diod. XVII 57, 2.

<sup>4</sup> Pp. 328 ff.

since, as we have seen, there were only six *taxeis* at Gaugamela and no Macedonian reinforcements reached the army in 329/8 B.C. The arguments that have gone on for years over who replaced whom in the command of phalanx-*taxeis* are exhausting, if not exhaustive, and to a large extent unrewarding; and I do not intend to open up the question here. Let it suffice to make reference to the discussions of Tarn and Lock for good examples of the different aspects of the controversy<sup>1</sup>. I will limit myself here to making two points: (1) as stated earlier, it would be an unsound method of working if one were to assume that every time Arrian uses the word *taxis*, he is referring to a unit of the phalanx<sup>2</sup>; (2) as Tarn pointed out<sup>3</sup>, it is very hard to refute the evidence of Arrian (V 11, 3 and 12, 1-2) that at the battle of the Hydaspes, "where again he [*sc.* Alexander] needed every man he had," there were only seven *taxeis* named. This, when combined with the evidence of the numbers of Macedonian infantry available to Alexander at any time during the expedition, seems to me to be reasonably conclusive proof that there were never, at least before the return from India, more than seven phalanx-*taxeis*. I cannot, however, accept Tarn's date for the arrival at the army of the new, seventh *taxis*—327 B.C., at Bactra—since this, in my view, is based upon an erroneous interpretation of Arrian IV 18, 3. Berve argues<sup>4</sup> that the seventh *taxis* was formed or added at the end of 331 B.C., with the arrival of the 6,000 reinforcements from Macedonia (see above, p. 108) and that its leader was the Philotas who is mentioned at the battle of the Persian Gates<sup>5</sup>. In my article on this subject<sup>6</sup> I also argued the case for late 331 B.C. as the date for

<sup>1</sup> TARN II 142 ff.; R. LOCK, *op. cit.*, 97 ff.

<sup>2</sup> This is essentially the basis upon which H. BERVE worked in his discussion of the problem; cf. I 116 ff.

<sup>3</sup> TARN II 142.

<sup>4</sup> I 115.

<sup>5</sup> Arr. III 18, 6; Curt. V 4, 20.

<sup>6</sup> In *GRBS* 7 (1966), 159 ff.

the arrival or formation of the new *taxis*, with Philotas as its commander, and added (pp. 165-6) what I considered a piece of indirect, but conclusive evidence.

Worthy of mention, as a tailpiece to this discussion of the number of phalanx-*taxeis* that took part in the Asian expedition, is the view of A. von Domaszewski<sup>1</sup>, which both revives an argument of D. G. Hogarth and anticipates one of R. Lock.

Basically, A. von Domaszewski's view is that there were never more than six *taxeis* during the whole expedition; that the strength of each *taxis* was 2,000 men, divided into two chiliarchies (Lock's view of the phalanx later in the expedition); and that sometime before the invasion of Bactria and Sogdiana a modification of the structure of the *taxis* was made, in that one of the chiliarchies now was composed of 'heavy' armed, the other of more lightly armed troops, "nach Art der Peltasten" (p. 30). The question of whether there were ever chilarchy subdivisions of the phalanx-*taxeis* is a more debatable one, which has recently been re-opened by Lock<sup>2</sup>, though on quite different evidence and grounds; his attempt has not, I believe, been particularly successful, especially the argument that "The fact that there were chiliarchies of hypaspists is no indication that there were not also chiliarchies of *pezetairoi*" (p. 126). True; but neither is it an indication that there were; and, pace Lock (*ibid.*), an argument from silence must carry some weight in the circumstances<sup>3</sup>.

The question of whether in the Far East or at any time the *taxeis* of the phalanx were composed of two different types of soldier, one more heavily armed, the other more like the Greek peltast, is a more important one. A. von Domaszewski, as we

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 29 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, 122-9.

<sup>3</sup> Note the comment of D. G. HOGARTH on the passage of Curt. V 2, 3 ff., on which R. Lock has based his view (in *Journal of Philology* 17 (1888), 7 n. 2): "The tactical unit of the phalanx was no more a pentacosarchy before, than it was a chilarchy afterwards."

have seen, believes that such an innovation was made in the *taxeis* “für den Krieg in den Steppen und Oasenlandschaften Irans” (p. 30). D. G. Hogarth<sup>1</sup> had already gone even further than this. Describing his view on “rank heresy”, he suggested that “Again and again in Arrian (especially I 27 and II 4, 3) we find a clear distinction between lighter and heavier hoplites of the phalanx . . . and in at least two passages (Arrian I 21; III 26) if not three (V 17?) hoplites seem to use missile weapons” and that “we have as the largest constituent of Alexander’s ‘ever victorious army’ from six to ten battalions, presenting a front of five pikemen, who on occasion could use the sword at close quarters, complemented perhaps by from two to four lighter hoplites armed with javelins, and closed by an οὐραγός, probably armed also with the pike.” A. von Domaszewski draws his evidence from three passages in Arrian: IV 6, 3 (Alexander’s forced march on Samarkand); III 23, 3 (the march through the Hyrcanian mountains); and IV 28, 8 (the assault on Aornus). The passages cited by Hogarth (I 27, 8 and II 4, 3) refer respectively to the attack on Telmissus and the forced march on Tarsus. The relevant parts are worth quoting in Greek:

- I 27, 8: καὶ ἐπὶ τούτους εὐθὺς ἀναλαβὼν τούς τε τοξότας καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀκοντιστῶν τάξεις καὶ τῶν ὄπλιτῶν ὅσοι κουφότεροι ἐπήγαγεν.
- II 4, 3: ...Παρμενίωνα μὲν αὐτοῦ καταλείπει σὺν ταῖς τάξεσι τῶν πεζῶν, ὅσοι βαρύτερον ὄπλισμένοι ἦσαν. αὐτὸς δὲ ἀμφὶ πρώτην φυλακὴν ἀναλαβὼν τούς τε ὑπασπιστὰς καὶ τοὺς τοξότας καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριανας... (cf. II 4, 6: δρόμῳ ἤγειν ἐπὶ τὴν Ταρσὸν τούς τε ἵππεας καὶ τῶν ψιλῶν ὅσοι κουφότατοι...)
- IV 6, 3: ἀναλαβὼν οὖν τῶν τε ἑταίρων ἵππεων τοὺς ἡμίσεας καὶ τοὺς ὑπασπιστὰς ἔνυπαντας καὶ τοὺς τοξότας καὶ τοὺς Ἀγριανας καὶ τῆς φάλαγγος τοὺς κουφοτάτους ἦει ὡς ἐπὶ Μαράκανδα.

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

- III 23, 3: ... ἀναλαβόν τοὺς τε ὑπασπιστὰς καὶ τῆς Μακεδονικῆς φάλαγγος τοὺς κουφοτάτους καὶ τῶν τοξοτῶν ἔστιν οὖς ξει... .
- IV 28, 8: αὐτὸς δὲ τοὺς τοξότας τε ἀναλαβόν τοὺς Ἀγριανας καὶ τὴν Κοίνου τάξιν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἄλλης φάλαγγος ἐπιλέξας τοὺς κουφοτάτους τε καὶ ἄμα εὐοπλοτάτους καὶ τῶν ἑταίρων ἵππεων ἐς διακοσίους καὶ ἵπποτοξότας ἐς ἑκατὸν προσῆγε τῇ πέτρᾳ.

It will be seen that, with the exception of II 4, 3 (though cf. II 4, 6), the passages all have in common the adjective *κοῦφος*, which, with the exception of I 27, 8, is always used in the superlative form. The argument of D. G. Hogarth and A. von Domaszewski is, essentially, that the word *κοῦφος* means "light armed"; hence there were two classes of phalangites, "von denen die eine in alter Weise schwer bewaffnet war, die andere leichter gerüstet"<sup>1</sup>. Obviously, the validity of this theory stands or falls on the meaning of the adjective *κοῦφος* in Arrian: does it mean 'light-armed' or something else? I am hoping shortly to publish an article surveying the uses of *κοῦφος* in the *Anabasis* and will here limit myself to indicating some of my arguments and conclusions. Firstly, G. T. Griffith would seem to be quite correct when he makes the point that the Macedonian phalangite was *not* a Greek hoplite, in that he did not have the essential breastplate and carried a smaller shield<sup>2</sup>. Hence, it is difficult to see how one could make any distinction between phalangites on the ground of quantity of equipment; for what could be further removed from the equipment without leaving the soldier completely defenceless? Secondly, we should note again that, with the single exception of I 27, 8, whenever Arrian uses the word *κοῦφος* he always uses it in the superlative form. If the word does mean 'light-armed', the implication is that there were more than one degree of 'lightness' of arms within the

<sup>1</sup> von DOMASZEWSKI, 30.

<sup>2</sup> In *PCPhS* N. S. 4 (1956-7), 3 ff.

phalanx ; and this is patently absurd. Why does not Arrian simply speak of the *κοῦφοι τῶν πεζῶν* ? Indeed, why use the word at all, when there is a regular and perfectly satisfactory word for ‘light-armed’ troops, which is frequently used in Arrian’s narrative, viz. *ψιλοί*. At two places in Arrian (II 4, 6 and VI 18, 5) we read about *τῶν ψιλῶν δσοι κουφότατοι* and *τῶν ψιλῶν τοὺς κουφοτάτους*. Were there, then, gradations of lightness among the light-armed? <sup>1</sup> Again, if *κουφότατοι* means ‘the light armed’, how can we explain the statement at Arrian IV 28, 8 (the assault on Aornus) that Alexander selected for the attack the archers, the Agrianians, *τὴν Κοίνου τάξιν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἄλλης φάλαγγος ἐπιλέξας τοὺς κουφοτάτους τε καὶ ἄμα εὐοπλοτάτους, κτλ.*? The *ἄμα* indicates that the *κουφότατοι* were also the best equipped troops in the phalanx (apart from Coenus’ *taxis*) ; and it would be surprising if ‘best equipped’ meant those with least equipment. All these problems, however, disappear, if we understand *κοῦφος*, when it appears in Arrian, to mean “active, nimble, fittest”, i.e. best at marching long distances in the shortest time, because the toughest and best trained <sup>2</sup>. We may note that the *κουφότατοι* are always used by Alexander, under his own leadership, on special expeditions, away from the main army, expeditions requiring these very qualities of marching ability and toughness ; and that these expeditions almost invariably include those favourite troops of the King, the hypaspists and the Agrianians (and often the archers) <sup>3</sup>. Now,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. also III 18, 5 : *τῶν τοξοτῶν τοὺς κουφοτάτους* ; were there “heavier” and “lighter” armed archers?

<sup>2</sup> For this common meaning of *κοῦφος*, see LIDDELL/SCOTT/JONES, s.v. I was interested to read, after writing this passage, the following footnote 4 in TARN II 153 : “The latter word [*i.e.* *κουφοτάτους*] does not mean lighter-armed (had the hypaspists been lighter-armed he [*i.e.* Alexander] would presumably have taken them) ; it means the most active, . . .”.

<sup>3</sup> See Arr. III 23, 3 ; IV 6, 3 ; IV 28, 8, for examples of such special expeditions which consisted of combinations of hypaspists, Agrianians, archers and *κουφότατοι* of the phalanx.

while there is little doubt that the archers and Agrianians were genuinely 'light-armed' troops, who could be put under the category of  $\psi\lambda\omega\iota$ , there is also little doubt, thanks to the researches of W. W. Tarn and G. T. Griffith<sup>1</sup>, that there was no difference between the equipment of the hypaspists and the phalangites and that the long-held view that the hypaspists were more lightly equipped than the phalangites must be rejected<sup>2</sup>. It would thus seem strange to argue that, for expeditions demanding long, forced marches, Alexander took with him phalangites who were more lightly equipped than their comrades and hypaspists who were more heavily equipped than these 'lighted-armed' phalangites. It is also worth noting that, on the occasions where  $o\iota\chiouφ\delta\tau\alpha\tau\omega\iota$   $\tau\eta\varsigma\varphi\alpha\lambda\gamma\gamma\sigma$  can be determined with any accuracy, the *taxis* of Coenus is regularly present<sup>3</sup>; and that we learn from V 22, 5 and 6 that the force with Alexander, which was described at V 21, 2 as  $χουφ\delta\tau\alpha\tau\omega\iota$   $\tau\eta\varsigma\sigma\tau\alpha\tau\iota\alpha\varsigma$  consisted of the *hippotoxotae*, the *agema* of the Companions, the hipparchies of Cleitus and Perdiccas, the hypaspists, the Agrianians and  $\tau\alpha\varsigma\tau\omega\iota\delta\sigma\theta\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota\omega\varsigma$   $\tau\alpha\varsigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ . The *taxis* of Coenus was, as we have already seen, in all probability the first *taxis* to be called  $\delta\sigma\theta\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota\omega\varsigma$ ; and that it was so called as an honour describing the best or 'crack' *taxis* of the phalanx; and that other *taxeis* eventually received the same title. Surely this equation of the *asthetaei* with the  $χουφ\delta\tau\alpha\tau\omega\iota$  of the phalanx must be an indication of the correct interpretation of the word;

<sup>1</sup> TARN II 153; G. T. GRIFFITH, *art. cit.* (above n. 2 p. 120).

<sup>2</sup> For examples of this view, see footnote 4 p. 96.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Arr. III 23, 2, where, in the march across the Hyrcanian mountains, Alexander takes  $\tau\delta\pi\lambda\epsilon\tau\alpha\tau\omega\iota$   $\kappa\alpha\delta\mu\alpha\tau\delta\chiouφ\delta\tau\alpha\tau\omega\iota$   $\tau\eta\varsigma\delta\mu\alpha\mu\omega\varsigma$ . By a process of elimination, working from the troop-units sent with Craterus and Erygius, it turns out that Alexander has only one phalanx-*taxis* with him and this, as we learn from III 24, 1, is that of Coenus. See also IV 28, 8 and IV 25, 5-6, in which passage the word  $χουφ\delta\tau\alpha\tau\omega\iota$  is not used, but in which the force with Alexander consists of the Companion Cavalry, the horse-archers, the *taxeis* of Coenus and Polyperchon, the Agrianians, the archers and—what has to be deduced from IV 26, 6—the hypaspists.

they were the *asthetaei* because they were the toughest and most reliable of the phalangites, capable of feats of marching and fighting that the others were not ; they were ‘the most mobile and active’ of the phalanx. It is highly likely, moreover, that these qualities were rewarded with more than a mere honorary title. We can well imagine their receiving better attention in terms of arms and equipment ; which is why Arrian—or Ptolemy—can refer to them as the *εὐοπλότατοι* of the phalanx. The *κουφότατοι τῆς φάλαγγος*, then, were these ‘crack’ *taxeis* of the phalanx, who, because of their superior fitness, training and bravery, were eventually called *asthetaei* ; but they were not more lightly armed and equipped than their fellows. It only remains to consider the other two arguments for lighter and heavier armed phalangites : the use by Arrian of the phrase *βαρύτερον ὀπλισμένοι* and the apparent use on occasions, pointed out by Hogarth, of missile weapons by phalangites rather than that of the sarissa. With respect to the former, it would be dangerous to draw any conclusion from Arrian’s use of this phrase at II 4, 3 ; for the contrast that is intended is evidently between the flying column that Alexander took with him to capture the Cilician Gates and the rest of the army, which remained with Parmenion. I would be inclined to regard the phrase *βαρύτερον ὀπλισμένοι* in this context as yet another example of Arrian’s imprecise expression and vague understanding of the Macedonian army ; for the Macedonians who remained with Parmenion were not—and Arrian’s text does not imply this—differently equipped from others in their ranks ; nor were they, as we have seen, differently equipped from the hypaspists ; but they were differently equipped—more heavily—from the archers and Agrianians ; and that is all that Arrian is saying. Of the three passages cited by Hogarth as indicating the use of missile weapons by phalangites, the logical explanation of I 21, 2 is that the two soldiers from Perdiccas’ *taxis* are using the missile weapons of the defenders of Halicarnassus whom they had killed in close combat, not that each of the two

had his own—considerable—supply of javelins ; and the fact that Philotas, in III 26, 3, *κατακοντισθῆναι πρὸς τῶν Μακεδόνων* is not strong evidence upon which to build an argument ; for, as we can see from Arrian III 8, 9, it is probably that the hypaspist-detachment that attended the King carried λόγχαι instead of sarissas and it would be reasonable to assume that it was these who executed Philotas. The passage V 17, 3, which Hogarth admits is dubious evidence, is easily explained : the expression ἡ φάλαγξ αὐτὴ τῶν Μακεδόνων refers to all the infantry forces under Alexander's command ; and these, as we see from V 13, 4, included οἱ Ἀγριανες καὶ οἱ ἀκοντισταί ; these obviously were the troops who were ἐς τε τοὺς ἐπιβάτας αὐτῶν [i.e. τῶν ἐλεφάντων] ἀκοντίζοντες κτλ.

Finally, I would like to examine briefly the developments in the use of the phalanx-*taxis* and their organisation in the years from Gaugamela to the death of Alexander. It has been generally recognised by historians that, after Gaugamela and the overthrow of the Achaemenid monarchy, the character of any further warfare in the eastern part of the empire must necessarily be different from what had hitherto taken place. Up to now the war had taken the form of the besieging and capturing of key cities and the defeating of the levies of the empire in large-scale pitched battles. Henceforth, at least in the north eastern part of the empire, of which we can be certain that Alexander had good information, there would be no pitched battles against large and unified armies, but rather the sort of guerrilla warfare which involves the pursuit and defeat of small, but highly mobile groups of 'national resistance' fighters ; a warfare in which it would be necessary to have available several 'flying columns' of swift moving troops to deal with uprisings or assaults from several quarters at the same time. It was the type of warfare which first the Romans and then the Napoleonic armies had to face in the Spanish peninsula and which recently the United States has fought, with singular lack of success, in Vietnam. It also turned out, though in 331 B.C. it is doubtful

whether Alexander had any presentiment of this, that, with the one exception of the Hydaspes battles, the same type of warfare would be encountered in India. What was needed was a new type of army. As F. Schachermeyr puts it<sup>1</sup>: "An Stelle des vereinten Einsatzes hatten geteilte Unternehmungen zu treten, mit jeweils ad hoc zusammengestellten Heeresgruppen, geführt von entschlossenen Generälen". Hence his belief that between 331 B.C. and 327 B.C. wide-sweeping reforms were made in the army organisation, the main results of which were: (1) the abolition of the position of overall commander of the phalanx, a position which Parmenion had held until he was left behind in early summer, 330 B.C. at Ecbatana<sup>2</sup>; (2) the *taxeis* of the *pezbetaeri* were made independent of each other with respect to their organisation and were increased considerably in number. The result of these reforms, says F. Schachermeyr, was that Alexander had at his disposal the means to put into effect his idea "eines getrennten Marschierens, eines nach Bedarf vereinten Schlagens und einer Verwendung feinnervig aufeinander abgestimmter gesonderter Heeresverbände." It was, he believes, the creation of the first 'modern' army in the history of the world, surpassing even today's armies in "innerer Beweglichkeit und Anpassungsfähigkeit"; and Alexander's genius as a commander showed itself above all in his handling, in India, of these flexible, mobile "getrennter Heeresgruppen".

It is possible to quibble with details of Schachermeyr's assessment of the situation; e.g. it is debatable whether Parmenion actually ever did hold a formal overall command of the phalanx; it is debatable—in my view, highly unlikely—that there was any increase in the number of phalanx-*taxeis* after 331 B.C.; and there is no direct evidence in Arrian, or any other source, of the argued reforms. But the character of Arrian's narrative of the years of campaigning in Bactria, Sogdiana and India

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 292 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Arr. III 19, 7.

make it abundantly clear of the basic correctness of his view and of his assessment of Alexander's achievement. The phalanx-*taxeis* were used always either singly, in combination with other units, such as light-armed and hypaspists, or in pairs or larger groupings, depending on the needs of the situation. It is possible that there never was any *formal* reorganisation<sup>1</sup>, but that each army group was formed at the time to meet the particular need; but the result is still the same: flexibility, mobility and a far greater degree of independence for each *taxis* and with this a greater degree of responsibility for each *taxis*-leader. R. Lock<sup>2</sup>, speaking of the period from 328 B.C. onwards, sums up the situation nicely: "The typical detachment during 328 B.C. consisted of a force of Companion cavalry, some light cavalry or infantry, or both, and a substantial force of good quality Macedonian *pezetairoi* infantry." At the same time, argues Lock<sup>3</sup>, though the new method of warfare imposed greater responsibility and independence upon the individual *taxeis*-leaders, it tended to lessen the importance of the phalangites in the army, since there was now less scope for close order fighting in which the phalangites could play their traditional role. "Light infantry and cavalry were the more important arms, for they were mobile and, therefore, more suited to the new style of warfare." This, however, is only true to a certain degree: light-armed, "specialist" troops, such as slingers and archers, certainly did increase in importance; but the backbone of any significant force was invariably its units of hypaspists and *pezbetaeri/astbetaeri*. Nor is it true to say, as does R. Lock in the same passage, that there was a corresponding decline in the status of *pezbetaeri* *taxis*-leaders; rather, it should be said that the senior commanders in the army from 329 B.C. onwards were men like Craterus, Perdiccas and Coenus, who

<sup>1</sup> So R. Lock, *op. cit.*, 121.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, 72.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, 138-9.

had all been *taxis*-leaders and were promoted because of their abilities ; but this does not necessarily imply any diminution in the quality and prestige of their successors ; indeed, in the new type of warfare and organisation, it could well be argued that a *taxis*-leader would be called in to display far greater powers of initiative and intelligence than in the old style warfare of pitched battle and solid, close knit phalanx.

Of the reforms which took place in the phalanx in the last two years of Alexander's life, little need be said and little can be said, so slender is the evidence. I have argued above that, after the dismissals from Opis, there were little more than 3,000 Macedonian *pezhetaeri* left with Alexander, a figure which harmonises reasonably well with those of Berse<sup>1</sup> and Schachermeyr<sup>2</sup>, and that reinforcements of c. 10,000 Macedonians were expected from Antipater. We hear in the sources of the arrival at Susa in 324 B.C. of the 30,000 young Iranians whom Alexander had arranged to have trained, in 327 B.C., in Macedonian weapons and military techniques and who bore the significant name of *Epigoni* (Successors)<sup>3</sup>. We further hear of the arrival at Babylon in 323 B.C. of 20,000 Persians and a significant number of Cossaeans and Tapuriens under the command of the satrap of Persis, Peucestas. These troops were mainly archers and slingers<sup>4</sup>, and, according to Arrian<sup>5</sup>, Alexander enrolled these ἐς τὰς Μακεδονικὰς τάξεις, in such a way that each file

<sup>1</sup> I 121 : “ . . . ungefähr 3-4,000 Pezhetairen nach Verabschiedung ihrer Kameraden übrig blieben.”

<sup>2</sup> P. 406 : “etwa 4,000-5,000 Makedonen” ; though F. Schachermeyr believes that the 13,000 infantry in Curtius' text refers to the Greco-Macedonian army that still remained with Alexander after Opis ; I have argued the case differently in my discussion.

<sup>3</sup> Arr. VII 6, 1 ; Diod. XVII 108, 1 ff. ; Plut. *Alex.* 71. On the significance of the name *Epigoni*, cf. SCHACHERMEYR, 405 : “Sollten sie den Kern des künftigen Heeres wie seiner Phalanx bilden. ‘Epigonoi’ (Nachkommen) nannte sie darum der König” ; and BERVE I 120, for a similar comment.

<sup>4</sup> Arr. VII 23, 1 ; Diod. XVII 110, 2.

<sup>5</sup> VII 23, 3-4.

contained sixteen men, of whom four were Macedonians and twelve Persians ; the Macedonians retained  $\tau\grave{\eta}\nu \pi\acute{a}tr\iota o\nu \delta\pi\lambda i\sigma i\nu$ , while the 'Persians' were armed with the bow and with  $\mu e\sigma\acute{a}g-\chi\omega\lambda\alpha$ . Questions immediately arise from this account, both with respect to the numbers involved and Alexander's intentions for the Macedonian element in his future army. If there were only c. 3,000 Macedonians available, as I have argued, and if each file was sixteen deep, then only c. 12,000 of Peucestas' troops would have been involved in this new 'mixed' phalanx, whose strength would thus have been c. 15,000 (without including any hypaspist formations). If this formation were intended as a permanent force, what are we to make of Curtius' statement<sup>1</sup>, discussed earlier, about the 13,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry? The only suggestion that I can offer is that Alexander intended to have at least three, and possibly four, field armies, each having a different character. Thus there would be one army of c. 10,000 Macedonians—the replacements from Macedonia—formed on traditional *pezhetaeri*-phalanx lines ; a second army of the *Epigoni*, perhaps broken up into two army corps, armed and trained in Macedonian fashion ; and a third army, this new 'mixed' phalanx. It is also possible that he intended to extend the process of 'Verschmelzung' to the newcomers from Macedonia and mix them with the *Epigoni* in the ratio of 1 : 3 and then split the whole 40,000 into two or possibly three field-armies, together with the mixed phalanx. But this can be only speculation ; there is no evidence for the King's intentions with respect to the *Epigoni* or the Macedonian reinforcements, other than the significance of the name and Curtius' vague statements about holding down Asia. Two things only can be said with reasonable certainty. Firstly, despite the enthusiasm of such scholars as Berve<sup>2</sup> and such

<sup>1</sup> X 2, 8. See above, pp. 112-3.

<sup>2</sup> I 121 : "In genialer Weise wurde hier das System der verbundenen Waffen zum ersten Male Wirklichkeit . . .".

soldiers as J. F. C. Fuller<sup>1</sup>, the ‘mixed’ phalanx was a monstrosity, whose soldiers must have breathed a great sigh of relief that Alexander died before he had the opportunity of sending them into battle. As a military corps it would have been both useless and unworkable and one may agree wholeheartedly with F. Schachermeyr’s statement that “Fast will es uns scheinen, dass Alexander in der neuen Reichsarmee vorerst gar nicht so sehr ein Instrument der Kriegsführung sah wie ein solches der inneren Ausgleichspolitik”<sup>2</sup>. Secondly, whatever may have been Alexander’s intentions for his ‘Reichsarmee’ and whatever may have happened after his death, “Eins nur ist sicher, die Neuregelungen in Babylon bedeuteten das Ende der makedonischen Truppe der Pezhetairen”<sup>3</sup>, a fair comment from a scholar who perhaps more than any other has contributed to our understanding of Alexander’s Macedonian phalanx.

<sup>1</sup> *The Generalship of Alexander the Great* (London 1958), 142-3: “The army of occupation he would require must be more flexible than his old army, hence the mixture of light and heavy troops. Another characteristic was that it combined missile power and shock.” J. F. C. FULLER, it may be noted, says incorrectly that “this mixed phalanx was never formed.”

<sup>2</sup> Pp. 406-7.

<sup>3</sup> BERVE I 121.

*LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS*

BELOCH = K. J. BELOCH, *Griechische Geschichte* III<sup>2</sup> 2 (Berlin/Leipzig 1923).

BERVE = H. BERVE, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage* I-II (München 1926).

von DOMASZEWSKI = A. von DOMASZEWSKI, *Die Phalangen Alexanders und Caesars Legionen*, Sitzungsber. Heidelberger Ak., Phil.-hist. Kl. 1925-6, 1.

H. DROYSEN = H. DROYSEN, *Untersuchungen über Alexanders des Grossen Heerwesen und Kriegsführung* (Freiburg 1885).

J. G. DROYSEN = J. G. DROYSEN, "Alexander des Grossen Armee", in *Hermes* 12 (1877), 226-52.

KROMAYER/VEITH = J. KROMAYER und G. VEITH, *Heerwesen und Kriegsführung der Griechen und Römer*, Handbuch d. Altertumswissenschaft IV 3, 2 (München 1928).

SCHACHERMEYR = F. SCHACHERMEYR, *Alexander der Große. Ingenium und Macht* (Wien 1949).

TARN = W. W. TARN, *Alexander the Great* I-II (Cambridge 1948-1950).

## DISCUSSION

*M. Errington*: I should like to open by dealing with a preliminary point which has traditionally been extremely troublesome. I am not convinced that the Alexander of Anaximenes (F 4 Jacoby) is any other than Alexander I Philhellene, an assumption which solves many difficulties. I do not think it legitimate (if the passage is usable at all, which I believe) to separate the two parts of the sentence. This means therefore that the same Alexander was responsible for the creation of the cavalry *betairoi* and of the *pezbetairoi*. In favour of Alexander I is the formal point that Harpocration attributes the fragment to book I of Anaximenes. Moreover the creation of the cavalry *betairoi* as early as Alexander I would make good sense: he led Macedonian cavalry under Persian generalship at the battle of Plataea; and I should cautiously suggest that the experience of the success of the Greek *hoplites* against the massed cavalry of the Persians at Plataea might well have provided Alexander with the incentive to form an equivalent body of infantry for Macedonia.

It would than be possible to use Theopompus F 348 Jacoby without conflict with Anaximenes with specific reference to the *pezbetairoi* of Philip, on the assumption that Philip's *pezbetairoi* were a reorganised select group whose new formation was necessitated by the virtual collapse of Macedonian military power in the period before Philip: it would therefore be a case of a well-established name having being used for a newly formed unit.

*M. Badian*: If we want to use the Anaximenes fragment, we must (as has often been observed) take it as it stands: it means that Alexander first had to teach his barons to ride, and this is absurd. The fragment therefore does not seem to give us any real information about the creation of the *betairoi*. Since, as Mr. Errington says, we ought to take it all together, it follows that one must doubt much reliance can be placed on the information about the *pezbetairoi*.

Mr. Milns seems to be right in stressing the superiority of the Theopompus passage, which at least makes very good sense as it stands. If this does not help us much in defining the *pezbetairoi*, that is merely the usual difficulty in the kind of sources on which we depend.

*M. Bosworth*: I would agree, and make a further point. It is obviously absurd to imagine any Macedonian king training his nobles to ride—so absurd that it has been often suggested that ἵππεύειν συνεθίσας is a misunderstanding by Harpocration. The quotation is at second hand and there is a double possibility of corruption. But the same is true of the Theopompus fragment also. It is an explanation of Demosthenes' reference to the πεζέταιροι (II 17), transmitted by the scholia of Demosthenes. There may again be distortion. Theopompus may merely have said that the king had an élite bodyguard who belonged to the πεζέταιροι. This the commentators may have seized as an explanation of the technical term.

*M. Badian*: The Theopompus passage, however, is essentially different from the Anaximenes in that it makes perfect sense as it stands, as his definition of the term *pezbetairoi* and explanation of the origin of the unit. There is no sign of compression or error in excerpting.

*M. Wirth*: Wichtig für die Historikerfragmente zur Pezhetairenfrage (Anaximenes F 4 Jacoby ; Theopomp F 348 Jacoby) scheint mir weniger das Militärische als das Soziale der Aspekte. An Möglichkeit, je Klarheit über den Anaximenes-Text zu gewinnen, zweifle ich. Indes, das erste ἐταίρους weist auf Rangerhebung durch Reiterdienst hin, die m.E. allein auf den Feudalcharakter der Monarchie Bezug haben kann. In Analogie dazu müsste das πεζεταίρους... als sensationelle Neuerung für den Fussdienst gelten, erklärlich vielleicht aus einem Bedarf an geeigneten Lehensträgern bei räumlicher Ausweitung des Reiches. Das πλείστους (das folgende καὶ τοὺς verstehé ich im Sinne etwa von ὄντας) liesse dabei Auswahl nach Qualität er-

kennen. Der Theopompstelle nach müsste derartiges dann als Erweiterung dieses Kreises verstanden werden : Bezöge sich das ἐδορυφόπουν auf die Hypaspistengarde, die auf diese Weise als neu geschaffene Durchgangsstufe zum Pezhetairenstand zu denken wäre, so liessen sich die späteren drei Hypaspistenchiliarchien sowohl als Erweiterung verstehen, die entweder Philipp oder erst Alexander durchführte. Dem Pezhetairenstand gehörten auch die Hypaspisten an (so möchte ich Arr. I 14, 2 verstehen). Allgemein scheint mir die damit forcierte Attraktivität des militärischen Dienstes die wichtigste Voraussetzung für Philipps jahrzehntelange Königspolitik, ähnlich auch für die Anfänge Alexanders. Der Schluss der Anaximenesstelle in diesem Zusammenhang ist bezeichnend, gleichzeitig, auf welchen König man sie bezieht.

*M. Schachermeyr* : Die Schwierigkeit des Pezhetairen-Problems liegt darin, dass wir über den sozialen Status dieser Leute keinen Bescheid wissen.

Dann ein weiteres Problem : Es ist richtig, dass wir mit Reformen mehr *de facto* als im Sinne einer intendierten organisatorischen Umstellung zu tun haben, seitdem der Gebirgskrieg immer häufiger spontane Kleinunternehmungen erforderte. Bis Baktrien tritt immer die Armee als Ganzes auf. Seit dem sogdischen Aufstand tritt immer öfter eine Verteilung auf kleinere Armeegruppen in den Vordergrund mit spontan zusammengestellten Expeditionsverbänden im Sinne « verbundener Waffen ». Die Reform galt somit eigentlich der Kriegsführung.

*M. Bosworth* : I should like to make two points, both dealing with use of the sources. Firstly, it seems to me dangerous to argue from the silence of the sources that there were no reinforcements sent to Asia after 331. The sources in these matters are too unreliable and lacunose for us to make reliable arguments from silence. Before 331 Arrian and Curtius both transmit details omitted by the other, and significantly the only reinforcement known to have been reported

by Callisthenes—the 5000 infantry from Macedonia who arrived just before the entry into Cilicia (Plb. XII 19, 2)—appears in none of our major sources. The record is obviously far from exhaustive. It is also dangerous to make sweeping inferences from the casualty figures in the sources. They are equally lacunose, and cover only one aspect of the losses. One need only recall that there were unrecorded and constant losses caused by illness and fatigue—such as the casualties on the march to the Oxus, greater says Curtius than all the battle losses (Curt. VII 5, 15). The figures in Arrian give a partial and totally incomplete picture.

Secondly I would agree with the speaker that hypaspists and phalanx troops were uniformly armed. In particular he appears correct that in the passages cited *κοῦφος* denotes physical agility not lightness of armament. But Arrian is quite capable of using the word in two senses. At III 21, 8 he describes a flying column of Agrianians and hypaspists sent in pursuit of Bessus. These were lightly armed—*ώς κουφότατα ἐσταλμένους*—and they are contrasted with the rest of the infantry who followed *ἐν τάξει*. This does not mean that the hypaspists were regularly more lightly armed than the phalangites, merely that they discarded some of their weaponry for a particularly arduous task. We should remember the tradition of the combat between Corrhagus and Dioxyppus, which explicitly attests that the phalangites carried a missile javelin as well as the sixteen foot *sarisa*; and the blade of such a weapon has in fact been found alongside the fittings for a *sarisa* in the warrior tomb at Vergina (cf. M. Andronicos, in *BCH* 94 (1970)). It is quite possible that for particularly arduous assignments the hypaspists (and phalangites) carried javelins alone. In that case we are dealing not with two different bodies of troops, permanently armed in different ways, but with a single flexible corps, uniformly armed but capable of using different weapons in different situations.

*M. Errington*: I should like to add that the passages in which *κουφότατοι* are mentioned do not need necessarily to imply the use of whole major units (*taxeis*). In particular Arr. IV 28, 8 seems to

imply a contrast between the *κουφότατοι* and the *taxis* of Coenus. Thus the *κουφότατοι* may have been small units or even individual phalangites detached for these specific non-phalanx duties. This would therefore constitute an additional illustration of the great flexibility of this part of Alexander's army practice.

*M. Milns*: I agree that we should be careful in making sweeping assumptions on the basis of Arrian's silence, or the silence of the sources in general. Hence my assertion that any attempt to work out figures for reinforcements and losses can be at best purely conjectural and tested only by their "innere Wahrscheinlichkeit". Do they, in other words, all add together to make a consistent and plausible account?

*M. Badian*: The question of reinforcements simply cannot be properly discussed, in view of the poor quality of our sources, so often stressed by Mr. Bosworth. Not only is an argument from silence impermissible: the difficulties raised by positive statements can be easily illustrated. In Arrian VII 23, 1, various contingents reach Alexander in Babylon in 324, including cavalry under Menidas. Mr. Milns argues that these are possibly the Macedonian reinforcements that Alexander had sent Menidas and two others to collect during the winter of 328/7, with instructions to wait in Asia Minor until the King had returned from India. This seems quite arguable. But Arrian merely has Philoxenus στρατιὰν ἄγων ἀπὸ Καρίας and Menander ἐκ Λυδίας ἄλλους. Were they Macedonians? Compare (for the wording) IV 7, 2, where Asander and Nearchus bring the king Greek mercenary forces at Bactra (στρατιὰν Ἐλλήνων μισθοφόρων ἄγοντες) and Arrian continues that Bessus and Asclepiodorus (whoever they were) came καὶ οὗτοι στρατιὰν ἄγοντες. Does he mean to contrast their στρατιά with the mercenaries—i.e., were these *Macedonian* reinforcements? Does he mean us to understand that this στρατιά was, like the other, one of Greek mercenaries? Or did he neither know nor care?

*M. Bosworth*: This incident is particularly interesting, for the parallel passage of Curtius adds to Arrian's account: *Antipater Graecorum VIII milia ... miserat* (VII 10, 12). It may be that they were Greek mercenaries, but they might also have been Macedonians. What is important is that it is omitted by Arrian and it is a contingent sent from the Greek mainland after 331.

## IV

R. M. ERRINGTON

### ALEXANDER IN THE HELLENISTIC WORLD

Alexander's *Nachleben* in the hellenistic period has not attracted much attention from historians in recent times. The basic reason is perhaps not far to seek : as for so much hellenistic history, the sources are woefully inadequate. With the single exception of Polybius the Greek historiography of the hellenistic period, from which we might conceivably have been able to collect some relevant material, has virtually vanished : the fragments of Hieronymus of Cardia, of Phylarchus, of Poseidonius, Agatharchides and Timagenes offer only the most superficial and haphazard information on their views about or attitudes towards Alexander ; the philosophical literature, which is supposed by many modern writers, doubtless correctly, to have been richly stimulated by experiences and ideas, real or imaginary, of Alexander, is also lost.

Despite these difficulties I have not seen it as the task of my contribution merely to complain that what I have undertaken to do is impossible. Nor have I seen it in an attempt to show merely in general terms what Alexander's career achieved for the Greek world : that has often enough been done, and a repetition of obvious and widely accepted generalities would not be very constructive. I shall also try to avoid discussing merely the idea (or ideas) that those who lived longer or later

had of Alexander, which allows me in general to avoid discussing the early Alexander-historians. What I have tried to do is more practical, and I hope more original : it is to survey the available material in an attempt to assess the extent to which Alexander remained, broadly speaking, an active factor in various ways in the hellenistic period ; how Alexander himself and people's experiences and ideas of him contributed to their politics, their attitudes, their way of life. There is no single source which can here be regarded as central or basic, no single obvious approach to this theme. The material which I shall discuss is inevitably all already familiar ; I can only hope that a rather different point of view might lead to some differences of emphasis, to some new (or forgotten) perspectives.

### I ALEXANDER'S RELICS

The immediate political importance of Alexander did not end with his death. Too many people owed too much power and influence solely to their companionship or contact with the dead king to be prepared (or able) to stand alone without the crutch of his influence after his death. The most important of these immediately was Perdiccas to whom, if we may follow a now normally accepted tradition, Alexander, shortly before his death, entrusted his signet ring<sup>1</sup>, which marked out Perdiccas as being the king's chosen chief administrator, if not his actual successor. Alexander's disposition thus inevitably played a major role in the initial discussions of the generals after his death.

Curtius' account of these discussions<sup>2</sup> is the fullest we have and, as I have argued elsewhere<sup>3</sup>, in broad outline probably goes back to Hieronymus of Cardia, hence to Eumenes who

<sup>1</sup> Diod. XVII 117, 3 ; XVIII 2, 4 ; Curt. X 5, 4.

<sup>2</sup> X 6 ff.

<sup>3</sup> In *JHS* 90 (1970), 72-5 ; cf. also P. BRIANT, *Antigone le Borgne* (Paris 1973), 112 ff.

was present at Babylon and who, we may assume, as the chief secretary of the dead king and close supporter of Perdiccas, knew intimately what was going on, even if his Greek birth prevented his active participation in the discussions. The whole scene-setting in Curtius' account therefore, in so far as it is not merely rhetorical padding, may well be reliable. Curtius reports a deliberate immediate exploitation of Alexander's relics and the influence which they were expected to have on the mass of the soldiers who came to the meeting—though it was officially merely a meeting of Alexander's officers<sup>1</sup>—to see what was going on and ended up by taking over the proceedings: Alexander's throne was set up in a conspicuous place; on it rested Alexander's diadem, Alexander's clothing and Alexander's arms; and to these Perdiccas added Alexander's signet ring<sup>2</sup>. Alexander's presence and influence therefore were immediately apparent, and from the point of view of the scene-setters, Perdiccas and his friends, were clearly expected to dominate the deliberations of the meeting in Perdiccas' favour; and they might indeed have done so, had not other more immediate considerations finally proved more important for the mass of the troops—already an indication that immediate problems were more important to them than the apparent wishes and lingering influence of the dead king.

That Perdiccas' initial failure at Babylon was not merely a result of inadequate scene-setting, but rather stemmed from immediate political factors is perhaps confirmed by the use which Eumenes between 318 and his death made of a similar idea—so similar, indeed, that it is difficult to believe that it was not directly influenced by his experience of Perdiccas' stage-management at Babylon. Indeed, Eumenes was not the only one who seems to have been impressed by these possibilities. Already at Babylon, if we may believe Curtius, Ptolemy had

<sup>1</sup> This is rightly emphasised by P. BRIANT, *op. cit.*, 240 f.

<sup>2</sup> Curt. X 6, 4.

advocated a 'committee solution' to the immediate problem of imperial government. But not just any committee : specifically a committee of Alexander's friends meeting as frequently as necessary in the presence of Alexander's empty throne. And Ptolemy's subsequent exploitation of Alexander's name and body rules out *a priori* considerations of unlikelihood as far as the reliability of the tradition about this suggestion is concerned<sup>1</sup>. In the end, of course, immediate need expressed in terms of force ruled at Babylon, and Ptolemy's suggestion seemed to have died an inevitable death when Eumenes unexpectedly, and with some success, resuscitated it. In 318, after his release from Nora, Eumenes received an appointment as representative of the central authority of the empire, in practice Polyperchon, to wage war in Asia against Antigonus. He was empowered to make use of the Cilician treasury at Cyinda, but found difficulty in co-operating with the Macedonian officers Antigenes and Teutamus, the commanders of the Silver-Shields, who were guarding the Cyinda treasury. Eumenes' solution was straightforward : wrapped up in the mystical wrapping-paper of an alleged appearance of Alexander to him in a dream, the essentials of Ptolemy's disdained suggestion of Babylon were presented : that a royal-style tent with a throne in it should be set up, and that this should be where common deliberations about future policy took place. Antigenes and Teutamus were apparently convinced, and the so-called "Alexander Tent" served fairly successfully as an immediate unifying factor for the very disparate elements of the Macedonian resistance to Antigonus in Asia<sup>2</sup>. Thus a *mise en scène* with real relics of Alexander on the day after his death at Babylon failed to solve an immediate difficult crisis for Perdiccas; but a similar *mise en scène* with purely imaginary relics of

<sup>1</sup> Curt. X 6, 13-15 ; cf. *JHS* 90 (1970), 74-5.

<sup>2</sup> Plut. *Eum.* 13 ; Diod. XVIII 60-61. On this from the point of view of cult see Ch. PICARD, in *Cahiers Archéologiques* 7 (1954), 1 ff.

Alexander nevertheless was employed by Eumenes, despite his personal experience of the collapse of the real thing at Babylon, with success more than five years after Alexander's death. We do not know enough about the feelings and motives of Teutamus and Antigenes and of the other officers who in the next few years allowed themselves to be influenced by this arrangement to be able to interpret accurately the precise influence of the Alexander-motif on their thinking. But it is clear that an Alexander theme, though deliberately stylised for the occasion, helped to solve a practical crisis among some of those who had personally known Alexander and who claimed to be representing the interests of his son.

The most important relic of Alexander was, of course, his body, the possession of which, from the moment of his death onwards, was a major priority for Perdiccas. Already at Babylon, during the first troubles with Meleager, the possession of the dead king's body had been at risk: early in the proceedings Perdiccas and his supporters had barricaded themselves into the hall where Alexander's body was being kept and determined to make that the scene of their resistance to the infantry and Meleager<sup>1</sup>; and even when a compromise had brought the fighting to an end, Meleager's reluctance to let his supporters abandon Alexander's body, once having got it<sup>2</sup>, was the critical sign for the leading nobles and the cavalry to leave the city and start the blockade, which led in due course to the final settlement.

Alexander had apparently expressed the wish to be buried at Siwah—it was a wish which was at least as well known as his giving his ring to Perdiccas<sup>3</sup>; and if it were to be carried out, instead of a traditional burial in the burial-place of the Macedonian

<sup>1</sup> Curt. X 7, 16.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.

<sup>3</sup> Curt. X 5, 4; cf. E. BADIAN, in *HSPb* 72 (1967), 185 ff.

kings at Aigai, it meant ultimately the sacrifice of possession of the body to the satrap of Egypt, for no central government which could be envisaged for the whole empire by a Macedonian could ever have had its central administration in Egypt. It may therefore have been partly an attempt to win time when the manufacture of Alexander's funeral chariot was made so extravagantly complicated that its completion took nearly two years<sup>1</sup>; it was in any case convenient that Alexander himself, in connection with Hephaestion's tomb<sup>2</sup>, had made such expense (and hence delay) not only respectable but actually almost a political necessity. The time won by the inevitable delay in building the chariot might at least be sufficient for it to become clear whether the new satrap of Egypt was reliable enough to be entrusted with the supervision of the tomb, and to allow a firm decision on whether it would not after all be better to ignore Alexander's wishes and to follow Macedonian tradition.

When the nearly two years of construction were over Ptolemy in Egypt had indeed begun to show himself unreliable; but at the same time Perdiccas had found it impossible to remain himself in Babylon, and therefore had been compelled to leave Arrhidaeus, who had been put in charge of the construction, behind in Babylon. In 321 Arrhidaeus in his turn proved unreliable, and the result was the famous body-snatch on the road from Damascus, which Perdiccas was unable to prevent<sup>3</sup>.

For the second time in two years the question of the control of Alexander's body directed events. For Perdiccas the loss was critical; whether he had wanted to continue to wait or had decided to try to return to Macedonia with the new kings at

<sup>1</sup> Diod. XVIII 26 ff. (especially 28, 2).

<sup>2</sup> Arr. *Anab.* VII 14, 8; Diod. XVII 115; cf. F. SCHACHERMEYR, in *JCEAI* 41 (1954), 127 ff. (= G. T. GRIFFITH (ed.), *Alexander the Great: the Main Problems* (Cambridge/New York 1966), 331 f.).

<sup>3</sup> Sources and discussion in E. BADIAN, in *HSPh* 72 (1967), 185 ff. On the general development after Babylon see *JHS* 90 (1970), 59 ff.

the head of the funeral-procession of Alexander—an arrangement which even an entrenched Antipater supported by Craterus might perhaps have had difficulty in successfully opposing—the continued possession of the corpse was vital and, it seems, worth fighting for<sup>1</sup>. The result is well-known: the bungled invasion of Egypt by Perdiccas, the continued resistance of Ptolemy, Antipater and Craterus (who did not want Alexander's body on their hands, if not in their hands), the death of Perdiccas and the effective neutralisation for immediate political purposes of the value of Alexander's body. Only in the hands of the 'central government' (or of those who aimed to set up or control a 'central government') of the empire was the body a potential political weapon. Once the decentralists Antipater and Ptolemy had defeated Perdiccas Alexander's body was, doubtless to the satisfaction of both, at last buried.

A certain symbolic value of course inevitably remained, but even this could hardly be adequately exploited if the body were left in the remote oasis: firstly then, burial in Memphis, where as Pharaoh Alexander could in any case appropriately rest; then some time later, probably still in the reign of Soter, in Ptolemy's new city of Alexandria<sup>2</sup>. The symbolism attaching to the great king's body was now essentially limited to his role within the Ptolemaic kingdom, more particularly to his dual role as founder of the kingdom and of the capital city Alexandria, which the golden sarcophagus, which Ptolemy constructed for him, duly emphasised and honoured<sup>3</sup>. Alexander's position in Alexandria remained therefore rather special—as we shall also see later in looking at his cults—but not so special that it could not be affected by some typically Ptolemaic administrative

<sup>1</sup> So explicitly in the Vatican palimpsest of Arrian, *De hist. succ.*, *FGrH* 156 F 10, 1.

<sup>2</sup> It is not quite certain that it was Soter who brought Alexander to Alexandria; but I follow here P. M. FRASER, *Ptolemaic Alexandria* (Oxford 1972), I 15-16; II 31-32 (n. 79), who has a full discussion of the sources, in preferring the version of Strabo, XVII 1, 8, p. 794, that Soter was responsible. See also below p. 170 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Strab. XVII 1, 8, p. 794.

rationalisation. By the end of the third century B.C. the organisational problem of accommodating the bodies of the dead Ptolemies and at the same time drawing attention to their connexion with Alexander was troubling the minds of Alexandrian court architects : the solution, which Philopator eventually blessed in stone, was the creation of a single new building, in which all the dead kings, including now Alexander, might be accommodated (the *soma* or *sema*)<sup>1</sup>. This arrangement will probably have meant in practice to some extent a levelling of the prestige of Alexander in relation to that of the Ptolemies—which would doubtless become more noticeable as the numbers of Ptolemies occupying the new mausoleum grew—and the measure doubtless reflects the lack of immediacy of the Alexander influence by the reign of Philopator.

Rationalisation of organisation did not of course imply official reduction in the status of Alexander's tomb. The gold sarcophagus remained to be inspected by those entitled to do so in the *sema* for some hundred more years, surviving the increasing chaos of the second century, only to fall victim to the chaos of the first. Ptolemy X removed the gold sarcophagus in a raid on Alexandria from Syria sometime in the early years of the first century ; but, in significant contrast to events after Alexander's death, he left the body behind. No political capital, it seems, could now be made, even in a limited Egyptian political context, by possessing the body of the founder of the kingdom and of the city of Alexandria : the whole point of the exercise was merely to steal the gold. The mummified body was therefore left behind, and was in due course laid in a new sarcophagus. This time however, the responsible persons, accepting at least partially the reduced estimate of the relic's importance which Ptolemy X had given, did not feel the need to replace the

<sup>1</sup> Zenobius, III 94 (in *Corpus Paroem. Graec.* I 81), cited by P. M. FRASER, *Ptolemaic Alexandria*, II 33 (n. 80).

original gold : a more modest glass model was Alexander's resting place when Strabo visited the city<sup>1</sup>.

The general development in attitudes to Alexander's immediate relics, therefore, seems fairly clear. At first, immediately after his death, not only his body but his equipment, even in a purely imaginary or imitative form, as Eumenes discovered, could be employed politically in favourable circumstances to good effect. In the course of time, however, as it became increasingly clear that new problems were here to stay and as the new kingdoms emerged, we hear no more of active political employment of Alexander's relics outside the limits of the new Ptolemaic kingdom. His body found a symbolic and extravagant resting place in its gold sarcophagus in the symbolic and extravagant city which Ptolemy built as his capital. But even here, once the immediacy of the foundation years was past, the dead Ptolemies received equally honourable burial beside Alexander in Philopator's new building ; and by the first century Alexander's tomb had become little more than a source of booty and a curiosity for tourists.

## II RELATIONSHIP TO ALEXANDER

The chief difficulty in this section is that of distinguishing the importance after Alexander's death of members of Alexander's family who owed their influence to him alone from that of those who owed their influence chiefly to Philip. The problem crops up immediately at Babylon in connection with the succession. So far as Perdiccas was concerned, the only conceivable heir to Alexander was Alexander's son, should the pregnant Roxane bear a son<sup>2</sup>. For him therefore and for his

<sup>1</sup> Strab. XVII 1, 8, p. 794 ; cf. H. VOLKMANN, in *RE* XXIII 2, 1743 sqq. For discussion of the site, form and later history of the tomb, see now P. M. FRASER, *Ptolemaic Alexandria*, I 16 f. ; II 33 f.

<sup>2</sup> Curt. X 6, 9 ; cf. my discussion in *JHS* 90 (1970), 49 f.

supporters, direct descent from Alexander and an acknowledged, official wife—an attitude doubtless deeply influenced by the facts that the Perdiccan group owed its own pre-eminence to Alexander and that it had control of Roxane—was to take precedence over any other possibility. That this was to a great extent a sectional political point of view became immediately clear, since the Macedonian troops, supported by Meleager, evidently saw no problem of loyalty in returning to the direct line of Philip and successfully promoting Arrhidaeus<sup>1</sup>. Perdiccas' group maintained its point of view until it was no longer tenable and finally had to compromise by accepting Arrhidaeus, but managed to set up the baby Alexander as king also<sup>2</sup>.

Surprisingly, a mere two years later, Perdiccas repeated his mistake of underestimating the importance to the Macedonians of blood relationship to Philip. When he was at Sardis in 321 Cynnane, daughter of Philip and the Illyrian Audata, arrived together with her daughter from Amyntas, son of Perdiccas III, whom Alexander had had murdered at the beginning of his reign. The purpose of the journey was that this daughter, Adeia, should marry Arrhidaeus, a scheme which Perdiccas bitterly opposed: he accordingly arranged for Cynnane to be murdered, only to be faced with a mutiny of his troops, which compelled him to allow the marriage to take place after all<sup>3</sup>.

From these two incidents therefore we must conclude that direct blood-relationship to Alexander was at first less important in practice to influential sections of Macedonian opinion than the general factor of relationship to the royal house of the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Curt. X 7, 2.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *JHS* 90 (1970), 54 ff.; Chr. HABICHT, in *Akten des VI. internationalen Kongresses für griechische und lateinische Epigraphik* (München 1973), 367 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, *De hist. succ.*, *FGrH* 156 F 9, 22-3. For other sources see H. BERVE, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage* II (München 1926), nos. 23 (Adea), 61 (Amyntas), 456 (Cynnane). For discussion see *JHS* 90 (1970), 64-5; P. BRIANT, *op. cit.*, 177 f.

Argeads, in particular with Philip. The Macedonians who took this view were quite happy to see Philip's mentally deficient son sharing the representation of the kingdom and the formal loyalty of the people with the baby son of Alexander. It is thus quite clear that many Macedonians were unwilling to accept Perdiccas' view that close blood-relationship to Alexander was the only thing that mattered ; the same people were however quite happy to follow Perdiccas and to acclaim the baby Alexander IV also as king<sup>1</sup>, thus proclaiming an unprecedented joint kingship which Olympias, who also had her own highly personal view of what factors ought to matter in Macedonia, clearly felt was nothing other than a diminution of the rights of her grandson (in practice, of course, more particularly of those who looked after him) ; and she took the first convenient opportunity to get rid of both Philip and Adea/Eurydice and many of their supporters with a brutality which paved the way for Cassander's overthrow of Olympias, despite her undoubtedly control of the little king Alexander IV and his mother<sup>2</sup>.

The immediate political importance of blood relationship to Alexander seems therefore to have been significantly less than its most committed promoters would have liked to think. Indeed, even Perdiccas himself was selective in his patronage of the blood of Alexander : Alexander's son Heracles, the fruit of an early relationship with the Persian Barsine (who subsequently became Nearchus' wife) was in the earliest phase of the succession struggle never seriously considered, although Nearchus is supposed to have drawn attention to him at the Babylon conference<sup>3</sup>. Moreover Heracles was allowed to live on at Pergamum, cannot therefore have been regarded by Perdiccas or by anybody else as an immediate threat or as a feasible alternative to the young Alexander (or, for that matter, to Philip

<sup>1</sup> Arr. *De hist. succ.*, *FGrH* 156 F 9.

<sup>2</sup> Diod. XIX 11, 3 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Curt. X 6, 10-12 ; cf. Iust. XIII 2, 6 ff.

Arrhidaeus)<sup>1</sup>. The same evident lack of urgency in monopolising control of or influence over Alexander's blood relations, which again helps to put the immediate importance of mere relationship into perspective, may perhaps be illustrated by the career of Cleopatra, Alexander's full sister. During the early part of Alexander's reign she had been usefully employed in holding together the link between Epirus and Macedonia as wife of her mother's brother, Alexander of Epirus. After his death in Italy the tyrant Dionysius of Heracleia Pontica had found that paying court to Cleopatra might save him some unpleasantness with Alexander<sup>2</sup>.

After Alexander's death however, oddly enough, Cleopatra seems at first to have been almost completely neglected by the generals, and was indeed herself the first to take the initiative in proposing for herself a new marital connection, firstly with Leonnatus, who after Babylon was made satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, an important but not central function in the post-Alexander imperial government<sup>3</sup>; and only after this move ended as a result of Leonnatus' sudden death did Olympias think it worthwhile to send her to Perdiccas—who refused her. The reason is interesting: Perdiccas, allegedly after long pondering and being advised by Eumenes to accept Cleopatra, chose to take Antipater's daughter Nicaea, who had been his first choice and whose hand he had sought almost immediately after Alexander's death<sup>4</sup>. Thus from the beginning Perdiccas' view of the political realities seems to have been that Antipater would

<sup>1</sup> Diod. XX 20, 1. W. W. TARN's arguments that Heracles was a propagandist fiction invented by Polyperchon (in *JHS* 41 (1921), 18 ff.; *Alexander the Great II* (Cambridge 1948), 330 ff.) have rightly failed to convince; cf. H. BERVE, *Das Alexanderreich ... II*, no. 206 (Barsine); also my comments in *JHS* 90 (1970), 74; P. A. BRUNT, in *RFIC* 103 (1975), 22-34.

<sup>2</sup> Sources in H. BERVE, *Das Alexanderreich... II*, no. 433.

<sup>3</sup> Plut. *Eum.* 3; cf. *JHS* 90 (1970), 60.

<sup>4</sup> Arr. *De hist. succ.*, *FGrH* 156 F 9, 21; 26; Diod. XVIII 23, 1-3; 25, 3; cf. Iust. XIII 6, 4-7.

be a more useful ally than any support which he might be able to arouse from a personal connection with Cleopatra. And this remained his view, even when Cleopatra was present, willing and able. It was indeed alleged later that he had changed his mind and intended after all to marry Cleopatra—but it was alleged by Antigonus, whose sole interest at that time was to awaken Antipater's suspicion of Perdiccas; and the rumour certainly never came to anything<sup>1</sup>.

Cleopatra never thereafter succeeded in playing the central role to which she aspired, in this respect sharing the fate of Alexander's son, the king Alexander IV who, after Olympias' attempt to exploit him had ended with her death, was shut up in Amphipolis together with his mother Roxane by Cassander and thus excluded from playing any further significant role<sup>2</sup>, beyond serving as a dating mechanism for the disparate parts of his empire (for which purpose, as it ultimately turned out, he did not even need to remain alive!)<sup>3</sup>. Cassander thus firmly prevented more than token exploitation by his rivals<sup>4</sup> but seems

<sup>1</sup> Diod. XVIII 25, 3. Perdiccas' motives, as described by Diod. XVIII 23, 3, that Perdiccas was by this hoping to become king and therefore wanted to marry Cleopatra may indeed go back (through Hieronymus of Cardia) to Antigonus' version of these events which he used to shock and stimulate into action Antipater and Craterus against Perdiccas.

<sup>2</sup> Diod. XIX 52, 4; 61, 3.

<sup>3</sup> Documents from Babylon and Egypt continued to date by regnal years of Alexander IV even after his death: the Babylonian chronicle published by A. J. SACHS and D. J. WISEMAN, in *Iraq* 16 (1954), 202-12, reaches year 6 S. E. (306-5) for Alexander's reign; in Egypt *P. Dem. Louvre* 2427 and 2420 are dated in Hathyr of Alexander's 13th Egyptian year (Jan.-Feb. 304 B.C.).

<sup>4</sup> Antigonus tried to use Cassander's treatment of Alexander to create some propaganda for himself among the Macedonians in his declaration at Tyre: Diod. XIX 61, 3; and in the agreement of 311 Cassander was only (officially) recognised by the other dynasts as στρατηγὸς τῆς Εὐρώπης until the young Alexander came of age: Diod. XIX 105, 1. That this latter provision was merely pro-forma seems to emerge from Diodorus' comment, doubtless reflecting Hieronymus (Diod. XIX 105, 3-4) that the death of Alexander shortly afterwards was regarded as a relief also by Lysimachus, Ptolemy and Antigonus. Was the murder of Alexander perhaps secretly agreed to by the dynasts at the peace conference?

to have found no way of making practical use of him himself. The murder of the young Alexander in 310 lent a certain rarity value to Heracles son of Barsine, which in competent hands might conceivably have been exploited to the embarrassment of Cassander. But in the hands of the old Polyperchon Heracles' artificially inflated and misplaced pretensions to the throne of the Argeads amounted to no more than a delayed death sentence : Cassander found no difficulty in making sufficient formal concessions to Polyperchon to persuade him to have the boy killed<sup>1</sup>.

Cleopatra remained in Sardis even after Perdiccas' death and was still there in 308 ; but she played no traceable part in the events which led to her mother's murder of Philip, to the enforced suicide of Eurydice and eventually to the death of Olympias herself. In 308 she is mentioned by Diodorus as attempting to leave Sardis to join Ptolemy ; the discovery by Antigonus' governor of this attempt led to her murder, though Antigonus took measures, including the arrangement of a royal funeral, to evade the appearance of responsibility for the murder<sup>2</sup>. It seems fairly clear therefore that it must have been Antigonus who prevented Cleopatra from playing any role in politics, after he came into control of Sardis in 320, as is explicitly attested by Diodorus for 308 : for between 320 and 308 Sardis had remained in Antigonus' possession. In connection with Cleopatra's death Diodorus, in a famous passage, relates that Cassander, Lysimachus, Antigonus, Ptolemy "and all the most distinguished generals after Alexander's death" had courted her because of her relationship to Alexander. The dates of these various courtship attempts (if Diodorus' passage is more than a fabricated *elogium*) cannot be firmly fixed. The fact that Cleopatra, shortly before her death, was trying to escape to Ptolemy suggests that his offer at least may have been

<sup>1</sup> Diod. XX 20, 1 ; 28, 1-2.

<sup>2</sup> Diod. XX 37, 3-6.

fairly recent. It would at least fit in with the Greek policy which he was pursuing at the time<sup>1</sup>. For Lysimachus not even a convincing guess is possible ; and the same applies to Antigonus, though sometime in the early period, possibly soon after the death of Antipater, at the beginning of his serious attempt to influence events in Greece and Macedonia, would perhaps be the most likely<sup>2</sup>. Cassander however is perhaps the most interesting of these names : his attempt, if authentic, must surely be placed early, perhaps shortly after the death of his father, when he went straight to Asia Minor and was clearly prepared to seek help wherever he could find it ; and it may suggest an attempt to torpedo Polyperchon's contemporary attempt to co-operate with Olympias, perhaps by playing the daughter's influence against the mother's<sup>3</sup>.

Perhaps the most important aspect, from our point of view, of these attempts to win Cleopatra—although in no single instance do we have any further details—is that even without her, so long as she remained shut up in Sardis and prevented from playing any active political role, the *diadochoi* were not in practice particularly affected in their decisions by her existence. Cassander, who would inevitably have been most concerned by any attempt to exploit Cleopatra, decided to build his influence and power on Philip and the Argead house in general rather than on Alexander in particular—which may indeed, have possibly been the attraction of Cleopatra all along<sup>4</sup>. His lasting

<sup>1</sup> So J. SEIBERT, *Historische Beiträge zu den dynastischen Verbindungen in hellenistischer Zeit* (Wiesbaden 1967), 23-4, with older literature.

<sup>2</sup> I am not sure why J. SEIBERT, *op. cit.*, 23 takes the view—which nothing in the text supports—that Antigonus courted Cleopatra not for himself but for Demetrius (his age is irrelevant if political advantage was the essence of the offer).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Diod. XVIII 53, 3 ; J. SEIBERT, *op. cit.*, 21-2.

<sup>4</sup> Diod. XX 37, 4 does not actually mention Alexander when he gives the motives of the *diadochoi* in courting Cleopatra, merely the distinction of her birth ; but his explanation of this distinction (*ibid.*, 3) puts the fact that she was Alexander's sister before the fact that she was daughter of Philip.

marriage with Philip's daughter Thessalonice<sup>1</sup>, his restoration of Thebes<sup>2</sup>, and his treatment and finally murder of Alexander IV and Roxane<sup>3</sup> after Olympias had already been removed, his honourable burial of Philip Arrhidaeus, Eurydice and Cynnane<sup>4</sup> all point in the same direction. His policy, in its developed form, was clearly directed towards destroying the possibility of exploiting Alexander's name, family or achievements in his own sphere of power; paradoxically his anti-Alexander policy relied nevertheless very heavily on the reputation of Philip!

Our conclusion from this material is not very flattering for Alexander. The attempts to create an exploitable importance for his baby son, for his sister or finally for his son Heracles all in the last resort failed to produce the kind of support among the influential Macedonian troops which their promoters were hoping for: the influence of Alexander IV and hence of his guardians from the very beginning was limited by the decision that Philip should also be king; Perdiccas preferred an alliance with Antipater through Nicaea to one with Olympias through Cleopatra; Cassander could successfully murder Olympias, Roxane and Alexander IV, and Heracles without causing the sort of disastrous rioting and loss of confidence which Perdiccas' murder of Cynnane at Sardis and Olympias' murder of Philip and Eurydice had caused. There can therefore be little doubt that in Macedonia the influence of Philip and his non-Alexander family, even after Alexander's Asiatic achievements, remained the most potent traditionalist political influence in Macedonian affairs. We must not however exaggerate. It is perfectly clear that after the first years, perhaps as soon as the death of Antipater, the critical factor in the affairs of the *diadochoi*

<sup>1</sup> Diod. XIX 52, 1.

<sup>2</sup> Diod. XIX 53, 2 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Diod. XIX 52, 4; 105, 2.

<sup>4</sup> Diod. XIX 52, 5.

was increasingly the personal loyalty of the troops to their commander and the ability of the commanders to reward them in terms of pay, booty and land. Connections with the old Macedonian royal house, which in themselves made no contribution to pay, booty or land, could be no more than a dispensable decoration.

Once the new dynasties were established evidence nevertheless suggests that the Antigonids and Ptolemies chose to advance the official view that they were connected with the Argead royal house. The Antigonids however seem to have claimed no special relationship with Alexander; they seem not to have emphasised relationship to him over and above the other members of his house. The epigrams of Samus from the time of Philip V draw attention merely to Philip's Heraclid descent<sup>1</sup>; the 'progonoi' monument of Antigonus Gonatas (or Doson) at Delos may have begun its group of statues with a god, if so then presumably Heracles<sup>2</sup>. There is certainly no reason for thinking that the single outsize statue of the series may have been Alexander. Similarly, the much-emphasised 'special relationship' between Philip V and Peloponnesian Argos is a direct reference to the alleged Argead origins in Argos<sup>3</sup>; Polybius accused Philip V of not imitating the beneficial actions of Philip and Alexander, though he claimed to be their συγγενής<sup>4</sup>—but the mention of Philip along with Alexander here makes it clear that the specific *exempla* are Polybius' own, and that what Philip is supposed to have claimed is merely a relationship with the Argeads. Indeed, his interest in his great namesake is well attested by the fact that he had Theopompus' *Philipppica* abbrevi-

<sup>1</sup> *Anth. Pal.* VI 114; 115; 116; on this see C. F. EDSON, in *HSPh* 45 (1934), 213 ff.

<sup>2</sup> F. COURBY, *Exploration archéologique de Délos*, V: *Le portique d'Antigone* (Paris 1912), 74-83 (cited by C. F. EDSON, *art. cit.*, 218).

<sup>3</sup> Liv. XXVII 30, 9; XXXII 22, 11, repeating an Argead tradition which was already known to Herodotus (VIII 137, 1).

<sup>4</sup> Plb. V 10, 10.

viated for easy consumption<sup>1</sup>. Philip's coinage, as much of the Antigonid coinage, made deliberate play with the Heracles motif; but of a special connection with or extra emphasis on Alexander in the Antigonid house we have nothing at all<sup>2</sup>.

The situation in Egypt was, of course, quite different. In Macedonia the established Antigonids, in particular, it seems, Philip V, might propound their claim to traditional legitimacy by asserting a connection with the Argead royal house in general: for them Alexander played no particularly important role. For the Ptolemies, who possessed Alexander's body, whose capital city was the greatest of Alexander's foundations—indeed, the only one of Alexander's foundations which achieved more than provincial importance—the connection with Alexander personally was of great importance and was indeed subtly emphasised by Soter himself in his *History of Alexander*<sup>3</sup>. It is thus clear that from the beginning the figure of Alexander, in cult and propaganda, had to play a major part in the ideology of the Ptolemaic kingdom<sup>4</sup>. It was nevertheless not finally personal descent from Alexander—which would in any case have been impossible to impose on the first generations after Alexander, who knew the relative ages of Alexander and Ptolemy Soter—or even an alleged close personal blood-relationship with Alexander that the Ptolemaic propagandists apparently chose to advance as a claim to Ptolemy's legitimacy among the Greco-Macedonian population of Egypt. Again, as with the Antigonids in Macedonia itself, a much more generally formu-

<sup>1</sup> Phot. *Bibl.* 176, p. 121 a 35 = *FGrH* 115 T 31.

<sup>2</sup> The source situation is not adequate to provide a firm check on C. F. EDSON's arguments (*art. cit.*, 220 ff.) that there was real substance to the Antigonid claim to blood relationship with the Argeads, going back to the fifth century; but if it were true we might have expected that Antigonus in his propaganda campaign against Cassander, in particular in the Tyre declaration (Diod. XIX 61), would have made use of it. That he did not seem to tell against C. F. Edson's view.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. R. M. ERRINGTON, in *CQ* 19 (1969), 233 ff.

<sup>4</sup> On this see above p. 143 f.; below p. 170 ff.

lated claim to connection with the Argead house seems to have been promoted. Two accounts were eventually in circulation: that Ptolemy was of Heraclid descent and related—at some distance, admittedly—to the Argeads through his mother Arsinoe<sup>1</sup>; the second, that Arsinoe was already pregnant with Ptolemy Soter by Philip II when Lagos married her, that Ptolemy was thus in fact a natural son of Philip but acknowledged by Lagos as his<sup>2</sup>; and Plutarch tells a tale according to which Ptolemy allegedly knew nothing to tell about his father Lagos' origins<sup>3</sup>.

W. W. Tarn attempted to prove that this second version was at first officially accepted by Soter, but already by 279 (W. W. Tarn's date for the *pompe* described by Callixenus, in which he claimed to be able to trace the Heraclid claim) was abandoned for the descent through Arsinoe. This was totally demolished by F. Jacoby<sup>4</sup>. But what is informative for our investigation is that in all this mythologising about Ptolemaic

<sup>1</sup> *OGIS* 54, 5; Satyrus, fr. 21, in *FHG* III p. 165. If it is this relationship which Theocritus (XVII 26-7) had in mind in his references to Heraclid ancestry (so W. DITTBENGER, ad *OGIS* 54 n. 5) a date before 270 for the propagation of the relationship can be established. Theocritus is the only source to make the explicit point that Ptolemy shared this Heraclid ancestry with Alexander.

<sup>2</sup> Curt. IX 8, 22; Paus. I 6, 2.

<sup>3</sup> Plut. *De cobib.ira* 9, 458 A-B.

<sup>4</sup> W. W. TARN, in *JHS* 53 (1933), 57 ff.; F. JACOBY, in *Hermes* 69 (1934), 214 ff. H. BERVE, *Das Alexanderreich ...* II, no. 668 had already guessed that the legend about Ptolemy's being a natural son of Philip belonged to the earliest period of the Ptolemaic kingdom, which W. W. Tarn found convenient; but as F. JACOBY points out (*FGrH* 138, *Kommentar*: II D p. 498) it is unlikely, in view of Diod. XVII 106, 6 f. that Cleitarchus knew of such an alleged relationship; we may add that although Ptolemy himself was happy enough to emphasise his own closeness to Alexander (as the Alexandrian Cleitarchus in the Diodorus passage cited also does) in his propaganda and his *History of Alexander*, the rumoured blood-relationship mentioned by Curtius and Pausanias was not known to Arrian and therefore can have played no part in Ptolemy's work. Nor does it play any part in the actual politics of the succession to Alexander. It is thus difficult to believe in an early origin of the tale, even more difficult to believe (with W. W. Tarn) that it was both early and officially propagated.

origins Alexander himself played a part only in Theocritus' conceit, that both were Heraclids, that is, I suppose, strictly speaking related in myth only<sup>1</sup>. In any case the point of the story about Arsinoe's pregnancy by Philip seems to be not so much that thereby Ptolemy became a natural half-brother of Alexander : it is quite simply that he thereby became a son of Philip and had the blood of the Argeads in his veins ; and the same basic point is made more cumbersomely by Satyrus' genealogy of Euergetes.

The third of the Macedonian successor kingdoms, the Seleucid kingdom, despite the fact that it, just as much as Ptolemaic Egypt, owed its very existence as a Macedonian kingdom to Alexander's expedition, seems to have made no attempt at all to use the Alexander-name for political or mythologising purposes in direct connection with the family of Seleucus. The references to the Seleucid kingdom in later writers no more than reflect contemporary usage : the kingdom is *Macedonicum imperium*—not Seleucus's, certainly not Alexander's<sup>2</sup>. M. Rostovtzeff indeed argued that the Seleucids may have officially counted Alexander as their first king<sup>3</sup>—but his evidence is unconvincing : in the only surviving list of Seleucid kings from Seleucid times<sup>4</sup> he is not mentioned, and this seems decisive in view of the inadequacy of other arguments. Indeed, even a mythical connection with the royal house of Macedon

<sup>1</sup> Theocritus makes no attempt to suggest that the two kings had anything more in common than their common mythological ancestry and their acceptance at the time of writing δι Λιδίος οὐκεφ (XVII 17). The depictions of Alexander and Ptolemy in the Alexandrian *pompe* described by Callixeinus do not seem to me to be interpretable as references to any claimed blood-relationship between Alexander and Soter : Athen. V 201 d; 202 a. What the εἰκόνας βασιλέων (*ibid.*, 201 f) were, which W. W. TARN (in *JHS* 53 (1933), 60) with a rush of imagination, interpreted as “the pedigree of the Ptolemies (and probably of Alexander) back to Dionysus, as Satyrus gives it,” is quite obscure.

<sup>2</sup> See the material collected by Ch. EDSON, in *CPh* 53 (1958), 153-70.

<sup>3</sup> In *JHS* 55 (1935), 56 f., followed by A. HEUSS, in *A & A* 4 (1954), 67.

<sup>4</sup> *OGIS* 246 (from Teos).

for the Seleucids lacks contemporary testimony<sup>1</sup>. Zeus Olympios was of course widely worshipped and occupied an important place in Seleucid religion : but the claimed line of descent for the founder of the kingdom (in the earliest extant version) seems to have run through Apollo, not through Heracles<sup>2</sup>.

What all this seems to amount to, therefore, is that in the official (or semi-official) mythologising propaganda of the successor kingdoms Alexander himself, even in Egypt, played no

<sup>1</sup> M. ROSTOVTEFF, in *JHS* 55 (1935), 63 ff. draws attention to Libanius, *Or.* XI 91, who, in connection with the founding of Antioch, mentions among the settlers τῶν ἀφ' Ἡρακλέους, οἵς ἦν, οἴμαι, συγγένεια Σελεύκῳ κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν Τήμενον. If this reflects more than imaginative embroidery by Libanius (which the obscurity of the reference, coming after specific mention of Argives and Cretans might suggest) the most that can be extracted from it is an alleged Heraclid connection—which for a prominent Macedonian noble would not in itself be very surprising. It is entirely fanciful to see in the *demotikon* δλυμπιεὺς at Seleuceia-in-Pieria (M. HOLLEAUX, *Etudes d'épigraphie et d'histoire grecques* III (Paris 1942), 199 ff. = *BCH* 57 (1933), 6-67; text also in C. B. WELLES, *Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period* (New Haven 1934), no. 45) a reference to Alexander's mother Olympias. This possibility M. HOLLEAUX mentions only to dismiss (*op. cit.*, 250 n. 8) but it was tentatively revived by M. ROSTOVTEFF, *art. cit.*, 64-5. M. HOLLEAUX (*op. cit.*, 250) mentions a sufficient number of more likely explanations for the origin of the name.

W. W. TARN, in *CQ* 23 (1929), 139, draws attention to the fact that Antiochus I of Commagene seems to have regarded Alexander as one of his ancestors on his mother's side (*OGIS* 398) through the Seleucid house. He explains this by assuming a fiction whereby Seleucus Nicator's wife Apama was regarded as a daughter of Alexander. This explanation is entirely fanciful, still more W. W. Tarn's view that the "legend" already existed and was known in the Peloponnese by late third century B.C. (he uses it to explain why Alexander of Megalopolis called his daughter Apama, *Liv.* XXXV 47, 5). In fact we have no idea why Apama of Megalopolis received her name ; nor how Antiochus I of Commagene traced his Seleucid wife's ancestry back to Alexander : by his time a mythical descent for Seleucus Nicator himself from Alexander would doubtless be as easy to invent as a fictitious descent from Apama. More important however for our theme is that nothing supports the view that this myth had anything to do with the Seleucid kingdom or with the official pedigree of the house of Seleucus. At most it sheds a side-light on how a fringe-monarch like Antiochus of Commagene as late as the first century B.C. found an active use for a dynastic myth about Seleucid origins, which the Seleucids themselves had apparently not used.

<sup>2</sup> *Iust.* XV 4, 3.

very important role—in Macedonia itself and the Seleucid kingdom perhaps even no role at all, although the Ptolemies and at least some of the Antigonids encouraged the propagation of the view that their line was directly related to the Argead house. The reason for the modesty of Alexander's role must go back to the early days of the *diadochoi* where, as we have seen, only in the brief period immediately following the death of Alexander were Alexander's own living relatives regarded as particularly important political objects : in the end all the leading *diadochoi* acquiesced in (or encouraged) their neutralisation and eventual execution. There must have seemed therefore no particular point in artificially resuscitating memories of an obscure or fabricated connection, the value of which the successors themselves had done so much to enfeeble.

### III ALEXANDER'S FAME

Nobody from the early hellenistic period whose opinion is extant seems to have been aware of or willing to admit the extent to which the creation of the Macedonian empire was the personal responsibility of Alexander. So far as I can see, even in that personality-loving period nobody seems to have given a personalised name to what we nowadays tend to call Alexander's empire. In the coverage of the history of the *diadochoi* by Diodorus and Plutarch—who must in this respect reflect the usage of their common source, the contemporary Hieronymus of Cardia—those of the *diadochoi* who were interested in asserting a central power struggled, as has often been remarked, for possession of τὰ δλα or ἡ τῶν δλων ἡγεμονία<sup>1</sup>; and this was indeed more than Alexander's achievement alone : it included the domination of Thrace and the southern Balkans, that is, explicitly Philip's European empire as well as Alexander's Asi-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Diod. XVIII 50, 2; 5; 54, 4; XIX 41, 1 : XX 37, 4 ; Plut. *Eum.* 12, 1 ; cf. *Demetr.* 15, 3.

atic<sup>1</sup>. It was therefore, if anything, the empire of the Macedonians; and it is accordingly not very surprising that the name Macedonian Empire (*Macedonicum Imperium*) seems to have lingered on in general usage, even into the late Roman Empire, as the normal description of the successor kingdom of the Seleucids<sup>2</sup>. In view of this it is hardly surprising that the monarchy in Macedonia itself seems to have also remained quite unpersonalised, beyond the name of the current ruler. In the period of the *diadochoi* it is normally described as ἡ Μακεδόνων βασιλεία or ἡ κατὰ τὴν Μακεδονίαν ἡγεμονία or variations on the same theme<sup>3</sup>. Thus Alexander, despite his later reputation, seems to have had no immediate recognised existence as the founder of the empire which now goes under his name.

In contrast to this, personal contact of individuals with Alexander or personal experience of Alexander's expedition were recorded by the same Hieronymus as distinguishing facts worth mentioning for their own sake or even as arguments worth using and preserving. Damis of Megalopolis, Diodorus records, had been with Alexander and thus knew how to handle elephants<sup>4</sup>; the remnants of the Perdiccan officers with Attalus are described as being "outstanding for boldness and dexterity as a result of their service with Alexander"<sup>5</sup>; "the *hetairoi* who had made the expedition with Alexander" are singled out for mention among the participants in Perdiccas' feast at Persepolis in 316<sup>6</sup>; Python, satrap of Media, was allegedly difficult for Antigonus to remove "since he was a man who had had advancement under Alexander and was currently satrap of Media"<sup>7</sup>;

<sup>1</sup> This is clear from Diod. XIX 41, 1.

<sup>2</sup> Amply demonstrated by Ch. Edson, in *CPh* 53 (1958), 153-70.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Diod. XVIII 52, 1; 54, 1; 56, 2; XIX 52, 1; 61, 2; XX 20, 1.

<sup>4</sup> Diod. XVIII 71, 2. See the discussion of this material also in J. SEIBERT, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios' I.* (München 1969), 152 ff.

<sup>5</sup> Diod. XIX 16, 1.

<sup>6</sup> Diod. XIX 22, 2.

<sup>7</sup> Diod. XIX 46, 2.

Andronicus of Olynthus and Philip, who were "older men who had made the whole campaign with Alexander" and Pithon "who had campaigned with Alexander" were appointed by Antigonus to be advisers for Demetrius at Gaza<sup>1</sup>; and finally Ophellas is described as "one of the friends who had campaigned with Alexander"<sup>2</sup>. In all these cases the companionship of Alexander on the expedition is positively evaluated, and Hieronymus seems to have taken the view that his readers would share his own positive assessment of the value or interest of these men's experiences.

Other incidences of this type are more dynamic and demonstrate that Alexander's companionship, employed in political argument as a measure of personal value or claim to influence and esteem was regularly used as a weapon of political propaganda in the struggles of the successors. Polyperchon is described by Diodorus, at the time of his appointment as *epimeletes*, as "practically the oldest of those who made the expedition with Alexander and respected by the people of Macedonia"; and it seems clear that Diodorus (Hieronymus) regards these as the reasons for Polyperchon's appointment<sup>3</sup>. It is well-known that Eumenes had great difficulty in holding his crisis-ridden Asiatic coalition together for the fight against Antigonus. As the armies collected in Susiana in 316 Peucestas, the local satrap, argued that he himself should be awarded the overall command because of the size of his troop contingent "and because of his position with Alexander"; Antigenes, the commander of the Silver Shields, argued against him that his men should have the right to choose the overall commander "since they had conquered Asia with Alexander and their bravery had made them unconquered". Neither argument convinced, since Eumenes once again succeeded in persuading everybody to accept

<sup>1</sup> Diod. XIX 69, 1 (Andronicus and Philip); 82, 1 (Pithon).

<sup>2</sup> Diod. XX 40, 1.

<sup>3</sup> Diod. XVIII 48, 4.

his Alexander-tent as a compromise ; but the tone and direction of the arguments is clear enough<sup>1</sup>. The Silver Shields tried to make further use of the same argument as propaganda against Antigonus' troops before the final battle of Gabene, when they pointed out that Antigonus' men would be opposed in the battle by the men who had conquered under Philip and Alexander. The argument did not win them the battle, but their fame and assertiveness ensured that after they came into Antigonus' hands their unit was deliberately broken up, perhaps partly reflecting the potential influence of their claims and experience<sup>2</sup>.

Reputation won by service under Alexander is alleged by Diodorus as the main reason for Cassander's murder of Aristonous, though other more immediate considerations will almost certainly have predominated<sup>3</sup> ; and Seleucus represented to Ptolemy a similar motive for Antigonus' policy in the east : that Antigonus was particularly concerned to expel from their satrapies those who had served with Alexander—Seleucus mentioned in particular Python, Peucestas and himself ; and indeed, while still in Babylon Seleucus had refused to recognise Antigonus' right to interfere with him, "since he had acquired his post from the Macedonians for services during Alexander's lifetime"<sup>4</sup>. Moreover, if we may believe Diodorus, it was by precisely an appeal to the experience and spirit which his men had acquired from their service with Alexander that the same Seleucus was able to encourage them to accompany him to Babylon after Demetrius' defeat at Gaza (312)<sup>5</sup>. Thus Seleucus, despite his failure to attribute any special place to Alexander in his new kingdom once he felt himself to be established there, was glad enough in the earlier phases of his career to take what-

<sup>1</sup> Diod. XIX 15, 1-3.

<sup>2</sup> Diod. XIX 41, 1; 48, 3; Plut. *Eum.* 19, 2.

<sup>3</sup> Diod. XIX 51, 1.

<sup>4</sup> Diod. XIX 56, 1; 55, 3.

<sup>5</sup> Diod. XIX 90, 3.

ever advantages he could from the employment of Alexander's name.

The last reference of this kind occurs much later. Probably in 285, when Lysimachus was setting out to take over the part of Macedonia which Pyrrhus then controlled he first tried a diplomatic approach to the Macedonians in Pyrrhus' part of the land and won over many of the leading men. If we may believe Plutarch's account, among the arguments which he used was, that by supporting Pyrrhus the Macedonians "were rejecting from Macedonia the friends and confidants of Alexander", that is, himself and his supporters<sup>1</sup>. The long gap in our evidence, from 312 to 285, in which no instance of an *argumentum ad Alexandrum* is attested, is no doubt to be attributed to two factors : firstly, the rapidly deteriorating quality of our source material for this sort of thing after 312 ; and secondly, the effectiveness of the argument in the course of time will doubtless have diminished. That Lysimachus found it useful even at that late date (if Plutarch's record is authentic) must be attributed to the fact that he was opposed by a non-Macedonian and he was operating within Macedonia itself, where such notions, particularly in the light of recent experience of the house of Cassander and of Demetrius, might retain their effectiveness longer than elsewhere. And the argument was by then in any case exclusive : Lysimachus was the only one in the area who could advance it.

#### IV HONOURS AND CULTS

Strabo comments, in connection with Lysimachus' renaming of Alexandria Troas, that the successors thought it εὐσεβές first to found cities named after Alexander and only then to name

<sup>1</sup> Plut. *Pyrrh.* 12, 7.

them after themselves<sup>1</sup>. Appian, in a famous passage of his *Syriaca*, in discussing the city foundations of Seleucus Nicator, says that some of the cities were named ἐς τιμὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ βασιλέως; but in his detailed list only two Alexander-names are mentioned, Alexandropolis in India and Alexandreschate in Scythia<sup>2</sup>. Since Alexandria Eschate (Chojend) was actually founded by Alexander himself, the most which can come into consideration for Seleucus is a technical re-founding or perhaps an addition to the facilities, which was remembered and got wrongly into Appian's list<sup>3</sup>. Alexandropolis in India is of dubious authenticity, being (as such) quite unidentifiable<sup>4</sup>. W. W. Tarn argued that the form of the name Alexandropolis, in contrast to Alexandria, indicates merely a military colony (which many of the other so-called *poleis* of Appian's list certainly were)<sup>5</sup>. But for our present purpose the precise technical character of the settlement is unimportant, (although it is clear that Seleucus' bestowing a name derived from Alexander merely on a military colony, and an obscure Indian frontier colony at that, has a certain value as evidence for his attitude to Alexander). If Appian's information here is correct, this Alexandropolis in India constitutes the only evidence for use by any Seleucid of the Alexander name in this kind of capacity (since he is wrong about Alexandria Eschate); and were it not for Strabo's comment, the balance of probability would seem to be tilted against its authenticity.

<sup>1</sup> Strab. XIII 1, 26, p. 593: ... ἔδοξε γὰρ εὐσεβὲς εἶναι τοὺς Ἀλέξανδρον διαδεξαμένους ἐκείνου πρότερον κτίζειν ἐπωνύμους πόλεις, εἰθ' ἔκατῶν.

<sup>2</sup> App. Syr. 57, 297.

<sup>3</sup> Sources in H. BERVE, *Das Alexanderreich* ... I 293; cf. W. W. TARN, *Alexander the Great* II 235-6.

<sup>4</sup> See V. TSCHERIKOWER, *Die hellenistischen Städtegründungen von Alexander dem Grossen bis auf die Römerzeit* (Leipzig 1927), 111.

<sup>5</sup> *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1951), 7; *Alexander the Great* II 248-9.

The implications of the Strabo passage seem however to have been neglected<sup>1</sup> by investigators of hellenistic city-foundations which, as we shall see, affects our view of Antigonus as well as of Seleucus. The context of the passage, Lysimachus' renaming Antigoneia as Alexandria Troas, seems to imply, if Strabo was not simply inventing the information on which he based his comment, that Antigonus also had already made his act of εὐσέβεια to Alexander before founding Antigoneia in the Troad. Moreover, Lysimachus and Antigonus can scarcely be the only *diadochoi* whom Strabo had in mind here: he mentions them both by name, but nevertheless uses the imprecise general form of Ἀλέξανδρον διαδεχόμενοι for the practicants of the Alexandria foundations. Now Cassander cannot here be considered. As we have already seen, his policy was not merely to annihilate Alexander's heirs in practice but he made no attempt to show any goodwill even in propaganda towards Alexander or his achievements. For him an Alexander-foundation certainly cannot be considered. For Ptolemy the development of Alexandria in Egypt may have been regarded by Strabo as an adequate token of representative εὐσέβεια. But for Seleucus no general or particular considerations rule it out, especially in the early years of his rule when, as we have seen, Alexander's reputation was in fact in some ways exploited by him<sup>2</sup>; and for Strabo's comment to be meaningful any Alexander foundation of Seleucus must in any case belong to his early years. In this case, despite the lack of other good arguments for its authenticity, the Alexandropolis in India of Appian's list may indeed be the Seleucid foundation which helped to justify Strabo's comment.

There is, in fact, from the whole of the hellenistic world only one further Alexandria certainly known, which was not

<sup>1</sup> In W. W. TARN's case, wilfully obscured: see his hopelessly selective treatment, *Alexander the Great* II 239 f., based on his groundless assertion (*ibid.*, 238) that none of the *diadochoi* ever used the Alexander name.

<sup>2</sup> Above p. 161 f.

explicitly founded by Alexander himself, Alexandria Troas. The city was founded by synoecism by Antigonus and named Antigoneia. When Lysimachus got control of the area after Ipsus he changed its name to Alexandria, thus providing the specific occasion which provoked Strabo's general comment<sup>1</sup>. This comment has already given us occasion to reconsider the authenticity of Alexandropolis in India; and in the light of it we should clearly examine the possibility of an earlier Alexander foundation (or re-naming, Lysimachus-fashion) for Antigonus. Of all the attested Alexandrias only one seems a real possibility (though others now unknown may have existed). Stephanus of Byzantium includes in his list of Alexandrias an Alexandria πρὸς τῷ Λάτμῳ τῆς Καρίας<sup>2</sup>. This puzzled Tarn so much that he suggested a complicated transmission confusion with a Heracleia in Media, the foundation of which is also attributed to Alexander; but he was himself dissatisfied with his wild explanation and inclined to the view that some lost word hides behind Λάτμῳ<sup>3</sup>. This however would not solve the difficulty, since Stephanus explicitly adds τῆς Καρίας. A. H. M. Jones without argument but possibly correctly assumed the identity of this Alexandria by Latmus of Stephanus with the well-known Heracleia by Latmus; but he also presumed that its naming as an Alexandria had been by Lysimachus, after the fall of Cassander's brother Pleistarchus, who had called it Pleistarcheia<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Strab. XIII 1, 26, p. 593; cf. V. TSCHERIKOWER, *Städtegründungen...*, 16; L. ROBERT, *Etudes de numismatique grecque* (Paris 1951), 5 f. Cf. W. W. TARN, *Alexander the Great* II 239 ff. for a typically bad-tempered attitude to an awkward source (quite unreliable).

<sup>2</sup> Steph. Byz. s.v. Ἀλεξάνδρεια (10).

<sup>3</sup> *Alexander the Great* II 242 f.

<sup>4</sup> *The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces*<sup>2</sup> (Oxford 1971), 43 and n. 23; cf. V. TSCHERIKOWER, *Städtegründungen...*, 28-9. On Pleistarcheia see Steph. Byz. s.v. Πλειστάρχεια. A. H. M. Jones says that Pleistarchus had rebuilt the city but Stephanus does not offer any confirmation and the archeological evidence for the building of the walls of Heracleia cannot be dated sufficiently accurately (cf. Fr. KRISCHEN, *Milet III* 2 (Berlin 1922); L. ROBERT, *Le sanctuaire de Sinuri*

However, if Strabo's comment is to be taken seriously it should perhaps imply also that none of the unnamed successors whom he has in mind founded or named more than one Alexandria; since Lysimachus was unquestionably responsible for Alexandria Troas, A. H. M. Jones's guess that he was also responsible for Alexandria by Latmus cannot be regarded as very probable. The town must however be a clear candidate for Antigonus' pious foundation (if there was one). It cannot be a foundation of Alexander himself; and the attribution to Antigonus would also offer us another example of Cassander's hostility towards both Alexander and Antigonus: sometime after Ipsus Cassander's brother Pleistarchus took control of Heracleia by Latmus which he re-named Pleistarcheia<sup>1</sup>. There was no particularly good reason for this, though the practice was common enough not to call for comment. However, had the town sometime

*près de Mylasa I* (Paris 1945), 60 n. 1.; J. M. COOK & G. E. BEAN, in *ABSA* 52 (1957), 138-40; F. M. WINTER, in *AJA* 67 (1963), 374 n. 38; *ibid.*, 75 (1971), 417 n. 28). A. H. M. Jones is followed now by R. A. HADLEY, in *JHS* 94 (1974), 63, who misleadingly states that Lysimachus refounded "several cities which he renamed in Alexander's honour. These include Alexandria Troas ... and Alexandria-by-Latmus, the former Heracleia-by-Latmus". In fact one instance only is certain and more perhaps unlikely (see text above).

This whole line of argument rests of course on the unproven identification of this Alexandria with Heracleia-by-Latmus. J. G. DROYSEN, *Geschichte des Hellenismus* III 2, 198-9, suggested an identification with Alinda which, as L. ROBERT pointed out at length (*op. cit.*, 59 n. 3), is not to be rejected out of hand. It would however imply a re-naming by Ada in 334 (cf. *Arr. Anab.* I 23), and must in this case be the first of all the Alexandrias—and not founded by Alexander. We might have expected to have heard about this in some source, a fact which perhaps argues against it.

The modern theory that Pleistarchus controlled a "buffer zone" stretching from Cilicia to Caria as a result of Ipsos has been exploded by L. ROBERT, *op. cit.*, 55 ff.; cf. H. SCHAEFER, in *RE* XXI 1, 196 ff. His presence in Caria however is now well enough attested: L. ROBERT, *op. cit.*, no. 44, published an inscription from Sinuri dated by him; R. MERKELBACH, in *ZPE* 16 (1975), 163, says that he has seen an inscription at Euromus dated by Pleistarchus (though he prints no text); and he draws attention to the inscription from Tralles for a Pleistarchos Antipatrou published by A. E. KONTOLEON, in *BCH* 10 (1886), 455-6, no. 6. He also clearly had something to do with Heracleia-Pleistarcheia.

<sup>1</sup> Steph. Byz. s.v. Πλειστάρχεια.

earlier been re-named Alexandria by Antigonus, then there may have been a very precise reason for the new change of name : the name of Alexander was to be removed together with the memory of Antigonus' act of εὐσέβεια.

Even if we are right to take Strabo's comment seriously as a formal statement of the facts, the εὐσέβεια of the successors in this respect was not particularly impressive ; and it certainly does not seem to have stretched into the second generation. We know of no further Alexandria foundations or re-namings ; and indeed, some existing Alexandrias were refounded under different names. We have noticed the possibility that Alexandria by Latmus became Pleistarcheia ; in the Seleucid kingdom several cases of re-foundings of earlier Alexandrias as Antiocheias seem probable. If W. W. Tarn's arguments are right, Alexandria-Merv, Alexandria on the Oxus and Alexandria Eschate were refounded in each case by Antiochus I as Antiocheiai, perhaps having been destroyed by nomad invasions<sup>1</sup>; a century later Alexandria in Persis was re-founded for unknown reasons and renamed Antiocheia by (probably) Antiochus IV<sup>2</sup>. *Eusebeia* towards Alexander thus did not run very deep in the city-founding activities of the successor kingdoms. In this sphere, as in others, the traces which bound the kingdoms to Alexander were very rapidly thrown off and the chief pre-occupation of the successors seems to have been much more to find independent justification for their existence : thus while Seleucus may conceivably have founded or re-founded one obscure Alexander-city (or community of some sort) Appian knows to relate of no less than sixteen Antiocheias, five Laodiceias, three Stratoniceias and one Apameia<sup>3</sup> ; and even if the authenticity of all the attributions to Seleucus I may be doubted,

<sup>1</sup> Evidence and discussion in W. W. TARN, in *JHS* 60 (1940), 89 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Plin. *Nat.* VI 31, 139 ; cf. V. TSCHERIKOWER, *Städtegründungen ...*, 178 ; O. MØRKHOLM, *Antiochus IV of Syria* (København 1966), 169.

<sup>3</sup> App. *Syr.* 57, 297.

the family ideology of the Seleucids contrasts strongly with the virtual absence of the Alexander name. And the same dynastic attitude is clear in the practices of the other *diadochoi*, though not in such an extreme form. Cassander may even have set the trend with Cassandreia as early as 315 ; and he followed it in due course with Thessalonike and Pleistarcheia. But in this aspect his avowed hostility towards Alexander's house did not distinguish him at this superficial level from the other *diadochoi*, who in other respects followed less extreme policies. Whatever the truth about Alexandreia in Caria, Antigoneiae are known from Bithynia, from the Troad and from Syria, which demonstrate the trend clearly enough. Lysimachus, despite his renaming of Alexandreia Troas, had no hesitation in founding his Lysimacheia in Thrace ; nor did he shrink from renaming such distinguished cities as Smyrna and Ephesus Eurydiceia and Arsinoeia, after his wife and daughter respectively<sup>1</sup>.

When we come to examine Alexander's cult *Nachleben* we find the same sort of general pattern. We know of no city cult, the origin of which need be later than Alexander's death ; all seem likely to go back to the benefits which Alexander brought, in theory or in practice, to the Greek communities in Asia Minor by defeating the Persians<sup>2</sup>. The cults lived on, some, as at Erythrae and Bargylia, into the third century A.D.<sup>3</sup>. But this was remarkable only in the length of time involved. After his initial invasion Alexander had never returned to Asia Minor, the cities of Asia Minor had therefore never in his lifetime had significant cause to hate him ; and the cult celebration quickly assumed a regular position in the normal life-pattern of the communities. So, for instance, we find the decaying Alexandreion at Priene being restored towards the end of the

<sup>1</sup> Sources and discussion in V. TSCHERIKOWER, *Städtegründungen...*

<sup>2</sup> See in general Chr. HABICHT, *Gottmenschenkum und griechische Städte*<sup>2</sup> (München 1970), 17 f.

<sup>3</sup> Chr. HABICHT, *op. cit.*, nos. 10 d and 10 f.

second century B.C. by a group of private individuals who are praised by the community for their munificence<sup>1</sup>; the Alexandreia, an *agon* of the Ionian *koinon*, were still celebrated at a grove sacred to Alexander in Strabo's day<sup>2</sup>. The administration of the cult might in the course of time be rationalised, as at Ephesus, where it seems to have been amalgamated by the second century A.D. with the cult of the Roman emperors and Gaius and Lucius Caesar<sup>3</sup>, at Rhodes already by 129 B.C. with Dionysus<sup>4</sup>. The relative importance of the cult of Alexander at Erythrae is traceable for the third century B.C. in the great inscription about the sale of priesthoods, where the ἐπώνιον, the tax on the price paid for the priesthood, although not fully preserved on the stone, cannot be restored as being less than that of the most expensive priesthoods of the list, the group which cost more than 2000 dr., of which only three others, Hermes Agoraios, Artemis Aithopia and Aphrodite ἐν Δαφναῖω[ι] are preserved on the stone<sup>5</sup>. This fact suggests that at Erythrae at least the standing of the Alexander cult was, presumably from the beginning, deliberately intended to be equal to or greater than that of the richest city cults. The later conflation of the Ephesian cult with that of the Caesars argues that its status also remained high.

The fact that these cults continued to exist for so long should not however in itself be regarded as particularly remarkable. It is entirely in keeping with normal hellenistic

<sup>1</sup> *Inscr. Prier.* 108; cf. Chr. HABICHT, *op. cit.*, no. 10 b.

<sup>2</sup> Strab. XIV 1, 31, p. 644; cf. Chr. HABICHT, *op. cit.*, no. 10 a.

<sup>3</sup> SEG IV 521; cf. Chr. HABICHT, *op. cit.*, no. 10 c.

<sup>4</sup> Evidence and discussion in Chr. HABICHT, *op. cit.*, no. 11.

<sup>5</sup> F. SOKOLOWSKI, *Lois sacrées de l'Asie Mineure* (Paris 1955), n° 25, to which add the fragment published by W. G. FORREST, in *BCH* 83 (1959), 513 ff. An incomplete version was published by W. DITTBENGER, *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 1014, many of whose interpretative comments however remain useful. The most expensive priesthoods are: Alexander (line 109), Hermes Agoraios (lines 105 & 115), Artemis Aithopia (line 6 of W. G. FORREST's fragment), Aphrodite ἐν Δαφναῖω[ι] (*ibid.*, line 11).

practice that such cults continued to be observed long after the person honoured had died, so long as before his death he had given no reason, by a change in his attitude to the honouring city, for the cult's being abolished. In this respect Alexander's cult was little different from the cults of a range of later hellenistic kings, whose cult was also maintained in many cases for several generations after the death of the king concerned: once part of the festival calendar of a city, the new cults seem to have remained so long as nothing intervened to change the general situation<sup>1</sup>.

We have already noticed that two of the three major Macedonian monarchies of the hellenistic age, the Seleucids and the Antigonids, made no traceable attempt to work Alexander into their pedigrees or to pay any particular attention to him, despite the later Antigonids' wish, for obvious reasons, to attach themselves to the traditions of the Argead house. The situation in this respect was in Ptolemaic Egypt different, though the role of Alexander even here should not be exaggerated. In Alexandria itself Alexander was honoured with a city-cult as *ktistes*, as he was doubtless also in his other foundations, though evidence, and that surprisingly late and modest, has survived only from Alexandria: a papyrus of A.D. 120/1 mentions a priest of Alexander *ktistes* of the city and the 'age groups' (*γέλεικειῶν*)<sup>2</sup>; it is a reasonable assumption that this cult went back to the foundation of the city, though the positive earlier evidence which P. M. Fraser has assembled is far from conclusive<sup>3</sup>. On the other hand our evidence about Ptolemaic Alexandria as a whole is too haphazard and fragmentary to attach very much weight to the fact that our only piece of positive evidence is so late. The quantity of evidence however contrasts very strikingly with that for the state cult of Alexander,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Chr. HABICHT, *op. cit.*, 185 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Sammelb.* 6611.

<sup>3</sup> P. M. FRASER, *Ptolemaic Alexandria* I 212 & notes.

to which the dynastic cult of the Ptolemies was in due course added ; and the conclusion suggests itself that the government took no particular pains to promote the cult of Alexander *ktistes* (which nevertheless managed to survive until at least the reign of Hadrian).

The official Ptolemaic state cult of Alexander was almost certainly founded by Soter ; a papyrus from Elephantine of 285/4 is dated in an approximation to later style : "Year 40 of the reign of Ptolemy, in the month Gorpiaios, in the priesthood of Menelaos son of Lagos"—that is, Soter's brother. Alexander is not himself mentioned, but the style nevertheless so closely resembles the later official dating by the eponymous priests of Alexander and the dynasty that any other alternative is difficult to envisage<sup>1</sup>. Soter's cult of Alexander then became a peg on which Philadelphus could hang his own particular development : apotheosis of himself and Arsinoe as *Theoi Adelphoi* ; and the eponymous priest of Alexander and the ever-growing dynasty thus became by royal ordinance the legal (though incredibly cumbersome) method of dating contracts<sup>2</sup>. We must surely assume that in making this rule Philadelphus was more deeply concerned with the propagation of his newly founded dynastic addition to the longer-standing Alexander cult than with the propagation of the Alexander-cult as such ; and that the Alexander-cult thus became little more than a respectably veiled vehicle for putting his own dynastic cult into practice. This view seems to be confirmed by the fact that, although there is plenty of evidence from Egypt for dedications to (or on behalf of) the Ptolemaic royal house, there is as yet no single instance known of any private dedication to (or on behalf of) Alexander ; and although there is evidence of games and processions in

<sup>1</sup> *PEleph.* 2. See in general for this and what follows P. M. FRASER, *Ptolemaic Alexandria* I 215 ff. and notes, with comprehensive discussion and citation of earlier literature.

<sup>2</sup> The first known instance : *PHib.* 199 of 272-1.

connection with the dynastic cult, there are no games or festivals of any kind known for the official cult of Alexander<sup>1</sup>.

One might be inclined to attribute this extraordinary-seeming neglect of Alexander to the inadequacy of our evidence, but I tend to regard it as more fundamental : by the reign of Philadelphus Alexander was long dead and could not help anybody ; members of the living dynasty were for this immediate reason more likely to receive private dedications. The situation of Soter in this respect had been quite different. Soter had known Alexander intimately ; his early career owed everything to Alexander ; his security in Egypt in the early critical years after Alexander's death was enhanced by the short-term critical importance of his possessing Alexander's body (or, at least, of preventing anyone else from possessing it) ; and once it became clear that he would survive in Egypt, Alexander's body could be ceremoniously moved from the old Egyptian capital Memphis to the new Ptolemaic capital Alexandria, thus symbolically emphasising the break with the old regime. In this context, conceivably in connection with the removal of Alexander's body to its final burial-place in Alexandria, the foundation and promotion of a cult of Alexander, parallel to but separate from the (presumably) already existing city-cult of Alexander-*ktistes*, under the royal auspices, to mark the particular importance which Ptolemy Soter claimed that Alexander had for him, would make sense. Once this cult existed, a cult which, essentially, we may perhaps see as a personal creation of Soter and which in itself had little meaning to his successors, it could clearly not be abandoned ; but it could usefully be developed and employed as a vehicle to bear the message that the rulers had officially become gods. In this capacity Alexander's cult survived, despite the accretions of late Ptolemaic protocol, to the end of the dynasty.

<sup>1</sup> So P. M. FRASER, *Ptolemaic Alexandria* I 228.

## V LITERATURE

Alexander's expedition stimulated the production of a flood of literature such as had never before been experienced in the Greek world. Much of it was written by men who had themselves accompanied Alexander and who were not in the first instance *littérateurs*. The general uncompleted official history of Callisthenes was followed by a mass of memoir writers, each anxious to tell his own story, or Alexander's story from his own point of view. Of many nothing is known after Alexander's death—of Chares, for example, whose inside anecdotes survived to be read by Athenaeus ; of Ephippus, whose apparently hostile account also survived to entertain Athenaeus. Others are known to have remained politically and militarily active—Ptolemy, above all, but also Nearchus and Medeius of Larisa, who are well-known as aides of Antigonus ; Onesicritus may have attached himself to Lysimachus, if a surviving anecdote that Lysimachus as king sarcastically criticised Onesicritus' story about the Amazon may serve as evidence ; Aristobulos is said to be from Cassandreia, which suggests that he may have attached himself to Cassander ; Cleitarchus, whether or not he was with Alexander, wrote as an Alexandrian and at least early enough to have been able to be in touch with survivors of the expedition<sup>1</sup>.

All these writers, none of whose works has survived for us, were available for consultation at least into the second century A.D., when some who had remained unpopular and little read, in particular Ptolemy and Aristobulos, were findable and were again used, at least by Arrian. I have no intention here of dealing with these writers in detail ; but I should like to emphasise that in contrast to the comparative lack of actual political

<sup>1</sup> It is not necessary to give detailed references here : the fragments and testimonia may be found in F. JACOBY, *FGrH* II B with commentary ; cf. also L. PEARSON, *The Lost Histories of Alexander the Great* (New York/Oxford 1960), *passim*.

enthusiasm for Alexander at high levels, writers of histories, even those who had certainly been present with Alexander, deluged the reading public with a mixed mass of fact and myth—the Amazon episode may be taken as a typical example of the sort of nonsense which was propagated—about the strangest peoples and places, such as nobody had hitherto experienced. It is thus no wonder that later rhetors like Hegesias of Magnesia<sup>1</sup> found the Alexander story an attractive vehicle for displaying their self-advertising talents, or that elements of the Alexander-romance seem to go back to early hellenistic material.

What I am more concerned with, however, is to try to explore the extent to which serious hellenistic writers, the historians, made use of Alexander and the Alexander literature in works which were not primarily (or at all) concerned with telling the Alexander-story, how they were influenced by the available information. The chief difficulty is that the only hellenistic historian who survives in more than the slightest fragments is Polybius, and for lack of adequate comparative material our conclusion here will inevitably be one-sided. The surviving fragments of Duris, Phylarchus, Agatharchides, Poseidonius, Timagenes and Timaeus offer very little useful information about their attitude to Alexander. When Curtius writes that both Cleitarchus and Timagenes said that Ptolemy was present at the battle with the Malli<sup>2</sup> we are probably right to assume that Timagenes took his false information from Cleitarchus, and we have thus identified in Timagenes a Cleitarchus reader (which does not take us very far); similarly Timaeus' praise of Alexander because he conquered Asia in less time than Isocrates took to compose the *Panegyricus*<sup>3</sup> or his criticism of Callisthenes for his 'unphilosophical' treatment

<sup>1</sup> *FGrH* 142.

<sup>2</sup> Curt. IX 5, 21 (= Timagenes, *FGrH* 88 F 3).

<sup>3</sup> Timaeus, *FGrH* 566 F 139.

of Alexander<sup>1</sup> tell us little about his own attitude to Alexander or the sources (beyond the fact that he had read Callisthenes). We know that Phylarchus, Agatharchides and Poseidonius commented variously on the luxurious living of Alexander's companions—the fragments are preserved without exception by Athenaeus<sup>2</sup>—but a more serious aspect of their interest or reference to Alexander cannot be expected from Athenaeus, and nobody else whose work has survived thought their views worth quoting<sup>3</sup>.

A broadly-based comparison with Polybius is thus not possible. But it is immediately striking that, whereas we have for the most part merely trivial details, anecdotes or frivolous comments preserved from the other writers, in the surviving portions of Polybius we have nothing like this at all. Now it is perfectly clear that the selection of quotations by our sources for fragments—particularly Athenaeus and Plutarch—has made this contrast quite so sharp; nobody would seriously suggest that we can draw any general conclusion about these writers' views on Alexander from the preserved fragments, preserved with a misleading casualness by writers whose interest lay in the story, not the context. But the fragments do let us know that such *trivia* played some part in the works of these writers; and to this extent the contrast with Polybius retains a certain validity. Polybius is never trivial in this way.

Polybius' single most frequent Alexander-theme, mentioned altogether five times in the preserved parts of the work, is the destruction of Thebes: in 220 Philip V was advised "to make an example of Sparta just as Alexander made an example of

<sup>1</sup> F 155.

<sup>2</sup> Phylarchus, *FGrH* 81 F 41; Agatharchides, *FGrH* 86 F 2; F 3; Poseidonius, *FGrH* 87 F 14.

<sup>3</sup> Since *FGrH* lacks an index it may be helpful if, for the sake of completeness, I list here the Alexander references in the fragments of the above-named historians which I have not already mentioned: Duris, *FGrH* 76 F 40; F 46; Phylarchus, *FGrH* 81 F 11; F 77; Poseidonius, *FGrH* 87 F 39; Timaeus, *FGrH* 566 F 150.

Thebes at the beginning of his reign”<sup>1</sup>; in Chlaeneas’ speech at Sparta Alexander’s destruction of Thebes is listed among other Macedonian horrors<sup>2</sup>; in a discussion of Philip V’s character resulting from his sack of Thermum Alexander is offered as an example of showing respect to the gods although he destroyed Thebes<sup>3</sup>. When he comes to the reply to the speech of Chlaeneas which he gives to Lyciscus of Acarnania at Sparta, he finds no excuse for the destruction of Thebes, chooses merely to argue that the services of Alexander and his successors had not been mentioned by Chlaeneas<sup>4</sup>. The example of Thebes crops up for the last time in the introduction to book XXXVIII, where Polybius discusses the greatness of disasters in the context of the Achaean War: Thebes was destroyed, but since everybody pitied the Thebans nobody tried to justify Alexander’s action; and in a short time they were back home!<sup>5</sup>

It is clear from this that the destruction of Thebes was for Polybius a favourite *topos*, capable of varied use and emphasis as suited his occasion. Nor is Polybius entirely ungrudging of credit to Alexander: in a discussion of causes of war taken from the context of the Second Punic War, he observes that Alexander’s crossing to Asia was not the cause of the war with Persia, but Philip’s decision; and he repeats the same argument in discussing the causes of the Third Macedonian War, which (in his view) Philip V planned and Perseus carried out, just as Philip II planned and Alexander carried out the war against Persia<sup>6</sup>. And when he takes issue with Theopompus’ version of the activities of the companions of Philip II he grudgingly admits some credit to Alexander for beating the Persians, but

<sup>1</sup> IV 23, 8.

<sup>2</sup> IX 28, 8.

<sup>3</sup> V 10, 6-8.

<sup>4</sup> IX 34, 1.

<sup>5</sup> XXXVIII 2, 13 ff.

<sup>6</sup> III 6, 4-14; XXII 18, 10.

heavily emphasises the roles of those old companions of Philip whom Theopompus had smeared<sup>1</sup>. Other aspects of Alexander are less emphasised in the surviving passages of Polybius : as destroyer of Persia, of course<sup>2</sup> ; and, in contrast to Philip V, in particular as a respecter of religion<sup>3</sup>. But in general two things are striking : first, the number of allusive references to Alexander which go into some detail implies that Polybius expected his readers to know at least the outline of the history of Alexander ; secondly, the extremely limited range of incidents which he chooses to comment on.

This latter point may reveal something about what Polybius had read. It seems likely that he had made use only of "the classics"—for general history Ephorus and Timaeus, for earlier Greek and Macedonian history Theopompus, Callisthenes and Phylarchus. There is nothing in his preserved knowledge of Alexander which could not be accounted for by these authors and his own intelligent thought. In particular, that Callisthenes was his main source of information on Alexander seems likely from the fact that he is the only Alexander historian to be mentioned at all. Callisthenes is named three times : in the first passage Polybius seems to criticise Timaeus for unjust attacks on Callisthenes, but the point at issue seems really to be that Timaeus should not attack those who make the same sort of mistakes as he himself does ; and the positive point about Callisthenes, if there was one, gets lost in the attack on Timaeus<sup>4</sup>. The second passage is the famous criticism of Callisthenes' military reporting as instanced by his account of the battle of Issus<sup>5</sup>. What

<sup>1</sup> VIII 10, 8.

<sup>2</sup> IX 34, 1 (pro-Macedonian speech of Lyciscus of Acarnania) ; XVIII 3, 5 (speech of Alexander Isios at the Nicaea negotiations : Philip V is contrasted unfavourably with Alexander).

<sup>3</sup> V 10, 6-8.

<sup>4</sup> XII 12 b.

<sup>5</sup> XII 17-22.

is interesting here for our purpose is the character of Polybius' argument : he does not cite another more reliable source to prove his point, but rests content to show that what Callisthenes wrote, from Polybius' own practical common-sense point of view, is either impossible or improbable. The third passage again concerns Timaeus' criticism of Callisthenes, and again is more an attack on Timaeus than a defense of Callisthenes (though he ends the passage by claiming to have defended adequately not only Callisthenes but also Aristotle, Theophrastus, Ephorus and Demochares from Timaeus' attacks—which merely confirms that we have lost a lot in the present gaps in book XII)<sup>1</sup>.

Callisthenes then was for Polybius worth defending (at least against Timaeus), but also worth attacking. No other Alexander historian is mentioned by Polybius. The conclusion seems reasonable, in view of the nature of the other references of Polybius to Alexander, that his chief, perhaps sole, informant was indeed Callisthenes. Polybius was of course too intelligent simply to swallow Callisthenes' official interpretation : his own varied use of the destruction of Thebes for different arguments shows how he interpreted and used in typical fashion what he knew. But the fact remains that, for all the writing about Alexander which by this time existed, the learned man of politics seems to have confined his reading to a single major work written by a man with a literary reputation, and moreover a reputation which did not depend solely on his history of Alexander.

Polybius may have been untypical both in the authors he chose to follow and in the consistent seriousness of purpose with which he employed his references to Alexander. But this short examination of hellenistic historians' use of Alexander and Alexander themes has shown at least one thing clearly : that the career of Alexander quickly had become a standard topic of literary reference among serious writers, as well as for

<sup>1</sup> XII 23, 4.

mere rhetors, whether or not their use of the theme was serious ; and that by Polybius' time a historian could expect his Greek readers to be sufficiently familiar with the Alexander story for his polemic against Callisthenes for his inadequate account of the battle of Issus to be meaningful. The literary importance of Alexander has brought us to the sphere, perhaps indeed the only sphere, where Alexander seems to have enjoyed an active *Nachleben* in the hellenistic period. The evidence at our disposal, however—and this comment applies to the poor fragments of the philosophical tradition just as much as the literary and historical—does not suggest that the hellenistic world was the time or place where this *Nachleben* enjoyed a significant development : for this the attitudes created by Rome's expansion in the east seem to have been responsible.



# V

GERHARD WIRTH

ALEXANDER UND ROM

Der Untertitel «Image et réalité» erleichtert mir die Arbeit sehr. Denn er erlaubt gerade in der Gliederung von Problemen das Suchen nach neuen Perspektiven. Dass der Gegensatz bei der Begriffsbereiche das Alexanderproblem überhaupt erst ausmacht, wer wollte dies bezweifeln?

Es war Aversion, Ratlosigkeit, Verbitterung und radikaler Egoismus, die Alexanders politische Rolle unmittelbar nach dem Tode beendeten; die Art seines literarischen Fortlebens scheint indirekt dafür Beweis<sup>1</sup>. Die zeitgenössische Publizistik als Medium dieses literarischen Bereiches freilich muss als Teil der Politik gelten, sie ist es, die weitgehend sein Bild bestimmt. Hatte er selbst damit begonnen, den Faktor Propaganda in sein militärisches, politisches Kalkül einzubauen, auch nach ihm lassen Nachrichten über einzelne Autoren vermuten, ihr Alexanderbild sei nicht nur von den üblichen historiographischen Motiven beeinflusst gewesen: Kassanders Verbindung mit den Peripatetikern ist ohne entsprechende Wechselbeziehungen nicht

<sup>1</sup> Zu Diod. XVIII 4, 6 s. E. BARIANT, in *HSPb* 72 (1967), 200; J. SEIBERT, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios' I.* (München 1969), 27 ff.; F. SCHACHERMEYR, *Alexander in Babylon* (Wien 1970), 187 ff.

zu denken<sup>1</sup>, Kleitarchs Aufenthalt in Alexandria unter den Augen eines Ptolemaios wirkt allein schon wie ein *argumentum e silentio*, und bezeichnenderweise hat es der auffallend loyale Nearch unter den Diadochen zu nichts mehr gebracht, was seinen Anlagen entsprach. Nicht nur, dass das Alexanderbild der Philosophen kaum einen positiven menschlichen Zug aufweist. Musste nicht für die unmittelbaren Nachfolger ein positiver Eindruck auf jeden Fall ständigen Vorwurf und immanente Abqualifizierung bedeuten? Anderseits wieder verwischte Alexander als Wundergestalt in ihren übermenschlichen Dimensionen glücklich die vergleichbare Wirklichkeit, liess aber, richtig gezeichnet, die eigene Herrschaft umso stärker als deren Abglanz verspüren<sup>2</sup>. Es muss derartige Ambivalenz pragmatischer Erwägungen sein, die im Hintergrunde des Alexanderbildes eine Weiterentwicklung von Alexandergeschichte verhindert, von den spezifischen Postulaten antiker Historiographie zu schweigen. Neue Aspekte etwa in philosophischer Deutung sind auf diesen Bereich beschränkt geblieben; wie weit die Stoa in der Herausbildung ihrer Lehren erst durch das historische Phänomen Alexander entscheidend beeinflusst wurde<sup>3</sup>, wird nie auszuschöpfender Diskussionsgegenstand bleiben. Ein Einfluss von hier aus wiederum auf die politische Gestaltung der hellenistischen Welt ist nicht zu regi-

<sup>1</sup> Zuletzt J. R. HAMILTON, *Plutarch Alexander. A Commentary* (Oxford 1969), 213 ff. Plausible Zweifel an früher Existenz eines peripatetischen Alexanderbildes (E. BADIAN, in *Historia* 7 (1958), 440 ff.; in *CQ* 8 (1958), 156; E. MENSCHING, in *Historia* 12 (1963), 274) bedeuten, soweit ich sehe, Widerlegung einer Hypothese durch andere: Sie hängen überdies davon ab, wie man griechische Opposition gegen Alexander bei dessen Lebzeiten und das Verhältnis des Aristoteles zu ihr einschätzt; das Schicksal eines Kallisthenes scheint in solchem Zusammenhang bedeutungslos.

<sup>2</sup> Vgl. dazu A. HEUSS, in *A & A* 4 (1954), 66.

<sup>3</sup> Dazu zuletzt J. R. FEARS, in *Philologus* 118 (1974), 114 ff. Bezeichnend etwa die Beziehung Panaitios-Polybios vor dem politischen Hintergrunde ihrer Zeit (vgl. *ibid.*, 119). Allgemein s. auch A. HEUSS, *art. cit.*, 74. Zur Wechselwirkung von Rhetorik und Philosophie s. J. STROUX, in *Philologus* 88 (1933), 223.

strieren. Sollte ein Eratosthenes Alexander als das Ideal eines Philosophenkönigs gepriesen haben, dann tat er dies wohl allein aus subjektiver Reflexion heraus, kaum aber, weil er sich entscheidende Wirkung erhoffte<sup>1</sup>. Ich halte für möglich, dass selbst die Entstehung des alexandrinischen Alexanderromans eine starke real- und zeitpolitische Komponente besitzt<sup>2</sup>, abzulesen aus Inhalt und Formgestaltung, verständlich aus den Notwendigkeiten griechisch-ägyptischer Symbiose und gefährlicher Gewichtsverlagerungen<sup>3</sup> in ihrem Bereich: Nichts aber macht die realpolitische, ja eigentlich historische Wirkungslosigkeit des Alexanderphänomens deutlicher als die literarische Fortentwicklung gerade dieses Versuches.

Aktiviert wird das Phänomen Alexander gleichsam erst wieder, als das römische Imperium Alexanders Erbe übernimmt<sup>4</sup>. Dies geschieht keineswegs in einem festen Willensakt; dass unsere frühesten Zeugnisse ebenso sporadisch wie vage sind, scheint ohne Belang, aber bezeichnend. Noch weniger geht es darum, bestehende Ideologien mit anderen zu bekämpfen: Weder für Antiochos III. oder IV., noch Philipp V., zu schweigen von Perseus, gibt es Zeugnisse einer Mobilisierung Alexanders als ideologisches oder nur propagandistisches Mittel im

<sup>1</sup> S. E. BADIAN, in *Historia* 7 (1958), 437. Analog dem pragmatischen, an Polybios orientierten Imperiumsbild etwa eines Poseidonios (vgl. H. STRASBURGER, in *JRS* 55 (1965), 40 ff.) wären entsprechende Neuansätze auch für dessen Alexanderbild zu vermuten.

<sup>2</sup> Dazu immer noch R. MERKELBACH, *Die Quellen des griechischen Alexanderromans*<sup>2</sup> (München 1970). Bezeichnend scheint der Versuch, durch Verwendung zeitgenössischer Quellen dem Werke legitimierte Authentizität zu vermitteln. Ich halte für möglich, auch der Kallisthenesname müsse in frühe Zeit gehören. Überblick über Deutungsversuche bei W. SPOERRI, in *Der Kleine Pauly* III, s.v. Ps.-Kallisthenes.

<sup>3</sup> Allgemein s. S. K. EDDY, *The King is dead* (Lincoln, Nebraska Univ. Press 1961), *passim*. Antigriechische Züge im Roman (vgl. S. K. EDDY, *op. cit.*, 279 ff.) könnten Konzession sein.

<sup>4</sup> Material zuletzt bei O. WEIPPERT, *Alexander-Imitatio und römische Politik in republikanischer Zeit* (Diss. Würzburg 1972).

Kampf gegen Rom<sup>1</sup>. Der berühmte Karneadesvergleich ist als politisches Zeugnis kaum zu werten, ein Ansatz unter Mithra-dates VI.<sup>2</sup> kam zu spät und hatte viel zu wenig an historischen Voraussetzungen als dass er wirksam werden konnte. Nicht zu vergessen ist, dass auf der anderen Seite auch eine römische Herrschafts- oder Eroberungsiedeologie kaum wirklich spürbar wurde<sup>3</sup>, ja nach 146 das Imperium, als permanentes Provisorium fortentwickelt, in Hellas und später im Osten eher als Möglichkeit dringend notwendiger Stabilisierung empfunden worden ist. Nein, Alexander wird unter anderen Vorzeichen lebendig. Er artikuliert sich vorerst allein in Selbstdeutung einzelner prominenter Römer und Suchen nach Sensationen als Voraussetzung für Person wie Handlung<sup>4</sup>. Ihr Mittel ist äusserliche Gestik, nachgeahmtes Verhaltensklischee und Ausnutzen zufälliger oder forcierter herbeigeführter Ähnlichkeit der Situation. Für all dies mag der üblich gewordene Terminus *imitatio* als Schlagwort wirken, das nichts und deshalb im Grunde alles umschreibt. Verglichen mit dem, was die Diadochen an Alexander zu verehren oder zu ignorieren hatten, bedeutet sie Rückfall in eine primitive Sphäre, auch wenn das Alexandervorbild so zur wichtigen Stufe auf dem Wege einzelner zur Emanzipation der Persönlichkeit aus dem *mos maiorum* heraus wurde. Es bleibt unwichtig, wie weit bei all dem die Beziehungen zum Vorbild, von Dichtern wie Ennius oder Propagandisten wie Theophanes von Mitylene gleichsam aufgebaut, wirklich immer den Gefühls-

<sup>1</sup> Für einen Demetrios von Baktrien mochte Alexander hingegen als Element der Propaganda aus Existenzgründen unabdingbar sein.

<sup>2</sup> O. WEIPPERT, *op. cit.*, 35; E. OLSHAUSEN, in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt I* 1 (Berlin 1972), 814; L. HAVAS, in *Acta Cl. Univ. Debreceniensis* 4 (1968), 13 ff.

<sup>3</sup> S. dazu E. BADIAN, *Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic*<sup>2</sup> (Oxford 1968), *passim*; A. HEUSS, *Römische Geschichte*<sup>3</sup> (Darmstadt 1971), 68; R. WERNER, in *Aufstieg und Niedergang I* 1, 560; F. HAMPL, *ibid.*, 420 f. Allgemein auch J. DININGER, *Der politische Widerstand gegen Rom in Griechenland 217-86 v. Chr.* (Berlin 1971), bes. 242.

<sup>4</sup> S. dazu O. WEIPPERT, *op. cit.*, 10.

intentionen der historisch Agierenden entsprachen. Alexander indes muss gerade auf diese Weise einer immer weiteren römischen Öffentlichkeit erst bekannt geworden sein<sup>1</sup>: Dass er dabei immer mehr zum Bestandteil römischer Problembewältigung wurde, indem er den Politikern einen Teil ihrer Rechtfertigung mit abnahm<sup>2</sup>, ist m.E. ein Symptom von vordergründig politischer und damit auch historischer Wirksamkeit, das nicht übersehen werden darf.

So mag jene Rede des Appius Claudius, wörtlich genommen, noch Zeichen gewisser Verständnislosigkeit gegenüber dem historischen Phänomen sein<sup>3</sup>, nichts verdeutlicht einen Wandel römischen Denkens besser als die auf den älteren Scipio angewandte, verbreitete Topik der Schlangenzeugung vielleicht noch zu Beginn des 2. Jhdts.<sup>4</sup>. Synthese mit römischen Vorstellungen scheint mir allzu abstrakt, näher liegt, es handle sich um den Versuch, sich angesichts anstehender politischer Aktionen<sup>5</sup> den

<sup>1</sup> Bezeichnend die Verbindung Alexander-Agathokles Plaut. *Most.* 775 ff. für Wertungsmöglichkeiten und gängige Perspektiven (andere Deutungen s. O. WEIPPERT, *op. cit.*, 55). Varros Abriss (*Suda*, s.v. Βάρρων) ist wohl aus den Bedürfnissen des 1. Jhdts. zu erklären.

<sup>2</sup> Zu Theophanes s. A. HEUSS, *art. cit.*, 80 : Rolle und Verwendung des Alexandermodells ergaben sich m.E. zwangsläufig aus einem propagandistischen Vakuum im Osten. Dies könnte auch für den von Livius herangezogenen C. Acilius gelten ; seine Verwendung freilich erklärt sich aus den Prämissen der augusteischen Zeit (XXXV 14, 5-7).

<sup>3</sup> Zum Alexanderbeispiel in der hellenistischen Welt dieser Zeit vgl. Plut. *Pyrrh.* 8, 1 ; 19, 3 ; Iust. XVIII 1, 2 ; s. auch Fr. PFISTER, in *Historia* 13 (1964), 37 ff., bes. 51. Für die Alexandererwähnung Plut. *Pyrrh.* 19, 1 ff. scheint mir das ὁ μέγας in seiner Selbstverständlichkeit auf spätere Version hinzuweisen. Deutung der zweifellos historischen Römergesellschaft im römerfreundlichen wie -feindlichen Sinne musste sich früh aufdrängen (Material bei J. SEIBERT, *Alexander der Große* (Darmstadt 1972), 172 f.).

<sup>4</sup> S. A. HEUSS, *art. cit.*, 80 ; O. WEIPPERT, *op. cit.*, 36 ff. ; 42 ff. Militärische Begründung von Handlungsweisen scheint neben der Sonderrolle des Scipio ohne Belang. Berichtete göttliche Eingebungen überdies lassen die Alexanderbeziehung als lediglich eine Komponente des Scipiobildes erscheinen.

<sup>5</sup> Vgl. Liv. XXVI 19, 4. Zweifel des Livius XXVI 19, 6 f. erklären sich wieder aus den Vorbehalten augusteischer Zeit.

griechischen Denkweisen anzupassen. Vorausgegangen war ihm wohl bereits der Bericht, mit dem man die Erstürmung Neukarthagos durch diesen Scipio ausgemalt hatte. Polybios *suo loco*<sup>1</sup> schweigt über die Schlangenzeugung: Ich halte für möglich, dass die allzu rudimentäre Vordergründigkeit derartiger Manipulation Indigniertheit in ihm auslöste; seine Studien zu Überlieferungsfragen und historischem Detail liessen sich überdies gut aus der Absicht verstehen, einen Nachholbedarf an konkreten Kenntnissen zu befriedigen und auf diese Weise nachträglich auch die Anfänge römischer Alexanderrezeption zu korrigieren. Dass die Auseinandersetzung um das Phänomen Alexander weiter ging, beweisen trotz mangelnder weiterer Zeugnisse im 2. die Imitationsformen der grossen Heerführer im 1. Jhd. So ist Marius als Neos Dionysos nach Germanensiegen und Heeresklientel doch nur vom Alexandermodell im Hintergrunde aus zu verstehen<sup>2</sup>, die Imitatio des Pompeius<sup>3</sup> von Anfang seiner Karriere an passt zu der Raffinesse, mit der etwa ein Lucull die gleiche Topik wie seinerzeit Scipio anwendet<sup>4</sup>. Die Imitationsversuche von Crassus, Vater wie wohl

<sup>1</sup> X 5, 2.

<sup>2</sup> Vgl. dazu St. WEINSTOCK, in *HTbR* 50 (1957), 224; in *RE* VIII A 2, 2488. Bemühen um entsprechende Assoziationen passt gut zu tastenden Anfängen neuartiger Heerespolitik. Zur Imitatio freilich fehlten Anhaltspunkte.

<sup>3</sup> Mat. O. WEIPPERT, *op. cit.*, 59 ff. Fraglich bleibt das *similem fore* in Sall. *Hist.* III 88 Maurenbrecher; allzu simplifizierend z.B. A. BRUHL, in *MEFR* 47 (1930), 206: «Pompée voulait être vraiment un nouvel Alexandre». Wiese das *fore* auf Deutung *ex eventu*, angesprochene Insinuation durch *fautores* wiederum wäre als Versuch der Beeinflussung innenpolitischer Verhältnisse durch Kräfte zu verstehen, die Pompeius nach Anfangserfolgen vorschoben. Die sich hieraus entwickelnde Wechselwirkung zwischen Ereignissen und Selbstverständnis lässt sich im einzelnen von da an kaum weiter verfolgen. Zum Fixum des *Magnus*-Titels mit Recht O. WEIPPERT, *op. cit.*, 63 gegen U. von WILAMOWITZ und H. J. METTE, in *Herмес* 89 (1961), 343. Persiflage, wenngleich erst nach grossen Erfolgen, auf persönliche Ambitionen scheint das *invictissimus*: Cic. *Pis.* 34.

<sup>4</sup> Vgl. O. WEIPPERT, *op. cit.*, 73 ff.; dazu K. H. ZIEGLER, *Die Beziehungen zwischen Rom und dem Partherreich* (Wiesbaden 1964), 20 ff.

auch Sohn<sup>1</sup>, allerdings vermag ich nur aus vordergründigem Wetteifer mit Pompeius zu verstehen: Karrhae scheint der Überlieferung nach die bewusst herbeigeführte Alexander-schlacht zu der es dieser bekanntlich gar nicht gebracht hatte. An Pompeius nun fällt auf, dass er bei aller Imitatio Alexanders dennoch keineswegs den Bogen überspannte und dadurch unglaubwürdig wurde<sup>2</sup>. Trotz propagandistischer Ausnutzung der Imitatio, trotz der Aussage, er habe das von Alexander Erreichte in Schatten gestellt<sup>3</sup>, und trotz der bezeichnenden römischen Reaktion auf vermeintliche Eroberungsabsichten<sup>62</sup> — die Grenzen römischer Politik blieben durch ihn gewahrt. Über all dies hinaus aber weist der berühmte Dionysosvergleich beim Triumphzug in Rom<sup>4</sup>. Er scheint Programm. Denn neben dem Weltoberer steht ein anderes<sup>5</sup>, das in bisheriger Imitatio bisher zu kurz gekommen war, nun aber einer Wesensbestim-mung römischer Geschichte gleichkommt. Der Triumph feiert neben dem Eroberer auch den Ordner des Ostens, den Städte-

<sup>1</sup> Plut. *Crass.* 16, 1; 35, 7; 37, 2. Dass äußerliche Unterschiede zwischen Vorbild und Nachahmer die Ausnutzung von Imitationsmöglichkeiten nicht behindern, lehrt Caesar (geg. O. WEIPPERT, *op. cit.*, 76). Der Kyrosvergleich bei Cic. *Brut.* 81, 282 weist über das Erobererideal hinaus und scheint hier vom Blick auf die *κτίστης*-Rolle eines Pompeius (s.u.) mitbestimmt. Er hält sich in der Rhetorik als Pendant zu Alexander bis auf Julian.

<sup>2</sup> Vgl. Cic. *Arch.* 23-24; Manil. (*De Imp.Cn.Pompei*) 23, 67; Att. II 19, 3; dazu O. WEIPPERT, *op. cit.*, 67. Dann aber das σῶμα δὲ οὐδὲν ὥφθη γυναικεῖον...: Plut. *Pomp.* 35, 5 (O. WEIPPERTS Skepsis (*op. cit.*, 81) mir unbegründet). Vgl. auch das τις ἔρως καὶ ζῆλος (38, 4).

<sup>3</sup> Plut. *Pomp.* 34.

<sup>4</sup> Plin. *Nat.* VII 26, 95; Nachahmung durch Antonius wohl Plut. *Ant.* 36.

<sup>5</sup> Zur Verbindung Dionysos-Herakles Materialübersicht bei O. WEIPPERT, *op. cit.*, 93. Die Wirkungsbereiche beider Gottheiten klar zu trennen ist bereits bei Alexander unmöglich, sie scheinen in rhetorischer wie ethischer Deutung in der Folgezeit noch mehr zusammenzuwachsen. Bedeutet Weltoberung Weltbefreiung von Übel und Last, an sie schliesst sich als gleichsam zweiter Schritt die segenspendende Weltordnung. Ist bezeichnenderweise für Alexander Usur-pation des Dionysos nicht vor Eroberung des Achämenidenreiches nachzuweisen, spätere Alexanderdeutung wie Herrscherideologie scheint die Grenzen hier be-wusst zu verwischen.

gründer, κτίστης und εὐεργέτης<sup>1</sup> und bei aller Kontinuität selbst in der Namengebung ist damit der Bereich blosser Imitatio verlassen. Konkrete Fortsetzung des von Alexander Begonnenen, muss gerade dies nachgewirkt haben. Im Osten wird denn neben Dionysos auch Herakles als der andere grosse Wohltäter mit ihm verbunden, die bei Pharsalos versammelte Armee besteht aus betonter Vielzahl von Elementen der durch ihn geeinten und geordneten Welt. Caesar wiederum setzt dort<sup>2</sup> ein, wo Pompeius aufzuhören hatte. Anekdoten früher Alexanderimitatio scheinen bereits bei Lebzeiten Topik geworden und weniger auf Alexander als auf Pompeius hin stilisiert. Ähnliche Absichten könnten umgekehrt für die Darstellung eigener Erfolge gelten, in der jede Alexanderbeziehung oder Spur von Imitatio vermieden ist, und auch angesichts späteren persönlichen wie politischen Verhaltens wird es schwer, etwa für das φιλαλέξανδρος<sup>3</sup> Strabos einen Sinn zu finden. Es scheint, als klafften Propaganda und Politik, bei Pompeius noch miteinander verbunden, gerade hier eigenartig auseinander, ja diene das eine dazu, das andere zu verschleiern, und deute sich indirekt

<sup>1</sup> Mat. bei O. WEIPPERT, *op. cit.*, 83; vgl. bes. F. HAMPL, in *HZ* 188 (1959), 525, in anderem Zusammenhang dazu H. STRASBURGER, in *JRS* 55 (1965), 43; 51. Zur hellenistischen Tradition zusammenfassend immer noch W. SCHUBART, in *APF* 12 (1937), 1 ff., bes. 14 f.

<sup>2</sup> A. HEUSS, *art. cit.*, 82; O. WEIPPERT, *op. cit.*, 105 ff., bes. 108 f. Ich möchte glauben, für das Novum der Sehnsucht eines Römers nach absoluter Weltherrschaft liesse sich aus dem Inhalt einschlägiger Anekdoten bei Sueton und Plutarch etwas wie eine Entwicklungslinie konstruieren. Publizierung vor der Imperiumsgestaltung 46 indes halte ich trotz vorausgehender Umstilisierung von Zustandsbeschreibung Roms in Herrschaftspostulat (vgl. dazu H. D. MEYER, *Cicero und das Reich* (Diss. Köln 1957), bes. 73 ff.; *Die Aussenpolitik des Augustus und die augusteische Dichtung* (Köln 1961), 16; J. VOGT, *Orbis. Ausgewählte Schriften zur Geschichte des Altertums* (Freiburg 1960), 194) durch Cicero für undenkbar.

<sup>3</sup> XIII 1, 27, p. 594. Vgl. auch ζηλώσας ἄμα καὶ Ἀλέξανδρον. Dem ὁ δὲ Καῖσαρ (ohne θεός) nach m.E. sehr wohl Beziehung auf Augustus möglich; hierzu würde das νεανικῶς wie auch Steigerung des Attributs durch Caracalla passen (Dio Cass. LXXVII 9, 1; vgl. *Jahrb. f. Fränk. Landesforschung* 34-35 (1975), 46). Materialübersicht für gegenteilige Ansicht bei O. WEIPPERT, *op. cit.*, 116; vgl. D. KIENAST, in *Gymnasium* 76 (1969), 439.

an, wieviel Caesar an seiner eigenen Rolle unklar blieb. So übernimmt er nach dem Ende des Gegners dessen eigentliche Erfolgsdomäne, den Osten, offensichtlich, um das Liegengelassene zu vollenden. Sicher, eigene Taten in Gallien mochten eine Parallele zu Alexander nahelegen<sup>1</sup>, eine zweite zu dem Alexander von 334 ergab sich, geht man von der Ausweglosigkeit innerrömischer Verhältnisse<sup>2</sup> 44 aus — neben brauchbaren Erwägungen etwa für den geplanten Rückmarsch liegen bekanntlich Caesars Ziele gegenüber Parthien wie auch dem Imperium selbst für die Zeit nach Rückkehr im dunkeln<sup>3</sup>. Ich halte für möglich, es sei auch jetzt eigentlich Pompeius gewesen, der damit endgültig erst noch zu überwinden war, ehe Caesar an die Vollendung seines Werkes gehen konnte. Alexander aber, gleichsam Kriterium und Kampfpreis in solchem Ringen, nimmt damit Dimensionen an, die das Schicksal Roms zu beeinträchtigen drohen. Denn indem er sich seiner zu bemächtigen sucht, scheint der Politiker Caesar an die Grenze des Unkontrollierbaren zu gelangen. Und die Imitatio, im Unterbewusstsein wirkend, ist anders als in Pompeius, nunmehr dabei, ihren Bezug zur Realität zu verlieren.

<sup>1</sup> Zu Caesars Vertragspolitik in Gallien s. D. TIMPE, in *Chiron* 2 (1972), 278 ff. Umfang und Systematik ist m.E. auch für römische Verhältnisse neu und erinnert entfernt an Alexander (zur römischen Tradition, D. TIMPE, *art. cit.*, 295; vgl. aber *Orbis*, 188). Betonte Begrenztheit des eigenen Interessenbereichs halte ich für Alternative zu Pompeius (vgl. Plut. *Pomp.* 38, 2).

<sup>2</sup> S. dazu M. GELZER, *Caesar*<sup>6</sup> (Wiesbaden 1960), 243; 299. Zu den nordöstlichen Plänen s. D. TIMPE, in *Historia* 14 (1965), 189 ff., bes. 209; vgl. auch H. BENGTSON, *SBAW* 1974, H. 1, 6 zu Suet. *Iul.* 44, 3. Im Vergleich zum Parthienproblem, in dem sich jetzt Alexanderideologie und Bellum-Iustum-Vorstellung verbinden, hatten sie wohl nur nebensächliche Bedeutung.

<sup>3</sup> Zur Entwicklung des Weltherrschaftsbegriffes s. Fr. PFISTER, *art. cit.*, 62 ff. Aus vorantiker Wurzel stammend (vgl. dazu M. J. SEUX, *Epithètes royales akadiennes et sumériennes* (Paris 1967), *passim*), blieb er bis auf Alexander als politischer Aspekt des Oikumenebegriffes stets im Bereich utopischer Spekulation; Beeinflussung Alexanders auch durch orientalische Tradition wäre zu überprüfen. Für Caesar kann nach erwähnten praktischen Erfahrungen der Weltherrschaftsgedanke nur Mittel zum Zweck gewesen sein.

Deutlich wird dies durch die Wende unter Augustus. Begegnung mit dem Phänomen Alexander gehört auch für ihn zur Tradition; einschlägige Berichte<sup>1</sup> und Anekdoten freilich wirken auffallend fremd und distanziert. Wenig an seinem Alexanderverhältnis wird aus gesuchtem Gegensatz zu Antonius<sup>2</sup> zu erklären sein, dessen Alexanderimitatio politisch kaum ins Gewicht gefallen sein kann. In Friedens-, Romanisierungs- und Stabilisierungspolitik wiederum war neben leicht zu erkennendem äusserem Zwang als typisch römische Perspektive die schon von Caesar strapazierte Berufung auf das Vorbild Romulus effektiver<sup>3</sup>, auch wenn man diese jetzt auf den ganzen Imperiumsbereich anzuwenden hatte. Als Ergebnis politischer Alexanderrezeption bis auf Augustus nun hatten sich zwei Hauptbereiche herausgebildet, um die ein Augustus nicht mehr herumkam, wollte er die römische Imperiumstradition nicht ignorieren: Alexander, der Weltoberer, und Alexander, der Weltordner. Beide mussten seit Pompeius immer mehr ineinander verwachsen, je mehr sich Kenntnisse vertieften und das Imperium die Grenzen von Alexanders überlieferten Interessensphären erreichte. War daher der Alexandername gleichsam zur

<sup>1</sup> S. D. KIENAST, *art. cit.*, 435; O. WEIPPERT, *op. cit.*, 193 ff.; 216 ff.; bes. 219.

<sup>2</sup> Vgl. A. HEUSS, *art. cit.*, 83; O. WEIPPERT, *ibid.* Für den Partherkrieg scheint Zielsetzung begrenzt (vgl. H. BENGTSON, *SBAW* 1974, H. 1, 9; 47; K. H. ZIEGLER, *op. cit.*, 35); an Alexander mochten Einzelmassnahmen und Verfahrensweisen erinnern, sicher aber nicht die politische Konzeption des Antonius. Herakles und Dionysos waren längst zu Medien der Rechtfertigung vor griechischen und nichtgriechischen Untertanen geworden. Zur römischen Komponente seiner Orientpolitik bezeichnend Suet. *Aug.* 69, 2; vgl. auch H. D. MEYER, *Die Aussenpolitik . . .*, 9. Es wäre möglich, dass Augustus gerade hier den Gegensatz ausnutzte, zugleich auch die Abkehr von Caesar zu verschleieren.

<sup>3</sup> S. dazu C. J. CLASSEN, in *Philologus* 106 (1962), 164 ff., bes. 196; O. WEIPPERT, *op. cit.*, Einl.; 162 ff. Romulus, neben Alexander etwa ranggleich mit Kyros erfüllt die Funktion eines Dionysos (Anm. 5 S. 187) und wird zur Schlüsselfigur römisch-italischer Renaissance. Zu Dionysos in vielleicht entsprechendem zeithistorischem Zusammenhang s. die Betonung Diod. III 73 (... "Ελληνες . . . βαρβάρους . . . ), auch III 66.

Formel für die Alternative geworden, mit der sich römische Politik des 1. Jhdts. v. Chr. konfrontiert sah, bereits unter Caesar scheint denn auch die einschlägige Weltherrschaftssymbolik<sup>1</sup> in der ganzen Vielfältigkeit ihrer Deutungsmöglichkeiten übernommen. Anderseits erforderte die Verwendung, nicht nur die Realisierung, eines solchen Alexanderbildes den Blick auf die ganze Oikumene<sup>2</sup>, d.h. Interessenausweitung über hellenistische Erkenntnisse wie römische Imperiumspostulate hinaus, die überdies ja auch die Ignorierung einer Macht wie das Partherreich involvierte<sup>3</sup>. Bleibe dahingestellt, wie weit sich die Vorgänger über die Konsequenzen ihrer Alexanderbeziehung im klaren waren: Sein Verzicht auf Realisierung des Oikumenedankens bedeutet nicht nur Bruch mit dem Caesar des letzten Lebensjahres, er ist zugleich das Ende aller Tendenz zu direkt ausgeübter Weltherrschaft Roms. An ihre Stelle tritt ein Prinzip der Koexistenz, von dem die römische Geschichte m.E. seither nie mehr abging; zeitgenössische dichterische Verklärung bedeutet dem gegenüber Verschleierung oder aber überträgt von neuer Voraussetzung ausgehend den Herrschafts-

<sup>1</sup> Dazu A. ALFÖLDI, *Die monarchische Repräsentation im römischen Kaiserreiche* (Darmstadt 1970), Ind. s.v. Caesar. Interessant Vergleich mit Ind. s.v. Augustus.

<sup>2</sup> S. dazu *Orbis*, 154. Bereits die ethische Auslegung der Pflichten einer Weltmacht durch Cicero involviert m.E. den Gedanken räumlicher Begrenzung und muss Augustus die Wende römischer Politik erleichtert haben (s. dazu als Formel immer noch Tac. *Ann.* I 11, 4).

<sup>3</sup> S. dazu K. H. ZIEGLER, *op. cit.*, 44 ff. Trotz Einbeziehung Parthiens in den Imperiumsbereich nach Verträgen 92, dann 69 und 66, scheint seit 53 seine Existenz ein Tabu, an das römische Realpolitik nicht mehr röhrt. Begründet ist dies am ehesten mit verbesserten Raumvorstellungen; dazu muss früh Erkenntnis von der notwendigen Ordnungsmacht der östlichen Oikumenehälften römisches Verhalten bestimmt haben, vgl. zuletzt D. TIMPE, in *Würzb. Jahrb.* NF 1 (1975), 164 ff. Die sich im Laufe der folgenden Jahrhunderte verfestigende Grundauffassung ist m.E. durch wechselnde Machtkonstellationen unbeeinflusst geblieben (anders etwa K. H. ZIEGLER, *op. cit.*, 96; vgl. aber 128; 140; vgl. auch F. DÖLGER, in *RAC* II (1954), 641 ff.; dazu für die spätere Entwicklung J. SAHID, in *DOP* 26 (1972), bes. 306 ff.).

gedanken bewusst in andere, nicht politische Bereiche<sup>1</sup>. Die Umstilisierung des Weltherrschafts- zum Gedanken vom Weltreich fast moderner Begriffsbedeutung in Verwischung von *orbis terrarum* und *orbis Romanus* beginnt wohl bereits um diese Zeit<sup>2</sup>.

Absage an Welteroberung als Verzicht auf sinnlose Kräfteverschwendungen und überflüssige Assoziationen freilich muss keineswegs als Bruch empfunden worden sein<sup>3</sup>. Hatte für das nunmehr an ihrer Stelle ausgebauten Bündnissystem eines Klientelstaatsgefüges<sup>4</sup> Alexander selbst in Indien, Baktrien und auf dem Balkan ein Beispiel gegeben, Partherkompromiss 20 v. Chr. und deutliches Einhalten an anderen Grenzen liessen sich gut auch als Kontinuität von hier aus deuten<sup>5</sup>. Beispielhaft für den damit eingeleiteten und durch Generationen festgehaltenen — so unglaublich Mommsens Formel klingen mag — defensiven Imperialismus nach aussen ist die Zurechtweisung eines Germanicus durch Tiberius, nachdem er in seinen Germanienexpeditionen offensichtlich eine neue Ära römischer

<sup>1</sup> Überzeugend dazu H. D. MEYER, *Die Aussenpolitik ... , passim*; Materialübersicht auch O. WEIPPERT, *op. cit.*, 222; vgl. M. HAMMOND, in *HSPb* 58–59 (1948), 120. Die Frage nach offizieller Sprachregelung ist hier nicht zu stellen, da Artikulierung schrankenloser Weltherrschaftsgedanken sich als Verschleierung realpolitischer Wirklichkeit verstehen liesse. Zum Ersatz von Herrschaft durch Auctoritas, s. bes. neben Vergil, *Georg.* IV 560, Horaz, *Carm.* III 3, 43 auch Augustus, *Res gestae* 29; als Steigerung hierzu die Absage an Herrschaftsausweitung Vergil, *Georg.* II 171; *Aen.* I 509. Zu den neuen Grenzvorstellungen s. W. HARTKE, *Römische Kinderkaiser* (Berlin 1951), 357.

<sup>2</sup> *Orbis*, 151; R. WERNER, in *Aufstieg und Niedergang* I 1, 526 ff. Ich möchte deshalb trotz gegenseitiger Argumentation das *consensus universorum* in *Res gestae* 34, 1 als über den Kreis römischer Bürger hinausgehend denken (s. zuletzt H. BRAUNERT, in *Monumentum Chilonense*. Festschrift für E. Burck (Amsterdam 1975), 13 f.).

<sup>3</sup> Auffallende Zurückhaltung der Zeitgenossen vor Erwähnung Alexanders erkläre ich mir nicht zuletzt auch aus Absicht, Verunglimpfung des Caesarbildes zu vermeiden.

<sup>4</sup> Vgl. dazu D. TIMPE, in *Chiron* 1 (1971), 267 ff.

<sup>5</sup> S. dazu D. TIMPE, in *Würzb. Jahrb. NF* 1 (1975), 162; in *RhM* 110 (1967), 291; in *Monumentum Chilonense*, 147.

Alexanderimitatio einzuleiten beabsichtigt hatte<sup>1</sup>. Und nicht von ungefähr lebt unter Augustus jene alte Alexanderagonalität eines Appius Claudius wieder auf<sup>2</sup>, während das Kulturprogramm der Rückbesinnung auf alles Italische gut als Ersatz für Vorstellungen erwarteter Weltherrschaft verstanden werden kann<sup>3</sup>. Für die östliche Reichshälfte mochten die hellenistischen Traditionen genügen. Dies gilt für den Eroberer, für den Weltordner sind damit die Weichen gestellt. Bedeutet Herrschaft den Abbau bisheriger Imperiumskonzeption durch ein sich in allen Bereichen herausbildendes homogenes Ganzes, so mögen Vielfalt und Kompliziertheit der Komponenten die Konzeption des Urhebers verschleiern<sup>4</sup>. Der in den folgenden zwei Jahrhunderten sich abzeichnende Prozess indes muss den Gedanken-gängen des Augustus entsprechen: Als Teilaспект etwa stellt die *Constitutio Antoniniana* einen Abschluss dar, den auch er mit ins Auge gefasst hatte. Realpolitische Hintergründe im einzelnen bleiben hier ausser Betracht. Als historisches Modell für erwähnte Homogenisierung muss sich erneut auch Alexander

<sup>1</sup> Roms Vorgehen bedeutet Einschränkung der Interessensphäre auf Kontrollierbares, langsames Durchdringen nahegelegener Räume ohne Absicht sofortiger Provinzialisierung und vordringliche Stabilisierung der inneren Verhältnisse barbarischer Foederatenstaaten. Zu Germanicus s. D. TIMPE, *Der Triumph des Germanicus* (Bonn 1968), *passim*; *Arminius-Studien* (Heidelberg 1970), 76; 100. Direkte Alexanderbeziehung wird nur für die Zeit danach sichtbar (s. G. J. D. AALDERS, in *Historia* 10 (1961), 383; D. HENNIG, in *Chiron* 2 (1972), 364), doch lässt m.E. der Tacitusbericht für die Operationen 14-16 die Imitatio noch gut erkennen.

<sup>2</sup> Zu Liv. IX 17, s. O. WEIPPERT, *op. cit.*, 224. Literarisches Genos des Exkurses scheint wenig von Belang gegenüber der Tatsache seiner Aufnahme in das Gesamtwerk.

<sup>3</sup> Vgl. dazu G. NENCI, *Introduzione alla guerra Persiana . . .* (Pisa 1958), 301 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Vgl. dazu O. WEIPPERT, *op. cit.*, 249 ff.; G. BOWERSOCK, *Augustus and the Greek World* (Oxford 1965), bes. 140 ff. Für zeitgenössische Auffassung augusteischer Leitlinien s. Plut. *Reg. et imp. apophth.*, *Aug.* 8, 207 D, allgemeinen vgl. W. HOFFMANN, in *Gymnasium* 76 (1969), 19; zur Weiterentwicklung s. die Interpretationen von Aristid. *Or.* XXVI (Keil). Allgemein E. L. BOWIE, in *P & P* 46 (1970), 3 ff.

selbst angeboten haben, dessen Verschmelzungspolitik vor und nach 324 bei ähnlicher Zielsetzung eine ganze Anzahl von Realisierungsmethoden gezeigt hatte, so dass auch hier der Bruch mit der Vergangenheit sich kaschieren liess. Freilich, der Gegensatz war ebenso wenig zu übersehen, er liegt im Wege zum Ziel. Denn ist die augusteische Imperiumsverwirklichung Prozess auf Dauer, bewusstes Reifenlassen und allmählicher Übergang, Alexander hatte gerade das Gegenteil verkörpert. So entsteht hier eine gleichsam aus sich heraus erwachsende Imperiumskultur, behutsam gefördert in wechselseitigem Austausch, es bildet sich ein Kräftepotsial, das die Integration auswärtiger Barbaren Jahrhunderte hindurch ermöglicht<sup>1</sup>, dort war Hektik und Überforderung am Werke gewesen und hatte das Zusammenpressen neuer Untertanen den Schritt in die Gewaltherrschaft bedeutet<sup>2</sup>, als deren Symptome sich Katastrophen noch bei Lebzeiten Alexanders abgezeichnet hatten. Der historische Alexander kann auch in diesem Zusammenhang für Augustus nur die Rolle eines Gegenmodells gespielt haben; hat er an ihm gelernt, was aus römischer Erfahrung nicht in solcher Intensität zu lernen war, indirekt durch ihn angeregt erhält vielleicht sogar die antimonarchische literarische Tradition des 1. nachchristlichen Jhdts. von Alexander ihre neuen Impulse<sup>3</sup>. Zwar fehlt die unabdingbare Beziehung auf Alexander in der Herrschersymbolik für keinen seiner Nachfolger. Von den durch Augustus geschaffenen Prämissen indes ging keiner ab.

<sup>1</sup> Bezeichnend das βασιλεῖς βαρβάρους ἡμεροῦντες ..., in Plut. *De Alex. M. fort. Or. I* 4, 328 A-B, als sachlich nicht zutreffende Übertragung römischer Imperiums- postulate auf Alexander.

<sup>2</sup> Bündig bereits D. KIENAST, *art. cit.*, 454.

<sup>3</sup> Vgl. A. HEUSS, *art. cit.*, 86 ff. Zur antimonarchischen Perspektive s. J. R. FEARS, in *Philologus* 118 (1974), 120 ff., bes. 122; 125. Allgemein vgl. K. THRAEDE, in *Entretiens Hardt* 19 (1973), 287.

Trotzdem kennzeichnet die realistische Alexanderaversion des frühen Prinzipats lediglich einen Übergang<sup>1</sup>. Dass sie niemals als Ausschliessliches, Endgültiges angesehen wurde, lässt die fast diametral entgegengesetzte Strömung in offizieller, zumindest halboffizieller Alexanderdeutung gegen Ende des 1. Jhdts., erkennen. Vorerst indes scheint Prüfung unserer Termini nötig. Hatte jene Imitatio in subjektiver Auslegung des Überlieferten bestanden und sich im Vordergründigen erschöpft, die augusteische Reaktion war gerade mit Ablehnung derartiger Forcierung historischer Parallelen begründet gewesen. Das nunmehr in den Vordergrund tretende Alexanderbild zwar enthält noch die seinerzeit so attraktiven Züge. Deren Summe aber, jetzt durchschaubar und geordnet, fügt sich zum sublimierten Idealbild eines Monarchen schlechthin; nicht zu übersehen spiegeln sich in ihm die Voraussetzungen für die Realisierung eines Idealzustandes von übernationalen Dimensionen. Die Gründe für diese Änderung mögen in der geistesgeschichtlichen Entwicklung wie in realpolitischen Erwägungen liegen: Denn hatte sich einerseits die augusteische Imperiumskonzeption so gefestigt, dass ein Alexandermodell für sie keine Gefährdung mehr bedeutete, andererseits kam die aus dem Provisorium des Prinzipats erwachsende Monarchie doch ohne ein historisch belegbares Leitbild nicht aus, für das die stoische Ethik trotz weiterer Ausbildung und Vertiefung nicht genügen konnte. Terminus für das unumgängliche neue Alexanderbild wäre wohl die Analogie<sup>2</sup> als das rational begründbare Selbstverständnis einer

<sup>1</sup> S. auch A. HEUSS, *art. cit.*, 90, wenngleich von anderen Prämissen ausgehend. Kontinuität in Ausprägung monarchischer Repräsentation hat damit nichts zu tun (vgl. A. ALFÖLDI, *op. cit.*, 4), von solcher auch ist m.E. die Kontorniatenstilisierung des 4. Jhdts. aus erst zu verstehen (vgl. A. ALFÖLDI, *Die Kontorniaten* (Budapest 1943), 14 ff.; 85; dazu jetzt A. ALFÖLDI/E. ALFÖLDI, *Die Kontorniat-Medaillons* (Berlin 1976), *passim* (erschienen vorerst Teil I)).

<sup>2</sup> S. dazu auch A. HEUSS, *art. cit.*, 66; D. KIENAST, *art. cit.*, 437. Analogie als Kategorie des Selbstverständnisses ist innerlich verwandt mit der historischen als Verständnismedium wissenschaftlicher Erforschung wie Deutung, vgl. dazu H. BENGTSON, *Einführung in die Alte Geschichte*<sup>7</sup> (München 1975), 2. In beiden Bereichen kommt ihr damit die Bedeutung eines Hilfsmittels zu.

historischen Situation, die in vielen Kriterien dem Modell entspricht, ihm aber nie ganz identisch ist<sup>1</sup>. Er erlaubt die Ausnutzung des Modells als Erkenntnis- wie Erfahrungsmedium, doch verhindert das Bewusstsein historischer Eigenständigkeit jede Vermischung von Zweck und Mittel. Eine solche Alexanderbeziehung mit ihrer immanenter Distanz ist neu; gerade sie aber ermöglicht erst etwas wie politische Alexanderidee: Ihre Verkörperung durch die einzelnen Herrscher scheint von nun an feste Normen zu kennen, der sich auch einzelne Spuren von Imitatio unterordnen. Berufung auf Alexander wird zur Rechtfertigung und von da aus zum Postulat. Doch wie gesagt, es ist keineswegs das Alexanderreich, als das das Imperium verwirklicht werden soll; indirekt und als formende Kraft wirkt Alexander vielfältig und gleichsam eher im Untergrunde mit.

Es wäre möglich, dass entsprechende Erwägungen eines Überganges vom ethischen in den politischen Bereich schon einschlägige Passagen bei Polybios zum Alexanderproblem mitbestimmten<sup>2</sup>. Den Prozess jetzt mochten die Entartungssymptome der Kaiserdynastien des 1. Jhdts. mit beschleunigen. So zeichnet denn nicht lange nach den alexanderfeindlichen Zeugnissen eines Seneca Plutarch Alexanders Werk als verwirklichte Philosophie<sup>3</sup>, nach den Flaviern entwirft Dio von Prusa mithilfe des Mediums Alexander das Bild des idealen Imperiumsherrschers in bisher kaum bekannter Intensität<sup>4</sup>; ein Werk über Alexanders Qualitäten wird erwähnt. Und nicht lange danach bedeutet die Monographie Arrians aus all dem gleichsam die

<sup>1</sup> Bezeichnend hierfür alles in allem das Alexanderverhältnis des Alexander Severus, s. bes. in *HA*, Lampr. *Alex.* 50, 4.

<sup>2</sup> S. VIII 10 (12); V 10.

<sup>3</sup> Vgl. auch *De Alex. M. fort. Or. I* 6, 329 A: ... πάντας ἡγούμεθα ... πολιτας ... und *I* 9, 330 E sqq. (Übertragung der römischen Concordia-Pax-Formel). Zu Aristid. *Or. XXVI* 9; 69 Keil, s. K. H. ZIEGLER, *op. cit.*, 118 ff.; vgl. Fronto, *Princ. Hist.* 7; bezeichnend Aelius, für den das Achämenidenreich als Modell wichtiger als Alexander (XXVI 26 Keil).

<sup>4</sup> S. dazu die Analyse bei A. HEUSS, *art. cit.*, 90 ff.

Nutzanwendung<sup>1</sup>. So entsteht in der Nähe des Thrones ein neuer, kurzlebiger Zweig der Alexanderliteratur, darauf abziehend, die Postulate isokrateischer und philosophischer Herrscherethik der Imperiumswirklichkeit anzupassen. Die in ihm fassbare Transformation des Alexanderbildes kann geradezu als Spiegel für Geschichte und Selbstverständnis des Imperiums gelten<sup>2</sup>. Trotz epigraphischen und numismatischen Materials freilich lassen sich Zeugnisse für Bedeutung und Intensität des Alexanderverhältnisses für kaum einen Herrscher mehr ganz erfassen<sup>3</sup>. Marksteine für die sich abzeichnende Entwicklungslinie indes scheinen drei Kaiser: Wird durch den ersten jene analogistische Synthese von Imperium, Leitbild und Herrscherrolle offenbar noch tastend vollzogen, beim zweiten in bewusster Kontinuität bestimmt die Analogie Imperiumsgestaltung und wohl selbst Herrschaftsform. Im dritten wird sie dann zur Überspitzung vorhandener Prämissen und damit Missachtung historischer Wirklichkeit. Nicht zuletzt deshalb manifestiert sich in ihm damit das Ende römischer Geschichte.

Für Traian, den ersten der Reihe, ist persönliches Interesse an Alexander bekannt<sup>4</sup>. Doch lassen einschlägige Zeugnisse sich

<sup>1</sup> S. A. HEUSS, *art. cit.*, 97; dazu G. SCHEPENS, in *AnSoc* 2 (1971), 254 ff., der m.E. freilich zu sehr den Literaten betont. *Anab.* I 12 lässt sich m.E. nur als Selbstzeugnis militärischer, philosophischer und damit politischer Autorität verstehen. A. B. BOSWORTH'S Versuch (in *CQ* 22 (1972), 163 ff.), indirekte Zeugnisse für ein Alterswerk zu entkräften, überzeugt mich nicht, vgl. *StudClas* 16 (1974), 169 ff. Eine genaue Definition für Arrians Alexandermonographie zu geben sehe ich mich indes ausserstande (vgl. auch G. SCHEPENS, *art. cit.*, 265).

<sup>2</sup> Vgl. dazu bes. W. HARTKE, *op. cit.*, 334; zur gegenteiligen Voraussetzung s. H. FUCHS, *Der geistige Widerstand gegen Rom*<sup>2</sup> (Berlin 1964), 51.

<sup>3</sup> Einschlägige Arbeiten beschränken sich bisher auf die Summierung wörtlicher Anspielungen (s. A. BRUHL, *loc. cit.*; F. WEBER, *Alexander der Große im Urteil der Griechen und Römer* (Diss. Giessen 1909)), ignorieren aber die Zusammenhänge. Alexander als Rhetorenbeispiel oder Literatenhinweis und als politisches Analogiemodell indes haben nichts miteinander zu tun, mag auch das Alexanderverhältnis einzelner Kaiser durch ihre Ausbildung überhaupt erst entstanden sein. Zur Verwischung unter Julian s.u. Einen Neuansatz gibt P. CEAUȘESCU, in *StudClas* 16 (1974), 153 ff.

<sup>4</sup> S. Julian, *Caes.* 318 C; Dio Cass. LXVIII 30, 1; 29, 1; 26, 1; dazu W. WEBER, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Kaisers Hadrianus* (Leipzig 1907), 8.

als Verehrung, nicht aber als Imitatio verstehen. Auffallende Parallelen mochten entsprechende Assoziationen fördern, frühe Qualifikation, Herkunft aus Randgebieten des beherrschten Reiches, Attentate, Rettung aus Lebensgefahr durch göttliche Fügung<sup>1</sup>, vielleicht sogar verwandte Schwächen. Hingegen scheint die Motivierung des Partherkrieges bei Dio Cassius vom Tatbestand bekannter Alexanderverehrung auszugehen<sup>2</sup>, ähnliches mag die Nachricht von Vergiftung des Kaisers erklären. Weitere Spekulationen freilich, selbst die mit dem Einfluss zeitgenössischer Publizistik, helfen kaum viel weiter bei einer Persönlichkeit, die so in sich ruht wie Traian. Sein Hinweis an den Senat, er habe das von Alexander Geleistete übertroffen<sup>3</sup>, mag Topik sein, nicht mehr: Und doch, unsere Nachrichten aus der Zeit des Partherkrieges sind nur verständlich, nimmt man stärkeren Einfluss der Alexanderanalogie auf die gesamte Reichspolitik an als auf den ersten Blick hin sichtbar wird<sup>4</sup>. Die Schwäche des Partherreiches drängte die Parallelen geradezu auf: Musste dann nicht die Ablehnung parthischen Einlenkens durch das Beispiel beeinflusst und demnach so verstanden<sup>5</sup>, ja erwartet werden? Traians Tigrisfahrt wirkt wie bewusste Erneuerung von Alexanders Indusfahrt in irgend-

<sup>1</sup> Herkunft und Bewährung s. Dio Cass. LXVIII 1, 1; Plin. *Paneg.* 14-15; zum Attentatsproblem s. Dio Cass. LXVIII 11, 3; dazu 15, 3-16, 1; zur Rettung LXVIII 25, 5-6. Zu menschlichen Schwächen s. LXVIII 7, 3. Fähigkeit zu Freundschaft und menschlicher Beziehung wird bei Dio immer wieder betont, vgl. LXVIII 6, 3 ff.; 15, 3 ff.; s. dazu auch Ps.-Aur. *Vict. Epit.* 48, 10; Plin. *Paneg.* 81. Zum Alexanderbeispiel s. bes. Plut. *De Alex. M. fort. Or. II* 4, 337 A. Zu wissenschaftlichen Interessen s. Dio Cass. LXVIII 1-3.

<sup>2</sup> LXVIII 17, 1: ... δέξης ἐπιθυμίᾳ ... Direkter Einfluss Dios v. Pr. (bes. *Or. IV*, s. dazu F. A. LEPPER, *Trajan's Parthian War* (London 1948), 193 ff.; 197) wird m.E. zu hoch veranschlagt. Zur πολυπραγμοσύνη des Pothosbildes bei Alexander s. V. EHRENBURG, in *JHS* 67 (1947), 67; H. MONTGOMERY, *Gedanke und Tat* (Lund 1965), 216. Zur Ermordung als Version, vgl. W. WEBER, *op. cit.*, 8; zum «πρόφασιν», F. A. LEPPER, *op. cit.*, 6.

<sup>3</sup> Dio Cass. LXVIII 29, 1; vgl. F. A. LEPPER, *op. cit.*, 10.

<sup>4</sup> Zu Herakles und Dionysos, s. W. WEBER, *op. cit.*, 10.

<sup>5</sup> Zu Dio Cass. LXVIII 17, 2, s. K. H. ZIEGLER, *op. cit.*, 100.

wie verwandter Situation<sup>1</sup>, ähnliches gilt für die unternommene Euphratmelioration. Sicher, alles weitere mag Hypothese sein: Brücken, Hafen- und Strassenbauten<sup>2</sup> verständen sich indes sehr wohl aus einer zu Alexander analogen Zivilisationsaufgabe, Bevölkerungs- und Siedlungsmassnahmen besonders in den gefährdeten Grenzgebieten Dakiens und Thrakiens nehmen sich wie Nachvollzug von Alexanders Baktrienpolitik aus, Dios Schilderung der Alimentarinstitution erinnert an Alexanders Epigonenaufstellung<sup>3</sup>. Ich halte für möglich, dass selbst für die Institutionalisierung des Consiliums Alexanders Hetairen mit Pate gestanden haben<sup>4</sup>. Die Beispiele zu Person wie Politik liessen sich vermehren. Aber dennoch: Es fällt auf, dass auch bei handgreiflicher Analogie der Kaiser das Beispiel nie bis zur letzten Konsequenz nachvollzieht, sondern sich geradezu auf die Andeutung beschränkt, so als wolle er bewusst falschen Anschein und allzu einseitige Deutung vermeiden. Zwar erinnert seine Intensivierung des Foederatensystems erneut an Alexander in Indien — man prüfe einschlägige Quellenzeugnisse — sein Indieninteresse aber ist keineswegs das Alexanders, und auch seine Arabienpolitik hat ganz offensichtlich andere Voraussetzungen, Ziele und Methoden. Eine von Traians Alexanderverhältnis immer wieder abgeleitete Weltherrschaftsabsicht ist m.E. schon deshalb reine Willkürdeutung<sup>5</sup>. Möglich wäre,

<sup>1</sup> S. *Philologus* 107 (1963), 294 ff. Zu δέσύτης ... ἔκπληξις . . . s. *RE* XXIII 2, 2467; vgl. Dio Cass. LXVIII 26, 1-2; Arr. *Anab.* VI 3, 4. Zur Euphratarbeit s. LXVIII 28, 1; 30, 1; Schiffbau: LXVIII 26, 1.

<sup>2</sup> Materialübersicht: *RE* Suppl.-Bd X 1073-86 (R. HANSLIK).

<sup>3</sup> LXVIII 5, 4; zur Rolle der Armee im Dienste der Bürgergewinnung s. Plin. *Paneg.* 28, 5-7.

<sup>4</sup> Dio Cass. LXVIII 2-4; 5, 2; 9, 7; 14, 3; vgl. Plin. *Paneg.* 49, 2; s. Anm. 1 S. 198. Von hier aus vielleicht auch Verhältnis zum Senat mit zu verstehen.

<sup>5</sup> Zur Diskussion s. W. WEBER, *op. cit.*, 8; *RE* Suppl.-Bd X 1097; zuletzt A. GARZETTI, *From Tiberius to the Antonines* (London 1974), 668. Wurzel ist möglicherweise Sprachregelung Hadrians. Auf Absichten über Verbesserung römischer Position oder Zerstörung des Partherreiches weist nichts hin, Welt herrschaftsanspruch scheint auch in traianischen Münzlegenden peinlich ver-

Traian wie seine Zeitgenossen seien sich über das Wesen der Analogie und des ihr immanenten Neuansatzes kaum bereits völlig bewusst gewesen und erst mit der Zeit prägten sich klare Vorstellungen aus. Ein Ansatz freilich scheint mir in einem Bereich nicht zu übersehen, der für ihn der ureigenste war: Die Überlieferung hebt Traians vorbildliches soldatisches Verhalten hervor<sup>1</sup>, das ihn in Gegensatz zu sämtlichen Vorgängern bringt. Nun ist in antiker Herrscherethik der Aspekt des Feldherrn gleichsam Komprimierung aller Qualitäten zu höchster Intensität<sup>2</sup>: Alexander aber als dessen deutlichste Verkörperung zu allen Zeiten kann allein dann für ihn demnach das Leitbild gewesen sein, das über persönliche Vorliebe hinaus das eigene Kaisertum rechtfertigte und seiner Imperiumsherrschaft ihren Sinn gab. Die Beziehungskette Alexander-Imperium-Kaiser lässt sich erst von hier aus verstehen; modifiziert wirkt sie bis zu den Soldatenkaisern fort<sup>3</sup>.

Unter Caracalla bestimmt die Analogie dann nicht nur die Gestaltung, sie droht scheinbar, den Rahmen des Imperiums zu

mieden. Äußerlich Anknüpfungspunkte mochten sich ergeben in Gesandtschaftstopik (zu Dio Cass. LXVIII 15, s. F. A. LEPPER, *op. cit.*, 107) und die zum Vergleich mit Alexander drängende neue Foederatenpolitik (vgl. LXVIII 15; 32; 21, 1-2; vgl. die Überlieferung zu Alexander in Indien). So vielleicht auch Besuch der Orakelstätten des M. Kasios und Baalbeks (*Macr. Sat. I* 23, 14 ff.: ... *ut de eventu consuleret rei coepiae ... an Roman perpetrato bello redditurus esset*).

<sup>1</sup> Dio Cass. LXVIII 6, 3; zum φιλοστρατιώτης s. auch A. HEUSS, *art. cit.*, 93. Auf Alexanders Einfluss lässt Vergleich Plin. *Paneg.* 13, 1 mit verschiedenen Stellen Arrians schliessen (vgl. auch 19, 1-4); zur römischen Komponente vgl. G. WEBSTER, *The Roman Imperial Army* (London 1969), 38.

<sup>2</sup> Vgl. u.a. M. P. CHARLESWORTH, *The Virtues of the Roman Emperor*, *PBA* 23 (1937), 9; J. STRAUB, *Vom Herrscherideal in der Spätantike* (Stuttgart 1939), 155. Zur *providentia* als Berührungs punkt menschlicher und göttlicher Sphäre (vgl. *Arr. Anab.* VII 28, 2) s. M. P. CHARLESWORTH, *op. cit.*, 19; in *HTbR* 29 (1936), 107; dazu Dio Chr. *Or. I* 28. Prof. Fears macht mich aufmerksam, dass die ἀνίκητος-Formel erstmals für Trajan inschriftlich nachweisbar ist. Zur Problematik des Herrscherbildes an sich s. freilich R. SYME, *Tacitus* (Oxford 1958), 217.

<sup>3</sup> Anklänge vielleicht in dem *Scythia* der Münzen des Antoninus Pius (vgl. K. Fr. STROHEKER, in *Beitr. z. Historia-Augusta-Forschung* 3 (Bonn 1966), 241 ff.; 254). Bezeichnend hier auch der Pharasmanesname.

sprengen. Vorliebe des Kaisers für Alexander wurde allzu eilfertig wohl stets als pathologisches<sup>1</sup> Symptom gedeutet: zu fragen ist, ob nach allgemeinen Voraussetzungen nicht jede einigermassen sensible Selbstdeutung zwangsläufig in einen solchen Steigerungsprozess gedrängt wurde. Äussere Umstände jedenfalls<sup>2</sup> legten die Parallele nahe, die Überlieferung spricht bezeichnenderweise hier die gleichen Bereiche wie für Traian an und verlegt überdies die Alexanderbeziehung in die Zeit geistiger Reife Caracallas<sup>3</sup>, jetzt freilich in grösster Breite eines Spektrums von Anhaltspunkten. Für die *Constitutio* wie gesagt, trotz über zweihundertjähriger Vorbereitung umstürzendes Ereignis, musste die Analogie geradezu ins Auge springen: Überdies bietet als ἔθος Αὐγοῦστος<sup>4</sup> Alexander ja einen geradezu unwiderlegbaren Beweis für Selbstverständnis und Deutung jener augusteischen Wende durch den Kaiser. Dazu aber kommt die Überfülle von Bau- und Zivilisationsmassnahmen der Dynastie im ganzen Imperium und besonders den Grenzgebieten<sup>5</sup>, dort überdies Zeichen verstärkter Barbarenpolitik; für den Partherkrieg scheint sich Alexandernachahmung im persönlichen wie offiziellen Bereich noch einmal zu steigern. Genau besehen freilich ist bei all dem die Analogie keineswegs ausser Kraft gesetzt, und auch jetzt kann etwa von Verwirklichung eines Alexanderreiches keine Rede sein. Wohl drängt sich Deutung jenes berühmten Heiratsplanes als Zeugnis einer Alexandromanie auf, deren Ziel nur die Unterwerfung der ganzen Welt sein kann; trotz plausibler Argumente gegen seine Historizität

<sup>1</sup> So bereits Dio Cass. LXXVII 15, 2-3; *HA*, Spart. *Carac.* 5, 6; 2, 1.

<sup>2</sup> S. *Jahrb. f. Fränk. Landesforschung* 34-35 (1975), 47 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Vgl. Hdn. IV 8, 1; *HA*, Spart. *Carac.* 2, 1; Ps.-Aur. *Vict. Epit.* 21, 3-4.

<sup>4</sup> Dio Cass. LXXVIII 7, 2; dazu M. HAMMOND, *art. cit.*, 159.

<sup>5</sup> S. H. W. BENARIO, in *Latomus* 17 (1958), 712 ff.; B. LEVICK, in *Hommages à M. Renard II* (Bruxelles 1969), 426 ff.; der religionsgeschichtliche Zusammenhang einschliesslich der Neokoratsgründungen gehört m.E. hierher. Zur Stabilisationspolitik in Rätien zuletzt A. RADNOTI, in *Bayer. Vorgeschichtsblätter* 37 (1972), 40 ff., bes. 50 f.

und der Divergenz der Quellen möchte ich glauben, er sei eine Zeitlang wirklich erwogen worden. War angesichts parthischer Wirren derartiges kaum aussichtsloses Unterfangen, die Motivierung seiner Heiratsabsichten durch einen Herodian<sup>1</sup> klingt derart realistisch, dass sie ohne Historizität sich kaum verstehen lässt: Militärische Vorteile, Kräfteaustausch, gemeinsame wirtschaftliche Interessen — als Konzeption einer defensiven Organisation der beiden wichtigsten, nunmehr gefährdeten Teile der Oikumene<sup>2</sup> nimmt ein solcher Plan wesentliche Bestandteile des spätromisch-sassanidischen Verhältnisses vorweg. Sicher, es wird das Modell Alexander, 332 und 324, sein, das hier wirkt: *Constitutio* und Heiratsplan erscheinen von hier aus in erster Linie als Entwicklungsstufen der Imperiumsgeschichte angesichts einer sich zuspitzenden Weltlage, scheinbare Alexandromanie aber lässt sich dabei sogar als Ergebnis realistischer Prüfung der Bewältigungsmöglichkeiten verstehen<sup>3</sup>. Der Gedanke wäre vielleicht selbst noch weiter zu führen. Caracallas Sichgerieren als *συστρατιώτης* und Heerführer, deutliche Steigerung des für Trajan Berichteten, allzu oft als Symptom geistigen Verfalls gedeutet, muss wohl aus verwandter Auffassung der eigenen Herrscherrolle verstanden werden<sup>4</sup>. Zu ihm kommen Foederatenintensivierung und Barbarenintegration in offensichtlich nie dagewesenen Ausmass<sup>5</sup>, ergänzt durch die Aktivierung

<sup>1</sup> Zu Hdn. IV 10, 3-4, s. *Jahrb. f. Fränk. Landesforschung*, 55, anders freilich F. KOLB, *Literarische Beziehungen zwischen Cassius Dio, Herodian und der Historia Augusta* (Bonn 1972), 26.

<sup>2</sup> Zu Dio Cass. LXXVII 3, 3, s. *Orbis, loc. cit.*

<sup>3</sup> Von hier aus vielleicht auch Bemühen um entsprechende Titulaturen verständlich; zu Dio Cass. LXXVIII 1, 4; Hdn. IV 11, 8, s. G. KERLER, *Die Aussenpolitik in der Historia Augusta* (Diss. Tübingen 1970), 109.

<sup>4</sup> Dio Cass. LXXVII 3, 1; 13, 1-2; HA, Spart. *Carac.* 9, 9; Hdn. IV 7, 4; 13, 7. Gegenüber stehen Zeugnisse physischen Verfalls, der hierdurch vielleicht beschleunigt.

<sup>5</sup> Dio Cass. LXXVII 13, 5; 14, 2; LXXVIII 6, 1; LXXIX 4, 5; Hdn. IV 7, 3; zu einschlägigen Rechtsmodalitäten s. F. KOLB, *op. cit.*, 121.

reichsangehöriger Völkerschaften, Makedonen<sup>1</sup>, Spartaner, Alexandriner zu gleicher Zeit, wobei sich der Kaiser in der Tracht dieser verschiedenen Elemente zeigt — in gewissem Sinne auch dies Analogie<sup>2</sup>. Sie bestimmt demnach einen Militarisierungsprozess, wie er angesichts deutlich sich abzeichnender allgemeiner Krise als notwendig erachtet wurde; scheinbare Barbarisierung auch des Herrschers wird zum Ausdruck einer Kräftemobilisierung, die ohne ein neues, den Umständen angepasstes Imperiumsverständnis nicht denkbar ist. Auch in realistischer Erwägung der Umstände war Alexander das einzige Modell, das sich anführen liess. Treffen unsere Mutmassungen zu, bedeutet Caracalla in bewusster Peripetie damit einen Höhepunkt römischer Imperiumsgeschichte; selbst die herkömmliche pseudopsychologische Deutung seiner Persönlichkeit braucht dem nicht zu widersprechen.

Auch für Julian ist die Alexanderbeziehung in einer Vielzahl von Nachrichten bezeugt<sup>3</sup>. Sein Gesamtbild freilich scheint zu

<sup>1</sup> Zu Makedonien s. zuletzt J. GAGÉ, in *Historia* 24 (1975), 13; Dio Cass. LXXVII 7, 1; 22, 1; Hdn. IV 8, 2. Zu Ägypten zuletzt F. KOLB, *op. cit.*, 97 ff.; Material immer noch am besten bei W. REUSCH, *Der historische Wert der Caracalla-Vita in den Scriptores Historiae Augustae*, *Klio Beih.* 24 (Leipzig 1931), 44 ff. Die Gründe für den Aufstand scheinen vielfältig, doch lässt die von F. KOLB, *op. cit.*, 102 interpretierte Papyrusnachricht auf geplante Massanaushebung schliessen [...] ἀγεν πρός σε π[άντας το]ύς). Geforderte Stellung von Kamelen (vgl. zuletzt D. van BERCHEM, in *Actes du IX<sup>e</sup> Congrès Intern. d'Etudes sur les frontières romaines*, Köln 1974, zu *PStrash.* 245) scheint mir analog früherer Massnahmen auf den Perserkrieg hinzuweisen.

<sup>2</sup> Dio Cass. LXXVIII 3, 2; 5-6; Hdn. IV 7, 3; 8, 2; *HA*, Spart. *Sept. Sev.* 21, 11; Aur. Vict. *Caes.* 21, 2; Ps.-Aur. Vict. *Epit.* 21, 1; Eutr. VIII 20. Mehrfach wird auf Uniformierung der Armee hingewiesen. Zum Militarisierungsprobleme s. R. MACMULLEN, *Soldier and Civilian in the Later Roman Empire* (Cambridge, Mass. 1963), 156. Ausgeklammert bleibt im folgenden Alexander Severus, da einschlägige Zeugnisse trotz ihrer Vielzahl politische Wirksamkeit der Analogie nicht erkennen lassen.

<sup>3</sup> S. bes. *Artemii Passio* 69 ... νέον γενέσθαι Ἀλέξανδρον ..., gesteigert Socr. *H.e.* III 21; vgl. dazu N. BAYNES jetzt in *Byzantine Studies and Other Essays* (London 1955), 347 f.; A. BRUHL, *art. cit.*, 220. Zum Selbstmordgedanken von

differenziert, um von hier aus abgetan zu werden. Hatten aussen- wie innenpolitisch die Katastrophen des 3. Jhdts. die Voraussetzungen für jene Analogie zunichte gemacht, so schwinden denn bezeichnenderweise die Beziehungen auf Alexander sichtlich und werden auch nach der Stabilisierung weder von einem Aurelian, Diokletian oder Konstantin verwendet. Bei Julian nun aber kehrt sich derartiges wieder ins Gegenteil : Weltherrschaft, gerade jetzt zum Programm geworden, ist pragmatisch kaum zu begreifen. Jugendschicksal, ausgeprägte Empfänglichkeit für den Reiz besonderer geistiger Erlebnisse und eine Bildung, die auf alles andere als den künftigen Monarchen abzielte<sup>1</sup>, mögen einiges erklären ; dazu kommt nach 356 das Hineinwachsen in eine Feldherren- und Herrscherrolle, das am meisten ihn frapiert haben muss und gerade deshalb die weitere Entwicklung bestimmte. Persönliche Zeugnisse über aktuelle, realpolitische Probleme oder aber die eigene Rolle in römischer Herrschertradition nun sind auffallend selten : Mag sich dies zum Teil aus der Lückenhaftigkeit unserer Überlieferung erklären, auch erhaltene Gesetze beweisen wenig für eine wirklich pragmatische Auffassung seines Kaisertums. Gerade sie indirekt verstärken den Eindruck, ihm sei es seit je um etwas anderes gegangen, das zur bisherigen Geschichte in einer Art Gegensatz stand, die Realisierung eines philosophischen Axioms. Sie in der Tat involvierte die absolute Weltherrschaft ; das Imperium aber musste Julian hierfür die Vorstufe bedeuten. Das Leitbild Alexander, das sich hier zwangsläufig aufdrängte, hat nach solchen Prämissen wenig mit dem Analogiemodell zu tun. Doch erscheint es als Medium

hier aus (vgl. Arr. *Anab.* VII 27, 3 ; *Epitome Mettensis* 101 ; Ps.-Callisth. III 32, 4 sqq. ; Zonar. IV 14 ; dazu Greg. Naz. Or. V 14) vgl. J. STRAUB jetzt in *Regeneratio Imperii* (Darmstadt 1972), 163.

<sup>1</sup> S. dazu J. BIDEZ, *La vie de l'Empereur Julien* (2<sup>e</sup> tirage : Paris 1965), 5 ; J. GEFFCKEN, *Kaiser Julianus* (Leipzig 1914), 22 ; 115 ; W. HARTKE, *op. cit.*, 54. Zum Verhältnis Dio von Prusa — Julian s. N. BAYNES, *op. cit.*, 346. Zur Feldherrnrolle s. Zos. III 1, 3 ; Amm. XVII 1, 1 ; vgl. J. STRAUB, *Herrschideal*, 32. Hinweis auf Alexander Amm. XVI 5, 4 ; XVIII 3, 7 könnte bereits Ergebnis von Sprachregelung sein.

eines wesentlich von subjektiver Weltsicht und damit auch von Imperiumsdeutung bestimmten, politischen Verhaltens. Es wird so zum Indikator für ein Auseinanderklaffen von Wunschbild und Realität, das das Phänomen Julian so verhängnisvoll kennzeichnet. Direkte und indirekte Zeugnisse passen zusammen. Wohl sind Julians erste beide Reden<sup>1</sup> an Constantius deutlich dessen Naturell angepasst, für das der überlieferte Alexander nur Gegenmodell sein konnte: Die Philipp-Alexander-Synkrisis der *Eusebiarede*<sup>2</sup> nicht lange danach jedoch bereits scheint persönliches Bekenntnis<sup>3</sup>, ja Versuch, den Weltenherrscher in das Gefüge neoplatonischer Ethik<sup>4</sup> und Gottesvorstellung einzurichten. Entsprechende Verschiebung des Herakles- und Dionysosbildes ist kaum zu verwundern<sup>5</sup>. So wird man denn den Durchbruch zur Verwirklichung eines philosophischen Weltregiments Jahre vor der Usurpation anzusetzen haben, ja letztere mag durch solche Absicht vorbereitet und gerechtfertigt sein<sup>6</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Dazu zuletzt J. BÉRANGER, in *Beitr. z. Historia-Augusta-Forschung* 10 (Bonn 1972), 78. Chronologische Einordnung der Reden zwischen 356 und 359 ist schwierig; Anwendung rhetorischer Prinzipien und Topik erklärt kaum alles. Ich glaube Intensivierung des für Constantius Charakteristischen im Verlauf der Reden zu erkennen.

<sup>2</sup> *Or.* 3, 107 A-C; vgl. auch *Or.* 6, 203 B (Schriften zitiert nach Ausg. von W. C. WRIGHT, in The Loeb Classical Library).

<sup>3</sup> ... οὐκ ἀξιος αὐτῷ ζῆν..., εἰ μὴ ξυμπάντων μὲν ἀνθρώπων, πάντων δὲ ἐθνῶν κρατήσειεν (*Or.* 3, 107 B).

<sup>4</sup> 107 C: ... ἀνίσχοντα πρώτος ἀνθρώπων τὸν ἡλιον προσεκύνει....

<sup>5</sup> Vgl. *Ep. ad Them.* 263 C, dazu etwa die Alexanderreminiszenz Amm. XVI 5, 4. Zum Vergleich die Allegorie *Or.* 7, 231 C. Zu Dionysos vgl. *Or.* 7, 221 A; dazu G. MAU, *Die Religionsphilosophie Kaiser Julians* (Leipzig 1907), 86. Zum Missionsgedanken, s. *Orbis*, 289 ff.

<sup>6</sup> S. zuletzt K. ROSEN, in *AClass* 12 (1969), 144 ff. Zum Gedanken des Weltfriedens durch Weltherrschaft s. W. HARTKE, *op. cit.*, 347; Ausnutzung gegen das Bild des am Bürgerkrieg interessierten, dort allein siegreichen Constantius (Amm. XIV 10, 16; 11, 8; XX 11, 32; XXI 13, 7; XXVI 5, 11) lag nahe. Die als Provisorium dargestellten germanischen Elemente der Krönungszeremonie (W. ENSSLIN, in *Klio* 35 (1942), 268 ff.; J. STRAUB, *Herrscherveideal*, 62) liessen sich als vorgeplantes Verlassen römischer Bereiche und Umstilisierung zum Weltherrscher verstehen. Sie übertreffen damit das für Caracalla Überlieferte an Tragweite und Intensität. Vgl. dazu auch die Programmatik *Or.* 7, 238 C; *Ep.* 20, 452 D; 21, 379 D; 22, 429 D.

Julians Ziel, die gewaltsame Neuordnung der Menschheit hin zum Gottesstaat<sup>1</sup> unter Zuhilfenahme aller Mittel politischer Macht aber wiederum lässt selbst den Perserkrieg als notwendigen ersten Schritt zur Erfüllung eines göttlichen Gebotes verstehen<sup>2</sup>. Für sein Alexanderverhältnis nun ist bezeichnend, dass er es wohl als Aktionselement in der beabsichtigten kriegerischen Auseinandersetzung sieht, für jene philosophische Auslegung brauchbare Anhaltspunkte sich aber kaum mehr finden, einige sporadische Hinweise ausgenommen<sup>3</sup>. Vorbild auch des künftigen Weltenherrschers ist ihm Mark Aurel<sup>4</sup>; im Vergleich zu ihm erscheint Alexander geradezu als das Bild des Antiphilosphen. Der Welteroberer in der Satire *Caes.* 330 B führt

<sup>1</sup> Zur christlichen Deutung seiner Rolle, s. J. LEIPOLDT, *Der römische Kaiser Julian in der Religionsgeschichte* (Berlin 1964), 15; 20; J. BIDEZ, *op. cit.*, 261; G. MAU, *op. cit.*, 15; vgl. *Orbis*, 389 ff., bes. 394. Bezeichnend Amm. XXII 2, 4; vgl. auch *Ep.* 8, 415 C-D; *Fr. epistolae* 289 A; 299 A-B. Zur damit hergestellten Identität von Herrscher und Priester s. Liban. *Or.* XII 80; vgl. J. STRAUB, *Herrschereideal*, 125; *Regeneratio Imperii*, 161; J. KABIERSCH, *Untersuchungen zum Begriff der Philanthropia bei dem Kaiser Julian* (Wiesbaden 1960), 81 ff. Indirekt hierzu Cyrill von Alexandria, *C. Julian.* II, in *PG LXXVI* 577 (= 50, 9); Greg. Naz. *Or.* IV 97. Eile einschlägiger Erlass (W. ENSSLIN, in *Klio* 18 (1923), 105; J. BIDEZ, *op. cit.*, 173; 213). Allgemein orientierend H. HUNGER, *Φιλανθρωπία*, in *Anzeiger d. Österr. Akad. d. Wiss. in Wien* 100 (1963).

<sup>2</sup> Vgl. *Fr. epistolae* 289 A; 299 A; dazu *Ep. ad Them.* 254 A: ... τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἀξίως ἀγωνιούμεθα; *Ep.* 8, 415 C; 20, 452 C-D; vgl. *Ps. Ep. ad Basilius* (81 Wright); *Mis.* 360; Eunapius, fr. 24. *FHG IV* p. 24; Amm. XXV 4, 26; s. auch *Ep. ad S.P.Q. Atheniensem* 268 A: ... πρὸς τὸν βάρθαρον . . . .

<sup>3</sup> *Caes.* 325 A. Zu *Ep.* 12, 383 A, vgl. *Or.* 3, 124 A. Zu dem θεοσεβής der Stelle (vgl. Dio Chr. *Or.* I 15) *Ep.* 47, 433 C; 21, 378 C. Eigenartige Ambivalenz haben daher die *Rede an Sallust* und der *Brief an Themistios*, vgl. bes. *Or.* 8, 249 D; 251 A; *Ep. ad Them.* 253 D; 256 C; 264 D; zur ἐπιθυμίᾳ (*Or.* 8, 250), vgl. *Caes.* 326 C. Zu Alexander und Trajan (*Caes.* 318 C), vgl. Amm. XVI 1, 4; Alexander als Feldherr auch *Adv. Gal.* 218 B (zusammen mit Caesar).

<sup>4</sup> *Caes.* 328 B-C; 333 ff.; dazu Eutr. X 16, 2; *PFay.* 20. Zu Alexander als Antiphilosphen s. *Caes.* 330 B, wohl Fortentwicklung von *Or.* 1, 45 D; *Ep. ad Them.* 256 C. Mamertins *Gratiarum Actio* erwähnt den Alexandernamen nicht. Eine Kluft möchte dabei der philosophisch begründete φιλία-φιλανθρωπία Gedanke aufreissen (vgl. dazu J. KABIERSCH, *op. cit.*, 64 ff.; vgl. *Or.* 1, 17 B; 2, 80 B; 7, 223 B; *Ep.* 26, 381; 53, 382 C; 54, 388 A-B; 50, 443 D) und zur Auseinandersetzung bes. mit dem späten Alexander zwingen (vgl. Eunap. fr. 24).

in nichtssagender Vordergründigkeit seines Schwadronierens selbst jenes πάντα νικᾶν der *Eusebiarede ad absurdum*.

Mit der Usurpation hören direkte Zeugnisse seines Alexanderverhältnisses auf. Indes, die kriegerischen Ereignisse und Erfolge in Gallien mussten anderseits ein Analogiebewusstsein erwecken, das in seiner Weise weiterwirkte; erwähnte Hinweise auf Selbstidentifikation können nur in entsprechenden Äusserungen ihre Wurzel haben<sup>1</sup>. Persönliches Eingreifen entscheidet die Schlacht bei Strassburg<sup>2</sup>, immer wieder werden ganz im Sinne Alexanders Überraschungsmoment und Improvisationsmöglichkeiten genutzt. Dazu kommt Barbarenintegration; Aufbau und die Errichtung römischer Suprematie in den Grenzgebieten, φιλανθρωπία<sup>3</sup> gegen Untertane wie Unterworfenen runden ein Gesamtbild ab, das ohne Analogie nicht zu begreifen ist. Wie für Traian und Caracalla schliesst sich auch hier die östliche Komponente an die westliche an. An direkten Äusserungen zum Persienproblem fehlt es nicht, und der Rache- kriegsgedanken ganz im Sinne panhellenischer Tradition ist ihm

<sup>1</sup> S. Anm. 3 S. 203; vgl. Liban. *Or.* XVII 17; XVIII 260 f. wohl aus eigener Kenntnis. Das Alexandermodell spricht vielleicht aus *Ps. Ep. ad Basilium* 81 (vgl. Arr. *Anab.* VII 20, 1). Fundierte Planung des Krieges geht aus Quellen nicht hervor, doch geht m.E. etwa O. SEECK, *Geschichte des Untergangs der antiken Welt* 4 (Stuttgart 1920-23), IV 341 zu weit, lediglich einen Sommerfeldzug anzunehmen.

<sup>2</sup> *Paneg.* 11 (*Mam.*), 4, 3; 15, 1 (vielleicht nach Sprachregelung), vgl. des weiteren Amm. XVI 2, 3; XVII 8; XX 10, 1; XXI 4, 8; XVII 1. Zur Wirkung auf Julian, vgl. Amm. XVI 12, 64 ff.; *Ep. ad S.P.Q. Athenensem* 279 C; Liban. *Or.* XII 69; XVIII 67; auch *Paneg.* 11 (*Mam.*), 3, 1; dazu Zos. III 8, 3; Eunap. fr. 7 a, *FHG* IV p. 15. Ich halte Versuch erzieherischen Aktes durch den über die Mentalität des Caesar orientierten Kaiser für möglich. Die Rechtsfrage (s. J. STRAUB, *Herrschereideal*, 57) klärt nicht alles.

<sup>3</sup> Differenziert J. KABERSCH, *op. cit., passim*, bes. 11; 35; vgl. dazu Amm. XVI 5, 14; XVII 10, 9 (zu Arr. *Anab.* III 17, 6); *Ep.* 22, 429 D. Zum Clementiabegriff s. J. ZIEGLER, *Zur religiösen Haltung der Gegenkaiser im 4. Jhd. n. Chr.* (Diss. Frankfurt 1970), 9. Demgemäß *Paneg.* 11 (*Mam.*), 7, 1-2 triumphaler Vergleich mit Alexander und Traian. Aufhebung dieses Gedankens Amm. XXII 12, 1 f.; XXIII 5, 19. Gegenüber Beispielen von Zerstörungswut und Grausamkeit nehmen sich Zeugnisse von Milde auf dem Feldzug (s. J. KABERSCH, *op. cit.*, 22) wie kalkulierte Gesten aus.

keineswegs fremd. Aus all dem nun scheint sich eine neue Art Imitatio herauszukristallisieren, die zu jenem philosophischen Standpunkt im Widerspruche steht, sich in den letzten beiden Jahren merkwürdigerweise aber ins geradezu Unnatürliche steigert. Die Zeugnisse julianfeindlicher Autoren werden dabei durch Ammian, Eunap und Zosimos ergänzt. So lässt sich die Zurückweisung persischer Friedensvorschläge mit aus der Tradition der Analogie verstehen: Die Art, wie dies geschieht freilich, stösst auch Freunde und Anhänger vor den Kopf und musste Zweifel an der Person Julians vertiefen<sup>1</sup>. Erklärlich ist sie, neben unlösbaren anderen Problemen, m.E. nur als Ergebnis einer Spannung aus dem Widerstand gegen das allgemein als unrealistisch empfundene Unternehmen; der Vergleich mit Alexander 332 oder dem am Hyphasis lag nahe. Zeichen persönlicher Isolation bietet dann der Feldzug selbst in Fülle, als Ausbruch aus einem unüberwindlich gewordenen Dilemma an den Kriegsbeginn von 334 v. Chr. erinnernd. Nicht nur, dass in Durchführung und Einzelheiten, auch im Verhalten des Kaisers selbst, vieles an die problematischen Umstände von Alexanders Indienfeldzug 326 erinnert, die Zeugnisse über Julian selbst zwingen zur Vermutung einer Flucht in die Vordergründigkeit<sup>2</sup> dadurch, dass er sich an sein Aktionsideal Alexander nunmehr geradezu verzweifelt klammerte. Zu deutlichen Zeugnissen gegenseitiger Verbitterung passt in den Rahmen der Analogie selbst der christliche Verdacht, dem Kaiser sei es um Dezimierung auch der eigenen Kräfte gegangen. Aus immer stärkerer Wirkung des Leitbildes ist Julians sinnloses Sichexponieren im Kampf wie auch sein Sichverzetteln in Trivialitäten zu verste-

<sup>1</sup> Liban. *Or.* XVII 19; XVIII 179; XII 78; Amm. XXIII 1, 2. Auf das Alexander-vorbild verweist Socrates, vgl. auch Ps.-Aur. *Vict. Epit.* 43, 1. Zur Haltung der Armee, Liban. *Or.* XVIII 163; Amm. XXIII 5, 4.

<sup>2</sup> Vgl. Greg. Naz. *Or.* V 9 ( $\pi\delta\theta\sigma\varsigma$  in Verbindung mit Weltoberung); s. auch J. BIDEZ, *op. cit.*, 344. Zur Ausrottung von Gegnern im eigenen Lager und geplanter Heeresdezimierung *Artemii Passio* 63; Greg. Naz. *Or.* V 13; Theodoret, *H.e.* III 26. Die Situation spiegeln Julian. *Mis., passim*; Liban. *Or.* I 132; XV 1; XVI 1; Amm. XXIII 2, 1-5.

hen<sup>1</sup>, auch hier Überspitzung des für Trajan wie Caracalla Überlieferten. Persönliche Bedürfnislosigkeit, als Element philosophischer Erziehung dem Heere aufgezwungen, fand in der Alexandergeschichte das wirkungsvollste Beispiel: Angesichts wachsender Resistenz und Disziplinslosigkeit in allen Rängen wird es zum Zeichen einer Wirklichkeitsferne<sup>2</sup>, die auf sachliche Gegebenheiten keine Rücksicht mehr nimmt. Bezeichnenderweise tritt an Stelle der realisierten φιλανθρωπία der Ausrottungsgedanke — immerhin von dem Julianverehrer Ammian formuliert — und fehlt es an Zeugnissen auffallender Härte und Grausamkeit nicht. Man könnte sich die fragwürdige Vorbereitung des Krieges aus dem Vorbild von 334 mit erklären<sup>3</sup>. Die Schiffszerstörung bei Ktesiphon wird ähnlich motiviert wie Alexanders Flottenauflösung 334 durch Diodor<sup>4</sup>. Sie passt in den Zusammenhang von Misstrauen, Erbitterung und Isolation. Doch ist nicht zu bezweifeln, dass Julian die Absicht einer Eroberung des Sassanidenreiches bei all dem noch keineswegs aufgegeben hatte.

<sup>1</sup> Vgl. Amm. XXIII 5, 19 ff.; XXIV 1, 13; 2, 10; 5, 6; 6, 1; 6, 9 ff.; XXV 3, 1; Ps.-Aur. Vict. Epit. 43, 3: *inconsultus*; zu Amm. XXIV 7, 1, vgl. Arr. *Anab.* IV 25 und als Urteil Greg. Naz. *Or.* V 13. Popularitätshascherei im Hintergrund (vgl. Amm. XXII 14, 1) widerspräche dem nicht. Bezeichnend auch Amm. XXII 7, 3.

<sup>2</sup> Vgl. Amm. XVI 5, 3; XVII 1, 3; XXV 2, 2; 4, 4 (dazu Arr. *Anab.* VII 9; VII 28). Interessant Vergleich Amm. XXII 3, 7 mit XXII 1. Zur passiven Resistenz vgl. Magnus von Karrhae (Jo. Mal. *Chron.* XIII, p. 329, 21-22: ... σωφρόνως ... προθύμως...). So tritt die offensichtlich auch hier zum Leitbild erhobene Variante des Freundschaftsgedankens hinter die Erziehung zurück (vgl. bes. Liban. *Or.* XVIII 216; Soz. *H.e.* VI 1, 7; Socr. *H.e.* III 21, 7; zu III 13, 3, s. W. ENSSLIN, in *Klio* 18 (1923), 176, der übrigens S. 126 in *Cod. Theod.* VII 4, 8, 7-8 ein Beispiel hierfür sieht). Vgl. im übrigen auch Liban. *Or.* XIII 44; XVIII 130. Für Gewalttätigkeiten als Resultat, s. etwa Amm. XXIV 4, 27.

<sup>3</sup> Die Quellen widersprechen sich. Gegen Amm. XXIII 2, 2; 3, 9; 3, 6; 5, 6 m.E. Greg. Naz. *Or.* V 9; Zos. III 27, 2 und die Tatsache bewusst zur Versorgung einkalkulierter Beute (Amm. XXIV 1, 15; XXV 8).

<sup>4</sup> Diod. XVII 22, 1; vgl. Amm. XXIV 7, 5; XXIII 5, 5-6; Zos. III 20, 2-3; 27, 1; Liban. *Or.* XVIII 247; Greg. Naz. *Or.* II. Verzweifelte persische Lage nur bei Zonar. XIII 13, 3-4.

Analogie im Hintergrund und Imitatio im Verhalten treten damit deutlich in Gegensatz zu seinem philosophischen Ziel, obwohl er sich in Briefen bis zuletzt um dessen Verwirklichung gleichsam als der Voraussetzung der zu erwartenden neuen Weltordnung bemüht. Ist es demnach das Unüberbrückbare dieses Gegensatzes, als dessen psychische Folge Julians Verhalten verstanden werden muss? Oder ein sich verhärtender Fanatismus, der ihn rücksichtslos die Herrschaft über die Menschheit, weiter verfolgen lässt? Zu Julians religiös ausgerichtetem Neoplatonismus gehören mystische Erfahrungen, Orakel, Vorzeichen. In ihnen lebt er und wird nicht müde, sie zu verkünden<sup>1</sup>. Von allen Zeichen, die er in Zusammenhang mit dem Perserkrieg erhielt, nun war keines, das ihn nicht warnte. Er indes nimmt auf einmal keine Rücksicht mehr auf sie. Liesse sich nicht folgern, das philosophische Postulat, Rechtfertigung von Existenz und Herrschaft, müsse ihm fragwürdig geworden sein? Dann bedeutet der Krieg die eigentliche Bewährungsprobe im Sinne einer Läuterung auch seines Glaubens. Oder aber er war das Gegenteil. Geht Ammians Schilderung der letzten Stunden auf authentische Quellen zurück, so müsste denn eine neue Imitatio Julian als Weg zum frühen, heroischen Ende erschienen sein. Der Weg zum Untergang<sup>2</sup>, diese Lösung des Gegensatzes von Idee und Wirklichkeit, wäre es dann gewesen, den er mithilfe Alexanders suchte.

<sup>1</sup> Vgl. u.a. Amm. XXI 1, 5-6; 2, 1; 10, 2; XXII 1; 13, 2; Ps.-Aur. Vict. *Epit.* 43, 8. Zur Usurpation s. J. STRAUB, *Herrscherveideal*, 60; zu Julian und Jamblich, *Heidnische Geschichtsapologetik in der christlichen Spätantike*, Beitr. z. Historia-Augusta-Forschung 1 (Bonn 1963), 72.

<sup>2</sup> Zu Tod und Nachfolge, Amm. XXV 3, 20; Ps.-Aur. Vict. *Epit.* 43, 8; Liban. *Or.* XVIII 273; dazu J. BÉRANGER, *op. cit., passim*. Zur philosophischen Deutung des Verzichts auf Nominierung des Nachfolgers kommt römische Tradition (Traian I) neben persönlicher Verbitterung: Alexanderanalogie steht für jede der Möglichkeiten im Hintergrund (vgl. W. HARTKE, *op. cit.*, 115).

## DISCUSSION

*M. Giovannini* : MM. Errington et Wirth n'ont pas fait état des monnaies à l'effigie d'Alexandre, sujet qu'aurait dû traiter M. G. Le Rider. On regrettera son absence, car ces monnaies constituent un témoignage essentiel pour juger du « Nachleben » d'Alexandre à l'époque hellénistique. Nous savons en effet, par les trésors monétaires, que ces monnaies ont été très populaires tout au long du III<sup>e</sup> siècle, pour disparaître au cours du II<sup>e</sup>.

Pourquoi les cités d'Asie Mineure ont-elles frappé des monnaies à l'effigie et au nom d'Alexandre ? Est-ce de leur propre initiative et pour leur propre compte ? Je croirais plutôt que c'est à la demande et pour le compte du roi.

Pourquoi ces cités ont-elles continué à frapper des alexandres durant tout le III<sup>e</sup> siècle ? On serait enclin à penser que c'est une marque de fidélité à la mémoire du souverain qui les avait libérées de la domination perse. J'en doute. Ce sont vraisemblablement des considérations économiques qui ont déterminé ces ateliers à ne pas changer sans nécessité leur type monétaire : les alexandres étant connus et acceptés partout, il était logique de continuer à en émettre. Le cas est le même que celui des chouettes d'Athènes, qui sont restées presque identiques à elles-mêmes pendant des siècles.

Dès lors, ce qui importe réellement, du point de vue de l'histoire, c'est de déterminer pourquoi le monnayage à l'effigie d'Alexandre cesse au cours du II<sup>e</sup> siècle. Des découvertes récentes nous ont appris que les cités d'Asie Mineure ont continué à frapper des alexandres après la victoire de Rome contre Antiochos III, et que c'est à l'époque de la guerre contre Persée qu'elles ont toutes cessé en même temps de frapper ce type de monnaies. Elles ont alors adopté un type nouveau, qui ne se distingue des alexandres ni par le poids ni par la teneur en argent : elles ont simplement remplacé à l'avers la tête d'Alexandre par celle d'une divinité ; au revers, elles ont fait figurer des symboles et le nom de la cité émettrice entourés

d'une couronne, là où jusqu'alors avaient figuré les symboles et les noms d'Alexandre ou de Lysimaque. Au même moment les anciennes pièces au portrait d'Alexandre disparaissent d'un coup en Grèce continentale, en Macédoine et en Asie Mineure : aucun des trésors de ces régions dont la date est sûrement postérieure à 168 ne contient d'alexandres. Ce phénomène est d'autant plus curieux que dans le royaume de Syrie et au Pont-Euxin, ces monnaies continuent à circuler. En Syrie, elles ne disparaissent qu'aux environs de 140 ; sur les rives de la Mer Noire, on en trouve jusqu'au I<sup>e</sup> siècle av. J.-C.

Ce n'est donc pas par accident, mais du fait d'une action concertée que les alexandres ont disparu de Grèce et de Macédoine après la troisième guerre de Macédoine. Leur disparition ne s'explique pas par des raisons économiques : les nouvelles pièces ont en effet le même poids, la même teneur en argent et le même aspect général que les anciennes. Il s'agit donc d'une mesure politique. On a voulu faire disparaître le nom et le portrait d'Alexandre. Cette *damnatio memoriae* s'explique aisément pour la Macédoine. Elle s'inscrit dans le cadre des mesures prises par les Romains, après la bataille de Pydna, pour empêcher un retour de la monarchie : la division de la Macédoine en quatre républiques, la réduction du tribut payé par les Macédoniens à leurs souverains. Dans ce contexte, il était logique d'envoyer à la fonte non seulement les monnaies frappées par les derniers rois de Macédoine, mais aussi celles qui représentaient Alexandre et portaient la légende ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΟΥ. Le retrait des alexandres en Grèce proprement dite, qui se fit au même moment, procédait d'une même intention : faire oublier la monarchie macédonienne.

Si tel est bien le cas, il faut nuancer ce qu'a dit tout à l'heure M. Wirth sur le rôle d'Alexandre dans le conflit entre Rome et les monarchies hellénistiques. Que si les Etats grecs ont estimé devoir, spontanément ou à la demande de Rome, procéder à une réforme monétaire de cette importance pour faire oublier Alexandre, ils devaient avoir de sérieuses raisons de le faire. Même si le nom d'Alexandre n'a pas été utilisé directement dans la propagande anti-romaine, rien ne prouvait que ce ne serait pas un jour le cas. Deux

textes de Tite-Live montrent que le danger était réel. Le premier se rapporte à l'an 192 (Liv. XXXV 47, 5-8), au début de la guerre contre Antiochos III. Nous apprenons qu'Amynander d'Athamanie avait épousé la fille d'un certain Alexandros de Mégalopolis, qui prétendait descendre d'Alexandre le Grand. Antiochos III, qui cherchait des alliés en Grèce, offrit à Philippos, beau-père d'Amynander, de soutenir ses prétentions au trône de Macédoine en sa qualité de descendant des Argéades. L'autre passage se trouve dans la célèbre polémique de Tite-Live contre Alexandre au livre IX. Tite-Live (IX 18, 6) y accuse certains Grecs d'affirmer impudemment qu'Alexandre le Grand aurait été capable de vaincre Rome. Nous ne savons pas à quelle époque cette opinion s'est répandue dans les cercles anti-romains de Grèce. Ce qui compte, c'est que la chose ait été possible. Il ne me semble dès lors pas absurde de supposer qu'après la troisième guerre, craignant une telle exploitation du personnage d'Alexandre le Grand, on ait décidé de prendre les devants.

*M. Badian*: I should like to express the thanks of all of us to M. Giovannini for his important contribution, which helps to fill an unfortunate gap in our presentations here, in the Roman-Hellenistic field. I do not think we can usefully discuss his views here, since we must wait for him to submit his full evidence in his forthcoming work. But we are glad to have this preview of his highly original ideas.

*M. Bosworth*: The most striking point in Mr. Errington's exposition seems to me the persistence of the influence of Philip even after Alexander's death. That should encourage us to look more closely at events during Alexander's reign, events such as the murders of Parmenion and Cleitus when attacks on men prominent under Philip caused serious agitation in the army. I am not, however, convinced that Alexander's popularity faded rapidly. Once more our sources may be at fault, scrappy and defective as they are. There is one episode which is important in this context. In 315 B.C., Antigonus is said to have harangued his army, attacking

Cassander and his allies. The gravamen of the attack was Cassander's actions against Alexander's family : Olympias, Roxane and the young king ; Antigonus also criticised the restoration of Olynthus and Thebes, cities destroyed by Philip and Alexander, moving his audience to a display of anger (Diod. XIX 61, 1-3). Not only persons but also policies were important after Alexander's death, and in the case of the restoration of Thebes there is a literary echo. Ptolemy we know supported Cassander's new foundation, and there is epigraphic evidence of his gifts to the fledgeling city. Now Ptolemy/Arrian's account of the destruction of the old city repeats that Alexander had no intention of taking the city by force (I 7, 7-8 ; 11). Its capture was almost an accident, the result of Perdiccas' insubordination and Theban intransigence. This version differs from the other sources (particularly from Polybius) which emphasize that the destruction was Alexander's deliberate policy. Ptolemy by contrast did all he could to dissociate the king from the incident, and in all probability he was reacting against Antigonus' criticisms. The incident seems to me clear evidence that the influence of Alexander remained vigorous, at least in the first generation after his death, and that policies attributed to him were not easily revoked.

*M. Schwarzenberg* : Numerous Hellenistic Alexander statuettes of Egyptian provenance show that the cult of Alexander was widespread during the third and second centuries B.C., and possibly even later. The cult belonged to Alexander the founder of Alexandria, as the attributes suggest.

In your treatment of Hellenistic literature you do not mention Eratosthenes, although his conception of Alexander's achievement underlies Strabo and Plutarch, and hence the general public. Alexander is, in their view, the creator of the world's cultural unity, the artisan of the coexistence between Macedonian-Greek conqueror and the natives, the great civiliser, the founder of the *oecumene*. If some of us think of Alexander as the initiator of a new era, if Hel-

lenism begins with him (J. G. Droysen), it may well ultimately be due to Eratosthenes.

*M. Hurst*: Votre exposé met un contraste en évidence : plus on avance, plus la figure d'Alexandre perd de son importance sur le plan des luttes dynastiques et politiques ; mais cela n'affecte pas sa destinée littéraire, qui demeure florissante. Dans ce contexte, ne vaudrait-il pas la peine de reconsidérer, au moment où vous évoquez cette littérature sur Alexandre, le cas très discuté de Lycophron ? Les vv. 1439 sqq. de l'*Alexandra* évoquent-ils Alexandre, comme on l'a pensé traditionnellement (de l'antiquité — via Tzétzès — jusqu'à Konrat Ziegler, en passant par U. von Wilamowitz — cf. P. Lévêque, in *REA* 57 (1955), 43), ou bien faut-il prendre parti pour ceux qui veulent y voir un autre personnage ? (e.g. C. von Holzinger (ed.), Lykophron's *Alexandra* (Leipzig 1895), 377 sqq. donne de bonnes raisons pour Pyrrhos). Si l'on imagine Lycophron à la cour des Ptolémées, comme l'ont fait les Anciens (avec l'exception bien connue du scholiaste au v. 1226 de l'*Alexandra*), votre analyse de la situation dynastique et politique offrirait une bonne toile de fond à ceux qui remettent en question la tradition et considèrent que Lycophron ne vise pas Alexandre, même s'il fait usage d'éléments de sa légende.

*M. Errington*: I do not think that Alexander is referred to in lines 1439 ff. of Lycophron's *Alexandra*. The arguments of A. Momigliano (in *JRS* 32 (1942)) for Pyrrhos seem to me convincing.

*M. Badian*: I am not sure how seriously we should take imitation of Alexander in Scipio Africanus. The story of Neptune's support in the capture of New Carthage is in Polybius, but hardly suffices for such an interpretation : Scipio always claimed divine aid as appropriate, and there is no reminiscence of Callisthenes' striking Homeric image of the homage of the sea to its lord. The story of the snake visiting his mother is not in Polybius—indeed, I think we only have

it in Augustan sources and it certainly cannot be traced back beyond the first century B.C. Its absence in Polybius is more than an argument from silence. Polybius, in a famous passage, compliments the Roman aristocracy on its use of religion and superstition to impress the masses, and in his discussion of Scipio in Book X he particularly imputes to him, and praises him for, such practices in his dealings with his soldiers, and actually even with his mother. I think it must be accepted that Polybius did not know the story of the snake, or any evidence of *imitatio Alexandri*.

Equally striking is the lack of any such element in Scipio Aemilianus, of whose character and education Polybius gives us a full account. In fact, as Mr. Wirth stressed, there is no evidence of imitation of Alexander on the part of any Roman in the second century—Scipio Africanus would be an isolated instance, poorly attested. Not even Sulla, who called himself *Felix* and *Epaphroditos* and stressed the special protection and inspiration he received from various deities, can reasonably be brought into any connection with any reference to Alexander. It is fair to say that attested *imitatio Alexandri* in Rome was born only when young Cn. Pompeius was told that he bore a resemblance to the great Macedonian and liked the idea.

*M. Schachermeyr* : Innerhalb der hellenistischen Monarchien scheinen sich mir dreierlei Tendenzen abzuzeichnen :

A. *Anknüpfung an Alexander* :

1. Alexanders Würde als *κτίστης des Gesamtreiches* wird von Ptolemaios in seinem Alexanderbuch betont dargestellt.
2. Alexander als *κτίστης* wird besonders in den von ihm gegründeten Städten (bes. im ägyptischen Alexandria) verehrt.
3. Alexanders Grabmal wirkt sich in Alexandria aus.
4. Ein gewisses zögerndes Anknüpfen an Alexanders Gottkönigtum lässt sich im hellenistischen Gottkönigtum erkennen.

5. In den nationalen Kulten und in der Königwürde knüpfen sowohl Seleukos (Weiterbau des Etemenanki) und Ptolemaios (pharaonische Würden, Tempelbauten) an Alexander an.
6. Alexander auf Münzprägung.
7. Die Stoa knüpft in Alexandreia besonders betont an Alexander an (Eratosthenes).
8. Einzelheiten : Dionysos Festzug (s. oben 4).

B. *Anknüpfung an Philipp* nicht eingestanden, aber sachlich bedingt.

1. Betonung der makedonisch-hellenischen Symbiose und Vorzüge gegenüber den Orientalen, also These des Aristoteles, aber durch Stoa gemildert.
2. Zentrierung auf Mittelmeer und Ägäis.
3. Münzprägung : Traditionen gehen bis Philipp zurück.

C. *Fundierung auf eigene Familie* :

Bei den überseeischen Hellenistenstaaten handelte es sich *de facto* um Institutionen, die eine private Domäne des jeweiligen Gründers und seiner Familie darstellte. Es waren Erbbesitze, jeweils auf die regierende Familie beschränkt.

M. Wirth :

1. In Frage des Gottkönigtums lässt sich auffallende Subtilität ptolemäischen Vorgehens feststellen. Wohl war solche durch Übernahme der Pharaonenrolle gegeben : Sie bezieht sich indes auf die einheimische Bevölkerung. Ein Herrscherkult für Griechen in Ägypten ist bekanntlich erst unter Ptolemaios II. nachweisbar. Und dies zeitlich nach göttlichen Ehren der Ägäiswelt und besonders nach göttlichen Ehren, die etwa Athen schon längst auf einem Demetrios Poliorketes gehäuft hatte.
2. Ich erkläre mir dies mit dem Trauma, das die Forderung Alexanders nach göttlichen Ehren 324 in der Heimat ausgelöst hatte.

Zurückhaltung in diesen Dingen, ähnlich wie Blick auf das Mittelmeer erklärt sich realpolitisch überdies auch damit, dass ein positives Verhältnis zur Heimat schon allein als dringend benötigtes Menschenreservoir für die Ptolemäerherrschaft — wie auch alle anderen Reiche — Existenzfrage vom ersten Tage an war. Sie überdies scheint mir auch der Grund für die Exklusivität, die das griechisch-einheimische Verhältnis in Ägypten kennzeichnet, und soweit ersichtlich ptolemäische Innenpolitik in ihrem ersten Jahrhundert bestimmt. An Neuaufleben aristotelischer Anschauungen braucht man dabei gar nicht zu denken.

*M. Badian:* Prof. Schachermeyr's remarks suggest that more ought to be said about Alexandrias. Strabo's words quoted by Mr. Errington perhaps need not be taken to imply one foundation (strictly) for each of the early Successors—perhaps the statement was not intended to give any precise information. Some foundations of Alexandrias by Successors seem pretty certain. First and most important, Alexandria ad Issum. Even W. W. Tarn, who roundly declared that *none* of the Successors used Alexander's name in founding cities (a view that the Strabo passage certainly refutes, however we understand it)—even Tarn had qualms about ascribing it to Alexander. The usual view, that it was founded by Antigonus or Seleucus seems far more likely. Pliny (in Book VI) knew of an Alexandria in Mygdonia-Adiabene, the only city there apart from Antioch-Nisibis. Again, no evidence whatever that Alexander founded a city there, yet no reason (with Tarn) to reject its existence. Scrutiny of Tarn's arbitrary treatment of the traditional catalogue (it seems to have added up to over seventy, according to Plutarch) will at once show more instances. The sources are too thin and confused to permit generalisation. But the fact that the Successors founded cities in their own and their relatives' names by no means disproves—as Tarn alleges, as his sole argument—that they also founded Alexandrias. That is a simple matter of logic. In some cases (e.g. Alexandria ad Issum) we are almost forced to conclude that they did. In others, further east, garrison posts left by Alexander

may perhaps later have been constituted "cities" in his name, by some Seleucid king. The *later* Seleucids, however, more probably gave their own names in such cases, when Alexander's no longer mattered : thus Charax, founded by Alexander, was refounded (Pliny tells us) by an Antiochus, *quintus regum* (Antiochus III?), and called Antioch. This kind of development would fit in with Errington's picture of the fading of Alexander's importance.

*M. Schwarzenberg* : Sie weisen auf die dionysische Komponente des römischen Triumphzuges hin, und haben erkannt, dass Alexander das Bindeglied in diesem Vergleich zwischen Gott und Triumphator war.

Das Theatralische, Prunkhafte der römischen Triumphzüge in der ausgehenden Republik scheinen den πομπαί nachgeahmt zu sein, die von den Ptolemäern bei Regierungsantritt inszeniert wurden. Auffallend ist vor allem das Mitführen von Elefanten. Auch das Dionysische weist nicht nach Asien, sondern nach Ägypten hin. Alexander ist zuerst in Alexandrien mit einem Attribut seines Dionysos, mit der Elephantenhaube dargestellt worden.

Sie fühlen sich durch Trajans Freundekreis an Alexander erinnert. Ich zweifle, ob der Kaiser über den Vergleich des Licinius Sura mit Hephaestion erfreut gewesen wäre, nicht der Freundschaft sondern der Leidenschaft wegen, die dieses Verhältnis charakterisiert.

*M. Wirth* : Ich verstehe Herrn Schwarzenberg so, dass er zwar nicht den Triumphzug an sich, wohl aber seine Ausgestaltung durch Pompeius, 62 v. Chr. durch Requisiten alexandrinischer Dionysosverehrung beeinflusst sieht. Formal war eine solche Ausgestaltung möglich ; dass Alexander im Hintergrund steht, ist nicht zu bezweifeln. Überdies Alexanders Dionysosbeziehungen werden sichtbar erst nach Beginn der Phase von Stadtgründung und κτιστης-Tätigkeit.

*M. Badian* : I think we ought to be much more careful in point of method, before positing *imitatio Alexandri* in a Roman ruler.

There ought at least—short of explicit attestation—to be some discontinuity that needs explaining. In such matters as Trajan's road-building (an old Roman practice) or his *consilium* (every Emperor had consulted his *amici*, and we remember Juvenal on Domitian's fish!), there is *prima facie* simply an easy development of previous practice and no need for an imported explanation.

*M. Wirth* : Bezuglich des Consiliums Trajans meine ich kommt es weniger auf Persönliches als die Institutionalisierung an. Dio Cassius weist übrigens auch auf Trajans besondere Veranlagung auch zur Freundschaft als zwischenmenschlicher Beziehung hin (LXXVII 6; 15).

*M. Milns* : The "Alexander-Exkurs" in Livy IX may perhaps be regarded as part of Alexander's Hellenistic "Nachleben". It shows the development among the Greeks of the idea of Alexander as a national hero, who would have been capable of beating their Roman conquerors.

The two papers we have heard this morning demonstrate the ephemeral nature of Alexander's career. There are few and rare lasting achievements of the king : his historical importance is only *per accidens*. In literature Alexander is a theme for an exciting story and a moralising sermon ; for the Roman Emperor he is the "Idealtypus" of the "Weltherrscher". But the significance of his actual work is seen from the fact that no historian of antiquity wrote a "Universal History" around the person of Alexander ; Trogus did this with Philip : there is no *Alexandrika* to correspond to his *Philippika*.

*M. Badian* : We ought perhaps to remember that, according to the chronology of Plutarch's writings worked out tentatively by C. P. Jones, in *JRS* 56 (1966), Plutarch's *Alexander* has nothing to do with the age of Nero, but is a Trajanic document and should be read as such.

*M. Spoerri*: Ich möchte noch eine Frage an Herrn Wirth stellen. In Ihrem Vortrag haben Sie auf die Bedeutung Alexanders in der griechischen Literatur des ausgehenden 1. und des 2. Jhdts. hingewiesen: Plutarch, Dio von Prusa, Arrian. Wie verhält sich hierzu die Stelle *Anab.* I 12, wo Arrian bemerkt, dass die Taten Alexanders viel weniger bekannt sind als die unbedeutendsten Taten der alten Zeit, dass der Zug der Zehntausend viel berühmter sei als Alexander und seine Unternehmungen ( $\Xi\epsilon\nu\phi\tilde{\omega}\nu\tau\omega\varsigma \,\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\kappa\alpha$ !) und dass er, Arrian, der Welt Alexanders Leistungen bekannt machen wolle? Herr Bosworth hat übrigens in seinem Exposé (oben, S. 1 ff.) mit Recht darauf hingewiesen, dass man bei der Beurteilung Arrians auch den Stilisten in Betracht ziehen müsse. Von Herodot und Thukydidesimitation war die Rede. Da musste auch gesagt werden, dass Arrian ein «neuer» Xenophon sein wollte (Photios bezeugt, dass man ihn einen  $\nu\epsilon\omega\varsigma \,\Xi\epsilon\nu\phi\tilde{\omega}\nu\tau\omega\varsigma$  nannte). Das bezieht sich wohl zunächst einmal auf die ganze Persönlichkeit. Inwiefern Xenophon auch Stilmuster für Arrian war, müsste im Einzelnen untersucht werden.  $\text{M}\acute{\mu}\eta\sigma\varsigma$  der «Klassiker» ist bei den meisten kaiserzeitlichen Autoren von grosser Bedeutung, zumal bei den Historikern. Dio Cassius kann bisweilen für den Thukydidestext ausgewertet werden.

*M. Wirth*: Ich weiss nicht, ob man Arrians Rechtfertigung (I 12) als Hinweis auf allgemeine Unkenntnis des Alexanderphänomens deuten darf. Die Stelle scheint mir zu sehr eingebettet in die Topik des Homer-Achillesvergleichs, als dass sie viel ausgäbe. Oder müsste man annehmen, man habe im 2. Jhd. n. Chr. von den selbst uns bekannten Autoren etwa gar nichts gewusst? Arrian benutzt den Passus wohl nicht zuletzt, um seine eigene Person herauszustreichen.



## VI

ERKINGER SCHWARZENBERG

### THE PORTRAITURE OF ALEXANDER

No life of Alexander is felt to be complete without some attempt at illustration, without at least a reference to the monuments. Apart from the subject-matter it is perhaps the only thing that the latest books on Alexander have in common. And yet the attitude of modern writers towards illustration is different from Varro's. The former give us as many pictures as the publisher will allow, the latter cared about a frontispiece epitomizing the virtues displayed by the *Vita*<sup>1</sup>.

The fear of leaving something out has led M. Bieber into reproducing many photographs of heads that do not represent Alexander at all<sup>2</sup>. Other scholars have collected much material that neither supports their theories nor furthers whatever case they are making. The attitude of most historians towards archaeology, and in particular towards that section of art history dealing with portraiture, is to blame for such compilations. Professors of ancient history do not as a rule feel qualified to deal with the monuments except as regards epigraphy. They are happy to leave the choosing of their illustrations to a private

<sup>1</sup> Plin. *Nat.* XXXV 2, 11. Varro's collection of worthies is bound to have included Alexander. Cf. *Suda*, s.v. Βάρρων.

<sup>2</sup> M. BIEBER, *Alexander the Great in Greek and Roman Art* (Chicago 1964).

secretary, an assistant, or the editor. They accept without query the traditional interpretation of the material provided by others. Scholars are on the whole as blind as moles. The more a historian sharpens his wits to deal with written documents, the more his natural gift for appreciating form seems to atrophy. It is too much to ask of a busy professor that he should meditate on the meaning of the visual arts and of portraiture ; he can at least be shown what *naiveté* has led to.

If scholars since the Renaissance had not taken for granted that the aim of Greek art was an exact reproduction of a person's outward appearance instead of a rendering of man, if their preference had not gone to the historical rather than to the divine and the ideal, the statue-heads of mythological heroes would never have been mistaken for portraits of Alexander. What the modern historian tends to look for in a likeness is the rendering of a particular moment in a person's life, rather than the definitive, the permanent expression of his character. Th. Birt, for instance, recognised in a statue of Achilles putting on his greaves, the Achilles Rondanini in Munich, a portrait of Alexander looking out over his army on the eve of his greatest battle<sup>1</sup>. It is not necessary to quote Plutarch, who reports that Alexander slept soundly on that occasion<sup>2</sup>, to show up the absurdity of Birt's interpretation<sup>3</sup>. A fourth-century artist had a different field of interests altogether.

It is better to give up looking at ancient sculpture than to look for the wrong thing in it. Whoever believes that the

<sup>1</sup> Th. BIRT, *Alexander der Grosse und das Weltgriechentum*<sup>4</sup> (Leipzig 1928), 494 f. A sentence from Alexander's speech to the army at Opis as quoted by Arrian (*Anab.* VII 9, 9) was obviously at the back of Birt's mind.

<sup>2</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 32, 1.

<sup>3</sup> E. SCHWARZENBERG, *Zum Alexander Rondanini oder Winckelmann und Alexander*, in Festschrift E. Homann-Wedeking, in *Wandlungen* (Waldsassen 1975), 163-88.

Guimet<sup>1</sup> and Sieglin<sup>2</sup> heads are portraits of Alexander taken from life is tempted to detect traces of sensuality or even cruelty in him. One might then proceed to find instances of either in the sources. This is easier than it is to realise that those heads can tell us a good deal about Alexandrian sculpture in the late third and second centuries, but nothing about Alexander's appearance and character.

Visual images do not, like the written or the spoken word, appeal primarily to reason : they act on the affective, the sentimental man ; they may lead to unconscious prejudice, to subjective opinions. Considering how misleading visual images are, it would be better for the historian to do without them. Unfortunately this is impossible, since the brain is not a computer that can be disconnected from its memory-bank. At least we can become aware of the danger. Images that are too weak to be recalled can still colour our judgment. A memory-image drawn from a children's picture-book may influence the views of a mature scholar. The only way to neutralise a visual image is to look again at the picture from which it was taken and to impress the conscious mind with its irrelevance. A fresh impression will help to correct misleading memories.

There is no time to indulge in a catalogue of wrong attributions, leading to mistaken views about Alexander. Let me quote only one other, blatant, instance. A head of a sea-god, now in the Uffizi, was taken in the sixteenth century to represent the dying Alexander<sup>3</sup>. As a result the meaning of a sentence in Plutarch (a crucial one to the understanding of Alexander

<sup>1</sup> Th. SCHREIBER, *Studien über das Bildnis Alexanders des Grossen*, Abh. Sächs. Ges. d. Wiss. Leipzig 21 (1903), 45-51 ; K. GEBAUER, "Alexanderbildnis und Alexander-typus", in *MDAI(A)* 63-64 (1938-9), 44 ; 88 Nr. 22.

<sup>2</sup> M. BIEBER, *op. cit.*, 27, fig. 10 f.

<sup>3</sup> E. SCHWARZENBERG, "From the Alessandro morente to the Alexandre Richelieu", in *Journ. Warb. & Court. Inst.* 32 (1969), 398-405.

portraiture) was distorted to fit the head's pathetic expression<sup>1</sup>. It has remained so in every translation I was able to consult.

In order to explain the many successive interpretations of the figure of Alexander, it is important to find out what portraits mattered to each generation. It is good to know that the mosaic with the representation of the battle between Alexander and Darius was discovered about the very time of the publication of J. G. Droysen's history<sup>2</sup>. It would no doubt be a rewarding task to collect all the monuments that have at one time or another been thought to represent Alexander, and try to discover why they were believed to do so. It would be the work of a lifetime. The little that I have done so far has led me a long way away from Alexander. I have decided to limit my investigation to monuments that contribute to our knowledge of him. Specifically they should further our understanding of Alexander portraiture during classical times. We shall be looking for copies of those works about which the ancient sources believed that they had something to say about the historical figure.

Plutarch draws on the bronzes by Lysippus as a source for the appearance and character of Alexander. Since Plutarch is by far our best guide, since his descriptions enable us to identify portraits of the king, it would be foolish to forsake him when it comes to interpreting them. Plutarch provides the best introduction to the study of ancient Greek portraiture, provided we read him the way he wants to be read. He is not a historian but a biographer. He only relates such episodes out of Alexander's life as best reveal his character. He believes that little intimate details tell us more about human nature than events that changed the course of history<sup>3</sup>. He paints his life of Alexander as an artist would a portrait.

<sup>1</sup> Plut. *De Alex. M. fort. Or.* II 2, 335 C; *Alex.* 4, 1.

<sup>2</sup> The mosaic was discovered in 1831; J. G. DROYSSEN's *Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen* appeared in 1833.

<sup>3</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 1, 2.

Whereas archaeologists are fond of quarrying information about ancient works of art out of Plutarch, no great trouble has been taken to look at these works from his own point of view. What he has left us is a work of art, not a collection of historical and archaeological material. He would have been more than ready to refer historians and archaeologists alike to the sources that he used himself. He could not know that he was fated to preserve them for posterity. His ideas about the meaning of portraiture differ widely from those of most modern scholars. They are not even those of his contemporaries. They tally on the other hand to such an extent with those of Aristotle and of his school that it is reasonable to assume a dependence on the latter, probably through some later eclectic author.

The aim of the fine arts, and not only of the art of portraiture, is to express the  $\eta\varthetao\varsigma$  of man<sup>1</sup>. The task of the artist is made possible because of an unfailing correspondence between the body and the soul. Plutarch does not take every sign to be equally meaningful. He compares himself to the portrait-painter who is at pains to catch the expression of the eye and the features of the face, but hardly bothers about the rest<sup>2</sup>. Only a poor artist tries to achieve likeness through a naturalistic rendering of detail unimportant except for passport identification—of warts, furrows and the like<sup>3</sup>—or through items of adornment and dress. Now what in the eyes of Plutarch is secondary and liable to distract from the study of character usually matters most to the patron. Alexander's successors expected court-artists to underscore the emblems of power, the insignia of royalty. Plutarch professes to despise such art because it ministers to the vanity of the monarch : art that contrives to flatter but faithfully mirrors the fault most conspicuous in its patron.

<sup>1</sup> E. SCHWARZENBERG, "Der lysippische Alexander", in *Bonner Jahrb.* 167 (1967), 64 n. 17 & 26.

<sup>2</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 1, 3.

<sup>3</sup> Plut. *Quomodo adul. ab amico internosc.* 9, 53 D.

Plutarch asks of his readers that they should look at Alexander the way he saw him. He demands an ability no different from that required by the study of classical art in general. Because the aim of art is to improve human nature—thus Aristotle and all ancient theoreticians except the Epicureans—its study will also deepen our knowledge of man. This is not true of art-history only. It is what Herodotus and his pupils expected from history. It is why Plutarch chose to be a biographer rather than a historian, since Thucydides deviated from history's original aim. Plutarch hoped that his readers would learn from his *Lives* what he himself had learnt from Theophrastus and Lysippus, both experts on human nature. He demands and is ready to bestow the sort of general knowledge most wanting among the specialists of today, who are distressingly naive and take everything for granted in a field nor their own.

The main difficulty in trying to understand Alexander as well as other great men of antiquity is their simplicity. Modern man seems to differ from his ancient counterpart only in his awareness of his own complexity. Fr. Hegel is chiefly responsible for this turning inward of consciousness upon itself, for what psychologists might call the split personality of our times. It takes imagination and a considerable amount of mental discipline to put oneself into an antique frame of mind.

What Plutarch tells us about Alexander's physical appearance agrees so well with his description of character that one suspects the one to be construed to harmonise with the other<sup>1</sup>. This is not Plutarch's doing; whatever did not fit Alexander's inner self is unlikely to have been remembered by contemporary sources. His hair may have been tawny<sup>2</sup>, he may have had a

<sup>1</sup> Once the character was known, it was perfectly possible to reconstruct the appearance: Diog. Laert. VII 173, quoting Zeno and Cleanthes; cf. Fr. LEO, *Die griechisch-römische Biographie* (Leipzig 1901), 182.

<sup>2</sup> Ael. VH XII 14; Iul. Val. I 7.

rough voice<sup>1</sup>. Such details may on the other hand have been invented to complete the portrait of the young lion, a simile that (as we shall see) Plutarch took over from earlier descriptions. Alexander's physical characteristics are, if not derived from, at least subservient to his moral ones<sup>2</sup>. It is these and these only that Plutarch cares about.

He endows Alexander with nature's best gifts. He joined the bravery of Achilles to the indomitable energy of Heracles. He was indeed descended from these heroes<sup>3</sup>. His education was worthy of his lineage. Philip selected the best tutors for him. He developed remarkable self-control as regards sleep and food and sex<sup>4</sup>. Unfortunately even the most careful education cannot stamp a character so permanently that life will not contrive to wear it down. Alexander used to be the fairest, the most considerate of judges; later on he became hasty and harsh, owing to the pressure of business and to disappointment<sup>5</sup>. He seems in his early days to have believed in the gods in a naive, refreshingly uncomplicated way<sup>6</sup>, but his faith degenerated into superstition<sup>7</sup>. After he had won the throne of Darius

<sup>1</sup> Plut. *Quomodo adul. ab amico internosc.* 9, 53 D.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch says at the beginning of his *Life of Kimon* that the rendering of ξενος and τρόπος matters more than the rendering of the body. He says at the beginning of his *Life of Lucullus* that the literary portrait is more beautiful than the painted one, because the latter merely reproduces the features. Cf. A. E. WARD-MAN, "Description of personal appearance in Plutarch and Suetonius", in *CQ* 17 (1967), 420. Such remarks strengthened a prejudice against the visual arts, supposedly unable to express disposition and character. Domenico Ghirlandaio painted the following distich below his portrait of Giovanna degli Albizzi in 1488: *Ars uitam mores animumque effingere posses / Pulchrior in terris nulla tabella foret* (J. POPE-HENNESSY, *The Portrait in the Renaissance* (Phaidon Press 1966), fig. 25).

<sup>3</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 2, 1; Vell. I 6, 5.

<sup>4</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 22, 3 f.

<sup>5</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 42, 2.

<sup>6</sup> L. EDMUNDS, "The religiosity of Alexander", in *GRBS* 12 (1971), 363-91. Cf. Plb. V 10, 6-8. Aristobulus catches the spirit of Alexander's faith.

<sup>7</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 75, 1 f.

he lost his temper on occasion, indeed he could burst into uncontrollable rage. Plutarch lays the blame for this worsening of Alexander's character less on circumstances<sup>1</sup> than on the king's flatterers<sup>2</sup>. Because of his great generosity, which begged to be abused<sup>3</sup>, he was most vulnerable to their attacks, especially after dinner. Although temperate by nature, he would linger over his cups for company's sake<sup>4</sup>. That is when flatterers managed to catch him and lead him astray. The flatterer who was chiefly responsible for Alexander's ruin was Anaxarchus. In order to cheer the king up after the killing of Cleitus, he used arguments that made him conceited and lawless<sup>5</sup>. Anaxarchus was equally to blame for antagonising Callisthenes and for making him unpopular with the king.

If Alexander was poorly served by poets and philosophers, he did not fare any better at the hand of court-artists. The kind of portrait that he deigned to accept after his return from India was probably no longer the same as before that great adventure. Decadence sets in with Alexander. The Diadochoi did nothing to stop it, having already been accustomed to

<sup>1</sup> The deterioration of Alexander's character was usually attributed to an excess of good fortune : Cic. *Tusc.* III 10, 21. This had been the view taken by Theophrastus and Diogenes of Babylon : A. E. WARDMAN, "Plutarch and Alexander", in *CQ* 5 (1955), 96.

<sup>2</sup> Plut. *Quomodo adul. ab amico internosc.* 24, 65 C-D ; *Alex.* 23, 4. Arrian also comments on the bad influence of the king's flatterers (VII 29, 1).

<sup>3</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 39, 1-3. Cf. Cic. *Off.* II 15, 53 on the corrupting influence of Alexander's largesses.

<sup>4</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 23, 3. Arrian, quoting Aristobulus, says that Alexander drank out of consideration for his companions (VII 29, 4).

<sup>5</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 52, 4. Arrian also blames Anaxarchus : IV 9, 11 f. The murder of Cleitus is the turning-point in Alexander's moral career. Arrian also links the murder of Cleitus to the fall of Callisthenes (IV 8, 9). The relevant chapters in Diodorus Book XVII are lost, but we know from the summary that the one followed upon the other in the narrative. Plutarch is following a source that is aware of the antagonism between Callisthenes and Anaxarchus. Cf. L. EDMUNDS, *art. cit.*, 386-90.




Fig. 1 *Alexander*. Vienna. Sammlung E. Schwarzenberg.



*Fig. 2 Cameo. Leningrad. Ermitage.*

greater luxury while he was alive<sup>1</sup>. As for Plutarch, he could look down on the appalling taste of his own day. The age of Alexander was generally recognised to be a turning-point in the arts, especially oratory<sup>2</sup>. When dealing with the monuments, it is important to remember that the very notion of portraiture changed during Alexander's short reign.

Recent scholarship has failed to take Plutarch at his word, for it is interested only in the information that his sources are able to give. We are not asking what source-material Plutarch owes to whom, but who inspired him, what earlier portraits appealed to him, which previous artists taught him to portray Alexander. He probably owes his notion of a noble, dashing conqueror to a single source. A devoted, unstintingly admiring author is bound to be a contemporary one. Later writers cannot help taking adverse criticism into account. Fourth-century sources may be favourable to Alexander or they may not, but they cannot help taking sides, their portrayal is either all white or all black. Something of this contemporary one-sided attitude still pervades Plutarch's *Life*, although less than his earlier Alexander essay. When reading it, it is easy to forget that the potential to do evil was present in Alexander from birth<sup>3</sup>.

Now Callisthenes depicted Alexander as the hero of an epic in Homeric style. Plutarch may well have turned to him, especially as he had stopped writing after Alexander's character was supposed to have deteriorated. The knowledge that Callisthenes had flattered Alexander even as Choerilus, as Agis<sup>4</sup> and Cleon, as Anaxarchus, as Apelles and Aristobulus<sup>5</sup> had done did not deter Plutarch from using him, since he had

<sup>1</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 40, 1. Compare Alexander's argument in *Arr.* VII 9, 9.

<sup>2</sup> Dion. Hal. *Orat. Vett.* 1.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Curt. X 5, 26 : *bona naturae eius fuisse ; vitia vel fortunae vel aetatis.*

<sup>4</sup> Plut. *Quomodo adul. ab amico internosc.* 18, 60 B ; *Arr.* IV 9, 9 ; Curt. VIII 5, 8.

<sup>5</sup> Lucian. *Hist. conscr.* 12.

redeemed himself over the προσκύνησις episode. Callisthenes had turned Alexander into a god, by giving him the attributes of Zeus<sup>1</sup>. Plutarch cannot have ignored them, since he takes Apelles to task for using them too.

Callisthenes was a sophist, trained to respect and to instruct men of action, politicians and statesmen. Those who remained unaffected by Alexander's success were as a rule of a philosophical bent of mind. I do not believe that Dicaearchus appraised Alexander's career in positive terms<sup>2</sup>. Although he gives precedence to the πρακτικὸς βίος over the θεωρητικός, he is not likely, as an Aristotelian, to have thought of Alexander's conquests in terms of ἔργα. He is less likely even to have called them πράξεις, deeds. Alexander was prodded on by cupidity and ambition; his actions deserve to be thought of in terms of κίνησις, not ἐνέργεια. He was being driven, instead of creating. Dicaearchus nowhere mentions Alexander as an example of the πρακτικὸς βίος, in fact he mentions no politicians or generals at all, but the Seven Sages. These furthered the interests of the city-state through their advice and legislation, but did not wish to increase it by conquest.

It took longer for members of the Lyceum or for other philosophers to take an interest in Alexander's achievements; longer even than it took for the dust raised by the anabasis to settle, and for historians to gain an insight into facts obscured by prejudice and controversy. Those furthest away in time may have succeeded best, as Arrian did, and Plutarch.

After Callisthenes, it was Eratosthenes who influenced Plutarch's thoughts, although this influence is less obvious in the *Vita* than in his Alexander essays. Eratosthenes had been invited by Ptolemy III to come to Alexandria to direct the great library. He was requested to preside over the education of

<sup>1</sup> Plb. XII 23, 4 & XII 12b, 3 quoting Timaeus = *FGrH* 124 T 20.

<sup>2</sup> E. MENSCHING, "Peripatetiker über Alexander", in *Historia* 12 (1963), 282; E. ISTLER, *Aristoteles und der Peripatos in ihrem Verhältnis zu Alexander* (Diss. Wien 1968), 189.

Ptolemy IV. He was very much of a professor<sup>1</sup>, and he saw the work of Alexander in the world that he lived in. If the Mediterranean of middle-Hellenistic times could be thought of as a scholar's paradise, that, in Eratosthenes' eyes, was Alexander's merit. Although it only became so after Alexander's death, he had willed it and would have made it so himself, if he had lived longer. Fate had granted him enough time to conquer the eastern half of his realm, but he had left plans concerning the rest. Although his kingdom was divided up by the Successors, it still formed a geographical and cultural unity<sup>2</sup>.

Alexandria, the capital of the Ptolemies, was also the centre of the world. Alexander founded it where the *sphragides* met, and he was fully aware of its future importance. Plutarch describes the foundation of the town in detail, although he does not quote Eratosthenes for it<sup>3</sup>. The cult-statue of Alexander *κτίστης*<sup>4</sup> is preserved in a number of copies<sup>5</sup>. The

<sup>1</sup> Ed. SCHWARTZ, *Charakterköpfe aus der Antiken Literatur*<sup>2</sup> (Leipzig 1910), 75-106; P. M. FRASER, "Eratosthenes of Cyrene", in *PBA* 56 (1970), 1-35. These and other scholars recognised the importance of the Eratosthenian Alexander, but did not distinguish sufficiently clearly between him and the historical figure.

<sup>2</sup> Eratosthenes realized the significance of Alexander's conquests for the science of geography (Strab. I 2, 1, p. 14; I 3, 3, p. 48).

<sup>3</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 26, 2-6. The islet of Pharos is mentioned in the *Odyssey* IV 355-6. Behind it could be found the only good anchorage along Egypt's Mediterranean coast. Homer is supposed to have appeared to Alexander in a dream before he founded a city and built a harbour there: Strab. XII 2, 4, p. 536; XVII 1, 6, p. 791. Alexander is bound to have been aware of this passage in Homer, while Callisthenes is bound to have made the most of it. But Eratosthenes probably mistrusted his poetic enthusiasm.

<sup>4</sup> The ιερεὺς Ἀλεξάνδρου κτίστου τῆς πόλεως is mentioned. Cf. B. A. van GROENINGEN, *A family-archive from Tebtunis*, *Papyrologica Lugduno-Batava* 6 (Leiden 1950), Nr. 20, lines 2-5, pp. 73 f., n. 3; P. M. FRASER, *Ptolemaic Alexandria* (Oxford 1972), 212 n. 182.

<sup>5</sup> P. PERDRIZET, *Un type inédit de la plastique grecque*, MonPiot 21 (1913), 59-72; K. GEBAUER, *art. cit.*, 77 f., 104 f., No 77; K. PARLASCA, "Alexander Aigiochos", in *Antike Plastik* (not yet published). The equestrian statue of Alexander the founder described by Libanius may never have existed and is of another type (*Descr.* 27, ed. R. FÖRSTER, VIII, 533-6; P. M. FRASER, *op. cit.*, n. 182, to chapt. 5).

founder of Alexandria is clad in the aegis of Zeus (our Fig. 7). It is longer than usual, and it has the shape of a Macedonian chlamys. An allusion to the shape of the city has been recognised in it<sup>1</sup>, in support of the ancient authorities, who make its length rather than its tassels the mean of the comparison<sup>2</sup>. Alexander holds the attribute of the hero the spear. He is carrying the palladium in his left hand (our Fig. 6)<sup>3</sup>. Alexandria must have been spoken of as the new Ilion. The story is told that Diomedes stole the palladium and brought it to his native Argos<sup>4</sup>. Aeneas is reputed to have rescued it from burning Troy and brought it to Rome<sup>5</sup>. So many ancient cities claimed to be in possession of the original relic<sup>6</sup> that we are entitled to assume the same of Alexandria also. Alexander had visited Ilion at the outset of his campaign, mainly for the sake of Homer and of Achilles, but also of Athena, whose special *protégé* he was. Let us presume that according to local Alexandrian legend Alexander brought the palladium from Troy.

<sup>1</sup> Plin. *Nat. V* 11, 62; P. PERDRIZET, *op. cit.*, 67.

<sup>2</sup> Strab. XVII 1, 8, p. 793; Diod. XVII 52; C. PRÉAUX, "Alexandre et la Chlamyde", in *Chronique d'Egypte* 43 (1968), 176-87.

<sup>3</sup> The foot of the shaft is preserved in a bronze replica in Berlin. Th. SCHREIBER (*op. cit.* n. 1, p. 225) thought it belonged to a Nike (pp. 143 & 145). The same applies to a limestone statuette from the Fouquet collection (p. 64). The attribute is best seen on a cameo in Cammin cathedral. It is published by G. BRUNS, "Staatskameen des 4. Jhdts. n. Chr.", in 104. *Winck. Progr.* (Berlin 1948), 16, fig. 11 = our Fig. 6. A marble hand in Munich holding the palladium belongs to a copy of our Alexander statue, and not to the Diomedes attributed to Kresilos: P. HARTWIG, "Die linke Hand des Diomedes", in *JDAI* 16 (1901), 56-61; J. SIEVEKING, *Palladian in der Kunst*, in W. H. ROSCHER, *Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie* III 1, col. 1329.

<sup>4</sup> L. PRELLER, *Griechische Mythologie*<sup>3</sup> II (Berlin 1875), 405 f.

<sup>5</sup> E. PARIBENI, in *Boll. d'Arte* 49 (1964), 198.

<sup>6</sup> Even Constantine was said to have brought the palladium to his new city: Io. Mal. *Chron.* XIII, p. 320 (ed. Bonn); Procop. *Goth.* I 15, 14; *Chron. Pasch.* on Ol. 277, 4 (I p. 528, ed. Bonn), cf. G. BRUNS, *op. cit.*, 17.

A snake winds itself around the support of one of the copies of the Alexander *κτίστης* (our Fig. 8)<sup>1</sup>. It would appear to testify to the conflation between the hero and the ἀγαθὸς δαίμων of the city. Any Greek would recognise in the snake the chthonic form of the soul of the founder, the hero who lay buried in the middle of the city. The snake was a *genius loci* to the natives too<sup>2</sup>. Pseudo-Callisthenes has Alexander build him a temple<sup>3</sup>. There were many non-poisonous benevolent snakes in Alexandria, born in the temple, that entered private homes to eat the porridge left for them at the altars<sup>4</sup>. The number of replicas of our statue<sup>5</sup>, all of them found in Egypt, implies that every self-respecting Alexandrian household had a shrine dedicated both to the founder of the city and to its good genius.

Alexander was of course the founder not only of Alexandria, but also of the kingdom of the Ptolemies. That was the aspect of the worship of Alexander that interested Eratosthenes least. The king was above all the creator of the Oikoumene. He had done much to bring mankind together, to make it conscious of inhabiting one world. He had gone further in this respect than the heroes of old, than Heracles, than Dionysus, whom

<sup>1</sup> Louvre, from the Collection Lambros-Dattari; cf. P. PERDRIZET, *op. cit.*, 62 f., pl. 4 = our Fig. 8.

<sup>2</sup> L. R. TAYLOR, "Alexander and the Serpent of Alexandria", in *CPh* 25 (1930), 377; P. M. FRASER, *op. cit.*, 211.

<sup>3</sup> Ps.-Callisth. I 32, 5; W. W. TARN, "The Hellenistic Ruler-Cult and the Daemon", in *JHS* 48 (1928), 214.

<sup>4</sup> Ps.-Callisth. I 32, 4; P. M. FRASER, *op. cit.*, 209-11.

<sup>5</sup> Since a good many copies of the Aigiochos have come down to us without their heads, we expect some loose heads of Egyptian provenance to have belonged to copies of the same type. I suspect that the Sieglin and Guimet heads (nn. 1 & 2, p. 225) as well as a head at the Liebighaus in Frankfurt and the Horn one belonged to such copies (N. HIMMELMANN (ed.), *Antiken aus rheinischem Privatbesitz*. Ausstellung Bonn 1973, Nr. 352). The Horn and Bodmer heads have holes for the insertion of metal rays (J. DÖRIG (ed.), *Art antique. Collections privées de Suisse Romande*, Genève 1975, Nr. 7). The rays were presumably added in the third century A.D. Almost all the replicas are smaller than life, suggesting a household cult; cf. H. KYRIELEIS, "Zur Eigenart der Ptolemäerbildnisse", in *Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologen-Verbandes* 6 (1975), 43.

Megasthenes described as having brought civilisation to India<sup>1</sup>. Eratosthenes on the other hand was more reserved in his appreciation of such tales. The Greek Dionysus never visited India. This story is a fabrication of Alexander's flatterers, who were trying to turn him into a new Dionysus<sup>2</sup>.

Eratosthenes looks at Alexander as a professor would, which means that he is careful about facts but totally ignorant about motive. He believed that Alexander's conquests were not motivated by thirst for glory, but by the curiosity of the scholar, the inquisitiveness of the scientist. Eratosthenes attributes his own interests as a geographer to Alexander, he makes him into a precursor of Alexander von Humboldt. Now Alexander was unquestionably filled with a longing to reach the ends of the earth and find out what he could about its inhabitants. He must have been fascinated by the trees growing in the damp heat of India; he preferred hunting in the game-reserves of the Great King to looking for boars on the slopes of Pindus. It is another thing to turn him into a geographer, a botanist or a zoologist. Although he may have given orders for collecting rare plants and exotic animals, it is doubtful whether he gave the natural sciences the incentive that they may have lacked until then, or encouraged them by conspicuous grants<sup>3</sup>, as he

<sup>1</sup> Arr. *Anab.* V 1, 5 f.; *Ind.* 1, 4-7; 7, 4-8, 3. The source of Diodorus is probably Hecataeus; cf. Diod. II 38, 3; 38, 6; III 65, 4; 65, 8; IV 3, 1; Ed. SCHWARTZ, "Hekataeos von Teos", in *RhM* 40 (1885), 254. The theory that all gods were human beings was put forwards by Euhemerus in the same generation as Megasthenes and Hecataeus.

<sup>2</sup> Megasthenes records the journeys of Dionysus and of Heracles through India. He also locates the cave of Prometheus in Paropamisus, further east than the Caucasus. Eratosthenes discredits these tales by pointing out their underlying features: Strab. XI 5, 5, pp. 505 f.; XV 1, 7-10, pp. 687-689; XV 1, 58, pp. 711 f.; Arr. *Anab.* V 3, 1-4; *Ind.* 5, 8-13; P. M. FRASER, in *PBA* 56 (1970), 24-26. Eratosthenes calls the tradition of the worship of Dionysus in Bactria, as well as in some other places mentioned in the prologue of the *Bacchae*, unfounded and mythical. Strabo does not realise that the *Bacchae* was Alexander's favourite play, and that vv. 14-19 provided him with an incentive for conquest.

<sup>3</sup> Athenaeus mentions the sum of 800 talents as a gift for research (IX 398 e).

appears to have sponsored the fine arts. Indeed, to judge from his self-centred interest in the arts also, he is not likely to have furthered knowledge very much. It was the Successors who were goaded by rivalry into providing such emoluments.

The source that made Alexander endow research institutions is probably also responsible for turning him into a discerning patron of the arts<sup>1</sup>. Here again there is no doubt that Alexander gave grand commissions and granted magnificent rewards to painters, sculptors and architects alike. Indeed under his reign the remuneration of artists grew out of proportion to the amount of time that their work required<sup>2</sup>. Here too Alexander's reign marks a turning-point. The artist, if he manages to gain the court's favour, no longer gets paid by the day, he is no longer the equal of the potter and the cobbler. He can command vast sums, he is a genius and deserves to be honoured as much as the poet. Alexander's untold generosity, his squandering the reserves of the Persian treasury, is to blame for this change. But he was not concerned with the fine arts in a theoretical way, his interests were self-centred. Nor had he had the time to give his own taste, that of the court of Pella, much thought. If that taste influenced the whole of Hellenistic art, it is because of the king's success as a conqueror. A fondness for colossal size, for expensive materials, for over-rich ornament, as many departures from an Aristotelian ideal, are the legacy of Alexander in the visual arts.

The cultural unification of the world, Alexander's great merit in the eyes of Eratosthenes, did not manifest itself in the arts and sciences only. Alexander erased the difference between Greeks and Barbarians in many ways. He civilised the latter<sup>3</sup> and

<sup>1</sup> Plut. *De Alex. M. fort. Or.* II 1, 333 E.

<sup>2</sup> Apelles is reported by Pliny to have received 20 talents by weight, as a reward for the Keraunophorus (*Nat.* XXXV 36, 92; G. BUDAEUS, *De Asse* (Paris 1541), fol. 55<sup>v</sup>-56<sup>r</sup>).

<sup>3</sup> Hostility to foreigners is a trait shared by all barbarians, according to Eratosthenes: Strab. XVII 1, 19, p. 802. The site of what later became Alexandria

taught the former to overcome their prejudice<sup>1</sup>. He mixed the Greek and the Iranian race, even as the wine that he served was mixed in a common crater. The metaphor is not Tarn's but Plutarch's, who may well have borrowed it from Eratosthenes himself<sup>2</sup>. The marriage of Alexander's Greek and Macedonian Companions to Persian brides, the recruiting of Iranian soldiers, were, I believe, brought up by Eratosthenes as so much proof of that policy.

He showed how considerate Alexander had been of the beliefs and customs of the countries he conquered. He had indeed conquered the hearts of his Egyptian subjects by behaving differently from their former Persian overlord. Eratosthenes believed that if Alexander allowed himself to be called son of Zeus, it was because he wanted to endear himself to the Egyptians by conforming to their notion of royalty<sup>3</sup>. Erato-

was occupied by brigand-shepherds who prevented merchants from landing and from using the only anchorage (cf. n. 3 p. 233). Eratosthenes knew what the foundation of Alexandria meant to commerce and to civilisation. Andron of Alexandria also praises the city's civilising influence : *FGrH* 246 F 1, *ap.* Athen. IV 184 b.

Alexander brought civilisation to the whole of mankind: Plut. *De Alex. M. fort. Or. I* 5, 328 B-329 A. Onesicritus related how he persuaded the Sogdians not to do away with their old parents (Plut. 328 C; Strab. XI 11, 3, p. 517 = *FGrH* 134 F 5).

<sup>1</sup> Strab. I 4, 9, p. 66 ; Plut. 329 A-B ; Arist. Fr. 658 Rose<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>2</sup> Plut. 329 C. Cf. W. W. TARN, *Alexander the Great* (Cambridge 1948), I 116 ; II 441 n. 2. Ed. SCHWARTZ (in *RbM* 40 (1885), 253) attributes the passage dealing with the crater to Eratosthenes. Tarn follows (*op. cit.*, II 438). E. Badian shows that there is no evidence for attributing the simile of the "loving-cup" to Eratosthenes, but admits that Plutarch "quite possibly" had him in mind when writing 329 A-D ; cf. *Historia* 7 (1958), 432-40.

<sup>3</sup> Alexander could not avoid being thought a god if he meant to rule over barbarians (Arr. VII 29, 3). Arrian appears to reflect the point of view of Eratosthenes, who did not believe in Alexander's divine descent, but assumed that there had been reasons of state behind it. Eratosthenes or, for that matter, most educated men coming after Euhemerus were not likely to appreciate or even understand the simple faith of Alexander. (Eratosthenes does not criticize Euhemerus' views but merely finds fault with his method : P. M. FRASER, *Ptolemaic Alexandria*, 295.) Scholars are fond of quoting a fragment of Eratosthenes in order to show that the latter did believe that Alexander was conceived supernaturally. Olympias

thenes is looking at the simple faith of Alexander from the point of view of an intellectual of his own day and milieu, of a late third-century Museum. He is attributing to the king the traditional policy of his successors. Ptolemy III and IV did try to secure the loyalty of the natives by a show of devotion to gods they probably did not believe in. They treated the priesthood with great respect, for they were aware of its hold over the fellahin. What was a generous impulse on Alexander's part degenerated into mere policy in the hands of his more "modern" successors<sup>1</sup>.

Eratosthenes mentions Alexander's semi-Persian dress as visible evidence of his conciliatory attitude towards the barbarians<sup>2</sup>. It is hard to say exactly why Alexander wore this

revealed the mystery of her son's conception to him alone and entreated him to behave accordingly. Olympias' convictions do not of course entail those of Eratosthenes, or even those of Alexander: *FGrH* 241 F 28, *ap.* Plut. *Alex.* 3, 2.

Eratosthenes is bound to have thought about how the priest of Ammon had spoken at Siwa, especially as the oasis was near and dear to his native Cyrene. The sources give several explanations for the way the oracle addressed Alexander. I suggest that Eratosthenes favoured the one exploiting the difference between the Greek and the native Libyan mentality, the one that plays on the language difficulty and sees a misunderstanding in the whole thing. Eratosthenes is likely to have taken the Egyptian version of the story into account (Plut. *Alex.* 27, 6 quoting Psammon). While realising that Alexander could not help being the son of Ammon to Egyptians, Eratosthenes was aware that Alexander did not need to impose the belief in his divine descent on his Greek retainers, the way he tried to impose προσκύνησις. Eratosthenes realised that Alexander's flatterers had of their own accord upheld and propagated the myth of Zeus consorting with Olympias. Eratosthenes says that the story of the Indian campaign of Dionysus is a fabrication of Alexander's friends (see n. 2 p. 236). This story aims at turning Alexander into a νέος Διόνυσος, into the παῖς Διός praised by Euripides in the *Bacchae*.

<sup>1</sup> Ptolemy III owed his cult-name Εὐεργέτης to his policy of restoring native cults after the Persian profanation. Ptolemy IV made many concessions to the natives after the victory of Raphia (Plb. V 65, 9; 107, 2 f.). This policy got out of hand under the weak Ptolemy V. Euergetes II made a renewed attempt at winning over the natives (U. KAHNSTEDT, *Geschichte des griechisch-römischen Altertums* (München 1948), 221; W. W. TARN & G. T. GRIFFITH, *Hellenistic Civilisation*<sup>3</sup> (London 1952), 205 f.).

<sup>2</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 45, 1-2; *De Alex. M. fort. Or. I* 8, 330 A, where Eratosthenes is quoted. Eratosthenes sees in Alexander's Persian regalia a fit reward for Darius'

costume. He seems to have been fond of individualistic weapons and picturesque items of dress. I have difficulty in believing that it was a calculated move, designed to win the sympathies of the Iranians without offending the Macedonians. It reminds one of similar compromises popular in middle-Hellenistic times, of religious syncretism, philosophical eclecticism, and the mixed constitutions of contemporary political theory.

Plutarch would seem to be embroidering an Eratosthenean pattern, whenever his Alexander appears as a wise administrator. Callisthenes, on the other hand, is the source of his portrait of the dashing conqueror. These qualities are seldom found together. Plutarch blends them skilfully, while attributing that exceptional mixture to Alexander's own nature.

The study of Plutarch's *Life of Alexander* has helped me most to understand the portraiture. Every age had its own ideas about his appearance, sometimes combining and sometimes contrasting them with those of the preceding age. We propose to use a method older than excavation, one dear to philology. It consists in peeling off every layer until the original stratum is left. Unfortunately too much has been lost to enable it to be used consistently. The paintings and statues that Plutarch knew have all been lost. Scholars live by the hope of recognising copies of these masterpieces. Such copies, if they should be found, are not likely to tell us anything essential. Roman work lacks the finish of the Greek originals; it was on the finishing touches that the Hellenistic portraitist relied most to express character. He showed his bravura by giving life to the lips and light to the eyes. The ancient descriptions of famous portraits of Alexander, Plutarch's scant but apt words, are more helpful than what remains. They have the power to

conqueror (*Alex.* 31, 2). The explanation that Arrian (VII 29, 3) gives of Alexander's mixed dress is similar to Plutarch's. Contrast IV 7, 4, where Arrian disapproves of the fad and is obviously following another source, perhaps the same as Curtius X 5, 33.

fire the imagination, and they have occasionally done so in the right direction.

Too little is known about the copying of ancient paintings. Indeed, next to nothing is known about Roman painting after A.D. 79. But copies of Greek statues are common from about 50 B.C. to A.D. 190, particularly in the reigns of Augustus and of Hadrian. Interest in Alexander did not remain constant during this long period. He was much in people's minds during the late Republic and the opening years of Augustus' reign. His fame suffered an eclipse under the Flavians. There is a great revival under Trajan, with Plutarch and Arrian. We are entitled to expect good copies of portraits made in or shortly after Alexander's reign from the Augustan and Trajanic periods. Archaeologists may one day be in a position to question their exactitude, but not, I think, their good faith. In the case of well-known works like the Doryphoros, the degree of objectivity reached by the copyists, especially under Augustus, was greater than either before or after<sup>1</sup>. Despite his great learning, or perhaps because of it, Eratosthenes did not succeed in understanding the figure of Alexander as his contemporaries did. As for the authors of the third and fourth centuries A.D., they did not even try.

What we do know about the imitation of Alexander by Trajan must be gathered from Arrian and from Dio. In order to understand the Trajanic figure, we must study the Augustan Alexander first. Augustus was compared to Alexander, like so many sovereigns before him<sup>2</sup>. He could only hope to dis-

<sup>1</sup> P. ZANKER, *Klassizistische Statuen* (Mainz 1974), 42.

<sup>2</sup> The Alexander *imitatio* by the Emperor is most apparent in the ten years following Octavian's visit to Alexandria. It is during those years that he used the seal with the impression of Alexander (Suet. *Aug.* 50) : D. KIENAST, "Augustus und Alexander", in *Gymnasium* 76 (1969), 435. It is then that the poets praise him in ways reminiscent of Alexander. Ed. NORDEN has shown how Virgil's panegyric in Book VI of the *Aeneid* is modelled on an encomium of the king (*P. Vergilius Maro. Aeneis VI*<sup>2</sup> (Berlin 1916), 322 f. = vv. 788-805). Horace plays with the same ideas in his third Roman *Ode*. See H. J. METTE, "Roma"

tinguish himself from his predecessors by seeking a new relationship to the common model and by fulfilling the claims that this relationship entailed. Under his rule the Roman commonwealth became equal to the Macedonian empire<sup>1</sup>. Augustus could be firm about the way in which his contemporaries compared him to Alexander. He had the final say about the definition of his own image. He was so successful about directing imperial propaganda that he discouraged posterity from probing his intimate thoughts. He impressed it with the rule that a monarch does not have a private opinion different from its expression in public, that his private life must correspond to the image entertained by his people.

On the face of it, Augustus' verdict about Alexander seems to have been objective enough. He recognised his good qualities without being blind to his faults<sup>2</sup>. He is bound to have admired his generosity and his creativity. But he found fault with his fits of rage, with the amount he drank, with the irregularity of his married life, with his generally impulsive ways. His way of starting major battles seemed to Augustus irresponsible

(Augustus) und Alexander", in *Hermes* 88 (1960), 459-61; D. KIENAST, *art. cit.*, 435. The poets start mentioning Alexander by name only after the Emperor was no longer interested in him as a model: Hor. *Epist.* II 1, 232 f. (13 B.C.). In his funeral eulogy in Dio, Tiberius only mentions Alexander to show how superior Augustus had been (Dio Cass. LVI 36, 3). To look for external events in order to explain why Augustus gradually lost interest in Alexander may well be irrelevant. Other ideals and other embodiments of those ideals became more appealing.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the beginning of the *Res Gestae Divi Augusti: orbem terra[rum] imperio populi Rom[ani] subiecit*; G. NENCI, *Introduzione alle Guerre Persiane e altri saggi di storia antica*, Studi e Testi 15 (Pisa 1958), 285-308: "L'imitatio Alexandri nelle Res gestae Divi Augusti."

<sup>2</sup> Vell. II 41, 1-2 (comparison between Alexander and Julius Caesar). Compare Tacitus' report of people's praise of the dead Germanicus (*Ann.* II 73). P. Treves believes that the comparison between Germanicus and Alexander is Tacitus' own. But Alexander is not likely to have come out inferior in a comparison of Trajanic date. Germanicus did not live long enough to develop a projection of himself distinguishable from Augustus' own.

in a general<sup>1</sup>. Above all he accused him of being accessible to flattery.

If Augustus' judgment appears a bit condescending, or at least lacking in the tolerance due to so great a figure, we must remember that the emperor grew up in an age in which lesser men were compared to Alexander. He lived to accept this comparison and had plenty of time to reflect on what it implied. He let it be believed that he thought virtue to be the only valid mean term of the comparison. He looked down on all those who had been satisfied with an exterior likeness, the mannerisms of greatness, the attributes of virtue. He condemned all flatterers, who through comparing their masters to Alexander on every occasion encouraged them to ape him<sup>2</sup>.

He declared war on the spoilt and arrogant Alexander of the Diadochoi, as well as on the figure that the East had fabricated out of resentment against victorious Rome. Octavian was particularly annoyed at Antony, because he had appropriated the Alexander myth to give glamour to his selfish schemes<sup>3</sup>. This is perhaps what impelled Augustus more than anything else to separate the wheat from the chaff, the historical figure from what the Epigoni had made out of it. Thus his urge for objectivity is in itself polemical, the severity of his demands on the historians has a personal motive. He nevertheless managed to inspire them with a need for pragmatism in Alexander studies. Both Livy and Strabo caught the spirit of Augustus' age, they went straight to Polybius for their scholarly scientific notions. Livy confounds the irresponsible Greeks

<sup>1</sup> The two faults that Augustus condemned most strongly in a military commander were recklessness and haste (*Suet. Aug. 24*).

<sup>2</sup> Augustus may well have had Pompey in mind, as well as Antony (*Plut. Pomp. 2, 1*). See D. MICHEL, *Alexander als Vorbild für Pompeius, Caesar und Marcus Antonius*, Coll. Latomus 94 (Bruxelles 1967), 35-66.

<sup>3</sup> On the Alexander imitation of Antony and Octavian's reaction, cf. D. KIENAST, *art. cit.*, 441-7.

who had chosen to forget Pydna<sup>1</sup>, Strabo opposes the figure of Alexander to the flatteringly subjective or passionately resentful Alexander histories<sup>2</sup>.

Augustus' own attitude was clearly revealed during his stay at Alexandria after Antony's defeat. He wished to see Alexander's tomb. His guides asked him if he also wanted to see the tombs of the Ptolemies in the same compound. He answered that he had come to see a king and not corpses<sup>3</sup>. Peaceful years went by. Augustus now felt that he could afford to forgive the Alexandrians their loyalty towards Octavian's enemies, to forgive them for their own sake and not, as he had put it to them at the time, for the sake of Alexander and of philosophy<sup>4</sup>. He could then safely grant Alexandria's Greek-speaking inhabitants their memories.

In his youth, the Emperor had been as enthusiastic about Alexander as Caesar ever had. It was the wish to find out for himself what Alexander really looked like, and not the illustrious precedent of Caesar<sup>5</sup>, that drew him to the tomb. The body was kept underground<sup>6</sup> inside a glass coffin<sup>7</sup>. Octavian was

<sup>1</sup> Liv. IX 16, 19-19, 17. See H. R. BREITENBACH, "Der Alexanderexkurs bei Livius", in *MH* 26 (1969), 146-7.

<sup>2</sup> Strabo grows almost eloquent on the untrustworthiness of the Alexander historians (XI 6, 4, p. 508). He mutters about the run of merely flattering memoirs (XVII 1, 43, p. 814; XI 5, 5, p. 505). The king's contemporaries indulged in the telling of miraculous stories, that aimed at increasing his fame (XI 7, 4, p. 509). Onesicritus is singled out for rebuke (XV 1, 28, p. 698). And then there were the forged letters (XV 1, 35, p. 702). The little that is reliable has to be hand-picked (XI 5, 4, p. 505; XVII 1, 43, p. 814). Strabo concludes that Alexander was better informed than his entourage (II 1, 6, p. 69).

<sup>3</sup> Dio Cass. LI 16, 5.

<sup>4</sup> Plut. *Ant.* 80, 1-2; Dio Cass. LI 16, 3.

<sup>5</sup> Lucan. X 19-22.

<sup>6</sup> Lucan. X 19; VIII 694.

<sup>7</sup> The golden coffin was replaced by a glass one because of the cupidity of Ptolemy Pareisaktos (Strab. XVII 1, 8, p. 794). See H. THIERSCH, "Die alexandrinische Königsnekropole", in *JDAI* 25 (1910), 63. P. M. FRASER, *Ptolemaic Alexandria*, 15 f., translates ὑαλίνη "out of alabaster" without giving another example for this meaning of the word.

not content to peer at it through the glass, he had the coffin brought up and opened. He gazed intently on the king's features, then crowned his head with a golden diadem and scattered flowers on his chest as if he had died but recently. We know these particulars, for the visit impressed the Alexandrians, who remembered it a quarter of a millennium later.

By then Alexander's body had acquired a significance very different from the one it had for Augustus and his contemporaries. His visit was interpreted in the same light as the one by the Emperor Septimius Severus, who ordered all books on magic containing spells and formulae on how to conjure up ghosts collected and walled up inside the tomb<sup>1</sup>. Why did he not have them burnt? They had proved useful to him, the last person, or so he fancied, to visit Alexander's body. The Emperor believed that the spirit of Alexander had entered his own self. He wanted to prevent others from gaining access to the body, to deprive them of what they needed to entice his soul from entering their own. There were enough adventurers around, eager to wrench the empire away from its legitimate owner by appropriating Alexander's invincible soul. The Genius of Alexander was an important force in Coptic magic. The Arabs made great use of his djinn. Coins and other effigies of Alexander were commonly worn as talismans<sup>2</sup>. Severus was not alone in believing that the soul of the dead can be forced through incantations to leave one body and enter another. We hear of several pretenders claiming to be Alexander, one of whom, a private person, was remarkably successful in the Balkan provinces<sup>3</sup>. Caracalla believed that he had been

<sup>1</sup> Dio Cass. LXXV 13, 2. Dio says how deeply the Emperor was involved in magic.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. E. SCHWARZENBERG, in *Bonner Jahrb.* 167 (1967), 117, n. 197; also P. BAYLE, *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, s.v. Macédoine; B. de MONTFAUCON, *L'Antiquité expliquée* II 2, 372 f.

<sup>3</sup> This happened in A.D. 221 (Dio Cass. LXXIX 18, 1-3). Cf. E. GROAG, "Alexander in einer Inschrift des 3. Jhdts. n. Chr.", in *Wiener Eranos* 1909 (Wien 1909), 251-5.

Alexander in a former life. His soul therefore had also dwelt for a while in the body of Augustus<sup>1</sup>. It was obvious, by the way the emperor looked at you and carried his head, that he was Alexander *redivivus*<sup>2</sup>. He had the tomb that Severus had so carefully sealed reopened<sup>3</sup>. Souls were most commonly believed to pass from one body into another through contact. The people of Alexandria remembered that Augustus had touched the mummy. Now the tip of its nose happened to be missing. It was believed to have crumbled under his fingers<sup>4</sup>.

The Emperor would perhaps have found the interpretation given by late antiquity of his visit to the σῶμα amusing. What he cared for was firsthand knowledge about Alexander. Since physiognomy could draw accurate, infallible deductions about character, it was essential to draw them from life<sup>5</sup>. Indeed why make do with a portrait, when Alexander's body was extant? Alexander's entourage knew it to be imperishable, even while he was alive, for it gave off a sweet odour as would a god's<sup>6</sup>. It did not decay although it lay in state for 30 days in the hot Babylonian summer<sup>7</sup>. Posterity fancied that it was bathed in the substance to which the gods owe their immortality, nectar<sup>8</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Dio Cass. LXXVII 7, 2.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Ps.-Aur. Vict. *Epit.* 21, 4; *HA*, Spart. *Carac.* 2, 2.

<sup>3</sup> Hdn. IV 8, 9.

<sup>4</sup> Dio Cass. LI 16, 5.

<sup>5</sup> According to Pliny, Apion was able to tell the age at which a person had died from his portrait, painted by Apelles (*Nat.* XXXV 36, 88). This was not the original purpose of physiognomy, the science invented by Zopyrus and defined by Socrates. Later physiognomists, probably under the influence of a fatalism of Chaldaean origin (although they thought of themselves as stoics), became increasingly concerned with predicting the future. Cf. F. R. KRAUS, *Die physiognomischen Omina der Babylonier* (Leipzig 1935), 15; 17.

<sup>6</sup> Plut. *Quaest. conv.* I 6, 623 E; *Alex.* 4, 2, quoting the Peripatetic Aristoxenos. See E. ISTLER, *op. cit.* (n. 2 p. 232), 181.

<sup>7</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 77, 3; Ael. *VH* XII 64.

<sup>8</sup> Stat. *Silv.* III 2, 117 f.



Fig. 3 Glass-paste, cast from Gem.  
Late IV century B. C. Berlin.  
Staatliche Museen, Antiken Abteilung.



Fig. 4 Contorniate. Auktion 35,  
Münzen & Medaillen AG, Basle.



Fig. 5 Cameo. Paris.  
Bibliothèque nationale.



Fig. 6 Cameo. Cammin,  
Domschatz.



Fig. 7 Bronze Statuette. London. British Museum.



Fig. 8 Marble Statuette. Paris. Musée du Louvre.

In fact stronger herbs than honey were used in preparing it for its slow conveyance towards its last resting-place<sup>1</sup>. R. M. Errington has reminded us of the events that account for its not getting further than Memphis. Now Egypt happened to be the country of the world's best embalmers. Anthropologists even to-day are able to reconstruct the exact appearance of persons who lived 4000 years ago. Professional undertakers put their skill at the service of Ptolemy and of the veterans of Alexander's army, who wanted to have their king with them always. Through his mummification Alexander broke even in death with the customs of his Macedonian ancestors<sup>2</sup>. The conservative element of Greek Alexandrian society must have been unhappy at the thought of Alexander lying in the capital of the Pharaohs. His body was quickly moved to the city he had founded. It took longer before an opportunity arose for his body to be put on display in a glass cage, much as the relics of saints and martyrs are displayed even now in Roman Catholic churches.

It would be foolhardy to guess at Alexander's features on the basis of a mummy that has disappeared. All mummies look alike to the layman. The nose of Alexander's mummy (or what was left of it) stuck out sharply and had a broken profile. Whereas nature may have forgotten to endow Alexander with the aquiline nose obligatory in the ruler<sup>3</sup>, Augustus is bound to have recognised it in the mummy. This is conceivably the only criterion the Emperor brought back with him to check the accuracy of the Alexander portraits then extant.

Augustus' opinion on works of art, his judgment of the old masters as well as of contemporary artists, mattered, for his own

<sup>1</sup> Curtius says that the Egyptians and Chaldaeans removed the entrails and filled the gold coffin with *odores* (X 10, 13). Diodorus likewise speaks of ἀρώματα (XVIII 26, 3).

<sup>2</sup> H. THIERSCH, in *JDAI* 25 (1910), 56, quoting Ps.-Callisth. III 33, 6.

<sup>3</sup> E. SCHWARZENBERG, in *Bonner Jahrb.* 167 (1967), 110, n. 112.

taste and preferences became those of his age. It is unlikely that works frankly disagreeable to the imperial court were copied. Much of Hellenistic art has been lost because of the severity of Augustan eclecticism.

Augustus searched for an original, a truly contemporary Alexander portrait. He must have been convinced that all the posthumous ones falsified his features, even as the later sources were untrue to his nature. The Emperor realised that the many contemporary artists who aimed at flattery could only have betrayed Alexander. The portraitists who reproduced his character in an objective spirit must have been few indeed. Augustan art historians know of three artists who did not play Alexander false. The choice of a sculptor, a painter and a gem-carver, a selection prepared by generations of art critics, was sanctioned by the authority that only Augustus could confer. We think of Augustan art, at least as displayed on public monuments, as official art. "Official" in fact meant what was pleasing to Augustus. He must have decided himself what was to be represented on the Ara Pacis and who should figure on its procession frieze, even as he obliged Horace through the offices of Maecenas to write the *Carmen saeculare*. It would have been normal for Augustus' contemporaries to assume that Alexander too had told his court artists exactly how to portray him. Indeed he was said to have threatened punishment to those unable to curb their creative freedom, those who took liberties with his own august features. By placing ourselves in an Augustan perspective, we shall understand why Alexander was believed to have forbidden all artists except Lysippus, Apelles and Pyrgoteles to portray him<sup>1</sup>. Since one took it for

<sup>1</sup> Hor. *Epist.* II 1, 232-250 (Lysippus and Apelles); Plin. *Nat.* VII 37, 125 (Lysippus, Apelles and Pyrgoteles); XXXV 36, 85 (Apelles); XXXVII 4, 8 (Pyrgoteles); Plut. *De Alex. M. fort. Or.* II 2, 335 A; *Alex.* 4, 1 (Lysippus); Apul. *Flor.* 7 (all three, since Polycleitus is an obvious mistake for Lysippus); Arr. *Anab.* I 16, 4 (Lysippus); Chor. XXXIV (*Dial.* 21), Cod. Matr. fol. 164<sup>v</sup> = *JDAI* 9 (1894), 173 (Lysippus).

granted that no artist would have dared to disobey Alexander, Euphranor and Leochares were simply forgotten. The Alexander portraits of these artists were not copied because of Augustan prejudice in favour of the great three.

Let us thank Augustus if the work of Lysippus was not discarded offhand. Almost all we know about Lysippean Alexander portraiture is due to Plutarch, who draws on it for the description of Alexander's body that was lacking in the sources. Early (fourth-century) sources were interested in character only, so Plutarch made the best of extant portraits. He turned to Lysippus as the only sculptor who had done justice to Alexander's virtues. Lysippus best expressed the regal bearing and the warrior's manliness. He availed himself of a poetic simile in order to do so. He compared Alexander to a lion. It was not the first time that an artist had used that comparison. The lion of Chaeroneia extols the courage of the fallen Thebans<sup>1</sup>. Lysippus is perhaps the first artist to use this simile for the representation of a living contemporary. The Greeks recognised in the lion an embodiment of courage and of majesty. Among the many features that reveal the manliness of the lion, Aristotle mentions the texture and colour of his mane. According to views contemporary with Lysippus, hair should be tawny and curl only slightly; it should be ξανθός and ἀκρουλος<sup>2</sup>. Hair that is neither black and curly nor pale and lank is manly. Lysippus transposed into statuary the most telling particular of a lion's mane, its ἀναστολή. It would be misleading to compare a live lion to a portrait statue by Lysippus. Nature is best compared to nature and art to art.

On the hopelessness of trying to enforce such a law, cf. A. SHAFTESBURY, *Characteristics of men, manners, opinions, times, etc.* III 2,1.

<sup>1</sup> Paus. IX 40, 10; J. BURCKHARDT, *Antike Kunst*, Gesamtausgabe XIII (Stuttgart 1934), 101.

<sup>2</sup> E. SCHWARZENBERG, in *Bonner Jahrb.* 167 (1967), 105, n. 53.

Enough Greek lions are preserved from the second half of the fourth century B.C. to show us what to expect from a Lysippean ἀναστολή<sup>1</sup>.

The ἀναστολή has been recognised on a number of beardless heads that have been called portraits of Alexander on the strength of this feature alone. Obviously much abuse can be expected here. The indiscriminate use of the ἀναστολή for the identification of Alexander portraits is responsible for many of M. Bieber's wrong attributions. There are all kinds of ἀναστολαι and only those conforming closely to the manes of fourth-century lions may be attributed to Lysippus or to his imitators.

We owe the understanding of the lion simile, as Lysippus' own way of expressing a fundamental trait of Alexander's character, to Plutarch. We may forgive him for mistaking it for a naturalistic touch in the portrayal of the king's hair style.

Plutarch does not tell us much that we should like to know about Lysippus' statue : where it was set up, on what occasion, to which god it was dedicated. But we are able to say on the strength of his description that it was a heroic statue. From the spear, and from what we know about Lysippus' veneration for the Polycleitan Doryphoros, it is probable that Alexander was portrayed in the likeness of Achilles<sup>2</sup>. The sculptor's creation conformed to the young king's wishes, since he modelled himself on the Achilles of Homer<sup>3</sup>. All that Plutarch says about the statue applies to a hero better than to a human being. Modern archaeologists have nonetheless taken for

<sup>1</sup> Cf. a lion from a tomb in Piraeus : F. WILLEMSSEN, *Die Löwenkopf-Wasserspeier vom Dach des Zeustempels*, Olymp. Forsch. 4 (Berlin 1959), 51, Pl. 60.

<sup>2</sup> G. LIPPOLD, *Griechische Porträtstatuen* (München 1912), 101 f.; E. SCHWARZENBERG, in *Bonner Jahrb.* 167 (1967), 106, n. 66. The Lysippean Alexander must have had heroic proportions, just as the Polycleitan Achilles has (*Chor. XXXVII (Dial. 23)*, Cod. Matr. fol. 174<sup>v</sup> = *JDAI* 9 (1894), 168). Pausanias, after seeing Polydamas' statue by Lysippus in Olympia, says that he must have been of heroic size (VI 5, 1).

<sup>3</sup> E. SCHWARZENBERG, *ibid.*, 68; 70.

granted that Lysippus portrayed the physical shortcomings of a human being rather than the ideal characteristics of the hero<sup>1</sup>. Alexander's leonine appearance belongs to the Achilles comparison. Achilles is very much a lion in Homer : he resembles it down to its tawny shock of hair.

The Alexander of Lysippus carried his head a little to one side and glanced up ever so slightly. This was the sculptor's way of expressing the pride of youth and the self-assurance of the athlete, as well as the indomitable will of the hero. The Lysippean pose is known to us from the Agias and the Apoxyomenos, two undisputed works, as well as from a Heracles<sup>2</sup>. An attitude characteristic of Lysippean heroes was mistaken for the naturalistic rendering of Alexander's body. The level look of the victorious athlete was turned into the inimitable gaze of Alexander, privileged while alive to look up to Zeus as to his father. Callisthenes described Alexander looking up in prayer to his Father in Heaven<sup>3</sup>. An epigram which, if it is by Asclepiades, must date from the first half of the third century B.C. refers to the Lysippean Doryphoros as proof of Alexan-

<sup>1</sup> Physicians mistake the inclination of Alexander's neck, recognised by Plutarch on his portrait statue, for a malformation of his body. A. Winkelbauer diagnosed it as an obstipum (see F. SCHACHERMEYR, *Alexander der Grosse* (Wien 1973), 95 n. 76). A. DECHAMBRE thought it was a clear case of torticollis (*Gazette médicale de Paris*, 1851, 717-20, 745-8). Oculists have taken a Byzantine story about Alexander's heterochromy at face value (A. ESSER, in *Klinische Monatsblätter für Augenheilkunde* 84 (1930), 704-6) : see Iul. Val. I 7 ; Ps.-Callisth. I 13, 3 ; Tzetzes, Io., *Hist. Chil.* XI 368, 97-99 ; Glycas, Michael, pp. 267 f. (ed. Bonn, Vol. 14) ; Io. Mal. *Chron.* VIII, p. 194 (ed. Bonn). According to Glykas, Candace read into Alexander's heterochromous eyes that he would conquer the world, and be conquered by a woman in his turn. We do not know what they signified to Pseudo-Callisthenes, the principal source of Byzantine historians. See J. J. BACHOFEN, *Das Mutterrecht* I (Basel 1948), 451-5.

<sup>2</sup> A Heracles of Lysippean style is known from two statuettes and clay heads, all found in Smyrna : 1) Louvre : A. de RIDDER, *Collection De Clercq* 3 (Paris 1905), no. 227, Pl. 37 ; 2) Smyrna : E. SCHWARZENBERG, in *Bonner Jahrb.* 167, fig. 21 on p. 95 ; 3) Copenhagen : V. POULSEN, *Publications de la Glyptothèque Ny Carlsberg. Catalogue des terres cuites grecques et romaines* (København 1949), no. 64 f., Pl. 40.

<sup>3</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 33, 1 = Callisthenes, *FGrH* 124 F 36.

der's divine sonship<sup>1</sup>. Plutarch quotes it with distaste, seeing in the statue's proudly lifted head the influence of flattery<sup>2</sup>. In fact the neck of the original statue was only slightly inclined, corresponding in Plutarch's eyes to a habit of Alexander's<sup>3</sup>. The Diadochoi found the Lysippian Doryphoros inspiring for self-representations. Their portraitists were expected to exaggerate the angle of the King's glance and to stress the familiarity with Zeus that it implied.

Plutarch was not fooled by these theatrical displays. He felt that Lysippus was not likely to have had recourse to external means (such as the direction of Alexander's look presupposing an object in Heaven) to express the *arete* of his hero and to show that he was truly the son of Zeus. Alexander was not in the habit of raising his eyes to search for his father's celestial realm. They were, on the other hand, full of life and of energy. This is the true meaning of the words διάχυσις<sup>4</sup> and ὑγρότης<sup>5</sup>. Alexander never longed for the unattainable, and it is wrong to read πόθος into representations of him<sup>6</sup>. Plutarch was helped in recognising the manliness of his hero by realizing that his flatterers had been mistaken in trying to turn him into a god. It is doubtful whether he would have appreciated the simple spear of the Lysippian statue if Apelles had not given a thunderbolt to his portrait painting of Alexander. Plutarch has helped posterity to an understanding of the art of Lysippus

<sup>1</sup> *Anth. Pal.* XVI 120; Th. PREGER, *Inscriptiones Graecae Metricae* (Leipzig 1891), 228, no. 279. The verses are attributed to Archelaos as well. He may have added the first two verses, which attribute the statue to Lysippus. Indeed Tzetzes seems to have known only the last two.

<sup>2</sup> Plut. *De Alex. M. fort. Or. I* 9, 331 A; *Or. II* 2, 335 B; Tzetzes, Io., *Hist. Chil.* VIII 200, 421-427; XI 368, 100-108.

<sup>3</sup> Plut. *De Alex. M. fort. Or. II* 2, 335 B; *Alex.* 4, 1.

<sup>4</sup> E. SCHWARZENBERG, in *Bonner Jahrb.* 167, 72. Cf. also Plut. *Alex.* 19, 4.

<sup>5</sup> E. SCHWARZENBERG, *ibid.*, 107 n. 80. Cf. also Polemo, *Anecdota Graeca* descript. J. CRAMER, IV (Oxford 1837), 255: δρθαλμοί... ὑγροὶ λάμποντες ὡς λιβάδες, ἥθη χρηστὰ ἐκφαίνουσιν.

<sup>6</sup> J. P. GUÉPIN, "Leonine brows and the shadow of Pyrgoteles", in *BVAB* 39 (1964), 132 f.

by challenging the preposterous airs of Alexander's imitators, as well as the pretentious imitations of Lysippus' followers.

Lysippus' reputation as a master of portraiture prevented the greater part of antiquity from appreciating his aims. It is hard to tell how he came by his reputation. The sins of distant pupils were perhaps attributed to him<sup>1</sup>. Plutarch stands alone in not allowing common views to prejudice his appreciation of Lysippean portraiture. He realized that too great a facility impairs a grasp of the essential, that the eye trained to perceive details important in a passport photograph cannot understand human nature.

The discrepancy between portraits by Lysippus and current opinion about them shows that ancient connoisseurs did not know, any more than more recent ones, what they were talking about. Augustan monuments give the lie to contemporary talk about Lysippus. No copies or echoes of his Alexander portrait can be dated to the period of Augustus. Patrons must have felt uneasy about it. The reason is not far to seek: late Republican portraiture was too obviously inspired by the famous work, for people in the know, eager to abide by the Emperor's preferences and able to follow his artistic guidance,

<sup>1</sup> Lysippus was thought in antiquity to have been the sculptor who copied nature most closely of all. He was praised above all other artists for *ad veritatem . . . accessisse optime* (Quint. *Inst.* XII 10, 9). Now, he is certain not to have wanted something different from contemporary students of human nature, from all those for whom Socrates meant the true beginning of philosophy and who wanted *ad veritatem vitae proprius accedere* (Cic. *De orat.* I 51, 220). Cicero knew that the purpose of the visual arts was no different from that of the dramatic arts: that they should study human nature and remain true to life and to man. The aim of the artist has ever been *veritas* (Cic. *De orat.* III 56, 214, of the actor; *Inv.* II 1, of the painter, quoted by C. L. URLICH, *Observationes de arte Praxitelis* (Würzburg 1858), 9). The Lysippean imitation of nature was unfortunately interpreted in a naturalistic way, his conception of *veritas* being understood in a veristic sense. The Romans believed that the art of Lysippus displayed the kind of verism found for instance in the famous wounded bitch on the Capitol. Pliny praises its *indiscreta veri similitudo* (*Nat.* XXXIV 17, 38). On this whole question, cf. R. KEKULÉ von STRADONITZ, "Über einen angeblichen Ausdruck des Lysipp", in *JDAI* 8 (1893), 39-50; E. SCHWARZENBERG, in *Bonner Jahrb.* 167, nn. 2, 24, 25.

to feel safe in harking back to it. They preferred to revive the style of the pre-Lysippean pre-Hellenistic period and to copy the works of Polycleitus. They found the dignity and the restraint of the Doryphoros ideally suited to representations of the Princeps. The Augustus from Prima Porta is different indeed from an honorary statue of Hellenistic or late Republican date, whose arrogantly<sup>1</sup> lifted head seems like a caricature of Alexander's stance. The portraits of the Epigoni were too blatantly derived from the famous statue by Lysippus, they were too deliberate a falsification of the master's aim, to permit Augustan craftsmen to copy him in a serene and objective spirit. The "Alexandros Doryphoros" was consequently not taken up in the smallish repertoire of Greek statuary that early Imperial workshops copied. We must expect a weak transmission in later times also.

The Azara herm is generally believed to be a copy of the spear-bearing Alexander<sup>2</sup>. It owes its fame to its inscription<sup>3</sup>, as well as to the fact that Napoleon owned it. It belongs to a large group of herms found in the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries in a villa near Tivoli<sup>4</sup>. They were made by the same workshop, apparently in Hadrianic or post-Hadrianic times,

<sup>1</sup> Quint. *Inst.* XI 3, 69 : *caput supinum* = *arrogantia*, quoted by E. C. EVANS, "Roman descriptions of personal appearance in history and biography", in *HSPb* 46 (1935), 47.

<sup>2</sup> M. BIEBER, *op. cit.*, 32 f.; T. HÖLSCHER, *Ideal und Wirklichkeit in den Bildnissen Alexanders des Grossen* (Heidelberg 1971), Pl. 3 f.

<sup>3</sup> W. FROEHNER, *Inscriptions grecques du Louvre*, no. 71; *IG XIV* 1130; Th. SCHREIBER, *op. cit.* (n. 1 p. 225), 28-40. The inscription should read 'Αλέξανδρος Φιλίππου Μακεδόνιος as it must follow the titulature of the other herms from the same workshop. The correct form Μακεδών is too short. See the Comte de Clarac quoted in *IG XIV* *cit.* The Latin *Macedonius* has probably contaminated the form of the ethnic. The reading suggested by W. Froehner and generally accepted since, Μακεδόνων βασιλεὺς, raises more difficulties than it solves. It is not a titulature Alexander would have used himself. It was used later only to avoid confusion. See R. M. ERRINGTON, "Macedonian 'Royal Style' and its historical significance", in *JHS* 94 (1974), 31; 37.

<sup>4</sup> *IG XIV* p. 304; T. LORENZ, *Galerien von griechischen Philosophen- und Dichterbildnissen bei den Römern* (Mainz 1965), 20-25.

and are easily recognised by the letter-forms of their inscriptions, by the square omicrons and thetas in particular. The Alexander herm is so badly worn as to be practically worthless. All the recognisable features, the mouth and the eyelids, have been recut. The nose, needless to say, was missing. The face is in fact a blank. Enough is left of the hair to enable us to call the Campana herm a replica<sup>1</sup>. Both show the ἀναστολή that we have been taught to expect on a Lysippian head. The face of the Campana herm is modern. In the original the hair must have been bound by a simple fillet. Indeed we would expect the Alexander Doryphoros not to wear any diadem or emblem of royalty.

A head in the British Museum was taken by F. Studniczka for a copy of the same original. I believe, as K. Gebauer says, that it is a mid-nineteenth-century forgery based on the Azara herm<sup>2</sup>. The mouth is especially unconvincing.

A claim has recently been made for a head in Vienna (in my possession)<sup>3</sup> (our Fig. 1). It is different from the herms, especially in the turn of the head to the left. It is at least preserved well enough to make comparisons with work attributed to Lysippus meaningful. It bears being put next to the so-called Diphilos<sup>4</sup>, as well as to the head of an athlete, a boxer

<sup>1</sup> K. GEBAUER, *art. cit.*, 62, 97, no. 54; G. M. A. RICHTER, *The portraits of the Greeks* 3 (London 1965), 255, figs. 1730-1733.

<sup>2</sup> B.M. Cat. III 1859; F. STUDNICZKA, *Zur Erinnerung an Theodor Schreiber*, Ber. Sächs. Ges. d. Wiss. 64 (1912), 197 f.; K. GEBAUER, *art. cit.*, 62, 97, no. 55.

<sup>3</sup> E. SCHWARZENBERG, in *Bonner Jahrb.* 167, 86-92; H. DÖHL, *Der Eros des Lysipp* (Diss. Göttingen 1968), Anm. 110; T. HÖLSCHER, *op. cit.*, 54 f.; E. BERGER, "Ein neues Porträt Alexanders des Grossen", in *AK* 14 (1971), 142; E. PARIBENI, in R. BIANCHI BANDINELLI (ed.), *L'Arte dell'Antichità classica* I (Torino 1976), Nr. 496.

<sup>4</sup> E. SCHWARZENBERG, *ibid.*, 88, 90, figs. 11-13. The "Diphilos" may be compared to the Olympiodorus in Oslo, the original of which probably dates from soon after his archonship of 294-3: G. M. A. RICHTER, *op. cit.*, II 162, figs. 894-896. In so far as it is possible to make chronological deductions from arguments about style based on Roman copies only, the Olympiodorus would appear to be older than the Demosthenes of 280 B.C., but younger than the "Diphilos". The latter may be compared to a head known to me only through a photograph from a sale catalogue (Sotheby 27.VII.1933, no. 113, Pl. 2).

or a pankratiast, known in two copies<sup>1</sup>. It reminds us of a Dionysus in Venice, recently attributed to Lysippus<sup>2</sup>. Nor are there any stylistic incompatibilities between it and the Apoxyomenos.

All this does not entitle us to attribute the original, of which the head in Vienna is a copy, to the Master himself. It is on the whole safer to refrain from attributing works known only through copies to a particular master, and from entering a battle, in which so many German art historians have discredited themselves of late. Let us say no more than that it is a faithful copy of a late fourth-century original, and that it does represent Alexander. The copy seems to be of Trajanic date, therefore to be contemporary with Plutarch's *Life*. Like his portrayal, it is not so much preoccupied with rectifying earlier prejudice as with trying to be fair to Alexander. It is less aggressively objective than an Augustan copy would have been. It is eminently suited for the cultured non-specialist beholder to enjoy. I propose that you imagine a portrait by Lysippus along the lines suggested by this head.

Because of the still greater appeal of the two-dimensional, it would be even more important to provide a non-misleading painted portrait, an image capable through its colour of satisfying the senses as well as the intellect. Augustus knew at least two representations of Alexander by Apelles, great panels that hung in his Forum<sup>3</sup>. They were originally intended for Ptolemy I, to whose court Apelles went after Alexander's death. Octavian carried them away to Rome, together with the art treasures that had belonged to Cleopatra.

<sup>1</sup> T. DOHRN, "Athletenkopf aus Lucus Feroniae", in *Antike Plastik* 6 (1967), 71-74. A replica in Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum, Inv. I 1023.

<sup>2</sup> J. DÖRIG, "Le Dionysos de l'Hélicon, œuvre de Lysippe", in *Antike Plastik* 12 (1973), 125-30.

<sup>3</sup> Plin. *Nat.* XXXV 10, 27; 36, 93 f.

One of the panels represented Alexander as Dionysus triumphant on his way home from India. Alexander was commonly imagined to have achieved apotheosis as a new Dionysus<sup>1</sup>. The notion of his return from the East, of his victorious *thiasos* through Carmania, particularly appealed to the Alexandrians<sup>2</sup>. They depicted him as the young god, wearing, instead of a *nebris*, the skin of an elephant, the trunk of which is artfully entwined about one of its tusks on a glass paste<sup>3</sup>. The theme of the triumphant Dionysos-Alexander was central to the *pompai* that the Ptolemies organised at their accession. The Roman triumphal processions of late Republican times owe a lot to these Alexandrian ones, with their oriental splendour and their elephants. Elephants, whether of Indian or of African origin, were to the people of Alexandria a reminder of Alexander. Ptolemy I used the animal as his emblem for that reason<sup>4</sup>.

Apelles in this painting played on the aspect of Alexander least palatable to Augustus. He is likely to have displayed it in Rome during the victory celebrations only as an example of the art of the captured Alexandria. The Roman people would have recognised Antony's motley levy from the East in the chained Indian prisoners. The painting was not put on public display for years afterwards, until it found a permanent home in Augustus' Forum. By then it was no longer associated with a particular victory. The Indian prisoners had become per-

<sup>1</sup> Diog. Laert. VI 63 (Athens).

<sup>2</sup> P. M. FRASER, *Ptolemaic Alexandria*, 202. Arrian does not name the source for his description of Alexander's *thiasos* (VI 28, 1 f.). It is likely to have been Cleitarchus of Alexandria. Cf. *Schol.* in Apoll. Rh. II 904 = Clitarchus, *FGrH* 137 F 17; E. SCHWARZENBERG, *Zum Alexander Rondanini...*, 174 n. 177.

<sup>3</sup> A. FURTWÄNGLER, *Antike Gemmen*, Pl. 37, no. 23; G. LIPPOLD, *Gemmen und Kameen des Altertums und der Neuzeit* (Stuttgart 1922), Pl. 68, no. 1. The features are those of the young Dionysus.

<sup>4</sup> P. M. FRASER, *Ptolemaic Alexandria*, 205; E. SCHWARZENBERG, *Zum Alexander Rondanini...*, 174.

sonifications of the woes of war, banished by the Pax Augusta<sup>1</sup>. Augustus himself was recognised under the features of Alexander. Claudius had the face of the one altered into the other<sup>2</sup>.

It was not the Emperor's modesty that prevented the over-painting of Apelles' masterpiece. Had he felt shy at being identified with Alexander in this way, he would not have worn a signet-ring bearing his own effigy immediately after discarding the stone with the king's portrait<sup>3</sup>. Augustus was prevented from doing what Claudius did by consideration for the past. He realised that the art of Apelles was irreplaceable. He must have felt that whoever was capable of falsifying the work of Apelles did not deserve to know about the original Alexander. With Augustus the Romans entered an age of greater awareness of the value of artistic and historical documents. Earlier, perhaps more creative periods had fewer qualms about deleting a person's effigy if he became unpopular, about replacing the head of a portrait-statue if it was needed to represent somebody else. We would like to think that it was not Julius Caesar himself but the vulgar Claudius who altered the equestrian statue of Alexander in the Forum Iulii into a portrait of the former<sup>4</sup>.

The other panel represented Alexander in the company of his half-brothers, the Dioscuri, crowned by Victory. The two paintings obviously formed a pair. They must have borne some formal resemblance to each other. I suggest putting a chariot in the second painting as well. Nike is habitually represented on Greek commemorative monuments crowning the

<sup>1</sup> Serv. *Aen.* I 294; cf. E. SCHWARZENBERG, *ibid.*

<sup>2</sup> On both paintings: Plin. *Nat.* XXXV 36, 94. Seneca's *Apocolocyntosis* would have fallen flat, if Claudius had not taken the prospect of his own apotheosis, and hence the apotheosis of Augustus, very seriously. The same lack of humour may be detected in the portrait statue of Claudius described in n. 3 p. 260.

<sup>3</sup> H. U. INSTINSKY, *Die Siegel des Kaisers Augustus* (Baden-Baden 1962), 31; 36; D. KIENAST, *art. cit.*, 435.

<sup>4</sup> Stat. *Silv.* I 1, 84-87.

victorious team of horses<sup>1</sup>. I suggest placing Alexander in the chariot, led by the Dioscuri, with Nike hovering above or behind the King<sup>2</sup>. Rome was at liberty to recognize Gaius and Lucius marching on either side of the triumphal chariot.

What Apelles painted while Alexander was alive, at least before the Indian expedition, was different in spirit from what he did for the Diadochoi. The early portraits are those that would have appealed to Augustus most. They were also the ones most difficult to secure. Augustus, far from extorting the works he fancied from the sanctuaries of the Greeks, is known to have returned some of those that had been illegally removed during the civil wars. The Ἀλέξανδρος κεραυνοφόρος was the property of Artemis at Ephesus<sup>3</sup>. The painting had been commissioned by her high priest, the Megabyzos, to com-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the Lysander dedication at Delphi (Paus. X 9, 4) and the Syracusan Demarateia.

<sup>2</sup> *Anth. Pal.* XVI 345 (statues of Alexander and of Victory next to each other); Athen. V 202 a (statues of Athena and of Nike on either side of Alexander).

<sup>3</sup> Plin. *Nat.* XXXV 36, 92. The painting is mentioned in Plut. *Alex.* 4, 3 and Cic. *Verr.* V 60, 135. Ael. *VH* II 3 may well refer to the same painting. In that case Alexander was painted on horseback. Alexander took part in a *pompe* at Ephesus that was part religious procession, part military parade. Arrian says that the whole army participated, as if it was going into battle (I 18, 2). Now Alexander normally fought on horseback, indeed he had distinguished himself by leading the cavalry attack at the Granicus shortly before. He must have ridden in the procession. The Keraunophoros and the *Pompe* of the Megabyzos may be the same painting (Plin. *Nat.* XXXV 36, 93).

Alexander was represented on horseback at Olympia, at Delphi and at Dion, each time as part of a group: Paus. VI 11, 1 (Olympia); H. von ROQUES DE MAUMONT, *Antike Reiterstandbilder* (Berlin 1958), 26-28 (Craterus' dedication at Delphi); H. B. SIEDENTOPF, *Das hellenistische Reiterdenkmal* (Waldsassen 1968), 46 f. (*turma Alexandri* at Dion). If the equestrian portrait statue took on a new importance and significance after Alexander, it is probably because of these dedications (G. HIRSCHFELD, in *Arch. Zeit.* 1882, cols. 127 f.). The first honorary equestrian statue recorded was put up by Athens for a Macedonian Asandros in 314-3 B.C. (H. B. SIEDENTOPF, *op. cit.*, 83).

The interpretation of the painting given in the text can be combined with its reconstruction suggested in this footnote only if the reader will accept the representation of a mounted Zeus in the late fourth century B.C.

memorate Alexander's visit to the Artemisium in 334 B.C. It must have been dedicated to the goddess as an expression of the thanks of the city because Alexander had been instrumental in the completion of her temple<sup>1</sup>. Plutarch is referring to this painting when he takes Apelles to task for having painted Alexander with the thunderbolt of Zeus instead of being satisfied, as Lysippus was, with the weapon of a hero<sup>2</sup>.

Plutarch takes it to be a portrait-painting not different in nature from contemporary ones. There is a statue of Claudius, of which Plutarch may have seen a replica at Olympia, that shows the Emperor as Zeus, with an eagle at his feet, looking up adoringly at its master<sup>3</sup>. This is the kind of portraiture Plutarch disapproved of. Having seen with his own eyes what art driven by flattery can lead to, he felt entitled to speak about conditions at Alexander's court. In fact the painting is not a portrait at all, unless one takes the word portrait in a meaning different from the established one.

The Thunderbolt-bearer was dedicated in commemoration of an important local event. Contemporary Ephesians are bound to have seen it as a replacement for the statue of Philip that the pro-Persian oligarchs had smashed a year before Alexander's arrival. The statue had been put up by the Demos after Parmenion had freed Ephesus together with a number of

<sup>1</sup> E. SCHWARZENBERG, *Zum Alexander Rondanini...*, 166.

<sup>2</sup> Plut. *De Is. et Osir.* 24, 360 D. Plutarch praises the painting in *Ad princ. iner.* 3, 780 F.

<sup>3</sup> E. CURTIUS/F. ADLER, *Olympia. Die Ergebnisse der von dem Deutschen Reich veranstalteten Ausgrabung III* (Berlin 1894), Pl. 60, no. 1, signed by Philathenaios and Hegias; G. LIPPOLD, *Die Skulpturen des Vatikanischen Museums I* (Berlin 1936), Sala Rotonda 550; A. HEKLER, *Die Bildnis-kunst der Griechen und Römer* (Stuttgart 1912), Pl. 18 a. A cameo represents Claudius naked except for the aegis shaped like a cloak or perhaps a *paludamentum*. He carries a thunderbolt. He is standing next to a trophy and a chained barbarian prisoner. The Emperor is leaning on a spear, the weapon of Achilles as well as the *summa imperii*. The eagle is gazing at his features. See F. EICHLER and E. KRIS, *Die Kameen im Kunsthistorischen Museum Wien* (Wien 1927), no. 20, Pl. 7.

other cities<sup>1</sup>. While Ephesus was setting up its statue of Philip, the Demos of Eresos was erecting an altar to him<sup>2</sup>. Actually not even a hatred for oligarchy would have induced the Eresians to sacrifice to Philip as to a god. The altar was dedicated to Zeus. But not to any Zeus, certainly not to the one by whom their political opponents were wont to swear. He was the one who had saved them by counselling Philip, Ζεὺς Φιλίππιος. Hence the painting by Apelles also may have represented Zeus Alexandreios. Suppose a Roman tourist had seen the painting without guide or guide-book. He would have assumed that it represented Zeus because of the thunderbolt.

When and why was Zeus mistaken for Alexander? What mistake there was must have been deliberate and must have occurred not long after Alexander's visit. It was impossible to tell whether the statue of Glykera put up by Harpalos represented a *hetaira* or Aphrodite<sup>3</sup>. Who knows if Zeus Seleukios was not as deliberately equivocal<sup>4</sup>, and whether he was not Seleukos as much as he was Zeus? Apelles must have painted his Zeus sufficiently like Alexander to make the confusion possible, or at least to invite comparison. He was of the young, beardless type that is common in antiquity. He was armed,

<sup>1</sup> On Parmenio's campaign of 336-5 and the events in Ephesus prior to Alexander's visit, cf. E. BADIAN, "Alexander the Great and the Greeks of Asia", in *Ancient Society and Institutions*, Studies presented to V. Ehrenberg (Oxford 1966), 40-42. On the statue of Philip, see ARR. I 17, 11; CHR. HABICHT, *Gottmenschenstum und griechische Städte*<sup>2</sup> (München 1970), 14-16.

<sup>2</sup> W. DITTENBERGER, *OGIS* I (Leipzig 1903), no. 8 a I, lines 5 f., p. 24; U. von WILAMOWITZ-MOELLENDORFF, *Der Glaube der Hellenen* II (Berlin 1932), 263 n. 1; *IG XII Suppl.* (Berlin 1939), p. 66.

<sup>3</sup> Harpalos also dedicated a shrine to Aphrodite Pythonike in honour of an early mistress: *Athen.* XIII 595 c-d. Was Aphrodite Stratoniakis a goddess or a queen? See *Anth. Pal.* XVI 79; CHR. HABICHT, *op. cit.*, 100 f.; E. SCHWARZENBERG, "Knidische Miscelle", in *Bonner Jahrb.* 169 (1969), 91 line 6. Female portraits remained ideal longer than male ones.

<sup>4</sup> Zeus Seleukios is attested by an inscription found in Lydia, dating from between 228 and 224 B.C.: A. D. NOCK, "Notes on Ruler-Cult", in *JHS* 48 (1928), 42.

as often in Asia Minor, especially in Caria<sup>1</sup>. A gem shows a Zeus of the type that Apelles probably used: indeed most modern archaeologists mistake it for a portrait of Alexander<sup>2</sup>.

Zeus and Alexander have often been confused, because the portraiture of Alexander influenced the iconography of that god. The fact that Zeus is often given an ἀναστολή misled Winckelmann into believing that the portraiture of Alexander was derived from representations of Zeus.

An artist asked to paint the Zeus of a particular king was bound to mould his idea about the god on the king's character. Everybody imagines God in his own way. God is but the projection, the extrapolation, the sublimation of man. We make God after our own image. How is a fourth-century artist likely to have conceived the Zeus of Philip as well as the Zeus of Alexander?<sup>3</sup> The former must have shown Olympian gravity and been reminiscent of the god in Homer: he wills war, mindful of its necessity. The latter is equally war-minded, but as swift as Ares. Thought does not appear to precede action in Alexander.

<sup>1</sup> The god may be represented on a silver medallion from the province of Asia in Berlin: F. IMHOOF-BLUMER, "Beiträge zur Erklärung griechischer Münztypen", in *Nomisma* 6 (1911), 15, Pl. 2, no. 4; London: *ibid.*, 16, Pl. 2, no. 3; A. B. COOK, *Zeus* II (Cambridge 1925), 577 f.; 705 f.; A. LAUMONIER, *Les cultes indigènes en Carie* (Paris 1958), 44; 186. But what is now generally thought to be a reproduction of Zeus Ogmios may simply represent Hadrian. See C. O. MÜLLER and F. WIESELER, *Denkmäler der alten Kunst*<sup>3</sup> (Göttingen 1877), 22 f., no. 22 b. The Carians gave to the Emperor the attributes of their local god, encouraged by his new epithet "Olympius".

<sup>2</sup> On the Neisos gem (after the name engraved upon it): A. FURTWÄNGLER, "Gemmen mit Künstlerinschriften", in *JDAI* 4 (1889), 69; Th. SCHREIBER, *op. cit.* (n. 1 p. 225), 205-7; O. WASER, *Zeus*, in W. H. ROSCHER, *Ausführliches Lexikon ... VI*, cols. 756 f.; W. B. KAISER, "Ein Meister der Glyptik aus dem Umkreis Alexanders des Grossen", in *JDAI* 77 (1962), 239; 233; 237. A possible replica in E. GERHARD, *Antike Bildwerke* (Cotta 1844), Pl. 308, no. 32, p. 421 b.

<sup>3</sup> Attempts to identify portraits of Philip without this question having been tackled previously are likely to be unfortunate. See V. von GRAEVE, "Zum Herrscherbild Philipps II. und Philipps III. von Makedonien", in *AA* 1973, 252-4.

Plutarch cannot be blamed for having been misled by all the available evidence in the interpretation of a painting that he perhaps never saw, the more so as its theme may have been deliberately ambiguous. Antiquity preserves the memory of a similar ambiguity. Pausanias mentions a statue of Alexander in the Altis made to look like Zeus<sup>1</sup>: Διὸς εἰκασμένος δῆθεν. We are not told why it was made to resemble the many statues of Zeus, such as were permitted in early times in that location. If we were dealing with a work from Alexander's own times, it would probably have been intended as a representation of Zeus. It appears to have been put up by one of the settlers whom Augustus had brought to Corinth after Actium and was in all likelihood intended to honour this emperor. There can be no doubt that the statue was dedicated to Alexander: Pausanias must have read the inscription. We are left to wonder how pleased the emperor would have been by a work identifying him not only with Zeus but also with Alexander.

A figure on a wall-painting from the house of the Vettii at Pompeii has been identified as a copy of the Keraunophoros<sup>2</sup>. Indeed its youth and its proudly lifted head have reminded archaeologists of Alexander from the moment of its discovery, and the identification has been sustained recently<sup>3</sup>. It will presumably be proposed for as long as the context of the fresco is not taken seriously. It is imperative to take the plan of the entire room into account. The so-called Alexander belongs to a series of four figures illustrating the amours of Zeus. Danae, Leda and another unidentified female conquest are represented

<sup>1</sup> Paus. V 25, 1; E. SCHWARZENBERG, *Zum Alexander Rondanini...*, nn. 55 f., where another date and a different explanation are given.

<sup>2</sup> *Regio VI* 15, 1, of late Neronian date: see K. SCHEFOLD, *Die Wände Pompejis* (Berlin 1957), 142.

<sup>3</sup> G. de LORENZO, *Una probabile copia pompeiana del ritratto di Alessandro Magno dipinto da Apelle* (Napoli 1900); J. SIX, "Apelleisches", in *JDAI* 25 (1910), 155; P. MINGAZZINI, "Una copia dell'Alexandros Keraunophoros di Apelle", in *JbBerlMus* 3 (1961), 7-17.

facing him on the other walls<sup>1</sup>. The god is characterised by the thunderbolt and by the eagles forming the arm-rests of his throne.

I have nothing to offer in helping the reader to imagine what the painting by Apelles must have looked like. It is a great pity that Justus Lipsius or some other humanist did not suggest the thunderbolt-bearing Alexander as a theme to Rubens. We have tried to gain an insight into the portraits by Lysippus and Apelles. We know nothing about the third master who mattered to Augustus, Pyrgoteles, except that he is connected with Alexander<sup>2</sup>.

The king did not advertise his features on his coins<sup>3</sup>. He is therefore not likely to have sealed with them either. I take all Alexander portraits on coins and on gems to be posthumous. Pyrgoteles probably worked for the Diadochoi. The degree of resemblance between his Alexander portraits and the coins of Lysimachos with the head of Alexander-Ammon can only be guessed at.

Augustus sealed letters and documents with his own effigy, carved by Dioscurides<sup>4</sup>. But during the years following his victory over Antony he sealed with a head of Alexander carved by an artist whose name is not recorded. Augustan critics are not likely to have praised Pyrgoteles as the only carver

<sup>1</sup> A. MAU, "Scavi di Pompei", in *MDAI(R)* 11 (1896), 23; A. SOGLIANO, "La casa dei Vettii", in *Monumenti Antichi pubbl. della Accad. dei Lincei* 8 (1898), 262; E. PETERSEN, "Zeus oder Alexander mit dem Blitz", in *MDAI(R)* 15 (1900), 160-4; Th. SCHREIBER, *op. cit.*, 93 f.

<sup>2</sup> H. von BRUNN, *Geschichte der griechischen Künstler*<sup>2</sup> (Stuttgart 1889), 320.

<sup>3</sup> As far as I know, numismatists have not yet been able to disprove the old dictum that there are no portraits on Greek coins before Alexander's death. See F. IMHOOF-BLUMER, *Porträtköpfe auf antiken Münzen* (Leipzig 1885), 5: "Die sicheren Anfänge des eigentlichen Porträtwesens fallen ... frühestens in die Diadochenzeit. Als erster und blosser Versuch in dieser Richtung kann etwa der Kopf Alexanders des Grossen gelten, welchen Ptolemaios Soter als Statthalter ... auf seine Münzen gesetzt hat." Cf. E. Q. VISCONTI, *Iconographie grecque* I (Milan 1824), 9.

<sup>4</sup> H. von BRUNN, *op. cit.*, 320.

capable of representing Alexander if the Emperor had owned a work attributed to some other master.

Copies of Pyrgoteles' work have been looked for among the cameos of Augustan and post-Augustan date. They were made for the Court and are faithful reflections of Imperial propaganda. H. Kyrieleis has shown that the cameo once in the possession of Christina of Sweden does not represent either Alexander or Ptolemy, and that it is of late or post-Augustan date. It must represent Augustus himself<sup>1</sup> (our Fig. 2). Earlier scholars were misled by the features and attributes undoubtedly derived from Alexander portraits. Indeed the aegis, side-whiskers and the hair escaping from under the helmet belong to Alexander and not to Augustus. It is only the helmet that prevents the hair from springing up into a regular ἀναστολή.

The head resembles the head of Alexander on coins of Ptolemy I<sup>2</sup>. The double profile, one head overlapping the other, is normal for representations of the Ptolemaic king and queen. These features point to Alexandria. The Roman carver probably used an Alexandrian model. H. Kyrieleis tentatively identifies the female head as Livia. Roma is a further possibility. It resembles the Aphrodite of Praxitelean type that was used for Berenike portraits. Whenever it occurs next to an Alexander portrait it must represent Olympias. Only in Egypt, where brother married sister to form the ruling pair, is Alexander likely to have been portrayed next to a woman. The artist did not choose one of Alexander's wives or his sister Cleopatra, because of the part played by Olympias in the Egyptian story about Alexander's birth. Olympias was shown beside her son almost as the Virgin Mary is shown next to Christ Cosmocrator on Byzantine coins.

<sup>1</sup> H. KYRIELEIS, "Der Kameo Gonzaga", in *Bonner Jahrb.* 171 (1971), 162-89. On the cameo's history, cf. N. T. de GRUMMOND, "The real Gonzaga Cameo", in *AJA* 78 (1974), 427-9.

<sup>2</sup> M. BIEBER, *op. cit.*, fig. 40.

The cameo is an adaptation of an Alexander portrait made in Alexandria under Ptolemy I. It must have been kindred in spirit to the paintings by Apelles in the Forum of Augustus. Although representing Alexander, they flattered Ptolemy and underlined his claims to legitimacy. A gem-portrait of Alexander not done for Ptolemy would no doubt have been more pleasing to Augustus.

Such a thing may exist. An Alexander portrait on a gem of late fourth-century date has come down to us in two copies, glass pastes of presumably Augustan date<sup>1</sup> (our Fig. 3). The approximate date of the original is not open to doubt. It is enough to compare it to coins. We need look no further than Lysimachus. Notice what a recent specialist on fourth-century art was bold enough to call the Pyrgotelean brows<sup>2</sup>. Notice the absence of all attributes indicative of royalty. The gem resembled the head in Vienna in the rapid flow of the hair, different from the showy calligraphic locks on the coins. The most pleasing feature of these Alexander portraits is the look of freshness, of eager youth. The King has not taken on airs yet. He knows how to command without striking an attitude.

The same features occur on a contorniate<sup>3</sup> (our Fig. 4). But here the neck thrown back and the eyes turned to Heaven have been added to indicate Alexander's divine origin<sup>4</sup>. These

<sup>1</sup> Berlin : *Antike Gemmen in deutschen Sammlungen* II (München 1969), 98 f., no. 227, Pl. 48 = our Fig. 3 ; Munich : I 1 (München 1968), no. 399, Pl. 46.

<sup>2</sup> J. P. GUÉPIN, *art. cit.*, 129-39.

<sup>3</sup> Münzen und Medaillen AG, *Auktion 35*, 1967, no. 189 = our Fig. 4 ; A. ALFÖLDI und E. ALFÖLDI, *Die Kontorniat-Medaillons*, Teil I in neuer Bearb. (Berlin 1976).

<sup>4</sup> Late antiquity, forgetting that the epigram by Asclepiades (n. 1 p. 252) contains more of a challenge than of a supplication, saw in the Alexander by Lysippus a prefiguration of the statue of Constantine, praying to his Father *qui es in coelis* ; it was haunted by the heavenward gaze of the monarch. See H. P. L'ORANGE, *Apotheosis in ancient Portraiture* (Oslo 1947), 19-27. The upward glance of Alexander on the contorniate resembles that of the Emperor Constantine on contemporary coins. Constantine decreed that he should be

features, not present in Alexander and in Lysippus' representation of him, were recognised by the Epigoni, who tried to imitate them in order to justify their claims to Alexander's throne. A cameo in the Bibliothèque Nationale of roughly the same date derives from a similar model<sup>1</sup> (our Fig. 5). There can be no doubt as to the identification, since Olympias appears on the reverse. An early portrait of Alexander, close to the one known through the Augustan casts, has been preserved by late Antiquity.

I have shown you only what is helpful in order to recreate the Alexander portraits by the three artists praised by all sources later than Augustus. Accept it as a compensation for all that should be discarded.

represented on his coins in an attitude of prayer (Eus. *De vita Const.* IV 15). The notion that the Emperor's contemporaries had about his appearance was not based on observation (for who would dare to look at his face?), but on the study of physiognomical handbooks. Constantine was given an aquiline nose and leonine eyes, thereby causing him to be compared to Alexander, because that is how the handbooks said a ruler ought to look (cf. Cedrenus, Georgius (ed. Bonn 1838), I 472 f.). The personal descriptions of the Emperors that Malalas, for instance, gives in his *Chronography*, are based on what the handbooks said about how persons with such a career behind them must have looked. Dionysius ek Phourna instructs painters on how to represent the saints according to the same principle. The Byzantine world considered all attempts at naturalistic portraiture to be sinful. The realm of *vanitas* in the visual arts must have been defined by documents such as the beginning of Porphyry's *Life of Plotinus*.

<sup>1</sup> Cat. *Babelon* no. 230, Pl. 22; H. KYRIELEIS, in *Bonner Jahrb.* 171 (1971), 177-9, fig. 12 = our Fig. 5.

## DISCUSSION

*M. Badian*: It seems to me that two important questions arise, concerning the influence of Eratosthenes on the literary and of Augustus on the artistic portrait of Alexander. To take the first one first: I am not really aware that any evidence justifies the great importance that has been assigned to Eratosthenes in shaping Plutarch's picture of Alexander in particular and the literary portrait in general. I have shown in *Historia* 7 (1958), 432-40, how the "Romantic" *Quellenforscher* (Ed. Schwartz and W. W. Tarn, in this case) could create Eratosthenes fragments in Plutarch out of practically nothing. This—and whatever else I at present remember of Eratosthenes' references to Alexander—does not seem to add up to anything very decisive; certainly by no means to any suggestion that Eratosthenes thought the flourishing of learning and of science in Alexandria under royal patronage due in any way to Alexander.

*M. Schwarzenberg*: The Eratosthenes fragments, important to Alexander scholars, have not been systematically collected. F. Jacoby lists the fragments from his historical works, while H. Berger limits his discussion to passages of geographical interest. Eratosthenes stresses the significance of Alexander's conquests for the knowledge of Asia minor, of the Balkans, of the entire oecumene. He realised geography would be in its infancy but for Alexander (sources quoted n. 2 p. 233). I was induced by the scantiness of the evidence to include in my Hellenistic Alexander-portrait material not specifically attributed to Eratosthenes. If the result should turn out to be only partially Eratosthenian, it still amounts to an image of Alexander typical of Hellenistic times, and corresponds to the notion entertained by cultured people in third century Alexandria.

*M. Wirth*: Wie Eratosthenes im einzelnen Alexander sah, scheint m.E. ungeklärt und aus den Fragmenten kaum zu klären. Der

stoische Tenor der hier zu strapazierenden Plutarchstelle legt Zweifel nahe.

Indes bringt besonders seine Auseinandersetzung mit den Alexanderhistorikern in gewissen zeitlichen Zusammenhang mit Abfassung des Alexanderromans, die ich aus vielen Gründen in der 2. Hälfte des 3. Jhdts. ansetzen möchte. Sie wäre damit vielleicht Bestandteil einer alexandrinischen Alexander-Renaissance, die von offizieller Seite inauguriert wurde, die Existenz eines Ptolemäerreiches wie auch dessen bisherige Entwicklung zu rechtfertigen.

*M. Schwarzenberg*: Sie warnen mit Recht davor, einen stoischen Einfluss auf Eratosthenes anzunehmen. Wir verdanken den Vergleich zwischen dem Alexanderreich und Zeno's Republik Plutarch und nicht Eratosthenes, der nicht einmal dort erwähnt wird, wo er tatsächlich benutzt wurde, für den Meinungsunterschied zwischen Aristoteles und Alexander in der Frage, wie man die Barbaren behandeln soll (*De Alex. M. fort. Or. I 6, 329 A-B*). Eratosthenes wird von Strabo genannt (I 4, 9, p. 66). Wenn der eine einen so wesentlichen Gedanken wie die Brüderschaft aller Menschen Zeno's Republik entnommen hätte, hätte der andere ihm nicht vorgeworfen, die Philosophie (gemeint ist die Stoa) nicht ernst zu nehmen, und die Lehre ihres Gründers zu übergehen (I 2, 2, p. 15).

*M. Errington*: One ought perhaps also to remember that at about this time (reign of Philopator) the *sema* was built in Alexandria.

*M. Badian*: As Errington implied in his paper, the burial of Alexander in the *sema* really marks an important stage in what one might call his removal from reality. Connections with the early Alexander Romance could be imagined. I still do not see any possible influence of Eratosthenes in all this.

*M. Cahn*: Herr Schwarzenberg hat einen Cameo gezeigt, auf dem Alexander mit Strahlenkrone, Aegis und Lanze dargestellt ist, in der Linken das Palladion. Darf man annehmen, dass dieser Cameo die

Statue Alexanders als *κτίστης* von Alexandria genau kopiert und dass damit der König als Gründer eines neuen Ilion aufzufassen ist?

*M. Schwarzenberg*: Ich habe Ihnen den späten Cameo nicht gezeigt, weil ich mir etwa einbilde, er wäre eine genaue Kopie des Aigiouchos. Die Strahlenkrone z.B. ist auf keiner der Repliken ursprünglich, und war am Original nicht vorhanden. Aber das Palladion, das bei rundplastischen Repliken fehlt, ist am Cameo gut erhalten. Der Cameo erlaubt uns, die Spuren des fehlenden Attributs an anderen Denkmälern zu erkennen. Der unterste Teil des vier-eckigen Schaftes ist an einer Kalksteinreplik erhalten. Eine Hand mit dem Palladion in München gehört nicht, wie bisher angenommen wurde, einer Replik des dem Kresilas zugeschriebenen Diomedes, sondern dem Aigiouchos an. Bereits J. Sieveking musste feststellen, dass der Schaft ein nachklassisches Profil aufweist (cf. n. 3 p. 234).

*M. Cabn*: Die *ἀναστολή*, d.h. die hohe Stirnlocke, die in einem Bogen wieder nach unten fällt, ist ein spezifischer Zug des Alexanderbildnisses. Sie ist aber keine Bilderfindung der Alexanderzeit. Zeusköpfe auf den fest datierten Prägungen des Arkadischen Bundes (herausgegeben zu Anlass der Gründung von Megalopolis durch Epameinondas, 368-7)<sup>1</sup> weisen zum ersten Mal diese Stirnlocke auf. K. Schefold hat in diesem Kopf einen Reflex des Zeus Brontaios von Leochares vermutet<sup>2</sup>. Es ist also anzunehmen, dass die *ἀναστολή* Alexander als Zeussohn charakterisieren soll.

*M. Schwarzenberg*: 'Αναστολή-ähnliche Gebilde kommen tatsächlich in der Plastik vor Alexander vor, z.B. auf einem Kopf des Mausoleums, jedoch keine *ἀναστολή* im Sinne meiner Definition. Sollte Ihnen eine solche auf einer Zeusdarstellung in der Zeit vor Alexander wirklich begegnen, so müsste Winckelmann rechtgegeben werden, der die *ἀναστολή* Alexanders von der des Zeus ableitet,

<sup>1</sup> P. R. FRANKE / M. HIRMER, *Die griechische Münze*<sup>2</sup> (München 1972), Abb. 512.

<sup>2</sup> In *MDAI (R)* 57 (1942), 254.

und sie als ein Wahrzeichen der göttlichen Abstammung des Königs bewertet.

*M. Cahn:* Das Referat von Georges Le Rider hätte eine willkommene Ergänzung des von Herrn Schwarzenberg so gedankenreich vorgelegten Bildmaterials gebracht. Ich kann nur eine improvisierte, in groben Strichen skizzierte Übersicht geben.

Die spätesten Alexanderbildnisse auf Münzen finden sich auf den Contorniaten. A. Alföldi<sup>1</sup> hat nachgewiesen, dass die Prägung der Contorniaten um 350 unter Constantius II. in Rom beginnt und sich in drei Hauptgruppen bis ins frühe 5. Jhd. fortsetzt. In ihnen manifestiert sich der geistige Widerstand der stadtrömischen Elite gegen das Christentum; Alexander, Nero und Trajan werden als heidnische Exempla hingestellt.

Die Alexander-Renaissance unter den Severern, besonders von Caracalla propagiert, hat ihren Niederschlag in den prächtigen Goldmedaillons gefunden, die in Beroia geprägt wurden und von denen sich Exemplare in den Funden von Abukir und Tarsos<sup>2</sup> erhalten haben. Hier wird ein ganzes Bilderbuch des Alexandermythos aufgeschlagen. Gleichzeitig mit diesen Medaillons werden vom οὐρανῷ Μακεδόνων zahlreiche Bronzemünzen mit dem Alexanderbildnis geprägt<sup>3</sup>: typischerweise gehen diese z.T. nicht auf das Bildnis der Lysimachosmünzen, sondern auf den Kopf Alexanders als Herakles zurück.

Mit den hellenistischen Alexandermünzen hat sich gestern Herr Giovannini beschäftigt.

<sup>1</sup> A. ALFÖLDI, *Die Kontorniaten* (1943), 85-8 und 102. Eine Neuauflage mit vielem neuen Material soll dieses Jahr in der Reihe *AMuGS* des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts, Berlin, erscheinen.

<sup>2</sup> Tarsos: A. de LONGPÉRIER, in *Revue numismatique* 1868, 309; R. MOWAT, in *Revue numismatique* 1903, 1.

Abukir: H. DRESEL, *Abb. d. Preuss. Akad. d. Wiss. Berlin, Phil.-hist. Kl.* 1906; J. SVORONOS, in *Journ. Int. d'arch. numis.* 10 (1907), 309. Weitere Bibliographie: Münzen und Medaillen AG, *Auktion 25*, 1962, 40.

<sup>3</sup> H. GÄEBLER, *Die antiken Münzen von Makedonien und Paionia III* 1 (1906), 94 ff.

Alexanders eigene Münzprägung hat die Forschung der letzten Generation wieder neu beschäftigt, seit den grundlegenden Arbeiten von E. T. Newell<sup>1</sup>. Gerhard Kleiner wollte die grosse Ausgabe von Goldstateren (Athenakopf/Nike mit Kranz und Stylis) und von Tetradrachmen attischen Fusses (Herakleskopf/Thronender Zeus Äetophoros) in Zusammenhang mit der Eroberung von Tyros und der Rückkehr des Königs aus Ägypten 331 bringen<sup>2</sup>. Seine Spätdatierung ist mehrfach widerlegt worden, namentlich von A. R. Bellinger<sup>3</sup> und G. Le Rider<sup>4</sup>, der in den Berichten über seinen Kurs in der Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes die Alexanderprägung seit mehreren Jahren zum Thema hat und eine aktuelle Übersicht über den Stand der Forschung gibt. Die Massenprägung ist also von Makedonien um 335 ausgegangen und diente vor allem zur Truppenzahlung der Feldzüge. Münzstätten, die autonome Münzen ausgaben oder für die persischen Satrapen prägten, werden geschlossen oder geben Alexandergeld aus; neue Münzstätten werden aufgemacht.

Uns interessiert hier die Entwicklung des Herakleskopfes. Seit Amyntas III. erscheint Herakles als Stammvater des Hauses auf den makedonischen Königsmünzen. Alexander übernimmt den unbartigen Kopf im Löwenfell von den Didrachmen Philipps II.; dieser Kopf hat zunächst in allen Münzstätten keinerlei Bildniszüge. Der entscheidende Schritt erfolgt um 326 in der neu errichteten Münzstätte Alexandria. Hier erhält der Herakleskopf von Anfang an Bildniszüge<sup>5</sup>. Es muss das Werk eines hochbedeutenden Stempel-

<sup>1</sup> E. T. NEWELL, "Reattribution of certain Tetradrachms of Alexander the Great", in *Amer. Journ. of Numismatics* 46 (1912), 5.

Weitere Arbeiten E. T. Newells zitiert bei A. R. Bellinger, H. A. Cahn und G. Le Rider.

<sup>2</sup> *Alexanders Reichsmünzen*, Abh. d. Deutschen Akad. d. Wiss. Berlin, Phil.-hist. Kl. 1947, 5 (1949).

<sup>3</sup> *Essays on the Coinage of Alexander the Great*, Numismatic Studies 11 (New York 1963).

<sup>4</sup> *Annuaire de l'Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes*, IV<sup>e</sup> section, 1968-9, 173; 1969-70, 266; 1970-1, 241.

<sup>5</sup> H. A. CAHN, *Friühellenistische Münzkunst* (Basel 1948). Neudruck in *Kleine Schriften* (Basel 1975), 115, bes. 118 f.; neuere Literatur S. 131.

schniders sein, der an den Hof Alexanders berufen wurde; der alexandrinische Herakleskopf mit den Bildniszügen Alexanders strahlt auf die anderen Münzstätten aus, was z.B. in Tarsos noch zu Lebzeiten des Königs beobachtet werden kann. Dass spätere Generationen diesen Herakleskopf als Alexanderbildnis verstanden haben, lässt sich z.B. an der Prägung des baktrischen Königs Agathokles belegen<sup>1</sup>, auf denen der Herakleskopf mit der Inschrift ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΦΙΛΑΠΠΟΥ versehen ist.

Ein neues Alexanderbildnis wird wohl vom gleichen Stempelschneider in Alexandria unter Ptolemaios I. geschaffen, als dieser noch Satrap von Ägypten unter der nominellen Oberherrschaft Alexanders IV. war (318)<sup>2</sup>. Es hat nicht mehr die Heraklesattribute, sondern Königsdiadem, Aegis, Elefantenhaut mit Stosszähnen und Ammonshorn, dazu die ἀναστολή. Eine flachere Version dieses Meisterwerks erscheint auf den Münzen der nächsten 15 Jahre in Ägypten. Nach der Annahme des Königstitels setzt Ptolemaios I. sein eigenes Porträt auf seine Münzen; es beginnt die Serie der Münzbildnisse hellenistischer Herrscher.

Anders Lysimachos, der in seinem Königreich, in Europa wie in Kleinasien, zahlreiche Münzstätten eröffnete und überall Gold und Silber mit dem Bildnis Alexanders als Zeussohn (mit Ammonshorn und Königsbinde) prägte. In der Frage der Aufteilung dieser Münzprägung auf Münzstätten, die von Margaret Thompson nach den E. T. Newell'schen Notizen versucht wurde<sup>3</sup> bleiben noch viele Fragen offen<sup>4</sup>. Die ganze Lysimachos-Prägung sollte einmal von der kunstgeschichtlichen Seite angegangen werden, namentlich auf das Œuvre von Stempelschneidern hin. Jedenfalls zeigt die Lysimachosprägung eine breitere Fächerung verschiedener Bildnistypen, die

<sup>1</sup> A. R. BELLINGER, *op. cit.*, Tf. 2, 7.

<sup>2</sup> A. R. BELLINGER, *op. cit.*, Tf. 2, 4; H. A. CAHN, *op. cit.*, Abb. 10.

<sup>3</sup> "The Mints of Lysimachus", in *Essays in Greek Coinage presented to Stanley Robinson* (Oxford 1968), 163.

<sup>4</sup> S. vor allem N. DÜRR, in *Schweizer Münzblätter* 23 (1973), 93.

vielleicht von plastischen Alexanderbildnissen abhängen oder auch auf solche ausgestrahlt haben.

Mit dieser unvollständigen und kurzen Übersicht sollte gezeigt werden, wie reich das Alexanderbildnis aus zeitgenössischen Münzen und Gepräge der Jahrzehnte unmittelbar nach seinem Tode zu dokumentieren ist.

*M. Dürr*: Der grösste Teil der gesicherten Zuteilungen an die zahlreichen Münzstätten ist noch im Ungewissen. Neuere Beobachtungen regen jedoch zur Wiederaufnahme der Probleme der Zuteilung an<sup>1</sup>.

Michel E. Dürr versucht gegenwärtig an Hand der Stempelschneider Gruppen zu formen, welche sich möglicherweise auf einige wenige Zentren zu reduzieren scheinen.

Das bekannte Dekadrachmon für Poros zeigt Alexander stehend mit Flügelhelm, in der Rechten das Blitzbündel des Zeus. Die Ansichten der Datierung dieses Stückes — Lebenszeit oder posthum — gehen auseinander. Durch einen 1972-3 in Babylonien gemachten grossen Schatzfund von mehreren Hunderten von Alexanderreichsmünzen, Löwenstateren und Athenanachprägungen kamen auch einige Porosmünzen zu Tage<sup>2</sup>. Die kurz vor dem Tode Alexanders beginnende Emission mit dem Münzzeichen M-ΔΥ war im Funde noch nicht vertreten; bei der Parallelemission der Löwenstatere trat mindestens ein Stück, in frischer Erhaltung, mit dem Münzzeichen M-ΔΥ auf. Der Münzschatz muss also beim Tode Alexanders vergraben worden sein. Die Porosmünzen zeigen Spuren von Abnutzung; sie dürften wohl 325 zu Anlass der Festlichkeiten in Susa geprägt worden sein.

Gibt es Reichsmünzen zu Lebenszeit Alexanders welche Züge Alexanders aufweisen? Herbert Cahn erinnerte an die Emission der Münzstätte Alexandria (Rose-Δ10) die deutlich individuelle Züge

<sup>1</sup> *Schweizer Münzblätter* 23 (1973), 93.

<sup>2</sup> *Schweizer Münzblätter* 24 (1974), 33 ff.

erkennen lässt. O. H. Zervos datiert diese Emission auf 325<sup>1</sup>. Im Babylonfunde (möglicherweise, wie wir gerade gesehen haben, in Folge des Todes Alexanders vergraben), fand sich unter Hunderten von Reichsmünzen keine einzige der Münzstätte Alexandria. Dagegen können Angleichungen an die Gesichtszüge Alexanders an einigen Stempeln der letzten Babylonemission dieses Fundes (M, Monogramm und Symbol), wohl auf private Initiative einiger Stempelschneider ausgeführt, beobachtet werden.

*M. Badian*: The chronology of the coinage is still very much debated. I am by no means happy about the very early dating of the "Nike with stylis" coins (where G. Kleiner's date made much better historical sense), and my recent personal enquiries among numismatists have produced a range from 331 to just after Alexander's death in 323 for the "Porus" coins. I am glad to hear from M. Dürr that the new hoard may have brought us closer to a solution of this latter problem.

*M. Schwarzenberg*: Indem M. Cahn und M. Dürr nachgewiesen haben, dass die Alexandermünzen Alexandriens und Babylons bereits kurz vor Alexanders Tod Bildniszüge enthalten, haben sie zugleich auf den ersten bescheidenen Anfang der griechischen Porträtkunst gewiesen. Was nämlich für Halb-Barbaren geltend gemacht wurde, trifft für Griechenland nicht zu<sup>2</sup>. Die Tatsache, dass sich das eigentliche Porträt vom idealen Heroenbildnis ausgerechnet zur Zeit Alexanders trennt, ist eine späte Bestätigung für Hegels Urteil. Dieser erkannte in Alexander "die freieste und schönste Individualität, welche die Wirklichkeit je getragen"<sup>3</sup>. Das Auftreten von Bildniszügen bereits zu Alexanders Lebzeiten zeigt, dass die Zeitgenossen im Herakleskopf der Münzen auch der anderen Präge-

<sup>1</sup> "The Early Tetradrachms of Ptolemy I", in *ANSMusN* 13 (1967), 1-16.

<sup>2</sup> W. SCHWABACHER, "Lycian Coin-Portraits", in *Essays in Greek Coinage presented to Stanley Robinson* (Oxford 1968), 111-24.

<sup>3</sup> Fr. HEGEL, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*<sup>2</sup> (Berlin 1840), 274.

stätten das Porträt des Königs erkannt haben müssen. Es sei daran erinnert, dass die meisten Numismatiker des 16.-18. Jhdts. in den Heraklesköpfen der Alexandermünzen den König selbst erkannten.

*M. Cahn*: Die Frage wurde gestellt, welcher Zusammenhang zwischen Gemmenschneidern und Münzgraveuren besteht. Diese Frage kann positiv beantwortet werden. Die Technik des Steinschneidens und Stempelschneidens ist im Grunde die gleiche: es muss mit einem Bohrinstrument (Grabstichel oder Rundbohrer) ein negatives Relief aus einer harten Materie gegraben werden. Die Stempelschneider konnten nicht nur von den Staatsaufträgen — Herstellung der Münzstempel — existieren; daneben schnitten sie Steine und waren wohl auch als Gold- und Silberschmiede tätig. Ein Fall lässt sich belegen. Phrygillos ist der Name eines Stempelschneiders, der gegen Ende des 5. Jhdts. in Thurioi, Syrakus und wohl auch in Terina tätig war und zahlreiche Stempel signierte. Der Name ist italisch. Es gibt eine von ihm signierte Gemme<sup>1</sup>.

*M. Dörig*: M. Schwarzenberg a retracé l'histoire de la gloire d'Alexandre à travers les siècles. Il a eu raison d'écartier la tête de sa collection<sup>2</sup> de l'œuvre de Lysippe et de la rapprocher étroitement du buste de Diphilos à Vienne<sup>3</sup>, qui date du début du III<sup>e</sup> siècle avant J.-C.

Le problème du portrait d'Alexandre reste entier. Comment le jeune conquérant apparaissait-il à ses contemporains? Comment Lysippe l'avait-il représenté?

Aucune copie directe de la statue d'Alexandre n'est conservée. La tête de Pergame, à Istamboul<sup>4</sup>, représente, certes, Alexandre; mais il s'agit d'une œuvre du sculpteur de la plaque d'Athéna du

<sup>1</sup> Heute verschollen. G. M. A. RICHTER, *Engraved Gems of the Greeks and Etruscans* (London 1968), 16; 18; 76; J. BOARDMAN, *Greek Gems and Finger Rings* (London 1970), 200.

<sup>2</sup> In *Bonner Jahrbücher* 167 (1967), 58 sqq.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. K. SCHEFOLD, *Die Bildnisse der antiken Dichter, Redner und Denker* (Basel 1943), 112 sq.

<sup>4</sup> R. LULLIES / M. HIRMER, *Griechische Plastik* (München 1956), pl. 260 sq.

Grand Autel de Pergame<sup>1</sup>. La tête de Dionysos du Musée de Venise<sup>2</sup> reflète une image plus proche du portrait d'Alexandre ; elle n'en représente pas moins la statue du dieu de l'Hélicon.

Le portrait du roi est préfiguré par les statues de Zeus que Lysippe a sculptées pour Sicyone, Mégare, Argos et Tarente<sup>3</sup>. Si Alexandre a fait appel à Lysippe, c'est qu'il souhaitait être représenté par lui à l'image de Zeus, ce qui s'explique peut-être par le fait que les discussions concernant sa divinité ont commencé de son vivant<sup>4</sup>.

*M. Schwarzenberg* : Je n'ai pas d'arguments nouveaux capables de vous faire accepter l'attribution de mon Alexandre à Lysippe ; mais je n'ai pas non plus de raisons péremptoires pour l'écartier, ni pour dater le "Diphilos" de Vienne du début du III<sup>e</sup> siècle (cf. n. 4, p. 255).

Il n'est nullement prouvé que le Dionysos de Venise soit une copie de la statue de l'Hélicon. Nous n'avons pas de copies d'originaux du sanctuaire delphique. J'ai peine à croire qu'un mouleur ait pu opérer dans le sanctuaire moins accessible encore de l'Hélicon.

A en croire des témoignages antiques, c'est l'image d'Achille et du lion et non celle de Zeus qui a déterminé le portrait lysippéen.

*M. Bosworth* : A most important feature of *M. Schwarzenberg's* paper was his argument about the importance of Augustus' role in moulding the tastes of his generation. Could we be a little more specific about the precise evidence for this? Augustus' visit to Alexandria is well known, as is his *imitatio Alexandri* in the *Autobiography*. But can we go further and argue that he had definite views about Alexander, which he imposed upon the artistic tradition of the reign? It would be pleasant to believe that he was responsible

<sup>1</sup> R. LULLIES / M. HIRMER, *op. cit.*, pl. 253.

<sup>2</sup> *Antike Plastik* 12, 10, 125 sqq.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. J. BOARDMAN, J. DÖRIG, W. FUCHS, M. HIRMER, *L'art grec* (Paris, Flammarion, 1966), 246 sq.

<sup>4</sup> *Antike Plastik* 12, 10, 130 n. 32.

for the canonical triad of Alexander portraiture—but is there precise evidence?

*M. Schwarzenberg*: Horace compares Roman poetry to Greek sculpture (*Epist.* II 1, 232-50). This is to be expected from the author of the famous phrase “ut pictura poesis” (*Ars* 361). Horace compares masters of different periods and countries, because eminence in the arts is seldom found together, both in one place and at the same time. To judge from Choerilus, the poets of Alexander’s day were notoriously bad, whereas sculpture was still, even as oratory and astronomy, a Greek monopoly in the time of Augustus : Verg. *Aen.* VI 847-50. Horace judges the sculpture of Alexander’s day according to the standards set by Augustus for poetry. He compares the portraits that Virgil and Varius painted of the Emperor to the one of the Macedonian King cast in bronze by Lysippus. Horace proclaims that Alexander had forbidden all other artists but Lysippus and Apelles to portray him, while Pliny, who is bound by no meter, mentions Pyrgoteles as well (cf. n. 1, p. 248).

## VII

E. BADIAN

### SOME RECENT INTERPRETATIONS OF ALEXANDER

A survey of this kind inevitably has to be very selective. In English alone, books on Alexander have been appearing at the rate of at least one a year : modest books for the student or the general reader ; glorious tomes for the coffee-table ; works of journalism, launched with all the skill and resources of Madison Avenue or its London equivalent<sup>1</sup>. Why this should be so, at this particular time—whether it is merely in keeping with the general proliferation of books, or whether there are socio-psychological causes for the phenomenon—is a question that must be left to future historians to investigate, from the perspective of distance<sup>2</sup>. At any rate, the size—or the sale—of a volume is not usually a measure of the author's competence, or of the intrinsic value and probable influence of his contribution. Nor must we forget that not all important interpretations appear in full-length biographies. Articles, nowadays, are perhaps even more likely than books to exert their influence

<sup>1</sup> Like, most recently, the *μέγα βιβλίον* of Robin LANE FOX (on which, see my review in *JHS* 96 (1976), forthcoming).

<sup>2</sup> For the same reason, I have refrained from detailed evaluation of the *most* recent work on Alexander, except for F. Schachermeyr's, which can and must be fitted into the development of his views. Perspective is necessary for historical evaluation, and contemporary events are best left for journalists to analyse.

on the specialist, and thus, at a long remove, on the general public.

A survey of interpretations of Alexander for any period is no dreary exercise in *Forschungsgeschichte*. It is a mirror of changing modes of thought and historical interpretation, as formed by the history and experience of the generations and the individuals surveyed. Not only has every scholar (as Wilcken said)<sup>1</sup> his own Alexander, but ever since antiquity the figure of the great Macedonian has been a universal symbol—as A. Heuss put it<sup>2</sup>, a bottle (“Schlauch”) that can be filled with any wine: it attracts and embodies the philosophy of a person or of an age as no other ancient figure has—not even Caesar—and perhaps none at all.

## I

As we all know<sup>3</sup>, J. G. Droysen, early in the 19th century, marked an epoch in Alexander studies, not only by first applying proper critical method in the use of the sources to fashion a narrative, but by his general interpretation: he saw Philip and Alexander of Macedon as the divinely preordained creators of Hellenic unity and propagators of Hellenic *Kultur* among the lesser races, in accordance with a divine plan that ultimately led up to the spread of Christianity, and on the model of a wishfully interpreted Prussian monarchy in the hoped-for future of Germany and the world. This (with the Christian influence somewhat lessening) provided a framework for over a century of German dreams of fated aggrandisement—initially, as Professor Schachermeyr has splendidly termed it, under the spell

<sup>1</sup> U. WILCKEN, *Alexander der Grosse* (Leipzig 1931), p. vii.

<sup>2</sup> In *A & A* 4 (1954), 102.

<sup>3</sup> See all the standard accounts of *Alexanderforschung*, e.g. (recently) the surveys by P. Green and F. Schachermeyr and, for a detailed analysis, A. Demandt, cited in the Bibliography to this paper. I am concerned with these early interpretations only as background to my proper subject.

of a "respektvollen Hochschätzung der Majestät des Herrschers"<sup>1</sup>. J. Kaerst and Ed. Meyer adapted Droysen's vision, each to his own temperament and the changed *Zeitgeist* of the Second Empire. J. Beloch, committed to a belief in the primacy of forces over individuals, could only *react*—one of the greatest of German historians of antiquity was so caught up in the historiographic tradition against which he rebelled that he was unable to find a positive interpretation of his own. He produced an Alexander who is a mirror image, lacking life and solidity and simply devoid of qualities.

The explosion that shattered the spell of the Hohenzollern dynasty and, to a large extent, of royalty as such, did not significantly change the nature of the German dream. Just as the attitude of Athenian intellectuals in the 4th century B.C., who preached the Hellenic Crusade against Persia, did not basically change through the explosions that shattered their faith in the Greek city and its citizen—they merely turned to tyrants and kings as destined to realise their vision—so German intellectuals changed from adoration of Prussia and its dynasty to a more generalized messianic *Führerprinzip*. Wilcken was too old, and perhaps too much of a scholar, to be caught up in this. His biography, as Schachermeyr has stressed, still stands under the spell of royalty as such, refraining from analytical probing. The change is first fully apparent in H. Berve.

For him<sup>2</sup>, Alexander, opposed only by the "verengte Polisgeist des vierten Jahrhunderts", felt called upon, "dem eingegengten Griechentum ein weites, neues Feld zu eröffnen, seinen herrlichen Geist sieghaft gegen die Barbaren vorzutragen als eine die Waffen heiligende Idee.... So erschienen seinem hellenisch schauenden Sinn Ideale in mythischem Bild". One

<sup>1</sup>(3), p. 615.

<sup>2</sup> *Griechische Geschichte* II (Freiburg i. Br. 1933), 167 ff. On Berve as a National Socialist writer, see the brief sketch (collecting only some obvious facts) by A. MOMIGLIANO, *Terzo Contributo* II (Roma 1966), 699 ff.

needs no leap of mental agility to think of a contemporary who, somewhat earlier, had written : "Wer ein Volk retten will, kann nur heroisch denken." In the second edition (1953), although the *Weltmission* of the Hellenic spirit is retained, this passage is considerably adapted. But Berve, recognising the predestined new leaders in the reaction they aroused in those not suffering from the *verengte Polisgeist*, went on to paint an unforgettable contemporary picture : "Die archaisch aktive Persönlichkeit ihrer Führer ... kam dem Individualismus der Gebildeten eigentlich entgegen. Naive Kraft und zivilisierter Geist entsprachen sich in seltener Weise." In the changed Germany of 1953, this passage was to be entirely deleted.

Here the history of the interpretation of Alexander inevitably becomes entwined with the history of Schachermeyr's interpretation, which (as we shall see) is in its present form the leading one of our age. I should stress at the outset that the early views from which we are bound to start have been entirely repudiated by their author<sup>1</sup> and are of interest only, like the intellectual errors of other great men, as historical examples. Schachermeyr, at the time a young and already brilliant scholar who had absorbed within himself the spirit of Berve's "Gebildeten" at Jena, tried to lay the foundations of an interpretation of history in the racial terms of National Socialism, in his work *Lebensgesetzlichkeit in der Geschichte* (Frankfurt 1940). I am not concerned with the racial theories in any detail. Their author has sufficiently shown that they were mistaken in their over-emphasis on the hereditary as opposed to the cultural and environmental factors in both national and individual behaviour, ignoring (as he now stresses) the fact that we have all seen nations change under our very eyes. They also—and this is worth adding, perhaps above all—shared one of the major scientific errors of the nineteenth century (and by no means only in Germany), that of equating language with "blood" and

<sup>1</sup> Last in (3), 630 f.

racial heredity (see, e.g., *op. cit.*, ch. 8)—ignoring, in this instance, the simple fact, known to all of us, that millions of human beings of all kinds of races and colours speak (say) English or French as their native tongue, and in antiquity spoke Greek or Latin. The equation of language and race is a scientific error that has caused a great deal of harm, in the scientific field and well beyond. It is, unfortunately, still a commonplace in many of our books.

However, what concerns us much more here is that Schachermeyr even at that stage had difficulty fitting the creative element into the tight biological scheme, and even greater difficulty in defining the proper attitude of the individual and of society towards this element, and in particular towards the person of the leader. In ch. 5 he develops the theory of the relationship between the mass and the leader in the proper sense of the term. His chief criterion for the leader is that he must be free from selfishness, eager to serve the community, and rooted in it. "Blind cult of personality" is vigorously condemned (p. 69), and the surrender of the individual to an alien ego is described as "erbärmlich". Hence (he concludes) it was not the worst men who opposed Alexander or Caesar, both of whom cut themselves off from their "blutsverwandten volkhaften Gemeinschaft" and were thus "autarke Titanen" and not true leaders.

Of course, much more is contained in that work, most of it erroneous; and it is not my business here to pursue it. But the principles of the theoretical work were applied and further developed in *Indogermanen und Orient* (1944): only the Nordic race is described as truly creative, the rest descend a scale down to the "Armenoid", which is wholly parasitic. The decline of Greece and of Persia is accounted for by the "Entnordung" and "Armenoidisation" of the former and the admixture of inferior blood in the Iranian barons in the latter, until the relatively pure Nordic Macedonians conquered both. Even though Alexander is said to aim at universal tolerance and well-being (a view we shall meet again!), and this is duly explained as conditioned by his

Nordic racial heredity, he was ultimately guilty of “biological sacrilege” by his encouragement of race mixture (“Chaos des Blutes” is the memorable phrase) and by his abandonment of his own national tradition (“Volkhaftigkeit”).

## II

*Indogermanen und Orient*—which (I repeat) is a work now repudiated by its author—is perhaps the most illuminating example of the interaction of the Alexander image with the world around the scholar and the dreams within him: an effect against which no brilliance of intellect or of historical judgment seems able to act as a safeguard. Within a year of the publication of the book, that particular dream had been thrown by history on the scrap-heap of disastrous absurdities. But the tradition out of which it arose retained its vigour. National Socialism had turned out a dead end, but Alexander the beneficent (though possibly imperfect) world conqueror remained a symbol with which German intellectuals (and especially the older among them) could readily identify. H. Bengtson incorporated it into the standard history of Greece, and E. Kornemann—totally unaffected, for all one can see, by the events of 1933–45—expresses it in a surprisingly naive form in his last work<sup>1</sup>.

Schachermeyr himself had learnt the lesson. He took a great deal of time to reflect, but then he developed a fundamentally new approach, which we shall soon notice. Meanwhile, however, he was taken to task for his earlier views by some post-War reviewers<sup>2</sup>. But the worst was yet to come. F. Altheim<sup>3</sup>, in an excess of embarrassing zeal, defended

<sup>1</sup> See Bibliography. It should be noted that Kornemann’s work was posthumously edited by Bengtson.

<sup>2</sup> As more recently by J. SEIBERT (64 ff.), who does not notice the later retraction.

<sup>3</sup> (2), 316 f.

Schachermeyr against the reviewers : if he had not (by then) retracted *Indogermanen und Orient* and all it stood for, that was because his new, very different, treatment was complementary to the earlier one, and *both* remained valid ! Schachermeyr was no doubt more embarrassed by the defence (which he never endorsed) than by the attacks. His disciple, as we shall soon see, did him little credit in other ways.

The end of the War was clearly a traumatic experience, especially for scholars committed to an ideology that had led to disaster. It could now be recognised that the theoretical errors of academics cannot be divorced from practical consequences. The shock and its results are embodied in Schachermeyr's "second Alexander". In 1949, five years after the earlier work and with Vienna still partly occupied by Soviet armies, the book appeared. It was the author's first post-War publication. The "Titanic" figure remains, this time at the centre of the stage : a Nietzschean superman, beyond good and evil, beyond human moral judgment. The *Weltreichsidee*, inherited from over a century of German tradition, is retained, but it is no longer biologically conditioned : it is the fruit of Alexander's own creative genius. However, that genius, unlike the pure genius of the artist, is contaminated by unlimited power, which adds the extreme of horror to the extreme of achievement. To the scholar now revolted by politics and autocracy, Alexander has become a poetic symbol, and the author strains language to the limit as (on his own admission) he strives to match it to his vision. Under the impact of war and disaster, Alexander the world conqueror may be seen turning into Alexander the artist.

That view was at once seized on and carried to its extreme by a scholar we have already met—one who was nothing less than a prodigy in his combination of vast and genuine erudition with deplorable lack of judgment. Franz Altheim, when writing the first volume of his *Weltgeschichte Asiens* (1947), had already dealt with Alexander in a fairly orthodox account, which

predictably asserted the dream of universal empire ; and, basing himself (as some people always do) on a selection of reported speeches in the sources, he moved its origins back to Alexander's youth <sup>1</sup>: "Vermutlich hat er es immer getan [i.e. dreamt of universal empire]. Denn was wäre ein Alexander ohne Weltherrschaft und ohne Weltherrschaftsträume !?" His special study, *Alexander und Asien*, which had grown out of the earlier work, was published in 1953. Alexander is only its starting-point, and it has many interesting things to say (though often in a very odd manner) about the *Kulturgeschichte* of Asia after Alexander's death. As far as Alexander is concerned, the relationship to the earlier work is close and the sentence quoted is repeated almost verbatim (p. 105). But Schachermeyr's vision had intervened ; Altheim had found a symbol for his own romantic longings, and the effect on the conception of Alexander is startling : "Hier [i.e. in the "Reichsgedanke"] wie nirgends sonst tritt hinter dem Feldherrn und Staatsmann Alexanders Eigentliches hervor : der verborgene Künstler oder Dichter, den das gottähnliche Bewusstsein des Schaffens und Gestaltens treibt. Seine Gesichte [*sic!*] und die übermenschliche Grösse dessen, was er anruhrt, lassen nur einen Vergleich aufkommen : Michelangelo" <sup>2</sup>.

Alexander the creative artist corrupted by power has been freed of the deep flaw that Schachermeyr had always felt in him and had twice honestly tried to account for, from two very different premises. The transformation of the German-Nordic world conqueror into the superhuman artist is thus complete : a terrifying latter-day monument (for this is 1953 !) to one—regrettably—significant aspect of German cultural tradition, seeing creativity in terms of violence and worshipping supreme power as supreme art. Schachermeyr's ardent disciple had thoroughly misunderstood him.

<sup>1</sup> (1), I 205.

<sup>2</sup> (2), 103.

## III

Meanwhile, the British Alexander found his final expression in 1948. W. W. Tarn (who, as a matter of fact, did not read German easily) was repelled by the conception of Alexander as a primeval force, incomprehensible to the rational Victorian mind. Tarn is one of the best examples of what Peter Green finds characteristic of a school of Victorian interpreters of history : to them, men "of whom they approved were reasonable in the same way as themselves" <sup>1</sup>. Yet his Alexander, the beneficent conqueror, stands fully within the German tradition we have noted. Indeed, in a way we have already come across him. Tarn merely substituted the ideals of his own environment for those of German *Kultur* as the precise content of the benefit conferred on the conquered. As I have put it elsewhere <sup>2</sup> : Tarn's Alexander is Droysen's, "translated into the King's English". He is an immoderately moderate and unreasonably reasonable creature, no believer in his divine birth or even in heroic *mimesis* : his march through Gedrosia has nothing to do with rivalry with Semiramis and Cyrus, as his friend Nearchus reported—no, "his object was to support the fleet . . . by digging wells and forming depots of provisions" (I 106) ; not to mention his own divinity : to explain the demand for deification (which he accepted), Tarn had to have recourse to an absurd fantasy of Ed. Meyer's, claiming that divinity would give him legal power to override the statute of the League of Corinth <sup>3</sup>. Tarn's Alexander knew no orgies or drunkenness : he went to parties for social reasons ; and though, of course, he was never impotent, he knew no sex except in

<sup>1</sup> *The Shadow of the Parthenon* (London 1972), 61.

<sup>2</sup> In *New York Review of Books*, Sept. 19, 1974, p. 9.

<sup>3</sup> All sorts of misinterpretations of our sources and of Greek law and custom were necessary to make it even technically possible to assert this : for a partial refutation, see J.P.V.D. Balsdon (cited in the Bibliography).

legitimate marriage : that "Alexander never had a mistress" is perhaps the funniest statement ever made by an Alexander historian. He specially abhorred pederasty<sup>1</sup>; and he was innocent of all violence except for two murders<sup>2</sup>, both argued to be almost excusable.

As so often in the history of Alexander portraits, things were not what they seemed. The rationality was deceptive. Tarn's Alexander is in fact a visionary as Romantically conceived as its German model. His "dream", however (the word is Tarn's), was that of the admirable Christian public-school Englishman whose ideal he embodied. As no English-speaking scholar can fail to be aware, he conquered Asia not only to *pacis imponere morem*, but in order to unite all his subjects in the bond of human brotherhood. It was with regret—for Tarn, though he often deceived himself, seems to have been basically honest—that Tarn had to reject the German view of Alexander's striving for world conquest : there was much to be said (he admitted) for the idea that the King who "dreamt of the unity of mankind" ought to have tried to extend the benefit of that dream to the *whole* of mankind<sup>3</sup>.

Needless to say, the step was soon taken. C. A. Robinson, perhaps the shallowest and least original of recent academic Alexander historians, while in most respects merely parrotting Tarn, added this further dimension to the "dream" as his most significant original contribution. His work was rhetorically subtitled "The Meeting of East and West in World Government and Brotherhood". His naiveté is delightfully illustrated by the way he explains his method of using the sources<sup>4</sup> : "I have relied chiefly on Arrian, but I have also included stories

<sup>1</sup> On all this see II 319 ff. : "Alexander's Attitude to Sex".

<sup>2</sup> See II 262 : Parmenio and Clitus.

<sup>3</sup> II 397 f.

<sup>4</sup> P. 14. Unlike Plutarch, on whom the criterion is ultimately based (see *Alex.* 1), C. A. Robinson was claiming to write history !

from Plutarch and others . . . I have tried, however, to choose from the mass of conflicting stories certain ones which delineate true qualities of Alexander and those about him." Approaching his subject with this intellectual and methodological equipment, he had no difficulty in concluding (p. 17) : "Alexander's insistence not only on spiritual values but also on the solidarity of the world constitutes his challenge to posterity."

For the moment, this will suffice to demonstrate Tarn's overpowering influence. No other Alexander portrait in history, surely, has been so remote from the reality of the Macedonian conqueror, so modelled almost to its total exclusion by a scholar's personal vision. The baronial savagery of the Macedonian court, barely kept in check by Philip II, controlled by Alexander through intrigue and terror, and emerging after his death to tear the kingdom to pieces ; the pomp and luxury of the Persian court, accepted and practised (not unwillingly) by Alexander in his quest for legitimacy in the East—all this is brushed aside, together (usually) with the abundant testimony on the heroic and mystical elements in the King's character, except to the extent that they can be channelled into the unifying vision. Yet this portrait, lucidly perceived and presented by a trained barrister, was astonishingly successful.

It was fortunate in its historical moment. Some scholars have connected it with faith in the League of Nations. Such faith was certainly widespread after 1918, as faith in the United Nations was after 1945 ; and British "enlightened" circles clung to it even in the thirties, as naive optimists have always clung to their hopes and dreams. But *that* dream was one of voluntary co-operation and self-restraint on the part of sovereign nations. It is worlds removed from that other vision of benevolent imperialism and the White Man's Burden, which in Britain both in principle and in fact most often conflicted with it. What is more : though Tarn's view was developed in the twenties and thirties, his real dominance follows the publication of his two-volume work in 1948, after the Second World War. That work

(or the narrative part of it) was sold as a successful academic paperback and was translated into several foreign languages (especially German), thus becoming accessible to the numerous scholars and other intellectuals whose reading is mostly confined to their own language. Coming at a time when the British Empire was disintegrating and the new American power was at its zenith, it embodied the proud nostalgia of the British ruling classes, and at the same time appealed to the sentimental internationalist imperialism characteristic of American intellectuals in those days Before the Fall. Despite one or two scholarly voices raised in protest, it so imposed itself that all derivative works were based on it wherever English was written, and some even beyond; and in the U.S.A. (where academic interpretations have always tended to be imposed and upheld by powerful and intolerant Establishments) publication of opposing views for a time became academically hazardous, if not impossible. The traces still linger, especially in secondary encyclopaedias and the work of those who use them as their source<sup>1</sup>.

It is of some interest to follow the effects of Tarn in Germany, if only because, as we have seen, his view is largely an adapted German one, substituting British for Prusso-German imperial ideals as the basis of interpretation. A little Academy lecture by W. Kolbe in 1936, in fact an epideictic display rather than a piece of serious scholarship<sup>2</sup>, had already tried to weave the idea of the "unity of mankind" into the traditional German Alexander worship. But it was again after the Second World War, with the appearance and translation of Tarn's book, that this interpretation seemed to provide a respectable ready-made alternative to discredited National Socialist views, for scholars

<sup>1</sup> The time-lag between scholarship and popularisation, although it has been greatly cut down, is still significant, especially in a field where the average person is less aware than he is (e.g.) in physics or in medicine of the fact of changing interpretations.

<sup>2</sup> See F. SCHACHERMEYR (3), 624: "eine panegyrische Neigung".

unable (like Schachermeyr) to go forward in original enquiry. Two outstanding examples are worth mentioning.

H. E. Stier, most famous for an immediate reaction to political events in his *Grundlagen und Sinn der griechischen Geschichte* (Stuttgart 1945)—a mystical interpretation in which Greek freedom, conceived in largely racial (“Indo-Germanic”) terms, is ultimately victorious through the Roman conquest—and later to gain notoriety through his *Roms Aufstieg zur Weltmacht und die griechische Welt* (Köln 1957), perhaps the most impassioned defence of conquest and empire, and of the principle that in human history success is all that matters (that “Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht”), ever produced by an ancient historian in any country—H. E. Stier first tried his hand at the interpretation of Alexander in a brief sketch in the *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum* (vol. I, 1950). Unaware even then (and that has remained sadly characteristic of that scholar) of almost all work done outside Germany, he had nonetheless come across Tarn, but the influence is not yet fully absorbed. That was to come, after many years of reflection, in a lecture to an Academy in 1972. Tarn had by then long been available in German, and thoroughly digested. K. Kraft (see below) had just been published. The attitude proved congenial. Stier’s Alexander is a creature very much after Stier’s own heart: the worship of successful imperialism, which he had revealed in his earlier works, made respectable by a great moral purpose, and the stark features of the Prussian or “Nordic” world-conquering superman (for we must remember that up to this point the portrait is well within the old German tradition) softened for the benefit of post-Nazi Europe into the likeness of an English gentleman: the decisive new element, for the German Alexander-worshipper, is in fact “the instincts of an English gentleman”, “die denen des historischen Alexander eben erheblich näherstehen, als mancher Moderne wahr haben möchte”<sup>1</sup>. Tarn—

<sup>1</sup> *Welteroberung und Weltfriede...*, 29, n. 82 (p. 30).

to give him his due—might well have been shocked by the product of this incestuous marriage of the German tradition that he detested to its British offspring that he had created : it helps to show us how little divides them.

Stier's lecture is worth mentioning merely as a recent historical curiosity. Totally unaware of the massive work done on Alexander in the last twenty years or so (especially since most of it was in foreign languages, which he does not seem to read) and totally undiscriminating and fanciful in its use of evidence, it is a reiteration of the political and perhaps personal apologia that he had been presenting, in various forms, since 1945—an outdated private vision as remote from the historical Alexander as from the present-day world. Far more real interest—despite its equal remoteness from the historical King of Macedon—attaches to the “rational” Alexander of Konrad Kraft, as filtered (after his death) through the devoted labours of his pupil Helga Gesche<sup>1</sup>. Full of astonishing faults of argument and even basic linguistic interpretation, it has not a single point that is both new and valid in its (approximately) 120 pages. It is remarkable chiefly for its stridency of polemical tone (so unlike the author's usual style), and for a continuous series of misrepresentations of other scholars' views combined with personal attacks on them. Written under severe psychological strain, the book shows a serious and usually competent scholar converting Alexander into a highly personal symbol, embodying (in this case) not a dream of conquest or a civilising mission, but—much more weird and incredible still—a desperate man's vision of human “rationality”, in a world that he felt had abandoned it. Alexander the Macedonian has to be vicariously defended against the Radical students shouting their professor down, who were joined in this (as the author well knew) by

<sup>1</sup> I have reviewed that strange work, unintelligible unless one knows something of the circumstances of the author's life and death, in *Gnomon* 47 (1975), 48 ff., where detailed evidence for the judgment here expressed will be found.

many of the professor's colleagues. There is truly no end to the variety of wine that can be poured into the bottle.

#### IV

Tarn, in his own way, both reacted against the Romantic German view and at the same time adapted it to his own national and social tradition. The extreme of uncompromising reaction, however, came from R. Andreotti, a scholar who had a "first Alexander" of his own in his past : in 1933 he had published a little book<sup>1</sup> in which Alexander's greatness and achievement were compared to their disadvantage—in a tradition that went back to Livy and beyond—with those of Caesar, who had the inestimable advantage of *Romanità* on his side. A world war later there was no explicit recantation : we do not know what Andreotti's post-War views on Caesar were, and on that *synkrisis*. But the actual interpretation of Alexander (originally trivial) was developed into a powerfully argued minimalist view in a critical *Forschungsbericht* (1) and two articles, (2) and (3)<sup>2</sup>. They are difficult reading, but worth the effort, indeed essential.

The survey, while mainly reporting, already ventures on some suggestive comments, e.g. that administrative arrangements before Gaugamela must not be regarded as systematic (588 f.) ; that it was the necessarily increased use of Iranians for military purposes that brought about concessions to the Iranian aristocracy ; above all, that the ascription of idealistic motives "may sometimes appear abstract and superfluous" where "una fredda ed acuta considerazione della realtà contingente"

<sup>1</sup> *Il problema politico di Alessandro Magno* (Torino 1933).

<sup>2</sup> Now that F. SCHACHERMEYR, in his survey of Alexander scholarship ((3), 637 ff.), has accepted the term "minimalist", which I originally proposed for this interpretation, I feel justified in using it without quotation marks, as presumably recognised and understood.

will suffice (596). The final conclusion (599) was that the only clear profile is that of the soldier—a view that, on a strict interpretation of clarity, is both reasonable and persuasive, and that recurs in such a very different work—sane yet exciting—as Peter Green's (487 f.). After rejecting the idea that Alexander was responsible for the theory of the “unity of mankind”, by an examination of that theory in its historical and philosophical context (2), Andreotti finally (3), in an article of almost monograph length, followed “tradition” and “reality” through the whole of Alexander's career, systematically excluding all Romantic and most ideological explanations, ancient and modern, in favour of rational and immediate considerations, as called for in the earlier survey. In the extreme and outstanding instance, the “crisis at the Hyphasis” is ascribed to our rhetorical sources : in fact, Alexander, far from wanting to go on, was glad not to continue his march, for fear of becoming an instrument in the political struggles of Indian princes ; and the return via the Indus and Gedrosia was not due to any desire for conquest or exploration, not to mention heroic *mimesis*, but to the political “necessities” of avoiding the appearance of retreat and the risk of moving through areas where the Iranian contingents had connections and might become dangerous. For Andreotti, Alexander is a fully rational military and political planner at all times. If scholars have tried to make Alexander a visionary or a philosopher king, “so geht dies vielleicht auf das instinktive Bestreben zurück, die Leiden, das Blut und den Kampf von Millionen von Menschen durch die Gewissheit einer Idee aufzuwiegen”<sup>1</sup>.

Andreotti, among major writers on Alexander, is probably the one who has most escaped emotional involvement ; though the conclusion quoted may give a hint of where he stands. It is most instructive to compare *this* “rationality” with the impassioned hymn to a very different “reason” sung by K. Kraft.

<sup>1</sup> (3), 161 : conclusion.

Partial attempts at a minimalist interpretation had been seen before : Tarn's was one, in many ways, although it finally takes off into the thinnest air of Romanticism. On a small front, J.P.V.D. Balsdon, a scholar in the same tradition and of the same cast of mind as Tarn, had provided an exemplary minimalist treatment of the question of Alexander's deification<sup>1</sup>. But Andreotti's extension of it over the whole field is an outstanding *tour de force*. This extreme view provides a permanent standard of reference and a limit of interpretation. It will never again be possible for one who has read it (alas, as we have seen, not every scholar expounding views on Alexander has) to write Romantic fiction with a clear conscience, or to accept it from others without scrutiny. The trouble with Andreotti's interpretation, however, is that in the last analysis it is somewhat akin to philosophical rationalism<sup>2</sup>. Though it avoids "metaphysics", in the logical-positivist sense, it is not based on a principle of strict adherence to the best sources in each instance : it proceeds from an *a priori* view of Alexander's character (a man of truly "professorial deliberation", as Schachermeyr has beautifully said)<sup>3</sup>, to discard even the best attestation where it does not fit in with that view—as in the accounts of the Hyphasis or the march through Gedrosia. I am personally all in favour of one kind of minimalist position—the historian (as one unfortunately has to keep repeating) is not in the business of producing Romantic fiction or adolescent *Schwärmerei*. But we must surely find our basis of interpretation in the sources, critically evaluated, and not in our personal vision : Andreotti's method ultimately meets, as extremes so often do, the very method followed by the wild Romantics and the Alexandrolaters.

Among very recent works, it is perhaps J. R. Hamilton who has most closely practised a minimalism of this more desirable

<sup>1</sup> See Bibliography.

<sup>2</sup> Rather than (as I once thought : see *Phoenix* 28 (1974), 371) to logical positivism.

<sup>3</sup> (3), 640.

sort. Some of his reviewers have found his Alexander dull; but I suspect that this is due to the sober, balanced, academic and unrhetorical manner of presentation, rather than to the character, finally approaching megalomania, that is actually depicted. Though there is no one "correct" interpretation, this is at least a truly professional one, and we must take it seriously.

## V

In what we may call the "post-imperialist" age, Tarn's Alexander began to look like a mere historical curiosity, while younger scholars searched for methods and interpretations appropriate to their own age. As far as general interpretation is concerned—if I may speak with all the caution requisite in one still so close to what he is discussing—there was a general revulsion (actually, traceable well beyond Alexander scholarship) against "charismatic" leaders and the price paid for their ambitions, and (perhaps for the first time) an attempt to write the history of Alexander with proper regard for the point of view of the victims as well as that of the victor.

Public attacks on Tarn's overpowering position in the English-speaking world were slow in coming, since difficult to make acceptable to the academic Establishment. When they came, they necessarily and rightly first concentrated on the scholarly underpinning. Hamilton and I, among others, in various detailed investigations, exposed some of Tarn's emotionally based methods of dealing with the sources<sup>1</sup>. One of my own early attacks concentrated on Tarn's final vision of "Alexander the Dreamer" of the unity of mankind<sup>2</sup>. Written before I saw Andreotti's quite differently conceived treatment, it followed Tarn's argument step by step, showing its basic

<sup>1</sup> It is not necessary for me to give full references here. They will be found in my *Forschungsbericht* (see Bibliography).

<sup>2</sup> In *Historia* 7 (1958), 425 ff.

unsoundness in almost every detail of logic, source analysis and understanding of Greek. One would have hoped that this job of painstaking demolition would not have to be done again : in some ways it is already becoming hard to realise how necessary it seemed at the time. But as Stier's case has recently shown, those who will not read cannot be convinced, and for some of them Alexander the Dreamer will remain a psychologically based reality.

## VI

The main problem in any serious interpretation of Alexander is, of course, that of the sources. It is well known that they are mostly late and literary, all in themselves unsatisfactory as historians, and that two strands of tradition tend to be represented in them : a court tradition fairly reliable (though selective) in its facts, but conceived as *apologia*<sup>1</sup>, and a tradition reasonably free from consistent bias, but contaminated with romance. Neither can mechanically be used to correct the other, as A. B. Bosworth has again made clear to us ; and it has always been the principal error of Alexandrolatry of various kinds that it has presented the apologetic version as the sole vehicle of truth, in content and even in omission. There is no easy answer. I myself tried to construct a method that aimed (as far as seemed possible) at neutralising faults of the primary sources and making use of their merits : it was to collect actual facts reported in the apologetic tradition and rearrange them in patterns not intended by the sources transmitting them, then to add facts that fitted into the pattern from the other ("Vulgata") tradition, where their omission in the apologetic sources could be adequately explained by *apologia*. This was the theoretical framework that I used, in particular, in disengaging some

<sup>1</sup> I use the word in its widest sense, to include both *xolaxelia* (or *pietas*) towards Alexander and a variety of possible personal and political interests on the part of the authors.

of the political background of Alexander's murderous and intrigue-ridden court : on that, indeed, we have an amount of reasonably reliable information that constantly surprises those who limit their investigations to uncritical reading of Arrian or Tarn<sup>1</sup>. Naturally, judgment and conjecture must be employed, as in every historical investigation, and later work has often revised the details ; but the method, I think, has not been invalidated, and those of my colleagues who have understood it have, on the whole, accepted and developed it and practised it themselves. It is to be hoped that sources altogether outside the literary tradition will in due course come to serve as a check, as they have (e.g.) for Classical Greece and Imperial Rome. So far, unfortunately, there has been no major contribution of this sort.

As far as Alexander's character is concerned, I have refrained from attempting an overall and all-embracing interpretation, in the sense of that advanced by the various schools of Romantics and Rationalists. This is because it has always seemed to me that the very attempt is worthless. What I tried to do was to pick out individual strands and *motifs* that had been ignored by those interminably rehashing "The Main Problems", like world conquest, or *Verschmelzung*, or the unity of mankind—with the result that they were forced into constructing ever more simplified models. Thus I followed a strand of insecurity and suspicion, not unjustified in the climate of the court at which Alexander grew up and which he took with him ; and I found that power as such never provided a cure for it, but by the isolation with which power surrounded its holder, tended to aggravate it into something close to paranoia<sup>2</sup>. I have also consistently tried (with the "Rationalists") to trace a strain of pragmatism in Alexander's practice, military, administrative,

<sup>1</sup> The method was paradigmatically displayed in *CQ* 8 (1958), 144 ff., and used on a much larger scale in *JHS* 81 (1961), 16 ff.

<sup>2</sup> See my *Studies in Greek and Roman History* (Oxford 1964), 192 ff.

political and (if you will) propagandist : at least one of the secrets of his success was surely that he took full advantage of situations as he found them,  $\alpha\gamma\tauοσχεδιάζων$  τὰ δέοντα ; and his few failures (the Hyphasis, Gedrosia, perhaps *proskynesis*, spring to mind) are chiefly due to his surrender to what one might call “ideological” motives—aims due to dreams or ambitions not practically related to the actual situation. The characteristic pattern of careful general planning, followed by the bold and ruthless stroke precisely when the opportunity offered ; and the ability to see that opportunity perhaps better than anyone else in history ever has—this turns out to be as distinctive in his political actions (say, against Philotas and Parmenio) as in his campaigns and battles. I am well content if I have helped to isolate some of these traits relevant to his success and failure, to strip some of the mythology from him, to show him actually at work, as a soldier, administrator and politician. If I have helped to set him into a line with other great conquerors, successful or finally defeated—Caesar, Napoleon, Hitler—whose methods and (to some extent) aims are better attested, this is because the species is well known in human history ; and although individuals always have their individual traits, specific features may surely be legitimately disengaged, and usefully noted by the historian. Response to this approach has constantly made it clear how shocked the Romantic in search of a hero is by it ; but then, the historian has little in common with him in any case, and it is the peculiar curse of Alexander scholarship that he has been so strongly entrenched in it.

It is fitting to conclude with Schachermeyr’s “third Alexander”—the work of 1973, subtitled “The problem of his personality and his achievement”. The basic features have survived : the Titanic figure, immense yet flawed ; perhaps no longer thought of as beyond human judgment, but certainly beyond human sympathy, even beyond full understanding. Schachermeyr, reaching a truly patriarchal age, had learnt from all of his colleagues, and in our much more complex world his

Alexander is now the most subtle and varied and (rightly) self-contradictory of the principal interpretations. It is characteristic of the naïveté common in this corner of historiography that some reviewers have actually complained of the contradictions.

## VII

But let me now come to my final and perhaps principal point. I would suggest that it is time to declare a moratorium on comprehensive books and on all-embracing interpretations. We have had too many brews in Heuss's bottle. There is real work to be done. As in other cases we know (e.g. Herodotus), it is easier and more pleasant to write another book embodying a private vision than to do the actual scholarly work that may make a general interpretation more valid. It is perhaps noteworthy that French scholarship has not produced a major interpretation of Alexander since the rather trivial one of G. Radet. French scholars have been busy piling up the leading record in actual historical investigation in the field of Hellenistic history.

Detailed problems as well as general questions in the interpretation of the sources for Alexander and of the actual events certainly remain<sup>1</sup>. It is almost incredible that Arrian, our main source, is only now beginning to receive competent and significant treatment as an author in his social and cultural

<sup>1</sup> It must not be forgotten that German scholars of the 19th and 20th centuries laid much of the foundation of detailed study on which our work is still based. Their general interpretation of Alexander, however, often distorted their findings, especially in the realm of *Quellenforschung*, and the actual methods and criteria of what one might call the great Romantics of *Quellenforschung* often appear unsatisfactory today.

milieu, rather than as a mere source for history<sup>1</sup>. We have only recently had the first proper commentary on Plutarch's *Life*<sup>2</sup>. Curtius and Diodorus are still practically untreated, and comments on them tend to be either limited or highly arbitrary<sup>3</sup>. The coins have yet to make their proper contribution (it is a pity that M. G. Le Rider is not here to expound on this); and archaeological investigation in most of the countries through which Alexander passed, from Turkey to India (not to mention the vast regions in between), is in its infancy. Historians, and human beings, are what they are, and there will inevitably be more grandiloquence and verbosity, more straining after trivial and inappropriate originality. We have already had threats of psychohistory—which, whatever its (debatable) merits in other situations, is surely the height of absurdity where the sources are as we have them in this instance. But alongside all this, which will come and go and be forgotten, the basic work must continue, until—perhaps many years hence—the time will be ripe for a really new synthesis. We cannot guess what it will look like, but we can be sure that, on a much more solid basis than we yet have, it will still be closely connected with the state of the world as a whole, and of the interpreter's society in particular, as they will be at the time. If all history is (inevitably) contemporary history, as R. G. Collingwood recognised, the history of Alexander seems always to be more so than any other.

<sup>1</sup> Chiefly in various studies by A. B. Bosworth; cf. also G. WIRTH, in *Historia* 13 (1964), 209 ff. Much of this is in the context of a general revival of interest in the Second Sophistic: cf. G. W. BOWERSOCK's editorial Introduction to *Approaches to the Second Sophistic* (University Park, Pa. 1974). For an interesting attempt at "historische Ortsbestimmung", see G. WIRTH, "Arrian und Trajan", in *StudClas* 16 (1974), 169 ff.

<sup>2</sup> J. R. HAMILTON, *Plutarch Alexander. A Commentary* (Oxford 1969).

<sup>3</sup> The continuing debate on the date of Curtius' life and work is, on the whole, best forgotten. Serious studies of Curtius as an author, such as that by W. RURZ, in *Hermes* 93 (1965), 370 ff., are all too rare. There is no 20th-century commentary on either author, none at all on Diodorus.

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\* F. SCHACHERMEYR (3), chapters 14 and 15) gives a long critical survey of changing interpretations of Alexander, P. GREEN (482 ff.) a short and penetrating sketch in his usual incisive style.

A. DEMANDT, "Politische Aspekte im Alexanderbild der Neuzeit", in *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* 54 (1972), 325 ff., gives a detailed survey of the period up to the Second World War (which I have briefly sketched in as "prehistory" in this paper), followed by a "kurzen Ausblick" (pp. 355-7) past 1945. He analyses each major scholar, starting with Niebuhr and Droysen, in detail, against the political and philosophical background of his work, with some help (at times) from biography. He concentrates on the various interpretations (interesting in view of nationalist, later turning into National Socialist, race theories) of Alexander's policy towards Orientals, and on historical "identification" with a man or a people. Among many illuminating observations, perhaps his most interesting is his brief summary (pp. 335-6) of the transformation of ruler-worshipping interpretations over the ages in the light of the current *Herrscherrideal*. A "systematische Zusammenfassung" (pp. 357 ff.) tries to set out categories for the analysis of interpretations of Alexander and (rather speculatively) for their propagandist use. Despite occasional reference to work in English and a shrewd comment on Clemenceau's *Démosthène* (pp. 337 f.), the article deals mainly with the development of German interpretations up to 1939<sup>1</sup> and is the best discussion of this subject at present available.

For a critical survey of work on Alexander over twenty-one years, see *CW* 65 (1971), 37 ff., 77 ff.

My own contributions to Alexander scholarship are about to appear in a German translation to be published by Teubner (Stuttgart).

<sup>1</sup> My comments (p. 290 above) on scholars "whose reading is mostly confined to their own language" is surprisingly illustrated by Demandt's statement (p. 360) that Tarn "noch 1968 betont ...", at a time when that author had long been dead. Inspection of footnotes reveals that this is the date of the German translation used by Demandt.

## DISCUSSION

*M. van Berchem* : M. Badian vient de nous tenir en haleine, en évoquant, dans un exposé lumineux, mordant parfois, toujours spirituel, les images d'Alexandre données successivement depuis Droysen. On regrettera que le doyen de ce colloque, le professeur Schachermeyr, obligé, pour des raisons de famille impérieuses, de regagner Vienne, ne soit plus là pour lui donner la réplique. Mais si je me réfère aux chapitres XIV et XV de son dernier ouvrage, je crois qu'avec l'ouverture d'esprit et la sérénité que nous avons admirées en lui, il aurait assez largement souscrit aux vues de M. Badian. Il était bon que fût illustrée, au terme de ces entretiens, la place prépondérante qu'a prise, dans les préoccupations des historiens, le problème de la personnalité d'Alexandre. En cela, ils sont restés dans la ligne des historiens antiques, attachés davantage à la peinture des caractères qu'à l'analyse des faits. Or si l'action d'Alexandre a profondément modifié l'aspect du monde méditerranéen, les mobiles de cette action continuent de nous intriguer. Je me rallie volontiers au vœu de M. Badian quand il demande que l'accent de la recherche se porte pour un temps sur une nouvelle appréciation des sources existantes et sur un élargissement de nos moyens de connaissance. Il a justement souligné l'importance des informations que nous sommes en droit d'attendre des numismates. Il me semble en outre que si la Grèce et la Macédoine au temps d'Alexandre ont fait l'objet d'études assez poussées, il n'en va pas de même de toutes les régions d'Asie et d'Afrique affectées par sa conquête. Un nouvel examen, par exemple, des conditions de vie des cités grecques d'Asie Mineure, de l'état de culture des royaumes ou des principautés de Chypre et de Syro-Phénicie, faciliterait peut-être l'intelligence du comportement d'Alexandre et de la réaction des peuples subjugués par lui.

*M. Wirth* : Der brillanten Darstellung der Dinge Herrn Badians hätte ich gerne einen ergänzenden Gedanken zugefügt, dies von einer gleichsam deutschen Perspektive aus.

Alexander in Rezeption und Deutung als Medium des Geistesgeschichte des 19. und 20. Jhdts. wäre ein dankbares, bisher kaum gebührend beachtetes Forschungsobjekt : Anlass und Ursache ergäbe dabei für Zeitsituation wie Biographie einzelner Forscher neue Möglichkeiten eines Verständnisses. So ist für den jungen Droysen etwa neben der Zeitsituation der späten Romantik als Anlass und Anstoss das Napoleon erlebnis wichtig ; gerade das weitere Lebensschicksal Droysens selbst liesse sich von hier aus gleichsam als natürliche Konsequenz solchen Jugenderlebens und Bekenntnisses verstehen.

So scheint denn auch für die Generationen nach ihm die Alexander-Geschichte als spektakulärster Abschnitt der alten Geschichte schlechthin nicht weniger von der eigenen Zeit einzelner Historiker bestimmt und, gleichsam Mittel ihrer Verarbeitung, als solche vielleicht am ehesten verständlich. Ich möchte meinen, die Bismarcksche Reichsgründung übe gerade hier etwas aus, was sich schwer mit Worten umreissen und wohl kaum immer als direkte Kausalität nachvollziehen lässt, indes wohl — man verzeihe mir falsche Plazierung und vielleicht Missverständnis des Terms — mit “Prussian Imperialism” nicht erschöpfend zu umschreiben ist. Aufgabe und Zielsetzung deutscher Universitäten im 19. Jhd., an denen und für die die einschlägigen Zeugnisse entstanden, die im Referat so treffend umrissen werden, erklären wohl vieles. Im Gegensatz etwa zu den verschiedenen Epochen der griechischen und römischen Geschichte hat es seit Droysen gerade für diesen Zeitraum etwa nennenswerten Zuwachs des Interpretationsmaterials kaum gegeben, so dass Forschung sich umso mehr als zur Deutung berechtigt fühlen möchte. Kurz, was diese Epoche kennzeichnet, scheint die immense Arbeit der Fundierung philologisch-antiquarischer Voraussetzung (Ed. Schwartz, F. Jacoby), anderseits aber auch das persönliche, zeitgeschichtliche Engagement einzelner Forscher, das deren wissenschaftliche Objektivität im Untergrunde mitbestimmt (e.g. Ed. Meyer, K. J. Beloch, auch Ed. Schwartz). Der erste Weltkrieg bedeutet Bruch von unabsehbarer Folge ; das Aufkommen etwa der biologistischen Betrachtungsweise — längst vorbereitet durch Darwin, sich von ihm

ableitende Pseudodarwinismen und die gängige philosophische und pseudophilosophische Geschichtsdeutung des späten 19. Jhdts. — erklärt sich als Suchen nach neuen, wohl auch wirksamen Verständnismöglichkeiten. Hieraus resultierende Betonung und Überstrapazierung der Rassenproblematik ist wie für die gesamte Alte auch für die Alexandergeschichte nicht hinwegzuleugnen: Ich glaube nicht, dass ihre Bedeutung und auch keineswegs die aus ihr sich entwickelnde, nur als weitere Trivialisierung selbst Zeitgenossen begreifbare nationalsozialistische Ideologie allein es war, die in diesen Dingen nunmehr den Ausschlag gab. Ähnliches müssen wir selbst für Persönlichkeitsdeutung und Geniebild, die andere Komponente des Gesamtbildes, annehmen, für die ja Herr Badian einen recht drastischen Conspectus aufzeigt: Mythifizierung als Versuch, die Folgen erwähnter Enttäuschung zu überwinden, ist nicht allein für Alexander nachzuweisen. Sie charakterisiert m.E. weitgehend die ganze Geschichtswissenschaft der Zeit zwischen 1914 und 1945.

Die Vulgarisierung der Inhalte einer geistesgeschichtlichen Entwicklungsstufe durch die bekannten politischen Zeitströmungen mit den bei ihrer Inauguration ins Auge gefassten katastrophalen Konsequenzen scheint mir weniger Wechselwirkung als unglückseliges Verhängnis. Man wird sorgfältig und äusserst behutsam nach Kriterien und Hintergründen zu suchen haben: Wie die Forschung von der Woge unfassbarer politischer Entwicklung überrollt wurde, lässt sich an einer ganzen Reihe wirklich tragischer Forscherschicksale nicht zuletzt in unserem Bereich beweisen. Auf der anderen Seite schrieb mir Sir W. W. Tarn zu Anfang der fünfziger Jahre, er habe die Arbeit an der Vertiefung *seines* Alexanderbildes immer als einen Protest gegen die wachsende Brutalisierung seines Zeitalters gesehen. Dies macht m.E. einiges begreiflich von dem, was hier in anderem Zusammenhang kritisch gesehen werden müsstet.

Mir scheint, das Trauma dieses Erlebnisses sei bis auf den Tag noch nicht völlig überwunden. Für das Alexanderproblem bedeuten Neuerkenntnisse — gerade bezüglich etwa für die Fragen nach Rasse, Rassenpolitik, Kultur, Stammes- und Staatsbildung, Lebensformen Ansatzpunkt der Korrektur: Bezuglich des Problems der Persönlich-

keit als historisch wirksamer Kraft ist, besonders in Arbeiten auf kleinerem Raum, Unsicherheit und gewisse Hilflosigkeit immer noch zu erkennbar. Allgemeines Ergebnis ist denn wohl auch die von F. Schachermeyr apostrophierte minimalistische Alexanderdeutung, die die Forschung unserer Tage so sehr bestimmt. In ihrer Weise von den Perspektiven mitgeformt, die das 20. Jhd. leider lehrte, sind denn m.E. auch die Ansätze der Arbeiten Herrn Badians selbst.

Ich möchte nicht glauben, dass sich, auf solchen Perspektiven der Deutung aufbauend, Ansätze einer Versachlichung abzeichnen, die gefördert von anderer Seite durch neues Verhältnis zu Quellen und Überlieferung, weiter führt. Sich soeben abzeichnende, wünschenswerte epigraphische und besonders numismatische Neuerkenntnisse bleiben abzuwarten. Nahe liegt, dass die damit bedingte Komplizierung nunmehr ein Auseinanderklaffen von Forschung und Deutung bedingt — bezeichnenderweise wehrt sich Herr Badian gegen ein eigenes Alexanderbild. Und sicher hätte die Alexanderforschung, jetzt weltweit geworden, ein Moratorium nötig, die erwähnten Neuansätze weiter auszubauen. Indes, was seit einigen Jahren den Büchermarkt kennzeichnet, scheint ein wachsendes Interesse gerade am Phänomen Alexander. Sollte dies nicht erneut der Reflex einer diesmal weltpolitischen und geistesgeschichtlich zu verstehenden Situation sein, die erneut denn auch verstärkt nach Deutung verlangt? Man möchte uns allen von Herzen wünschen, dass sich Herrn Badians Hoffnungen erfüllen.

*M. Badian*: I very much welcome Mr. Wirth's striking development of some of the points in my paper, particularly about German scholarship against the background of *Zeitgeschichte*. Naturally, the paper had to sacrifice refinement of detail to clarity of outline, in its treatment of German scholars as in that of (e.g.) Tarn. Racial theories were certainly by no means confined to Germany, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. We know names like H. S. Chamberlain (himself with strong German sympathies and intellectual roots) and J. Gobineau, and the history of the French

Right in its influence on certain currents of thought and political events in France. But, of course, all this flowed into the stream of National Socialist theory, with the theoretical contradictions not even reconciled, but with the practical consequences we all know. It would be paradoxical to maintain that the works of German scholars, embodying, preaching and applying such theories, which appeared under Nazi rule, were the outcome of an independent and parallel European development. As for "Prussian Imperialism", no one would ever dream of describing any historical current — in fact, hardly even any concrete political event — "exhaustively" in those terms. But there is little doubt that the arrogant romantic nationalism of German intellectuals found its symbol in the Prussian monarchy, and Droysen (however complex his personal background, what with Fr. Hegel, the Lutheran Church, even—as we have been reminded—Napoleon) is a particularly clear example of this, which happens to be a particularly important one for our subject. Nor can there be any serious doubt that the intellectuals in that tradition, desperately fighting against the trauma of admitting error (let alone guilt), turned to National Socialism as their new ideal with fairly wide acceptance and even enthusiasm. The splendid German record of scholarship in what one might call its antiquarian aspects is duly praised in my Notes, but it must not blind us to the wider aspects that formed the subject of my paper. Needless to say (and as I insisted), I regard all of this merely as a matter for serious historical enquiry, not as an instrument for facile moral condemnation.

*M. Spoerri*: Herr Wirth hat noch einmal darauf hingewiesen, wie sehr das jeweilige Alexanderbild von der zeitgenössischen Geschichte geprägt wurde. Ein anderes, sehr instruktives Beispiel, auf das gerade in diesem Zusammenhang verwiesen werden darf, sind die verschiedenen, widersprüchlichen Demosthenesbilder, die das 19. und das 20. Jhd. hervorgebracht hat. In der Demosthenesdeutung spiegeln sich immer wieder, mehr oder weniger stark, zeitgenössische politische Erfahrungen und Wünsche wieder.

*M. Schwarzenberg*: Die Gestalt an der sich der Wandel der Interpretation am besten ablesen lässt, ist Sokrates, wohl deshalb, weil wir so gut wie nichts über ihn wissen. Nichts hat die Philosophen und die Gelehrten daran gehindert, sich und ihre Zeit in ihm zu spiegeln. Dieses γνῶθι σαυτόν ist das nicht beabsichtigte aber auch nicht unerwünschte Ergebnis der sokratischen Lehre ; deswegen hat der Meister nichts Schriftliches hinterlassen.

*M. Milns*: Mr. Badian has demonstrated very clearly how historians in the 19th and 20th centuries have been influenced in their interpretations of Alexander by their own experience and their own hopes and aspirations. This, I believe, could be regarded as an indictment of these historians. For, though it may be the task and duty of the historian to isolate the facts and to interpret them, it is also his duty to do so from as objective a standpoint as possible ; and to be ever on his guard against allowing his interpretations to be influenced by the attitudes that have been built into him by his own society and times. He must strive, on the basis of the evidence, to project his mind back to the times he is describing ; and this so many modern writers have not done. In their hands Alexander has become an object for artistic creativity, as we can see from the expressions we use about the different writers : we talk of "das Alexanderbild" of so and so, of a "portrait", a "picture" of Alexander—terms which are more appropriate to the writer of creative fiction than to the historian. In what ways does the Alexander of the historical novels of Mary Renault differ from the creations of such scholars as Droysen or Tarn, if these scholars twist, distort and interpret the ancient evidence to fit their own preconceived—and desired—view of the man?

*M. van Berchem*: Il est naturel que chaque génération repense l'histoire des siècles écoulés à la lumière des expériences qu'elle fait. Ce phénomène n'a toutefois pas que des effets négatifs. Ainsi, par exemple, le développement récent de l'histoire économique s'expli-

que-t-il par une réflexion plus poussée sur l'importance des conditions matérielles de la vie.

*M. Errington:* I should like to express my agreement with M. van Berchem, and would like additionally to point out that classical studies in modern times, from the Renaissance on, have usually justified their existence by offering positive values for the societies in which they have been carried out. The interrelationship between classical studies and contemporary experience is thus not something unique to historians of the 19th and 20th centuries, but has been an immanent factor in classical studies from their beginning. If the connection between study and society is lost, history degenerates to arid antiquarianism.

*M. Bosworth:* Perhaps we may draw a distinction between biographies of Alexander in the strict sense and more general histories in which the reign of Alexander is part of the whole and the figure of the king is not central. Mr. Badian has brought up the example of Beloch, whose picture of the king is peculiarly colourless. Partly this is due to his reaction against the literary *proskynesis* of Droysen and Kaerst, but also, I think, Beloch was more remote from the figure of Alexander and treated the evidence in a more detached manner. The same type of portraiture emerges from the work of George Grote, who certainly wrote from the standpoint of his age and was repelled by Alexander whom he considered the destroyer of most of what was admirable in Greek city culture. Nevertheless the portrait of Alexander is as colourless as that of Beloch. The general histories, I think, are closer to the texts and preserve the contradictions inherent in the extant sources. As Mr. Schachermeyr repeatedly pointed out to us, a coherent and consistent interpretation of Alexander must necessarily depart from the texts and either explain away or ignore some of the essential evidence. If we remain with the texts, there are necessarily contradictions, and, as Mr. Badian has well emphasized, contradictions are inherent in any valid history of the reign. The more precise our questions, the closer our focus

on the sources, the more remote the figure of Alexander himself becomes. In this case the closer we come to reality, the more blurred and confused the image becomes.

*M. Schwarzenberg*: Es wird oft von Droysen behauptet, er sei der Begründer einer "modernen" Alexanderforschung, ähnlich wie J. J. Winckelmann als dem Vater der Archäologie gehuldigt wird. Herr Bosworth hat G. de Sainte-Croix erwähnt. J. C. Freinsheim nimmt für das 17. Jhd. eine ähnliche Bedeutung ein.

Man hat sich in den 16.-18. Jhdten weniger für die Eroberungen und Leistungen Alexanders als für seine Person, für den  $\beta\lambda\sigma$ , für das Porträt interessiert. Weil die Gelehrten noch Renaissance-Menschen waren, weil das Spezialisieren innerhalb der Altertumskunde unbekannt war, waren sie vielleicht besser in der Lage, Alexander zu verstehen.

*M. Wirth*: Man wird zwischen Renaissance und Droysen vielleicht doch den Werdegang der Altertumsgeschichte ein wenig mehr differenzieren müssen. Freinsheims Curtiusergänzungen sind im wesentlichen Rekapitulation anderer, allgemein bekannter Quellen; ähnliches gilt für die Historiographie. Die Aspekte Winckelmanns zu untersuchen lohnte sich sicher, einen Einfluss auf die von ihm beeinflussten Vertreter des zweiten Humanismus vermag ich bezüglich ihres Alexanderbildes nicht zu erkennen. Für das 17. und 18. Jhd. scheint das plutarchische Bild bestimmd; dies wird aus der Begründung der Historie als vorwiegend moralisches Exempel zu verstehen sein.

*M. Badian*: We might well at this point glance at B. G. Niebuhr's definition of the two poles between which the historian has to move and the extremes he must avoid. First, there is "confusion with the present", characteristic (according to him) of the Middle Ages: "In Dante's eyes, Vergil was a Lombard". At the other extreme there is "pedantry, that yawning chasm, where (the scholar) would be buried in dust and dead leaves as soon as he took a false step". It is still the mark of the historian to avoid both.



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- XIII (1967) LES ORIGINES DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE ROMAINE *par Andreas ALFÖLDI — Frank E. BROWN — Emilio GABBA — Einar GIERSTAD — Krister HANELL — Jacques HEURGON — Arnaldo MOMIGLIANO — P. J. RIIS — Franz WIEACKER, avec la participation de Denis van BERCHEM et J.-H. WASZINK.*
- XIV (1969) L'ÉPIGRAMME GRECQUE *par A. E. RAUBITSCHEK — Bruno GENTILI — Giuseppe GIANGRANDE — Louis ROBERT — Walther LUDWIG — Jules LABARBE — Georg LUCK, avec la participation de Albrecht DIHLE et Gerhard PFOHL.*
- XV (1970) LUCAIN *par Berthe MARTI — Pierre GRIMAL — F. L. BASTET — Henri LE BONNIEC — Otto Steen DUE — Werner RUTZ — Michael von ALBRECHT. Entretiens préparés et présidés par Marcel DURRY.*
- XVI (1970) MÉNANDRE *par E. W. HANDLEY — Walther LUDWIG — F. H. SANDBACH — Fritz WEHRLI — Christina DEDOUSSI — Cesare QUESTA — Lilly KAHIL. Entretiens préparés et présidés par E. G. TURNER.*
- XVII (1972) ENNIUS *par Otto SKUTSCH — H. D. JOCELYN — J.-H. WASZINK — E. BADIAN — Jürgen UNTERMANN — Peter WÜLFING von MARTITZ — Werner SUERBAUM. Entretiens préparés et présidés par Otto SKUTSCH.*
- XVIII (1972) PSEUDEPIGRAPHA I *par Ronald SYME — Walter BURKERT — Holger THESLEFF — Norman GULLEY — G. J. D. AALDERS — Morton SMITH — Martin HENGEL — Wolfgang SPEYER. Entretiens préparés et présidés par Kurt von FRITZ.*
- XIX (1973) LE CULTE DES SOUVERAINS DANS L'EMPIRE ROMAIN *par E. BICKERMAN — Chr. HABICHT — J. BEAUEU — F. S. B. MILLAR — G. W. BOWERSOCK — K. THRAEDE — S. CALDERONE. Entretiens préparés et présidés par Willem den BOER.*
- XX (1974) POLYBE *par F. W. WALBANK — Paul PéDECH — Hatto H. SCHMITT — Domenico MUSTI — Gustav Adolf LEHMANN — Claude NICOLET — Eric W. MARSDEN — François PASCHOUD — Arnaldo MOMIGLIANO. Entretiens préparés et présidés par Emilio GABBA.*
- XXI (1975) DE JAMBlique A PROCLUS *par Werner BEIERWALTES — Henry J. BLUMENTHAL — Bend DALSGAARD LARSEN — Edouard des PLACES — Heinrich DÖRRIE — John M. RIST — Jean TROUILLARD — John WHITTAKER — R. E. WITT. Entretiens préparés et présidés par Heinrich DÖRRIE.*
- XXII (1976) ALEXANDRE LE GRAND, IMAGE ET RÉALITÉ *par E. BADIAN — A. B. BOSWORTH — R. M. ERRINGTON — R. D. MILNS — Fritz SCHACHERMEYR — Erkinger SCHWARZENBERG — Gerhard WIRTH. Entretiens préparés par E. BADIAN et présidés par Denis van BERCHEM.*
- XXIII (A paraître en 1977) CHRISTIANISME ET FORMES LITTÉRAIRES DE L'ANTIQUITÉ TARDIVE EN OCCIDENT *par Alan CAMERON — Yves-Marie DUVAL — Jacques FONTAINE — Manfred FUHRMANN — Reinhart HERZOG — Walther LUDWIG — P. G. van der NAT — Peter L. SCHMIDT. Entretiens préparés et présidés par Manfred FUHRMANN.*
- XXIV (A paraître en 1978) LUCRÈCE *par L. ALFONSI — D. FURLEY — Olof GIGON — Pierre GRIMAL — Knut KLEVE — Gerhard MÜLLER — Wolfgang SCHMID — P. H. SCHRIJVERS. Entretiens préparés par Olof GIGON.*